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
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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,
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AMERICAN BIBLICAL REPOSITORY.

COMBINED SERIES.—No. I.

ART. I.—COLLEGIATE EDUCATION—MATHEMATICAL
AND CLASSICAL STUDY.

BY B. B. EDWARDS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

THE subject of collegiate education in the United States is intimately related to the prosperity of Theological Seminaries and to the usefulness of the Christian ministry. Hence we have opened our pages, not unfrequently, to classical criticism, and to topics of a more general nature, bearing on the studies, libraries, revenues, &c., of the colleges of our country. The seminaries are fed from the colleges. If the latter are flourishing, the former will not be likely to languish. If pursuits of a commercial, mechanical or business character, present irresistible attractions to the select youth of our land, then not only will the college hall be vacant, but the churches will mourn, and heathen lands continue to sit in darkness, because none will come to them with the messages of truth.

The basis of theological training, in all the departments, is an adequate knowledge of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. A system of divinity has value just in proportion as it is founded on the grammatical interpretation of biblical texts. Beautiful dogmatic systems have often been formed by the adoption of the current explanations of the proof passages, without subjecting them to a sifting examination, by detaching a verse from its context, by building on mere verbal resemblances, or by framing the materials independently of biblical truth, recourse being had to the written revelation in order to save appearances, or as a kind of buttress to the walls. A thorough, life-long, grammatical study of the original Scriptures, pursued in the Seminary, is essential for all who would be able theo-

logians, or who would magnify their office as expounders of Divine truth. But this study will not be prosecuted with energy unless a foundation is laid in the college. It is the accurate classical scholar who will become the able biblical interpreter. He only who is grounded in Demosthenes and Tacitus, will be likely to relish the words of Paul and Isaiah, as they are found in their original source. There is an universal grammar. The principles of all languages are to a great extent alike. He who has mastered any single language, has the best preparation to commence any other. He who has come to the classic page in college as a task, who does not find a kind of going out of the heart to those old masters of thought and speech, will be likely to sell his Hebrew Lexicon at the earliest opportunity, and content himself with King James's version. Hence, the systematic, patient, genial study of Latin and Greek in the colleges, is of unspeakable value in its bearings on theological study, and on the success of the Christian ministry. Hence the reason why so many clergymen fail to become skilful interpreters of Divine truth. Their preparation in Greek and Latin was superficial.

Again, the successful study of systematic theology requires a disciplined mind, the power of tracing effects to a cause, of making nice discriminations, of concentrating attention upon a single object, of combining truth into a system, of marking the relations of a vast system of truth, of detecting the most latent and specious sophisms. No one can make rapid or satisfactory progress in the studies of natural and revealed theology without a disciplined understanding. Truth is one and simple, but it is capable of logical analysis, of a development strictly scientific, and of an orderly and beautiful arrangement. But this stern discipline is ordinarily acquired in college. It is the fruit, in a great degree, of severe mathematical study. The pursuit of mathematics and of the related branches of natural philosophy fit the mind for patient attention, for severe and continuous thought, and give it that sharpness and delicacy of edge, which, in unison with the culture acquired by other studies, are an excellent preparation for the pursuits of theology. Hence it is of pre-eminent importance that the abstract and exact sciences should occupy a prominent place in the college course. Any diminution of interest in this class of studies will operate with prejudicial effect on the whole professional life, and on the entire course of the Christian ministry. Loose and vagrant habits, an inability to concentrate all the powers of the mind, the want of clear statement and accurate analysis in sermons, are a legitimate effect of a superficial mathematical training.

The same remarks are applicable to taste, and to skill in

written compositions. The ability to hold the pen of a ready writer is not acquired in a day. Habits of accurate composition are the slow growth of time. The power of wisely selecting a topic, of protracted meditation upon it, of a logical arrangement of its parts, of calling up from a well-stored mind apposite illustrations, and of a tasteful and impressive exhibition of it in language, is rather an acquisition than a gift. It is the product of long months of hardy discipline. It is the result of many a painful process. Though a secure and a precious possession, it is hard-earned. The foundations of a correct taste and of a practised style are commonly laid in college. The theological student carries forward and perfects the discipline. The seed is sown in the early collegiate training which bears its precious fruits in the pulpit and the lecture-room. The elements of good writing, and sometimes its most beautiful and finished forms, are obvious in the commencement exercise of the graduate. In such cases, we may confidently predict a successful professional career.

Equally close and important are the moral relations of the college and the seminary. If the standard of moral excellence in the former be high, a healthful influence will pervade the latter. If the college course is marked by ennobling aims, by a lofty morality, by a sincere piety, then the professional school will be elevated into a serener atmosphere, the ethics which are there taught will find a more welcome home, the Christianity which is professed and preached within its walls will shine out with more of its native splendour, and the churches in distant years will rejoice in the benigner influences. Thus in an important sense the theological course will be extended, not over three years merely, but over a decennium. While the student is acquiring the general principles of science, he is studying them with a truly theological spirit. The college becomes the nursery of an elevated morality, of a holy living, and of all generous aims, eminently qualifying for studies which are exclusively sacred.

Such being the intimate, reciprocal relationships of the college and the theological institution, we may well consider often, and at length, the condition and the wants of the colleges. It is well worth our while to watch closely their development, and the changes which are proposed in their organization and in their course of studies. We rejoice in their prosperity, as we do in that of the churches or of the country. The destiny of all is bound up together.

Peculiar weight is added to these considerations from the fact of the rapid, but not unfrequently injudicious, multiplication of these institutions. Our widening country is dotted with them.

Their existence dates with that of each State, almost with that of the territorial government. Hence the subject is one of paramount importance, and its discussion in our pages needs no apology.

We propose to consider briefly in the following pages the nature of our collegiate system, what should be its aims, and how its highest efficiency may be secured. If we shall deal somewhat in the language of censure, or dwell somewhat on the deficiencies of the present system, it will not be in an unkindly spirit, or with any want of appreciation of the signal benefits which the collegiate institutions have conferred on the country for more than two hundred years. What then is needed to secure the highest usefulness of our colleges?

1. Every reasonable effort should be put forth to improve and perfect the academies and preparatory schools. Too much pains can hardly be expended in sustaining and protecting their growth. They lie at the foundation of our entire system of higher education. A defect here extends through all the following stages. Bad or good habits are here formed and strengthened. A direction is generally given which determines the destiny for ever. Every considerate friend of collegiate and professional education can hardly fail to put forth a helping hand in sustaining and encouraging these schools.

There are indeed several academies and classical schools, scattered throughout New England, that are making laudable efforts to elevate the standard of preparatory discipline, and that send forth students excellently fitted for the higher institution. But they are few and far between. The majority of our college students are not trained within their walls. In one respect the effect of our present arrangements is injurious. Those members of a college class who have been well trained at the academy are brought into contact with twenty, or thirty, or forty, as the case may be, of those who have had no adequate preparation. The consequence is, that the general standard of acquisition is depressed. The well-trained minority must conform to the average scholarship. Without any powerful stimulus for further effort, they may come to rely on their previous acquisitions, and the youth of high promise sinks into a respectable mediocrity. We have in our eye a number of instances of this unhappy retrogradation.

A three years' course of study in the preparatory school ought to be insisted on in all ordinary cases. Every moment of this period may be filled up to the best advantage. The parent or guardian, who abridges it, in order to save expense, or because his son or ward is somewhat advanced in life, may commit an irreparable injury. Imperfect preparation for college often

operates as a serious discouragement throughout the course, and occasions embarrassment and mortification in all subsequent life. The number of studies which are required for admission to college cannot be well mastered in less than three years. The principles and details of the two classical languages are to be fixed in the memory for life. The thorough study of the elements of these languages is necessarily a slow process. Repetition is the only road to success. Frequent and searching reviews are indispensable. Many points in topography and geography are to be ascertained. Maps and drawings are to be freely canvassed, and all the appliances of modern classical erudition are to be brought into requisition. The details of prosody and versification must now be investigated. In short, the forms, the syntactical laws, the outward history and the inward structure of these noble languages, are to become familiar to the ingenuous youth as household words, so that when he enters upon his college course, he may enjoy the beauty of the landscape. The drudgery of the ascent should be ended. He should now be ready to take in the wide horizon, and grasp those forms of everlasting beauty which shine around him. In other words, he may now *enjoy* Tacitus and Demosthenes. He can feel something of the strengthening influence which comes from their immortal pages. He pierces beneath the forms to the principles. Through the language he imbibes the spirit. His mind enlarges; the chains of ignorance fall from around him; gradually he attains to a comprehensive knowledge of the great themes which he studies. He learns accurately to estimate the merits and defects of the systems of government, law, and polity, with which his mind is conversant. All the while, his eye is trained to appreciate the graceful forms of Plato, and his ear to drink in the subtler melody which comes from the pages of that "old man eloquent." His taste is quickened and purified, till he attains the highest style of the scholar, a susceptibility for all truth and beauty, a power of kindly appreciation for all science and literature.

But it is sad to think how rarely this picture is realized in college! How slow and toilsome the professed scholar's steps! How seldom does he attain the high privileges of his birth-right! He has never mastered the elements of the grammar. The analysis of the verb may be an impossible task. He reverts to the classical page only at the call of duty, or the dictate of authority. His preparatory training was desultory and interrupted. He reaps through all his subsequent life, the harvest which his errors, or those of his early guardians, sowed.

In the preparatory course, too, the elements of the mathe-

matics should be studied. The youth between the ages of fourteen and seventeen or eighteen is competent to master portions of algebra and geometry. Sufficient time for this purpose ought to be spared from the classics. The latter should be indeed the prominent and leading study in the preparatory school, as they are fitted beyond almost any other branch of knowledge to the lively susceptibilities of youth. Still, a good beginning may be made in the other great department of collegiate learning. The mental powers which are addressed by mathematics begin to be developed in the later stage of the preparatory school. This study, likewise, will furnish an agreeable relaxation from the classical routine.

The young scholar having thus laid the foundation in the classical school, by mastering the elements of abstract science, and by becoming familiar with the forms and principles of the two great languages of antiquity, will be prepared for the wider fields which await him. Exact knowledge in the earlier course has fitted him to climb loftier heights, has given him a keen relish for the profounder truths and more beautiful forms to which his attention will be called. If the classical school has done its work well, if the three years have been wisely occupied, the education is in one sense complete. Just habits are formed; the great aims of a student's life are appreciated; real and perhaps the greatest difficulties are surmounted, and that course is begun which will lead to the loftiest attainment. In short, the preparatory school occupies in some respects the most important place in our system. It holds the keys of knowledge. It has in its hands almost unlimited means of good. It may easily shape the destiny, both as scholars and moral beings, of most who are committed to its keeping. It should be fostered with the most benevolent care. It should be elevated to its high and true rank. The few who are now toiling for its improvement should be cheered with all good omens, and with all substantial aid. It is said that the endowed classical schools of England exert a greater influence upon the higher education, than the universities themselves. The same can by no means be affirmed of the Latin schools of our country. A very few have attained, or are laudably endeavouring to attain, a high rank. But they are met with many depressing influences. Instead of being allowed a six or eight or ten years' course, as is the case with the English schools and the German gymnasia, it is with the utmost difficulty that they can secure three unbroken years. The ill-advised haste or economy of parents, or the relaxation of professed rules at the colleges, diminish the prescribed term to two years or eighteen months.

II. The standard of the prosperity of a Collegiate Institution ought not to be numbers, but the kind of education which is secured.

In the United States, with a population of twenty-three millions, one hundred and twenty or one hundred and thirty colleges are enumerated. In New England, with a population of less than three millions, there are thirteen incorporated colleges. One of the principal evils of this excessive multiplication is the practical lowering of the standard of admission in order that the college may show as large a list of names as may be. The competition between the different colleges has respect to numbers, not to the quality of the instruction, or the facilities for a thorough education. The terms of admission are about the same at all, but we fear that in some institutions these terms are a variable quantity, that in practice they are greatly lowered, and that, instead of a severe and conscientious examination, all the applicants are admitted with about equal facility. It is well if positive inducements to enter unprepared are not held out to young men who ought on every account to protract their preparatory course. The temptations to this ill-advised lenity are strong. The colleges are mainly supported by tuition fees. The larger the number of students, the greater the revenues. The standard, too, of the prosperity of a college which is sedulously cherished in the community, and which the public press encourages, is numbers. This college is preëminently flourishing, because it has two hundred undergraduates; its neighbour is in a depressed state, for it has only one half that number, though it may be pervaded by the spirit of genuine scholarship, its rich results being seen in the culture and ability of its alumni. Another baneful effect, to which we have already alluded, is the premium for imperfect preparation, which it holds out to those who are technically said to be fitting for college. Industry is called into exercise, strenuous exertion is put forth by the members of the preparatory schools in proportion to the severity of the examination to which they are looking forward. But as it now is, if the door is shut against them at one college, it is wide open at another. Accordingly, the stimulus to exertion is in a large measure removed.

The evil in question, great as it is, is not irremediable. The current of popular opinion may be turned into the right direction. The attention of the organs which now control or guide this opinion, may be earnestly directed to it. The commendations which they bestow on the public exercises of a college may be made discriminating and just. The public mind may be fixed on the rigid examination rather than on the large accession. The institutions which now adhere with commendable

strictness to their published requisitions, may be encouraged to be still more exacting. And if it is impossible to induce the colleges to create a common law on this subject, or come to a mutual understanding, single institutions may well risk their prosperity for a season, and be content with smaller classes, and thus establish that high reputation for scholarship, which will surely be rewarded in the end. Indiscriminate admission to valuable privileges, or the relaxation of salutary rules, will prove at length to be short-sighted policy.

III. The course of collegiate study must be necessarily limited. A selection only can be made from the vast fields of human knowledge.

This necessity obviously results from the almost infinite disparity between the time devoted to the college curriculum and the studies which might be pursued. The period is by courtesy four years, but by vacations it is reduced to three years, and in many instances, in consequence of absences, not more than thirty months or two years remain for effective study. This brief term is wholly inadequate for the attainment of the leading principles even of many important branches of science and literature. The time is fixed and short, the circle of knowledge is ever widening. Life is momentary, art is long. The age of man is hardly sufficient to master the sciences which have had their birth within the present century. The science of entomology, for example, taxes the life-long energies of such a man as Ehrenberg. The great geographer, Ritter, is likely to leave his work but half accomplished. The student, who would become possessed of the leading principles of a science like chemistry, needs time and great industry.

Again, the average talent of a class must be taken into the account. The ablest men may accomplish tasks to which the majority are not equal. To adopt a circle of studies which the men of average ability could master only by the utmost exertion, would leave all below them in hopeless ignorance. It would in effect debar not a few respectable scholars from all the advantages of a college.

It is, furthermore, indispensable that a considerable portion of time should be taken up with reviews and re-examinations, in fixing the knowledge already acquired, in considering it from various points of view. It is not enough that the teacher is skilled and able in communicating the principles and outlines of knowledge. The student must have opportunities for personal investigation. He needs time for calm reflection, for a patient survey, and for gathering up his scattered knowledge into a regular system. The judgment, we believe, of all experienced instructors, coincides with that of the veteran Wytt-

bach, that frequent reviewing is the secret of success in study. A little land, well cultivated, enriches the owner. A country is not thoroughly subdued while a single fortress is standing.

The necessity in question arises, also, from the nature of our collegiate system. This system is peculiar to the United States. It differs in essential points from the university systems of England, Scotland and Germany. The schools at Westminster and Winchester secure a discipline and form a character for nice scholarship to which but few of our colleges can lay any claims. Many of the late Dr. Arnold's pupils had acquired fixed habits of scholarship, and settled moral principles long before they left his school. Some who join the English universities have already gone through a course of discipline longer and more thorough than is reached by our entire American system, preparatory, collegiate and professional. It would be more pertinent, therefore, to compare our colleges with the English classical schools. With these, however, there are more points of dissimilarity than of resemblance.

The Scottish universities are conducted on principles very unlike those which lie at the basis of the American colleges. They are in a great measure professional schools. The instruction is communicated by lectures. The attendance upon them is optional. They have often been the theatre where brilliant discoveries have been propounded, rather than schools where old and simple truths have been taught. Eminent metaphysicians, original investigators in science, have illuminated these venerable halls with their researches. Institutions, like the High School in Edinburgh, are far more analogous to the American collegiate system. The attendance is compulsory; the members are arranged into classes; a complete circle of studies is pursued; and many pupils are trained immediately for practical life.

How divergent the German university system is from ours is well known. No two systems could easily be more unlike. Many of our colleges are far inferior to the German gymnasia. No college in the United States pretends to give so complete a classical training as is effected in a multitude of the German gymnasia. The German universities are admirably fitted to receive the students from the gymnasia and carry forward their studies in some special department, or perfect their training, with the aid of great libraries and eminent professors, so that they may fill the offices of school superintendents, principals of gymnasia, assistant professors in the universities, and many others in the gift of the government. The object is not so much the discipline of the mind, as the acquisition of positive knowledge, or the investigation of some special topic to its

farthest limits, or the publication of a book which shall secure an appointment. On the contrary, the great design of the American collegiate system is the discipline of the mental faculties, the educating and culture of all the mental powers, the sharpening of the instruments by which success in life is to be achieved. This has always been regarded, we believe, as the special aim of our collegiate system. The communication and reception of instruction, highly important as they are, have been viewed as of secondary consequence. Adequate discipline has not been acquired in the preparatory school. It must now, if ever, be secured. No one is prepared for the professional school, or for professional life, till he has undergone this hardy discipline. But the attainment of it is impracticable, if the course of study be extended too far. It is a trite remark that it is immaterial what science or branch of literature, one studies, provided he masters it. The robust discipline is attained if the principles of a single science are apprehended. Each branch of literature is a microcosm. It admits of infinite analysis. It involves topics for inquiry to which no limits can be set. The student, who has made himself familiar with the splendid theories and wonderful results of modern Chemistry, or who has studied the Greek language with all the light thrown upon it by comparative philology, and the researches of German scholars, has girded his mental system for almost any effort in any other field of knowledge. Still, the remark in question requires modification. That science or branch of literature is doubtless to be selected, which, while it invigorates the intellect, ensures the greatest amount of useful information. Regard is, also, to be had, in the selection of studies, to the mental defects of the scholar, and to the symmetrical and complete development of his understanding. The peculiarities of individuals may require a somewhat varying discipline. It remains, however, an unquestionable and fundamental truth that the great design of the college system is to secure mental discipline, and not to anticipate the professional studies, or to attempt to survey the vast fields of science and literature.

IV. It hence becomes a question of the deepest interest, What studies lie at the basis of a college education? What branches of knowledge are best fitted to accomplish the end in view? We may confidently reply, Mathematics with the related branches of Natural Philosophy, and the two Classical Languages. There are, indeed, other studies of great importance, and which ever ought to form a part of the collegiate course. They meet necessities which neither Greek nor Geometry can supply, and no reasonable man would banish them from the lecture-room if he could. Still, they might be better dispensed

with than the two studies in question. They do not enter so deeply into the idea of collegiate discipline. Their value, relatively to mathematics and the classics, is indicated by the less time which is assigned to them in the schedule of studies.

As this topic is awakening special interest at the present time, we may be allowed to dwell upon it at some length. It will be readily inferred, that in naming these two departments of human knowledge as of primary and indispensable value, we have respect to the domain of the intellect. It is taken for granted that in Christian institutions as all our American colleges profess to be, the training of the moral faculties is of permanent and indispensable importance, and that all necessary provisions will be adopted to secure their development. Indeed, the classics and the sciences are not to be taught with an exclusive aim to their intellectual effects. The wise, Christian teacher will draw valuable moral lessons from the satires of Horace and the histories of Thucydides. Ethics may be taught and exemplified without the aid of Paley or Brown. The laws of Divine government are as palpable in the melancholy lines of Tacitus, as in the reasonings of Butler.

The fundamental position of the classics and mathematics in the collegiate system may be shown from a variety of considerations. Let us first look at their nature, or their inherent fitness and tendencies in disciplining the faculties. And first as to the classics.

One of the most obvious and important results of classical study is the habit of discriminating thought which it insures. It involves from beginning to end a nice analysis, a delicate perception, a constant collocation of words, a sharp definition of synonymous terms, a patient process of comparison till the words which hit the case are determined, a weighing of evidence, a balancing of shades of thought, almost imperceptible. In these processes, the mind acquires the power of recognizing the slightest varieties in thought and speech, something like a quick and unerring instinct; the judgment becomes like the scale capable of weighing the smallest particles, of detecting the slightest variations. Language is no longer an uncertain instrument. Many apparent synonymes are shown not to be such in reality. Forms of speech long acquiesced in as of a general or indefinite character, are divested of the haze which has settled around them. The ancient writers stand forth vindicated as masters of the subtlest elements of thought, as possessing weapons of the most perfect temper and of the keenest edge—a system of symbols for communicating the fine mental conceptions such as the world has never seen. This power of discrimination has respect, be it remembered, both to words

and thoughts. One, trained under this discipline, has acquired at the same time, the elements of the most effective style, and the ability to form the most careful moral judgments. He can detect the plausible sophism, disentangle the web of error, and exhibit truth in its just proportions. He will not be so likely, as other men, to adopt an erroneous theory, to defend a system whose plausibility consists in the ambiguity of its terms, or to make war, in the temper of a bigot, upon his brethren, who differ from him only or mainly in the language which they employ.

Again, the study of the classics ensures a copious vocabulary. The careful student of Cicero and Plato has enriched himself with many spoils. He has laid in a large stock of invaluable materials, gathered from the choicest fields of literature. In all the exigencies of life, in the thousand calls of duty, at moments when no preparation can be made, he can draw upon resources which are admirably classified, and whose value has often been tested. The copious stores of the English tongue have been necessarily digested, compared, arranged, as emergencies required. Successive terms, one phrase after another, have been carefully weighed, and while one has been chosen, the entire series have been sedulously deposited in the records of the memory, ready to trip as "nimble servitors" at the bidding of him who needs them. That the acquisition of a copious stock of select language is one of the effects of classical study, might be proved from the experience of distinguished men in all the learned professions. We have in our eye an eminent American senator, now deceased, who could clothe his beautiful and effective thoughts in the most varied as well as pertinent forms, who was listened to with delight by all his auditors, and who was an earnest classical scholar when he was an octogenarian.

We may advert, in the third place, to the effects of the study on the taste, imagination and general culture. The sculptor, who is aspiring to the highest excellence, repairs to Rome to study the Belvidere Apollo and the wondrous group of the Laocoön, or to Florence to gaze upon the Venus or the Dancing Fawn. The young painter idealizes his conceptions before the great masters of his art at Munich, Venice and Rome. The landscape painter plunges into the recesses of the Alps, or lingers under the "purple" light and amid the eternal spring of Southern Italy, that he may copy his model in her most awful or fairest attitudes. The forms of mediæval architecture, which shoot up so gracefully and in such inimitable proportions in the Netherlands, are patiently studied by him who would produce works worthy to live. So he, who would be drawn to the beauty of written symbols, who would gaze at the "winged

words" of the masters of language, who would worthily educate his own instinctive love for beautiful sounds and forms, who would place himself under the full influences of compositions which combine the freshness and simplicity of nature with the last polish of an art that conceals itself, will repair to the pages of the classics. He will carefully study their finished sentences. He will mark the perfect truth of expressions which can never grow old. He will dwell upon some word or phrase exquisitely chosen which is a picture in itself. To these cherished passages, he will revert so fondly, that they will be for ever singing in his ears, or be vitalized as it were, and incorporated into his own being. We need not refer any true scholar to the passages which can be excelled by no specimens of sculptured or pictured beauty. The Odes of Horace, the Georgics of Virgil, the Poems of Homer, the Dialogues of Plato, will at once recur to the mind. They furnish models which combine all the excellences of which the subject is capable—perfect truth to nature, sweet simplicity, most felicitous selection of epithets, a collocation of words, which is music itself, the repose of conscious power. It may be said, indeed, that this is in part a deception. The antiquity of the poems casts a deceitful halo around them. The rich clustering associations of two thousand years are with them. So much the better, we reply. If to their unapproached intrinsic excellences, we add the mellowing and exalting influences of time, then they will be only the more worthy of study.

The distinct benefits which the classics confer on the taste and imagination are such as these: The mind learns to delight in order, proportion, fitness, congruity. It instinctively shuns extravagance, finical terms, unseemly plays of words, all straining after effect, all ostentatious parade, all dainty expressions, all cant phrases, all tautology and wearisome diffuseness. It would be an unpardonable offence against his old teachers, if the scholar should deck out his compositions with tawdry ornament, or deform them with unseemly adjuncts. He feels as the student of Raphael or Michael Angelo does, that they will frown on aught which interferes with the severe simplicity or the heavenly beauty which speak in every lineament of their works.

These excellences are strikingly contrasted with the defects of many of those writers who do not make the classics their model. They may possess great force of thought and language, and in certain directions great power of execution. But in an unexpected moment, a sad prejudice will be revealed, an extravagant opinion will be broached; the mind will be developed in a one-sided and disjointed manner. The charm and usefulness of symmetrical culture never meets our eyes. They are

able but not finished thinkers and writers. We never repose upon them with entire affection and confidence. We always suspect some lurking weakness, or dread some unlicensed outbreak. We do not look to this class of men for finished writers, for men of the purest taste or comprehensive views, or perfectly sound opinions.

There is another class of these influences, to which we have already alluded, and which must be felt rather than described. We refer to those reminiscences which for ever linger in the memory, which people the fancy, which excite the imagination, which attract the affections, like strains of the sweetest music. There are passages in Cicero's works which seem like the dear faces of departed friends yet remembered. They are full of an elevating, genial influence. They crowd the mind with solemn and affecting impressions. They suggest thoughts which, for the time being, expel every low desire and frivolous fancy. They have not indeed a religious efficacy, yet they are powerfully auxiliary to all virtuous tendencies. The music of their words does not sound harshly along with the holier strains that come from the hill of Zion. Passages in nearly all the greatest writers of Greece and Rome embody the beautiful yet fragmentary notes which natural theology utters through all her domains. It is this melancholy association in part, in company with words of the most exquisite fitness and grace, which gives to the passages in question their deathless power. Some of them are the words of men who saw the ancient glories of their country fading away, never to return. Hosts of barbarians, or the sands of the deserts, were mutilating or burying works which their authors fondly thought they were fashioning for eternity. But, whatever may be the causes of this peculiar influence, it certainly exists, and is like a perennial spring in the hearts of all genuine scholars, and it is an influence which no literature but the classical supplies, except in a very limited measure. We look in vain for it to the student of Johnson, or Burke, or Addison. We find it in a degree in the pages of great poets like Milton and Wordsworth, for they were imbued with the spirit of classic song.

We will now refer, in the fourth place, to another great benefit of classical study. By means of it we can trace no inconsiderable part of our own language to its source, and we lay an excellent foundation for the study of the languages of all Southern Europe. The part of the English language derived from the Latin, or variously affected by it, through the Norman conquest of England, the juxtaposition of England with countries that use languages derived from the Latin, and the influence on the English of the studies of learned men, conversant

with Latin, is quite important. It is only the classical scholar who enjoys the signal advantage of being able to trace these various forms to their roots on the Roman soil, and of having spread out before his mind, without investigation, their thousand modifications and associations, at once enriching his style and enlarging his knowledge. The same is true, to a less extent, of words derived from the Greek language. An acquaintance with the derivation and history of these expressive terms, many of them so useful in modern science, is an acquisition of no mean value. Again, the classical student is possessed of the elements of all the South European dialects, with a few insignificant exceptions. The traveller in Italy, without a particle of acquaintance with the Italian language, soon feels at home. The sounds, and in many cases the identical words, of a familiar speech greet his ear. The student who sits down to French or Spanish literature, finds that half his labour is accomplished, if he has mastered the Latin. Many of his old friends, indeed, appear under a somewhat different costume. They have enlarged or diminished their attire, not always, as it seems to him, in the best taste, but no transformations can hide from him their original parentage under Roman skies.

We may refer to a recent but eminent benefit which results from classical study. It introduces us to a vast body of varied and profound criticism. It unlocks treasures of inestimable value. Some of the greatest minds of the present day have traversed the fields of classical literature, and have illuminated with the light of a happy erudition, the most secret nooks, and the remotest corners. Great classical scholars, like Niebuhr, Müller, Savigny, Hermann, have brought stores of learning to bear upon the illustration of the classics, no more admirable in amount than in selection, pertinence and sterling value. Multitudes of very able men have laboured, not in verbal criticism merely, not in the lighter matters of metre and prosody, but on the great questions of law, and government, and revenue, and on the still greater questions of moral philosophy and theology. The profound problems relating to man's eternal destiny as stated by the Greek and Roman moralists, the degenerating process of heathenism as it wandered farther and farther from a primeval revelation, the true significance of pagan mythology, &c., have been handled with a depth and fulness of learning, with a clearness of method, and with a satisfactoriness of results, which should seem to leave little for the future inquirer. The laws of the two classical languages, the principles of syntax, the relations of these languages to others, opening the rich fields of comparative philology, have been investigated with eminent success. These investigations impart to the subject a

truly scientific worth, and command the attention of all who feel any interest in the origin and fortunes of our race. Now this vast body of classical criticism, and historical literature, for which we are indebted to hundreds of able scholars in Germany and elsewhere, can be adequately appreciated only by the classical scholar. In illustration, we may refer to works on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; to those comparing at large the origin, structure and relations of the Latin and Greek languages; to the profound, acute, and, in one sense, creative labours of Niebuhr, and of the very able scholars who have followed in his steps, in investigating the ante-Latin languages of Italy, and the general antiquities of that country; to profound treatises on Roman law; to acute researches in ancient and modern history; and to studies of a more general nature, sweeping over the vast regions from India to the Atlantic, and deducing by a rigorous inquiry the mutual laws of the most important languages of past and present times, and showing the identity, in origin and locality, of the races that spoke them. In short, a vast field has been traversed, and is now thoroughly exploring, by hundreds of eminent scholars in Germany, France, England, and other countries. The rich fruits of these explorations can be enjoyed only by those that have mastered the two classical languages. These, in some respects, constitute the central points—embrace the germinating principles of the inquiry. They possess a literature perfect in form and adequate in amount. Being understood by large numbers of scholars, they can be appealed to as common umpires in a dispute. Through them, as a mirror, we can see the culture and development to which all the sister dialects might have attained, or did actually reach.

We may now refer to the other great department of collegiate study, the mathematics and the relative branches of natural philosophy. In the language of Dr. Whewell, "No education can be considered as liberal, which does not cultivate both the faculty of reason, and the faculty of language: one of which is cultivated by the study of mathematics, and the other by the study of the classics. To allow the student to omit one of these, is to leave him half educated. If a person cannot receive such culture, he remains in the one case irrational, in the other illiterate."

The great and indispensable value of mathematical study may be illustrated by a reference to the practice of composition. The ability to write in an impressive manner, is an acquisition of importance for all educated men, for multitudes indispensable. Stores of knowledge are valuable in proportion as they can be used. An effective and accomplished writer does not owe his

skill to chance. Neither is he indebted only or mainly to a ready memory, to a nervous excitability, to strong passions, or to the gift of imagination. In addition to these he needs the exact training which mathematics will furnish.

What are the principal hindrances in the way of the youthful writer? On what points is he liable to be discouraged? Why are many unable to make a deep and continuous impression by their written performances? One cause of it is, the inability to fix the attention. The mind is under the dominion of vagrant habits. When brought, forcibly as it were, to reflect upon a particular subject, it starts back instantly. It rebels against all efforts to confine it. The individual who has not disciplined himself to habits of close attention, may write effectively, on particular occasions; but his success is owing to some extraordinary impulse, or to some external cause powerfully exciting his feelings. The effects of his exertions will be likely to be evanescent. They have not the enduring element of connected thought, or of just and comprehensive views. He has not investigated the subject on all sides, but has been seduced by some attractive features, or by some temporary interest involved in it.

Another hindrance is, the inability to abstract the mind from all intruding cares, all foreign and all related objects, and keep it inexorably fixed on the one point before it. One may have the power of fastening the attention in a measure, of drawing it within the general range of the topic to be investigated, but he fails to separate the particular quality, the identical point, to bid all related questions depart, and to keep the thoughts resolutely and for a long time, on the hinge of a discussion, or on the needle's point, as it were, of a theme. Napoleon on the field of battle, or in his tent at night, could abstract his mind from every consideration and fasten it on the one necessary to gain his object. With writers, it is often the reverse. Foreign or but partially related thoughts come thronging before the field of vision. Hence, they never attain to a logical consistency. One thing does not flow legitimately from another. Their compositions are as far as possible from being well reasoned. They are not the evolutions of a principle, but the stringing together of beads. A thought is impressive only by its independent force. It has no vital connection with its predecessor, nor with that which follows. The fortress is carried, if at all, by the impetuosity of a single unplanned or ill-planned charge, not by well-concerted or closely connected assaults. Defeat or want of success is the rule. Victory is accidental. In other words, the mind of the writer has not been trained mathematically. He has not been disciplined by a rigid geometry. He has not fami-

liarised himself with the unerring and absolute truth of lines and numbers. His positions want the precision which they might acquire from the axioms of pure science. His inferences might flow legitimately from a hundred other doctrines. His reason has not been cultivated. A leading department of his intellect has run to waste. Mathematical discipline would have introduced order into this confusion. A patient study of abstract science would have added immeasurably to his power as a thinker and writer.

The topic under discussion may be strikingly illustrated from experience. Several hundred years bear testimony to the value of mathematical and classical study in the collegiate discipline. The whole civilized world, since the revival of letters, have coincided in the general arrangement of the university course. This general acquiescence, however, has not been effected without discussion. The ground, at several periods and in all the leading countries of Christendom, has been sharply contested. The relative value of the classics has often been tried in a fiery crucible. Mathematical study has encountered fierce assailants. The practical utility, especially of its higher departments, has been confidently denied, as if the great object of the college course were not mental discipline, but the formation of a corps of original investigators in mathematics and natural philosophy. Still, the verdict in favour of these studies, has been all but unanimous. In our own country, opposition to the prominent place which these studies hold in the system, has at various times appeared. But it has always given way to fair and open argument. Besides, the conviction of the value of these studies is not confined to those who have pursued them. Business men, intelligent mechanics and merchants, who have not received a collegiate education, have often given the most gratifying testimony in behalf of the classics. The high opinion of their value entertained by the late Dr. Bowditch, who was what is called "a self-taught" man, is well known. One of the most eminent and wealthy living merchants of Boston, not himself educated at college, has repeatedly affirmed that a business clerk with a classical education was generally far superior to one not so educated, doubtless because it secures a training of the faculties, a balance of mind, and a quickness of apprehension that is reached by no other method of discipline. An eminent author in the natural sciences, a distinguished scholar of Ritter, remarks, that, as a general rule, those individuals in the classes of natural science, who were skilled in the classics, had a marked pre-eminence over those who had not thus been favoured.

It may, however, be more instructive to adduce, in proof of our general position, the experience of the English Universities,

some of the results of the liberal studies which have been pursued in our parent country for several centuries.

The classics and mathematics have been from the beginning at the foundation of liberal studies in England. It is true that classical studies at Oxford have had far too great a preponderance over the mathematical; while at Cambridge, especially before the present century, mathematics were the favourite and far too exclusive study. Yet, on the whole, taking the two Universities and the Classical Schools together, the fundamental studies in the liberal education of Englishmen have been the two in question. The classical deficiency in Cambridge was partly at least supplied by the thorough classical preparation in the Schools, and by the efforts of particular Colleges. The mathematical want at Oxford has been in part atoned for by the rigid discipline of the Aristotelian logic, well known as the favourite study from the foundation of the University.

We may here repeat the remark which we made on another occasion, that we do not by any means regard the English course of study as incapable of amendment. Some of these amendments are of grave importance. The natural sciences, political economy, etc., were jealously excluded at Oxford up to the present year. The habits and system of that university, the absorbing attention to the scholastic logic, the exclusion of some of the more liberal classical writers, have doubtless had much to do with the peculiar theological and Papal tendencies which have given an unfortunate celebrity to that venerable seat of learning. A wider and more general course of studies would have liberalized the views of its members. The study of the classics at public schools and at the universities has been too much of the letter, without the spirit. It has consisted too exclusively of niceties, of imitation, of attention to forms. The pupils have kept too much aloof from the substance, from the great questions of morals, law, politics, general grammar, comparative philology, etc., which have characterized the German method.

Still, notwithstanding all its defects, we look upon the English system with reverence. We believe it has wrought out immeasurable good for the people of that country, and through them on those of other lands. The subversion of the institutions, the substitution of any other branches of knowledge in place of the classics and mathematics, would be justly regarded as an irreparable calamity. The English university system was the parent of our own; and our own system, if not the cause of unmixed good, has been one of the main sources, and one of the mightiest bulwarks, of all which is precious in our land.

As a general proof of the practical benefits which have resulted

from the English university system, we may point to the English character, to the world-wide reputation of Englishmen for virtue, knowledge, steadiness of principle, practical benevolence and usefulness. It would be folly, indeed, to attribute all this result to this or any other single cause. Many causes have co-operated; chief and paramount among them has been Protestant Christianity. Dissenters, too, who have never been graduated at the universities, have borne a noble part in extending the influence of the British name, though they have shared largely in the indirect benefits which have flowed from the great national schools. Still, we are entitled to name the universities as one of the principal instrumentalities that have created what we mean by British character and influence. A large proportion of her naval and military officers, governors of provinces, consuls and ambassadors, travellers, the men of the three learned professions, statesmen, and multitudes of the gentry, bankers, merchants, etc., received their training in the classical schools and universities. The most susceptible and important period of their lives, from the age of ten to that of twenty-one, was passed in the venerable halls and shades of Eton, or Winchester, or Christ Church, or Trinity, or some other of those foundations, whose very stones and door ways seem to be freighted with instruction. We are authorized, therefore, to attribute to these seats of learning no small share of that which has made England what she is. She is distinguished for sterling integrity. This may be owing in a measure to the fixed and regular discipline of her schools. She has a name among the nations for the love of liberty in union with law. This may proceed in a degree from the restraints of a prescribed course of abstract study, united with the generous influences of the classical page. England is eminent for wisdom in action—for practical good sense. May not this be ascribed in part to the effects of mathematical and classical study in imparting symmetry to the views, in preserving the mind from bias and one-sided tendencies, and in fitting it to meet the real exigencies of life?

But this point is so important that we may be allowed to specify some particulars. The English people of the upper and middle classes are characterized for sobriety of judgment, by a native common sense, by a steady and not unworthy opposition to change, by a reverential and loving reliance on the past, sometimes, indeed, excessive, but generally in beautiful contrast with the course of their restless continental neighbours. As a leading cause of this characteristic, we may refer to the influence of the universities. There stand those old seats of learning, the very embodiment of past generations. In the whirl of the present, how soothing to look on their time-worn

pinnacles, to walk beneath their moss-covered arches, to wander along the aisles which were once trodden by Bacon and Newton ! Amid the buoyancy of youth and the excitements of the times, nothing could be more wholesome than to live under these awful shadows of the past. Entirely coincident is the effect of the studies themselves. The scholar lives among the great minds of antiquity, shedding upon him a serene and never-setting light. His daily tasks conduct him to the profound reflections of Thucydides, and the unchanging truths which shine forth from many of the pages of Aristotle. Or he is contemplating the beautiful truths that lie couched in lines and numbers, those immutable "ordinances of heaven." He is refining his sensibilities and his taste among the wondrous creations of ancient literature, or disciplining his reason in the fields of absolute truth.

Again, the English upper class, taken as a body, and many in the middle, are distinguished for an admirable culture, for manners so simple and graceful, that they seem to be inherited, not acquired, attractive, because they are the expression of a native courtesy and real friendliness. It is not the growth of a day : it is not the patronizing courtesy or intolerable assumptions of a class that have just risen from obscurity. It is the product of ages of refinement. It is the growth of a civilization more perfect than the world has elsewhere seen. We cannot but attribute it in part to the university system, to the proprieties and decencies of the life that is led there, to the intercourse of the young with their accomplished seniors, to the refining and tasteful local associations, and to the congenial influences which come from the studies of the historians and poets of Greece and Rome. These influences may be indirect and imperceptible : but thoughts so beautiful, clothed in forms of such exquisite grace, as are found for example in the Greek tragedians, must form no small element in the culture to which we refer. Through a thousand avenues they enter and pervade the susceptible hearts of the young.

Furthermore, the university system counteracts and neutralizes in a measure the great tendency of the English mind to that which is immediately practical and useful. Oxford and Cambridge have cast up mighty barriers against an intensely avaricious spirit. They are public, standing monuments of the worth of mind. They are constantly uttering their silent yet intelligent protest against that exclusive spirit which would test all things by their weight and measure. England is absorbingly commercial and manufacturing. The acquisition of riches, the eager pursuit of material advantages are her beset-

ting sin. But a liberal education affords some counterweight. The truths of geometry have a close relationship with the loftiest conceptions which can fill the human soul. In the language of Playfair, "the reason of Newton and Galileo took a sublimer flight than the fancy of Milton and Ariosto." Classical studies, too, are eminently humane. Well were they styled the "humanities" from their enlarging, unselfish influences. They have no special affinities with what are called "the material interests." They lead to the cultivation of tastes, which throw a charm over the dealings of trade, lighten the heart of the banker, and lead the mechanic and the land-owner to cherish enlightened views and perform philanthropic deeds. "It is delightful," says Mr. Talfourd, "to see the influences of classical learning not fading upwards, but penetrating downwards, and masses of people rejoicing to recognise even from afar the skirts of its glory." In further illustration of the utility of the university system, it may be mentioned, that a large number of those who leave the universities, enter upon the study of the law, or into political life in Parliament. Now, what both these classes pre-eminently need, is mental discipline, not knowledge, not the facts of science, not the details of statistics, but the power of working with the mind, of fixing the attention often on the most arid subjects, of grasping the great points of a question, of disentangling a net-work of inconsistencies, of laying bare sophistical plausibilities, and of bringing at once the whole force of the intellect on the citadel that is to be carried. The late Mr. Buxton owed his usefulness, under God, to his exact and finished training at Trinity College, Dublin. He triumphed in Parliament, not simply on account of the justice of his cause, or the strength of his feelings, or the accuracy and thoroughness of his information, but because he could grasp, and digest in a masterly manner, and luminously expound whatever he undertook. While gaining the prizes in college, he was fitting himself to be the champion of Africa.

The preceding considerations might be abundantly confirmed by the detail of particular cases. It has been constantly asserted and reiterated, that the most eminent public men in England, in every art and science, have not been educated at the public schools, and that the universities contribute but a little to the science and intellectual progress of England. Let us test this remark by a few decisive instances. Francis Bacon entered the University of Cambridge in his thirteenth year, "where he made astonishing progress in all the sciences taught there." Isaac Barrow, whom the king called "the best scholar in England," spent nearly one-half of his life in the universities

of Oxford and Cambridge. Just after, "within the walls of Cambridge," in the language of Professor Huber, of Marburg, "were found the two men, Newton and Bentley, who, in the promotion of science and of classical criticism, became the leaders, not of England only, but, in the first instance at least, of all Europe." Newton would probably have lived and died as the overseer of his mother's farm, if his attention had not been accidentally, or rather providentially, directed to Cambridge. Locke's philosophy, pervading the college lectures at Cambridge, paved the way for Newton's agency, and prepared the academic soil and atmosphere for it. Locke himself was educated at Westminster School, whence he was elected, in 1751, to Christ Church College, Oxford. "Here he distinguished himself much by his application and proficiency." John Milton was removed from St. Paul's School, London, to Christ's College, Cambridge, where he "distinguished himself by the purity and elegance of his Latin versification." Joseph Addison spent six years in Oxford, and gained distinction by writing Latin verses. Lord Mansfield was educated at Westminster. Blackstone went from a public school to Oxford, and was fellow of a college when he wrote his Commentaries. "William Pitt's stay at college was unusually long, nor did he leave it until his mind was as perfectly formed as it could be by theory." His knowledge was not confined to the classics, though with these he was conversant. The more severe pursuits of Cambridge had imparted some acquaintance with the stricter sciences. Mr. Fox was highly distinguished at Eton by his Latin and Greek poetry. "Like Mr. Canning, Lord Carlisle and Lord Grenville," says Mr. Brougham, "Lord Holland laid both at school and college a broad foundation of classical learning, which through his after-life he never ceased successfully to cultivate." The Marquis Wellesley was pronounced by the master of Eton to be superior as a classical scholar to Porson. He continued these studies with great success at Oxford. Mr. Wilberforce's "natural talents were cultivated and his tastes refined by all the resources of a complete Cambridge education." At Eton, Mr. Canning became distinguished for the elegance of his English and Latin poetry, as well as for the easy flow and propriety of diction which distinguished his pure compositions. At Christ Church, Oxford, he increased his high literary reputation and gained several prizes.

It were easy greatly to enlarge this list from the most illustrious names in England, both from among the dead and the living. The Bishop of London, who has been said to be the best living Greek scholar in England, was greatly distinguished at Cam-

bridge, and obtained several prizes. The same is true of a large number of the most eminent mathematicians, natural philosophers, orators, statesmen, classical scholars, &c., now living in England, e.g. Mr. Airy, astronomer royal; Dr. Peacock, author of the algebra, &c.; Mr. Melvill, the eloquent preacher; Prof. Sedgwick and Dr. Buckland, the geologists; Judges Coleridge and Talfourd; Archbishop Whateley; Sir John F. W. Herschel, in the highest rank in college; Bishop Thirlwall, the historian; Mr. Macaulay, who carried off a number of prizes; Prof. Challis, the astronomer; Mr. Adams, who is fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, several members of which college have established an Adams' prize, "in testimony of their sense of the honour he had conferred on his college and the university, by having been the first among the mathematicians of Europe to determine from perturbations the unknown place of a disturbing planet exterior to Saturn." This list, however, we need not extend. A very large proportion of the ablest men in almost every department of public life, who honour the British name, were educated at the public schools and universities. But, as it has been well said, a chief advantage and excellence of the public schools and universities consists in forming the *secondary* men, who carry a cultivated taste, a liberal and manly understanding and a mild intelligence into all the retired walks of life. We will close these observations by referring to the testimony of the late Dr. Arnold, which is particularly valuable from the fact of the independence of his character, and the favour with which he regarded reforms: "My own belief is, that our colleges of Oxford and Cambridge are, with all their faults, the best institutions of the kind in the world, at least for Englishmen."

We may recur, on a future occasion, to some other points connected with this subject.

ART. II.—REVIEW OF DR. WOODS'S WORKS.

BY HEMAN HUMPHREY, D.D., PITTSFIELD, MASS.

The Works of Leonard Woods, D.D., late Professor of Christian Theology, Andover; in five volumes. Andover: Printed by J. D. Flagg & W. H. Wardwell. 1850.

DR. WOODS is a theologian of the old, or Edwardean school, owning but "one Master, even Christ;" and few if any of his contemporaries, on either side of the Atlantic, have contended

more earnestly or ably "for the faith, once delivered to the saints." Amid the fluctuations of the age, he has never swerved from the primitive New England orthodoxy—the exponent of which, is the Assembly's Shorter Catechism.

The structure of Dr. Woods's mind is eminently conservative. It has no elective affinity for new and startling theories, of any kind. He chooses to walk in the beaten path "of the Apostles and Prophets," heedless of beckonings, however plausible and captivating, on the right hand or the left. Some have thought him quite too slow and cautious for an age of progress, which outstrips everything but the lightning. But, if he has not "kept fully up with the times," he has adhered closely to the Bible, and his manifest aim has been, to "prove all things, and hold fast that which is good." Old men should be allowed to abide by the old landmarks, and leave it to those, who with better critical and exegetical helps are coming after, to extend the boundaries of theological science, if they can, within the "charter." We are just now under such rapid head way, that it needs some strong and steady hands to put down the breaks, as well as high pressure to drive the engine.

The candid reader of Dr. Woods's system of theology, as drawn out in these volumes, will find, that though his convictions of truth are strong and earnest, he is no dogmatist. He is as far as any one from claiming infallibility for his opinions upon abstruse and debated points, cautiously and deliberately as they have been formed. He believes, that there is more or less of error in all human systems and digests, and that absolute perfection is not to be expected in any. But while he strenuously maintains, that the Bible is a complete and full revelation, to which nothing must be added and from which nothing may be taken away, he regards the Scriptures as an inexhaustible store-house of wisdom and knowledge, ready to yield new developments and illustrations of divine truth, to the devout student.

It is no disparagement of any system of theology of anterior date, if in some respects it is surpassed by others which have since come from the press. As every author may fairly avail himself of the ripest fruits he can gather, in the wide fields of sacred culture by other hands, it were a reproach, if with equal talents and better opportunities, the commentator or lecturer of the nineteenth century, were to make no advances upon his predecessors of the eighteenth.

It was, we believe, the general hope of the divinity classes at Andover, when they were listening to Dr. Woods's Theological Lectures, that they might one day see them in print; and no sooner had he left the chair, which he had so ably filled in the

Seminary for thirty-eight years, than some of the ablest and most distinguished of his former pupils, addressed him a letter, requesting him in the most respectful terms, to revise the course by which they had been so much benefited themselves, and give it to the public. In this, they only expressed the wish of all the early alumni, and the desire of a still greater number of ministers, perhaps, who had never enjoyed the privilege of hearing the lectures. They rightly judged, that having spent almost the whole of a long life in theological investigations and discussions, he might bring out a system which the church "would not let die." Having now lived to devote three years, or more, with his accustomed diligence, to the revision of his lectures, and carefully re-written some of them—in short, having spared no pains to make them as worthy of acceptance as he could, he has carried them through the press, together with ample selections of miscellaneous matter on kindred topics, and they have already obtained a wide circulation, in a type and style which does great credit to the Andover press.

In cordially recommending these volumes to students in theology and young ministers, we do not forget, that strong objections have been urged in some quarters, against Systems of Divinity, or compends of doctrine in any shape. It is plausibly alleged, that with the Bible in our hands, containing a full and complete revelation of the mind and will of God, and embracing everything that is "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for instruction in righteousness," without any systematic arrangement of topics, those who will "search the Scriptures" with a humble and teachable mind, stand in no need of such helps as are proffered in this or any other system of didactic lectures, from the theological chair.

There would be great force in this objection, if the lecturer were to go out of the divine record for any of his materials, in constructing his system. But when he religiously adheres to the "Law and the Prophets;" when he confines himself to the teachings of holy men, "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost" in the Old Testament, and of Christ and his apostles in the New, what is his object? Not to elicit any new truth—not to save us the trouble of searching the Scriptures for ourselves, but to bring together and arrange the doctrines of the Bible, so that we may see their relations and harmony as it were at a glance, "comparing spiritual things with spiritual." And what harm or danger can there be in this? Are not those great and good men entitled to our thanks, who have spent their lives in studying the Scriptures, and given us the fruits of their labours, while they have left us the whole Bible, just as they found it, to read and judge for ourselves; "calling no man

master" upon earth? If any go to Calvin, or Edwards, or Dwight, or Woods, rather than "Moses and the prophets," Christ and his apostles for their creed, they are without excuse. The fault is in themselves, and not in the theologians, who never pretended to be infallible guides and teachers. For reasons in favour of systematic theology, drawn out at length, under the following heads: "System carried into every other branch of knowledge—Thorough knowledge best promoted by it—System demanded by man's rational faculties—and by the nature and relations of religious truth," we refer to Dr. Woods's eighth Lecture, Vol. I. His system contains a hundred and twenty-six Lectures, and fills the whole of the first three volumes, and embraces the following outline of topics, in the order here indicated: "Directions for the right prosecution of theological study—Revelation, in four Lectures—The use and explanation of Theological terms—Dangers to be avoided in analogical reasoning—Inspiration of the Scriptures, in six Lectures—Existence of God—The language respecting the divine attributes explained—Man's unlikeness to God—Unity of God—Dangers of analogical reasoning respecting the Trinity—Humanity of Christ—Pre-existence of Christ—Deity of Christ, in three Lectures—Sonship of Christ—Divinity and personality of the Holy Spirit—Trinitarian use of the word Person—The doctrine considered as a subject of speculative reasoning—Divine Purposes, in four Lectures—Reprobation—How the doctrine of Divine purposes should be treated—Divine Providence, in four Lectures—Moral Agency, in thirteen Lectures—Man's Depravity, in twelve Lectures—The Atonement of Christ, in twelve Lectures—Regeneration, in five Lectures—Directions to inquiring sinners—Evidences of Regeneration—Nature of Christian Nurture—Repentance—Faith, in three Lectures—Prayer, in four Lectures—Justification, in three—The Perseverance of Saints—Resurrection—Endless Punishment—Baptism, in ten Lectures—The Lord's Supper—Lord's Day—Church Government, in six Lectures—Personal Religion necessary to Ministers.

The filling out of such a plan, embracing all the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion, is a great undertaking; and delivering such a course of lectures to more than a thousand young candidates for the sacred office, involves immense responsibility. How far Dr. Woods has entitled himself to the thanks and confidence of the Christian public as "a Master in Israel;" with what ability and success he has fulfilled his great task, every reader of these volumes will judge for himself. Religionists (out of the evangelical pale), by whatever names they may be distinguished, will of course fundamentally dissent from

many of these lectures; and some, who fully agree with Dr. Woods on every essential point in his system, will doubtless differ from him in some of his views and statements, of minor importance. It would be an unheard-of agreement if this were not the case. No system of theology has ever yet been drawn up, in which all good men have been perfectly agreed, and probably never will be, so long as they study and think independently for themselves.

But that the venerable author of these volumes has an acute and logical mind; that he has an uncommonly clear discrimination of metaphysical subtleties; that he has pondered long and thought deeply upon all the more abstruse and difficult parts of his system, and that he has fairly stated and met the most common and plausible objections urged against it, few, if any, we think, will deny.

In the brief notice which our present limits will allow, we can only glance at a few topics, as fair specimens of the ability and candour, with which they are all handled, in these hundred and twenty-six lectures. The four, on Divine Providence, at the opening of the second volume, strike us as exceedingly well reasoned and conclusive. The author's definition of Divine Providence is, that "all things are sustained, directed and controlled by God." "The doctrine proved from his attributes and from experience. Providence particular and universal—important to intelligent beings—asserted in the Scriptures—benevolent—just—wise—powerful and holy. Appeal to Scripture—oriental idiom considered—miracles—argument from the duty of prayer—Divine Providence includes the powers and laws of nature—those powers and laws dependent on God—two agencies, that of creatures and that of God—their relation to each other—practical reflections."

The filling up of this outline covers the whole ground of debate between those who expressly or virtually aim to exclude the Creator from the government of the world, and those who maintain with Paul, that "He worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will," and with the Westminster Divines, that "the works of God's providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful preserving and governing all his creatures, and all their actions." Though Dr. Woods does not profess to explain *how* it is that God governs the universe of moral beings without the slightest infringement of their free moral agency, many, we are sure, whose minds have been more or less perplexed on the subject, will acknowledge their indebtedness to him, for his clear statement and able vindication of the orthodox doctrine.

The unwelcome but undeniable doctrine of human depravity,

is treated at great length and with great ability in these lectures. A glance at the table of contents is sufficient to show, that Dr. Woods has deeply studied the subject in all its aspects and bearings: and every intelligent and candid reader must admit, that the discussion is thorough and candid and scriptural, in a high degree. The leading topics are proofs of depravity from human conduct—of its universality from Scripture—that it is native, or innate, and that it is total, by which the author means, not that men are by nature as bad as they can be, but that “they are entirely destitute of the holy love required by God’s law, and that all their affections in relation to that law are of an opposite nature.” In the progress of the discussion, Dr. Woods is unavoidably led to examine some of the most popular theories of depravity from which he dissents, and to encounter a variety of objections which have been urged from different and opposite quarters against his own. Those who have slid entirely off from the Calvinistic, or Westminster platform, will of course widely dissent both from his arguments and conclusions. But we are more and more convinced, that evangelical writers differ more in the use of terms than in their views of the original corruption of human nature, than with regard to the extent and malignancy of human depravity. Those who claim to be sound Calvinists, and are so, on every essential point, but who may not agree with Dr. Woods exactly in all his views, will allow, that he reasons with great cogency and fairness, and that his proofs of the native and universal depravity of our race cannot be gainsaid.

On the subject of regeneration, Dr. Woods proves himself to be an eminently sound and able defender of the faith once delivered to the saints. We regret, that our limits will not allow us to give even a condensed abstract of his reasoning, by which he shows most triumphantly, that in every case of true conversion “the excellency of the power is of God; even according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.” The theory of moral suasion, as being in any instance the efficient cause of regeneration, is overthrown beyond recovery. The strongest motives are shown to be utterly powerless, to melt or break the “heart of stone,” which every unregenerate man carries about in his bosom. The nature of the change, its evidences and its fruits, are also pointed out, with a clearness and cogency, which it seems to us, must carry conviction to every unprejudiced mind.

Restricted as our limits are, we fully intended, when we began, to devote a page or two, to the cardinal doctrine of Justification,

which is so clearly stated, so scripturally defined, and so admirably illustrated and established in these lectures ; but we can only recommend them, in passing, to the devout study of the serious and candid reader. There are few, but will find themselves more than repaid, by gaining clearer and more definite views of the "way to be saved."

But we must hasten to the thirteen lectures on Moral Agency, which we regard as the ablest series in the whole system, and as embodying a lucid and masterly discussion of some of the most abstruse points in theological science. Edwards, in his immortal Treatise on the Will, is more profoundly metaphysical, and some other writers may have surpassed the venerable Abbot Professor, in the deeper subtleties of the science ; but in logical arrangement, in clearness of statement, in exactness of definition, in transparency of argument, in fulness and felicity of illustration, and in unanswerable appeals to human consciousness, we have never read any treatise on Moral Agency, which seems to us more worthy of the theological chair, in any "school of the prophets," or more worthy of being studied by all who desire to obtain correct views of the nature, grounds and extent of their moral responsibility. As specimens of the train of thought and argument, we offer a brief abstract, partly in our own, and partly in the language of the author.

"Moral Agency," he justly remarks, "has a near and important connection with Christian theology ; and in prosecuting our inquiries we must pursue the inductive method. We must derive our knowledge from facts and experience." No *à priori* hypothesis can be admitted in the science of mind, any more than in physical science. What we wish to know, are the simple facts that exist, and the general laws which they develop. "As, in natural science, we observe and arrange the phenomena, so we must do in mental and moral science. Instead of saying, such must be the nature and laws of moral agency, our proper business is to find out by Scripture, experience and observation what they are." "I shall assume, that man is a moral agent. We know that moral agency belongs to us, just as we know, that any other attribute belongs to us ; that is, by consciousness and by observation of one another—just as we know, that we see and hear." This being admitted, the question arises, is there any test or standard of moral distinction on which we may rely ? There is.

When we have certain affections, or do certain actions, or when we observe the same in others, the feeling spontaneously arises in our minds, that these affections are right. But when we are conscious of different affections in ourselves, or con-

template them in others, a feeling of disapprobation is excited. "This feeling takes place uniformly, so far as our minds are unperverted and act according to their nature. The fact that certain men in certain conditions and under the influence of certain causes, judge differently from this, is no evidence against the existence of a uniform constitution in man, any more than the fact, that men under the influence of certain mental or bodily diseases, do not perceive the difference between harmony and discord in music, or between different colours and different tastes, proves, that there is no difference in reality, or that there is no fixed principle, in our minds, which leads us to make the distinction." "But diseased and depraved as the moral sense is, there is much less difference among men in their moral judgments, than has sometimes been represented." Who can witness an act of kindness and magnanimity to an enemy in distress, without a feeling of respect and admiration, or of cruelty to a friend and benefactor, without a feeling of indignation? "The sentiment of approbation which arises in the mind in relation to such actions, is as uniform, as the sensation of different colours at the sight of a rainbow." "Present a prism to a man's eye, and you excite the sensation of different colours; speak to him, and you excite the sensation of sound. In like manner present to man's mental eye the feeling of benevolence, and the actions that flow from it, and you excite in him instant approbation. Present the contrary, and you excite disapprobation. And if at any time, the impulse of his own passions leads him to justify the wrong affections of himself or others, he will ultimately condemn himself for it as an act of violence done to his moral nature."

Having, as he thinks, established this point in the first lecture, Dr. Woods proceeds in the next, to consider different states of conscience, in reference to moral agency, and the ambiguity of such words as knowledge, understanding, power, ability, &c., by which men are often perplexed and led astray. The course of reasoning by which he proves, that the merit or demerit of any action lies in the intention, in the state of the heart, and not in the overt act, is remarkably clear and satisfactory.

In the third lecture of this series, on Moral Agency, Dr. Woods goes on to examine the different affections or states of the mind, embracing its sensations or perceptions, intellectual acts and volitions. On these topics, no abstract of ours would do justice to the analytical acumen of the author, nor to his rare felicity in translating metaphysics into the vernacular tongue.

The affections, in themselves, morally good or evil; the laws by which they are governed and their connection with the intellect and the will, are the topics of the next lecture, and they

are handled with an ability which would do credit to any writer on Moral Agency. So would the lecture which immediately follows, in which Dr. Woods inquires, "What connection our present affections have with any preceding affection, or what influence preceding affections have upon the present." Next he goes on to show, on what principles we ordinarily predict our own future affections and those of others. Then comes Moral Necessity, which, he tells us, furnishes a remarkable example of the difficulty and perplexity occasioned by employing words in a sense not well defined, or not well understood, and to the elucidation of which, he has, with rare success, applied the perspicacious power of his mind. Then follow highly discriminating remarks upon the influence of motives, objective and subjective. Then in the next lecture, he inquires, "Do motives influence men necessarily, and if so, what is the nature of this necessity?" This leads him next to consider certain alleged difficulties, as to moral inability, the divine purposes, our dependence on God, and the work of his Spirit in sanctification. This brings us to the tenth lecture in the series, in which Dr. Woods shows, that Moral Agency continues through all changes of character, and refers to Gen. iii., as a satisfactory account of the first human sin, and then very ably closes the discussion in two lectures upon "the sinner's inability to obey the divine command, and in what it consists."

This, we are sensible, is but a very meagre outline of these lectures upon Moral Agency; but if it should induce any to possess themselves of the great work in which they are contained, we are quite sure they will never regret the purchase. It should be in the hands of every young minister, as well as on the shelf of every public and private religious library.

The fourth volume contains a series of twelve letters, to Unitarians, occupying 121 pages—then a Reply to Dr. Ware's Letters to Unitarians and Calvinists, of 170 pages—next, Remarks on Dr. Ware's answer to his Letters, of 40 pages—then Eight Letters to Dr. N. W. Taylor, with an Appendix—after which follows an Examination of the Doctrine of Perfection, with a Letter to Mahan, of Oberlin, and lastly, a Dissertation upon Miracles.

This volume bears throughout, the impress of the same richly furnished, perspicacious and logical mind, which has imparted such distinguished character and worth to the lectures in the three preceding volumes. We regret that no space is left us for extracts, which would more than sustain this high estimate. If the candid reader does not find himself very much entertained, as well as instructed, we are but poor judges in such matters. Proud as Unitarians and Perfectionists are of their

champions, we opine, that they would not be over anxious to pit any of them in a fair field against such a "foeman" as Dr. Woods has proved himself to be in these letters.

The fifth and last volume contains three letters to young ministers, five essays on Mental Philosophy, three miscellaneous essays, and twenty-five sermons, preached on various occasions.

Here we take our leave of the work before us, which has cost the author the best years of a long professional life; which has been waited for with high expectations, not only by the hundreds who sat at his feet, while he filled the theological chair, but by multitudes who never heard him, and whose labours will be held in grateful remembrance long, very long, after he shall have been gathered to his fathers.

ART. III.—PARALLEL BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF EARLY AND MODERN CHRISTIANITY.

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No study can offer a richer field to the philosophic thinker, than that of the laws which control the differing ages and phases of opinion. It would seem at first sight a task almost impossible, in the very nature of the intellect as well as the variety of phenomena; far easier for the naturalist to read the history of the earth's formation in the rocky strata, and classify the manifold forms of organic life; or for the astronomer to reduce the immensity of space to a *mécanique celeste*, than to discover such unity in the domain of spirit. Yet it is by no means so. The mind of man, fertile as are the sources of knowledge, and ever ready as it is to push its inquiries into newer fields, is, after all, compassed by a horizon wide, yet clearly marked. And not only do these limits of possible knowledge bring us always back to the same sphere; but the innate affinities of intellect, the likeness of culture, and, more than all, the deep inward causes which produce the spiritual movements of every age, produce also a likeness of result. Nor is it often that men enter as individuals into this or that channel of isolated speculation; the master-mind of society is rather the *τρικυψία*, the accumulated wave of general tendencies. Hence then is seen a law of reproduction in human thought. Age on age passes through kindred processes; and in the mind, as in nature, there are certain archetypal forms, which are the

conditions and the objects of its striving. We may observe this law in every variety of phenomena. Literature imposes the same necessity of epic, lyric, idyllic, dramatic expression on the genius of the poet; art seeks in vain to do more than reproduce the orders of Greece, and that of the middle age, the offspring of a supernatural religion. Philosophy in the mind of India, of Athens, and the modern world repeats the primary problems. Plato and Kant state the ground-law of pure reason in opposition to empiricism; Hume and Berkeley arrive at like conclusions with the Greek sophists; Paley lays down, as the principle of a Christian ethics, that which Cicero explodes as revolting even to a heathen conscience; the propositions of Spinoza are read in almost parallel passages of Abelard; and the system of Schelling is but a more scientific fulfilment of that ideal Pantheism which envelops as a mysterious cloud the primitive dreamland of Eastern contemplation. The efforts of man in the world of ideas are like the results of his discovery on the broad ocean, which can only at the last circumnavigate the narrow globe, and bring him in a returning circle to the point whence he set forth.

But in nothing is this law of reproduction more visible than in the sphere of theology. Theology is philosophy, seeking scientific unity with a historical revelation; and as its truths are highest of all, so has every age its questions, which master and penetrate its leading intellect. The controversy of Arius marks the early period; the problem of freewill and decrees, that of Augustine; the dispute between Nominalism and Realism underlies profound views of original sin and redemption, which employed the scholastic mind; the mighty principle of justification sways the theology of the Reformation. Ideas, which in one day are of vital interest, are quite forgotten in the next. A theological proposition, in the time of Luther an *experimentum crucis* in too literal a sense, is now a piece of antiquated divinity; and men wonder that any should have gone to the stake for so abstract a matter. To come nearer home, our New England contests of old and new school, of physical and moral ability and the like, are beginning to be merged in far broader questions, which have arisen on the theological horizon; in the contest, for life or death, between a gigantic naturalism and a Christian supernaturalism; or, on yet another side, between the claims of private judgment and Catholic authority. Yet, amidst these differences, we ever behold the law of reproduction; the old questions are repeated in new form, and the reigning tendencies of belief and heresy cast in the same mould. Calvin reproduces Augustine; and Socinus develops the germ of Arius. The tenets of the school of Arminius are anticipated in the

Greek fathers. Modern Oxford speaks in the cognate dialect of Cyprian and Vincentius. Early New England theology moved in the same cycle of metaphysical thought as the scholastic; and the later contests with a growing and now full-grown Unitarianism have been fought, inch by inch, on almost every portion of the ancient battle-ground, whose record will form, when a philosophic historian is found, a chapter of rich phenomena unsurpassed in Christian Annals. It is facts like these which make the study of doctrinal history of so vast importance, not more than, but equally with, dogmatic theology itself. The doctrinal expressions of every age are more or less always polemic, and reflect a particular phase of thought. But, in the systematic study of opinions, the scholar takes each successive point of view; he sees pass before him the varied eras of faith, of struggle, and from his philosophic centre, can calculate their real and apparent distance; he perceives in this or that doctrine the necessary reaction of one extreme upon another; he knows, that in his own, as in other ages, prevailing errors have their little hour, and vanish; and he thus becomes, in his comprehensive largeness of vision, not a polemic of his time, but the Christian sage of all times, who, amid the fluctuating forms of belief, recognises the *quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus*, the unchanged and unchangeable truth of revelation.

We have dwelt thus long on the introduction to our subject, because we deem it of the utmost importance to grasp fully the principle; and we now proceed to apply it to one of the most striking analogies in the history of doctrine; a parallel between the philosophical relations of Christian belief and unbelief in our own age, and that of primitive Christianity in its earliest era of scientific development. Perhaps two periods could not be chosen to the superficial observer so apparently diverse in every regard:—the one, an age when science was comparatively in its state of degeneracy, and Christianity as yet in its rudest germ of intellectual culture; the other, an age, distinguished by the noblest genius in every sphere; the age of Kant, of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; the age of exegetical criticism, of historical research, of most searching theological inquiry; the age, when all questions seem to be opened, all forms of truth and error striving on the broad battle-ground; when a Newman would turn the overflowing waters again into the narrow channel of Romanism, a Schleiermacher, a Coleridge breathe into philosophy the living soul of faith, a Strauss swallow up the whole fabric of revelation, as a transient phenomenon in a world-embracing naturalism. Yet, singular as it may seem, it is a fact that is apparent to a deeper insight, that there may be traced not merely a general, but a minute and most curious

similitude. It will be shown, hereafter, what is the secret of this real likeness and seeming unlikeness, and what the causes which have produced the same conflicts of opinion; but here we proceed at once to an examination of the phenomena themselves; nor do we doubt, that the subject will be found of the deepest interest, the further we penetrate into its details.

In the development of Christianity there was, of necessity, a first age, when it appeared only in the form of a living faith. It was its time of fresh spontaneous activity; it had not as yet reached self-conscious intelligence; it knew nothing of the speculative contests, which afterwards divided the church; its battles were almost wholly external, against Pagan persecution, or internal, against immorality and sin. The reflex of this period is given us in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, whose theology, if we may speak at all of them as theologians, is wholly in the concrete. But it followed, equally of necessity, that another period must dawn upon the church. When the preliminary work of external upbuilding was ended, or far advanced; when Christianity had leisure to retire from the field of battle, and began to reflect more upon its own truth, to mingle more with the mind of the time, it could be no longer only a religion of the life, but must become one of developed thought. If our readers would study the principle of this transition-process, we refer them to the first chapter of Kliefoth's Introduction to Dogmatic History, where it is shown with surprising power and beauty. The whole is a masterwork of philosophical analysis. And here, next to the study of the Fathers and the latter Platonists, we must acknowledge our deep indebtedness to modern German writers, on the history of philosophy and doctrine, for our ideas of early Christianity; the master minds who have studied not its ages only, but its spirit, and gained thus the key to unlock secrets hidden from the Mosheims and the Milners. The second era, then, was that of scientific Christianity. Its enemies must be now the Pagan philosopher and the subtle heretic; it must pass at once into the broad domain of theology, and exhibit the truth of revelation in the shape of doctrine, which at the same time should approve its unity with all other truth, and its claim as the authoritative oracle of a yet higher, supernatural wisdom. Hence it was that this first era of scientific Christianity was one of peculiar and varied phenomena. While it implanted in the mind of the world the seeds of belief, and laid the basis of its supremacy over human reason, it had of necessity its crude beginnings; it was compelled to meet with and adjust, in itself and in heathenism, without the mingled mass of intellectual tendencies and systems. The Jew, tied to the dead body of a ritual formalism;

the philosopher, proud of his abstract and aristocratic position, contemptuous of a new religion; the better minds, hungering and thirsting after truth, yet finding it nowhere, and by their culture unable to apprehend at once the nature of revelation; the sceptical or the fanciful minds, wandering in mocking doubt, or accepting anything that pleased the speculative understanding, rather than appealed to the deep wants of the sinful heart: all were to be influenced by, and in turn to influence, the Christian faith. With them, as the one religion, it was to contend; with some in open hostility, with others as pretended friends, but insidious foes, who, under the mask of philosophy, would corrupt its simplicity; and yet others it was to receive as its own, even in the earnest and deep study of its truths. It was, indeed, an age of wonderful fermentation of thought. There was no longer, it is true, the philosophic grandeur of former days; the brilliant lights of Plato and Aristotle had faded from the firmament. Yet was it, as it appears to us, a time of greater importance to Christianity, than had it arisen amid the splendours of the academy; because, in the very decay of faith, it appeared the herald of a new truth, and became the centre, around which all intellects grouped themselves as friends or enemies. The mind of antiquity was afloat on a sea of unbelief. The bonds of old religion and philosophic dogmatism were shorn away; and on every side was the utmost freedom of opinion. It was a chaos before the new creation. Manichæism, already spreading in its germinal form, from the East, the cradle of theosophy; eclecticism and mysticism in the garb of neo-Platonism mingling with the faded systems of stoic Pantheism, and the "sty of Epicurus;" with these, blended in strange confusion, old idolatry struggling to retain its hold, and the most monstrous forms of popular magic, combine to show the picture of that unparalleled age. Christianity was to mould these discordant elements into a new unity. It was unavoidable, therefore, that in the contact of its truth with error, there should be produced, before such unity could appear, various forms of partial development; and these, mutually related to each other, as well as to the Christian faith, either as opposites, or in greater and less degrees of harmony. If, now, we put ourselves into the attitude of that time, and seek to construct in imagination its natural processes of thought, we shall find certain well-defined modes, wherein it would, by an inward necessity, express itself; and by these we determine, what, in a word most apt, has been called the genetic development of doctrine. On one side would be found an unphilosophical empiricism, arising from the want of any true appreciation of the nature and need of scientific truth in religion, manifesting itself in adherence to

the received tradition, in jealousy of all else as destructive of it; and this tendency would have its exponent both in heathen superstition and in Christian belief. On another side would be seen a philosophical spirit, which would demand of the new faith a scientific ground. This would appear, first, in heathenism, as utter hostility to revelation, regarding it as a fresh fanaticism, wholly incapable of rational construction. Again, the same aim would call forth a deeper view, and seek from partial perception of Christian ideas to receive this religion into a comprehensive philosophic system, while rejecting it as a divine, supernatural revelation. This scientific aim would next show itself in Christianity, in the endeavour of its deeper minds to arrive at a philosophic basis of faith; in some, with too great a tendency to lose sight in idealizing theories of the literal fact, but in the profoundest thinkers, as they grasped more the true principle of connection, in an attempt clearly to define the middle ground between a bare empiricism and an absorbing idealism. Yet a further form, in which the mind of such an age would develop itself, is that of mysticism. Mysticism may be called the philosophy of forlorn hope; the surrender of the intellect, seeking a higher than empirical knowledge, but wanting a true scientific basis to its own subjective impulses of thought and feeling, or to some plausible system, which has in it an element satisfying to the individual craving. Such a tendency would naturally appear in that chaotic state of ideas. Among heathen minds it would exhibit itself in a speculative idealism, irrational and confused—or, in the grosser shapes of sensuous imagination; and on the Christian side, in the substitution of a fanciful religion for the simple faith and life of the Gospel, or of vague spiritual notions for objective truths.

Such are the chief forms in which the mind of the time would embody itself, and such are actually the systems which we find to have been the outgrowths of its history. Our limits will allow only a rapid sketch. We find the first form of empiricism, not only in the efforts of heathen priest and people to breathe a new life into the decaying superstition, as the ivy puts forth its greenness among ruins; but equally in some of the philosophic writers of that day, whose culture, while it raised them above the mass, was shallow and superficial. Such was Celsus, who, if we may judge by the remains in Origen, had not the least insight into the truths of revelation, but was capable only of a petty, carping criticism. In Christianity this empiricism found its natural representatives in the Latin fathers, since the Latin mind was more practical than speculative; and in most of the early apologists and champions of the faith. This character is seen in their prevalent view of

heathen philosophy, deriving it from evil spirits, or referring its truths to some objective, fragmentary Hebrew tradition; and again, of revelation, which they confined within the sphere of an authoritative letter, or an outward church system. Such a class of minds was natural, and necessary as a counterpoise against the tendencies of idealism; yet we cannot recognize in theirs more than an imperfect and narrow position. Had Christianity remained fixed where they placed it, it would have been no theology. We turn then to the representatives of the philosophic thought of that age. In all the reigning systems of heathenism, save the neo-Platonic, we have the extreme of denial. Stoicism, in its Pantheistic metaphysics, found no place for revelation; in its ethics asserted a self-sufficient virtue for the self-renouncing morality of Christ; it wrapped itself in its mantle as of old, and met the new faith with "What will this babbler say?" sensuous Epicureanism had no perception of spiritual Christian truth: scepticism, as in a frivolous Lucian, mocked at all earnest belief, and blasphemed against the deepest moral sentiments of the heart. All, from various points, converged in the rejection of Christianity. But it is when we turn to a nobler school, that we find the first manifestations of a deeper thought. The neo-Platonism of that day was an attempt, amid the ruins of faith and reason, to upbuild an eclecticism; and, accordingly, while its teachers would not accept revelation as authoritative, they sought to weave its doctrines into their system; in a word, to embrace it as an element in a comprehensive whole. This is clear to any who has examined their remains, especially with Proclus, in our view the most symmetrical expositor of the school. In his writings there is contained a distinct approximation to the doctrine of the Trinity, as well as fragments of ideas concerning the creation of the world, the truth of a Mediator, such as could only have been derived from revelation, and are utterly different from the conceptions of the heathen mind.* But a far more important writer, in this connection, who seems to occupy just the middle point between an anti-Christian philosophy and a Christian belief, is a yet earlier mind, the prototype of Alexandrian eclecticism, Philo Judæus. It appears to us that, even among our learned historians, his due place of eminence has not been awarded him. We might draw a striking analogy between this intellect, combining comprehensive reason with lofty imagination, and the philosophic genius that seems the peculiar character of modern Germany. Of course, we do not call him Christian, for it is from the position of Jewish supernaturalism

* V. Procli Comment. in Theolog. Plotin., Lib. I. chap. 3d et al.

that he reasons ; nor do we call him a true philosophic believer, for he deserts the solid ground of history. But we have in him a mighty intellect, struggling to grasp the inner ideas of revelation, and unfold them in their unity with all other truths ; yet, in the attempt to rise above historical fact, losing sight of any objective reality, and merging it at last in a comprehensive but baseless idealism. One word will sum up their results. They indicate an approach towards Christianity, a preparation for its reception by the better heathen intellect, yet an utter failure in the apprehension of it as a special, supernatural religion. Had philosophy gone no further, Christianity would have taken its place in the rank of speculative systems, and its author been honoured, as he was in the palace of Alexander Severus, with a niche and a statue by the side of Plato and Socrates.

We must pass, then, to the proper domain of Christian belief, to find the first glimpse of that unity for which the ancient mind was striving. It would be folly to expect in that age an integral system : we must be content to discover ideas and tendencies. The harbinger of this Christian philosophy was Justin Martyr : yet, while in his writings we find noble suggestions, especially in his idea of the λόγος σπερματικός (v. Apollog. II.), which shows a perception of the unity of all philosophic truth, with him Christianity was rather a fuller revelation of doctrines, already known in part by the ancient mind, than of a central, supernatural fact of redemption. It is when we turn from his cruder reasonings to the works of Clement and Origen, that we find the richest developments. Filled with the spirit of Christian faith, while nursed in the atmosphere of Greek genius, their writings are a mine of precious metal, as yet in the ore, but piercing the soil everywhere with broad veins, and its very sands heavy and shining with grains of golden wisdom. Origen is the greater and more systematic of the two. We have nothing to say here of his errors. The fallacy of critics, in judging their remains, has resulted from looking at them in the mass, and so pronouncing them a farrago of follies and fancies. All the works of that age are what Clement called his, *Stromata*, materials for a doctrinal edifice rather than the edifice itself. It is not their views on particular doctrines, that claim our attention ; it is only their fundamental ground as to the relation of Christianity to reason ; and it is by our recognition of this their central aim, that we must judge of the influence of those great men. Clement, and yet more, Origen, in his work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, laid down this position, new to that age, that the Divine Revelation was the distinct source of all truths which concerned redemption ; that, while the speculative reason might

range freely beyond the circle of these truths, within this it must bow in faith, and from this centre build up a Christian philosophy and ethics. It was thus a position, opposed on one side to the empiricism of the mere letter, on the other to the idealism which destroyed it. This was their work; thus they laid the corner stone of a legitimate Christian science, and this result they handed down to the ages after them. The rubbish and dross of Origen were cast aside; the gold was refined into a later and better wisdom.

But we must pass rapidly to the last form of intellectual effort, that of mysticism. It was, as we might suspect, from the school of neo-Platonism, it was developed on the heathen side. An eclecticism at first attempting, but failing to combine, the heterogeneous elements of Eastern and Western thought, it took refuge, at last, in subjective notions and fancies. Porphyry believed in special illuminations, and Jamblichus merged the pure Greek intellect in the wildness of Oriental theosophy. It passed on one side into a kind of philosophic self-isolation, an arrogant assumption of intuitive knowledge; and on another, by that necessity which often compels the intellectual mystic to fly from what is subjective, it degenerated into fanaticism. Out of the sublimated mysteries of latter Platonism came those who pretended by the discipline of thought to have risen above the sphere of man, and to hold communion with the supernatural. The most remarkable of these phenomena is seen in Apollonius of Tyana. In this man, ancient philosophy descended from its abstract region into contact with the realism of Christianity, and dared to cope with the Son of God in the assumption of wonder-working powers. But we cannot linger here; we pass to the Christian and semi-Christian forms of mysticism. In its simplest shape, as the result of pious feeling, we trace it among several of the Latin fathers; again, in others, in a more speculative dress, mingled with an undefined, imaginative philosophy. But the strangest type of this is found, at a somewhat later and vanishing period, in Synesius. One can hardly read his mysterious hymns, without the feeling of wonder that such a mind could ever have belonged to a bishop of the church. What would be thought now, should a learned diocesan reproduce the ideas of Schelling's *Welt-seele*, in the most transcendental lyric verse? Christian truth, in these poems, glides like a spectral shadow into the region of philosophic fancy, and dissolves in its own rare atmosphere.

But we must hasten to a view of other forms of semi-Christian mysticism. From the religion of simple faith and worship,

was produced the most extraordinary theosophy the world has ever seen. Minds not content with the letter, yet guided by no true principles of philosophy, sought speculative nourishment in the then prevalent Oriental systems; and from this unnatural union sprang Gnosticism. It is one of the most singular contrasts to turn from a page of Paul or James to these fantastic records, and think that such were in any sense Christian sects. As we read of them in Irenæus, it seems more than Cimmerian darkness; and the reader of Neander must thank him for having first thrown a ray of philosophic light into it. We cannot, of course, enter into the differences of Gnostic theory, but grasp only the central points, from which to know their common relation to Christianity. Their essential principle was that of a higher Gnosis, above the natural sense of Revelation. Assuming that it was meant to be a system of speculative knowledge, and thus finding in its common truths too narrow a sphere; aiming, in the Oriental spirit, at a theory of God, the soul, and the world, they mingled with the received doctrines the most heterogeneous elements, the most intricate problems, which perplex the mind of man, and out of this *rudis indigestaque moles*, sought to weave a great scheme of the universe. The letter of Scripture was interpreted by purely fanciful hermeneutics: its ideas transformed into the most stupendous conceptions. This world was only a scene in the grand drama of eternity; creation the first link in a chain of degradations, a passage of spirit from the bosom of pure being into impure matter; the existence of man in time and body intrinsically evil; Christ, the divine *Æon*, descending into this gross sphere to deliver the soul from its enthrallment to the malignant power; and redemption the attainment of intellectual and spiritual freedom above the bonds of material sense. The pagan was, in the lowest class of sense, an enslaved man; the Jew and vulgar Christian were a step above him, but possessed only a husk of truth; the Gnostic enjoyed the intuition of truth itself, and was animated with a principle of divine holiness. In a word, Christianity with these men was not a revelation to be philosophically developed from its own centre, and complete in its natural meaning; but only, as the inscriptions of an Egyptian obelisk, a key or picture-alphabet of a higher science; and the fruit of such confusion of ideas could only be mysticism.

These, then, in a sketch of necessity rapid, were the forms in which the ancient mind manifested itself. It were needless and irrelevant to our design to more than note the general features. We have said enough to exhibit the process of action and re-ac-

tion between Christianity and human reason ; and would only re-affirm that these are not to be held as arbitrary or disjointed parts, but the necessary phenomena of that age.

From this analysis of early Christianity we turn to the parallel we have affirmed, and show in the features of the present, amid all differences, the essential counterpart. It may be said in general, that there has never been a time, since the primitive, when such an utter chaos of opinion has existed under the common name of Christianity. There have been, indeed, all along the periods of our religion, the boldest speculations, and ceaseless contests of faith with error : and it is a fact worthy of note, that in the writings of Erigena, of Abelard, and many others both of the Platonic and Aristotelian eras of theology, may be found as monstrous forms of abstract falsehood as in these latter days of philosophic Pantheism. But all these wore the outward garb of the one revealed faith ; they created no distinct classes of Christian, semi-Christian, and un-Christian, but were rather the speculations of individual minds. Now we behold the fact of a philosophic Christendom, severed into sects, standing at all points of the scale, and forming, as at first, peculiar schools of reasoners. This explains the truth already stated, that the difference of the two eras is more apparent than real. Christian theology seems now in the widest sense passing through an age of development, the image and likeness of the primitive. Its issues are as complete and unlimited. It is a period of theories, each of which opposes others on first principles ; a time, when there is as vast a variety of error, as alarming a scepticism, as unsettled a philosophic striving, as earnest an aim after belief ; when many are walking in twilight and praying, " Would God it were morning." Our spiritual state may be well described in the Roman poet's picture of the primeval world of dissevered atoms :

" Nulla quies est
Reddita corporibus primis per inane profundum ;
Sed magis, assiduo varioque exercita motu,
Partem intervallis magnis conflictata resultant,
Pars etiam brevibus spatiis nexantur ab ictu ;
Et quæcumque, magis condense conciliatur,
Exiguus intervallis convecta resultant."

Lucretius, Lib. II. 94—100.

We will consider, then, the leading tendencies of this age, in regard to scientific Christianity. And first, as before, we have our modern empirics ; a class which is as numerous now and influential, notwithstanding our religion has shown in its triumphant progress that it has everything to hope and nothing at last to fear from the results of reason. " There must be in all ages metaphysicians," says Coleridge, " men to whom the

heaven-descended *γνώθι σεαυτόν* is a law of intellectual striving;" and in all ages, we may add, there must be those to whom there is no such conscious necessity, and who therefore oppose such strivings. With minds of this class theology is no science, but a dogmatic statement of facts; a concordance of Scripture texts is their *summa theologiæ*; or it may be a routine of worn-out discussions concerning a set of particular doctrines, a partisan attachment to the *magister sententiarum* of some narrow school; or, in another shape, it may be a *catena patrum*, a blind resting on the church as an *ecclesia docens*, with no requirement save implicit faith, not because the universal reason and conscience of the Christian past speak to the individual reason and conscience, but because a council has settled truth for ever. In our day this empiricism is marked by its indiscriminate opposition to the sciences, which are the sources of its fear. It is seen in the prevalent jealousies of natural philosophy, as if there were really doubt that Revelation could find its reconciliation; and so we must decree in synod, that there has not been any creation anterior to the present system, must put down astronomy with its nebular theories, as that sage Aristotelian, who refused to look through a telescope for fear of shaking his settled opinions. It was seen in the dread of exegetical criticism, branding without difference all from Paulus and Strauss to Tholuck and Olshausen; and equally in a blind dislike of the philosophical and theological inquiries of the age, unwilling to sift good from evil, not recognizing that these are in every period the deep necessities of its thought. It is seen in the various minds that are seeking to regenerate discordant Christendom by the repetition of some magic formulas of Protestant theology, which once had power; and again, in such as a Newman and a Ward, who, weary of ultra-Protestantism, chose ultra-Romanism, and, Pygmalion-like, would warm the stone statue of a mediæval Christianity into new life. On the other side, we have a neurological empiricism, as hollow and groundless. It was, indeed, the want of a true Christian philosophy, underlying the formulas of doctrinal faith, which first led such as Semler to attack the record. A belief in the dead letter produced a criticism of the dead letter. This neology confined itself to the mole-eyed work of undermining the outer wall; it searched the canon, doubted the authenticity and genuineness of the sacred books, and on purely hermeneutical grounds would anatomize not only the body, but the soul, of Christianity. It is this empiric neology, which prevailed in Germany, until now that Strauss has placed an unchristian exegesis on the basis of a philosophic Christology. It is this, which entered among us with Unitarian error; which, unable to grasp the grand, living truths of Incar-

nation and Redemption, quarrelled about this and that text, set aside the introduction of John's Gospel as a neo-Platonic corruption, and called all its sublimest mysteries Orientalisms. So far as it is a philosophy at all, it is one of pure negations; it rests on the assertion of a few vague notions of natural theology, with but a bald recognition of distinct Christian doctrine. This empiricism, however, is fast passing away, as its spirit of unbelief has developed into bolder and more decided forms.

We turn, then, to the higher ground of philosophy, and consider, first, the forms of un-Christian and semi-Christian error. The attitude of utter denial, seen in the early schools of heathen false wisdom, has had its counterpart in the English and French deism of the century just past. And, as at first this opposition sprang from the want of the least affinity with Christianity in a material Pantheism, a sensual Epicureanism, and a mocking scepticism, so in the like coarse and revolting principles of a D'Holbach, a Helvetius and a Hume was the entire negation of a divine religion in its spirit and truth. But that grosser unbelief is vanished. Idealism has taken the place of materialism. Here, then, as we have observed in early time, the phenomenon of a philosophy seeking to recognize the truths of revelation, yet in reality subverting its ground-work of supernatural faith, we may behold the same results in the systems of modern idealism, under the twofold aspect of Naturalism and of Pantheism. We come now to the phenomena, which are more fully the outgrowths of the age, and present our parallel in its most striking light. There has always been a certain direct opposition of belief and unbelief; but it is only causes, lying deeply in the mind and circumstances of these two periods, which can produce the similitude of which we speak. While in the domain of pure science, the fruits of idealism are nobler, and thus the infidelity issuing from it, is of a more spiritual character; and while, again, it were proof of most obtuse empiricism to blend present with past deism in the same condemnation, it is yet true that the denial of a special and supernatural revelation is as complete on one side as the other.

We shall consider the first form of naturalism, or subjective idealism, in this view. The philosophy of Kant, powerful as it was against the dogmatic scepticism of Hume, and the dogmatic sensualism of Condillac and Helvetius, was itself only a scepticism on a profounder base. It denied the possibility of demonstrating or surely knowing objective truth; it brought all truths within the limits of pure reason, while it gave to the conclusions of that reason only subjective validity. And thus its necessary result was a rejection of the supernatural ground of Christianity; it sought to explain its doctrines by mere phi-

losophic conceptions, its miracles on natural principles; nor could it see, as even a profounder unbelief has seen, the demand in reason itself for an objective, supernatural reality. The critical philosophy was thus pushed to the very verge of utter denial. If the reader will find one of the fullest statements of this system of naturalism, let him turn to the volume of Tennemann's History of Philosophy, (the complete, untranslated work,) which treats of Christ and primitive Christianity. In this, revelation appears as a pure phenomenon of its age. Prophets and inspired messengers are only representatives of Jewish and Christian ideas: Christ is a teacher of a Kantian ethics in a concrete shape; and all religion is the mere affirmation of reason and moral sentiment; a self-development of consciousness; a self-culture of holiness. We have seen and see this system in our country, coalescing with a development of modern Unitarianism, leading it out from the materialism of Priestley into an ideal shape, and at length in its finished results overturning all faith in the outward and miraculous, pronouncing Judaism and Christianity only transient forms, rejecting on subjective grounds the authority of Christ and His apostles, applying this "foregone conclusion" as a critical dictum to the interpretation of the record, and resting at last on the basis of natural reason and conscience as the oracles of absolute truth and goodness.

But we must pass to the yet higher developments of philosophy: we refer to the stupendous systems of modern natural-supernaturalism. Since the rise of that idealism, which was rather, as Kant called it, a *Kritik* than a system, there has been felt the need of a profounder metaphysics and theology. In proportion as men investigated the truths of revelation, they recognized in its supernatural character somewhat which could not be merged into a mere naturalism. In the Absolute Philosophy of Schelling, further developed by Hegel, was given for those who, with no true Christian principles, yet sought to grasp the supernatural which they could not explain away, the basis of a new and comprehensive system. As a philosophy, it attempts to pass the bounds of a Kantian subjectivity; it looks on nature as a living organism, on God as not a pure idea, but a Being, developing Himself in the forms of outward creation, in the consciousness of man, and again in human history, as the unfolding of Divine law through ages and events. Such a system, then, as applied to revelation, must lead to different views from those of naturalism. Instead of excluding the divine, it includes it in a more comprehensive whole; instead of reasoning away the facts of supernaturalism, it affirms them as instances of the perpetual outflow of a higher power into nature; instead of denying a manifested God, it views Him as ever revealing

Himself to the race; it seeks even, as Baur has done in his great work, to supply the philosophic truth lying at the basis of a Trinity; instead of regarding the incarnation as an absurdity, it sees in it the law of universal humanity, the identical oneness of God and man. In a word, it has grasped the ideas of Christianity, and given them a place in its system, but in so doing robbed them of all which makes them Christian. All that is special is merged in the absolute. All historic facts are the mythologic dress of general truths. Such is the outline of this system, grand in its features, vast in its errors as well as truths. We have then here, as we have said, the peculiar phenomenon of the first and this latest age; an unbelief, totally different from the philosophy which directly rejects revelation, and yet as essentially and entirely destructive of it. It matters not, whether it be by a higher or lower method; whether through the subterranean road of a grovelling atheism, or the airy path of pantheistic speculation, we arrive at last at the same *profundum inane*, at the annihilation of all those personal and living ideas of God, of redeemed humanity, of immortality, which only a supernatural revelation can supply.

But we must turn briefly to the position which a true Christian philosophy occupies in our age. It has been seen that in the primitive day the aim of the Alexandrian fathers was to rear a Christian science from the starting-point of revelation, as a historical and divine truth, yet to exhibit its harmony with all other truth. The solution of the same problem, in connection with the present state of advanced science in every sphere, is the labour of this era. It is true, nor do we mean to deny, that there has been a legitimate Christian philosophy in each successive century; but we mean that since that earliest period the question of the fundamental relation of Christianity to reason has never stood forth in so distinct an attitude. It was then a necessary striving; it is with us from the circumstances, which in common phrase have resolved all things into their original elements, as necessary a demand for reconstruction. To learn what are the results of the age of this domain, we must turn, then, to Germany. While we acknowledge the labours of the learned in all branches of Christian knowledge, we must say, unhesitatingly, that in the proper sphere of a scientific theology, there has appeared in no other country a work destined to have a marked influence on the great speculative conflict now waging in the bosom of Christendom for the very foundations of revealed truth. England has her divines, but they have been so busied with the old questions of theology, with local polemics, and of late with the Anglo-Catholic movement, which is shaking the unstable equilibrium

of her reformation, that she has brought forth only here and there a thinker who has dived to the depth of modern science. France has borrowed her ideas from Germany, and as yet little more than its rationalism. Our country has had no profound metaphysician since Edwards. It is the land which originated the most stupendous form of unbelief that must produce the Christian philosophy of the age. There is, then, to classify the leading tendencies, one class among those who hold the principles of the absolute philosophy who seek, as we have already recognized in the Alexandrian Philo, to find a middle ground between an absorbing idealism and a historic revelation. Such, so far as we can gather from the outlines of his lectures, appears the position of Schelling at present. It is his purpose to show that his system, instead of merging the special and supernatural, gives the true method by which to rise from the ideas of reasons to supernaturalism. But, though there are many professed Hegelians who occupy a similar position, we confess, that to our own view there is an impossibility in the very ground of the absolute philosophy of such reconciliation. A system which does not set forth from the fixed centre of historic supernaturalism, must end in its denial, or in a vague theosophy. The truth of Christianity can never be evolved from the abstract idea of the absolute. We find here, therefore, not a right result, but only an indication of the aim of the time. It is to another class of theologians that we look, as those who have begun to construct revealed science in its true basis. The principle, which was first philosophically grasped by Schleiermacher, is the corner stone of a Christian system. In mentioning this great name, we by no means claim for him the praise of a complete theology, but find in him many grave errors, and only the massive fragments of an unfinished edifice. Yet it is a shallow criticism, which sees in him only a Sabellian heresy, and forgets his service to the cause of revelation. His work was, in an age of rationalism on one side and pietism on the other, to fix the fundamental idea of a revealed truth in its relation to reason. And while others, like Twisten and Müller, have purified his truth of its errors and carried it to its completeness, the Christian philosophy of Germany and the age stands rooted in his central principle. Revelation, in his view, is in itself a distinct, supernatural reality, having its subjective basis in the consciousness, recognizing Christ as a Redeemer fitted to its spiritual want, its objective basis in the historic fact of redemption. The same idea is the groundwork of the "Aids to Reflection," a work whose value, in spite of its partial statement of the doctrines of original sin, atonement, baptism, is that it grasps the essence of revealed truth,

and upbuilds it on a living foundation. Christianity is one central sun, around which all other truths revolve; and a true theology, while it does not deny the legitimacy of the reason in its own domain, from this starting point of the moral consciousness and the revealed fact answering thereto, enters into its domain, and creates a proper Christian metaphysics and ethics. Here, accordingly, on one hand, is overthrown the principle as well as the result of that rationalism, which, beginning with an intellectual abstraction, merges in absolute ideas the essential meaning of revelation as a redemptive fact; and on the other, by a right method the divine truth is developed in its harmony with all truths, not in the way of an unphilosophical dogmatism. But we cannot dwell longer here than to show a distinct aim and direction. It may be asked, if such a principle has not been affirmed by many sages before; and to this we answer, it is doubtless a truth implied in all Christian theology; the praise of our age is to have brought it out in its essential meaning, its complete form. No theology is ever in advance of the philosophy of its time, but is founded upon it. Metaphysical rationalism has never before sought with such dialectic skill to prove the impossibility of revelation in the very groundwork of reason. Theology has been hitherto occupied rather with particular doctrines; has built up systems on an assumed dogmatic basis; now it has been compelled to investigate its deeper, fundamental relation to pure science, and the result has been a true adjustment of the claims of philosophy without infringement on supernatural religion. We have thus far traced a remarkable analogy in the features of the primitive and present eras, and we have space for no more than the briefest sketch of the rest. Mysticism was spoken of as the outgrowth of that early mind, and as then on the side of heathenism, it sprang from a philosophy which, wanting a true basis, surrendered itself to individual notions, or mingled with the poetic pantheism of the East, so do we have its antitype. It is found in that class of mock-transcendentalists among us, who arrogate to themselves the title *κατ' ἑξοχὴν* of the spiritual thinkers of New England, but whose philosophy is indeed only the weakest dilution of that German mind, which it imitates. It wears sometimes the form of subjective idealism, sometimes of pantheism, but is in truth only a confused mingling of these in an unscientific mysticism. It claims for itself direct intuitions of the absolute, and its self-soliloquizing is communion with the divine; it scorns the idea of revelation, a Mediator, a written word, a formula of worship, and from its sublime heights looks down on the gross souls bound in the fetters of Christian belief. All cant in ridiculous; but the cant of our modern philosophic

sentimentalism is the absurdest, because most pretentious, of all. Nothing can exceed the folly which has infested its votaries. It is a philosophy which spurns logic, and which logic spurns; a philosophy of notions and words, whose chief strength lies in a peculiar dialect, drawn from the sacred books of its sages, and preserved as the convenient substitute for well-defined thought. Nor should we forget to mention in this connection, as an instance of the parallel we have exhibited, its tendency to fanaticism. One of its strongest features is, that it has allied itself to the crude jugglery of animal magnetism, has recognised it as perhaps a new communion of the soul with higher powers of nature. Apollonius of Tyana has re-appeared in the followers of Mesmer and the Poughkeepsie seer. While Christian miracles are denied, the miracles of modern *clairvoyance* are asserted; and it is even gravely suggested that a key may be found in them to the wonder-working cures and prophetic vision of Jesus of Nazareth. So true is that keen criticism of Pascal:—"Incredules, le plus credules. Ils croient les miracles de Vespasien, pour ne pas croire ceux de Moïse."—*Pensées*. But we must hasten to the consideration of this mystical tendency on the side of Christian belief. Here it is we must name the pietism of Germany, which, from the early day of Spener, has attracted to itself many hearts, taking refuge from the coldness of rationalism in the warmth of devotional feeling. Much of our evangelical religion has this character. It is the form in which an earnest Christian consciousness expresses itself, but it wants a philosophic clearness and depth; it rests the doctrines of revelation too much on emotions, which are not intelligibly grasped; it differs from a right Christian philosophy in this, that it does not by a scientific analysis of the spiritual consciousness lay the basis of objective and universal truth, but asserts only its own subjective states of devout thought and feeling, its own individual convictions of sin and longings after redemption. But it is in what we may call a semi-Christian form, we find the last type of modern mysticism. Primitive religion brought forth Gnosticism; our age has its Gnosticism, as fantastic, as stupendous, the outgrowth of like causes, and the counterpart of the past in its general features. We refer to the theosophy which holds so marked an attitude among the chaotic elements of the time; which, erroneous as it is, has drawn to itself many intellects of a high order, and created a school—the system of Swedenborg. The principle of the modern as of the ancient Gnosticism is the assertion of a higher Gnosis, vouchsafed to the wise above the multitude of believers; its method is the same, an endeavour to find in common Christianity a symbolic form, beneath which is hidden a more spiritual

truth, a husk containing a purer kernel of wisdom, a revelation given in the germ by Christ, and now fully developed by a second Emmanuel. It is, in short, a theology of the imagination, which takes the ideas of Scripture, and rears on them a superstructure of its own; carries the miracles to a second power; turns the written word into a cipher, of which the initiated have the key; a vast, symmetrical mysticism, unfolding many noble views in religion and ethics, interwoven throughout with fancies and falsehoods, itself built essentially on a fancy and a falsehood. The mind of many, tired of a bare naturalism, yearning for supernatural truth, yet by the very force of re-action borne to the extreme of indiscriminating faith; not content, therefore, with simple Christianity, quarrelling, like Sir Thomas Browne, because it has not mysteries enough, ready to accept the *Credo, quia impossibile*, plunges into this bottomless sea of Swedenborgianism, and finds there ample room to float at pleasure. The same despairing spirit, which leads the man of devotion, but more sensuous imagination, into the attractive worship of Rome, as a refuge from ultra-Protestantism, guides him of more intellectual, abstract temperament into the church of the New Jerusalem.

We might at greater length pass on from feature to feature, but our limits compel us to omit several, perhaps as important views. Two of these we name as characteristic tendencies of our own and the early ages; the syncretism, which is so prevalent in this time of opinions; and, again, the false and formal Catholicism, which has carried so many into the Roman church to realize the dream of unity in a mere mechanism of faith and worship. But, as these are rather popular than scientific tendencies, we only mention them. Let the reader follow out, if he will, this line of comparison, and it will offer him one of the most curious and fruitful studies of philosophic antiquarianism. It is enough for us, if we have laid down a sufficient induction for the conclusions we would draw.

The knowledge of causes is that which the philosopher seeks, not the mere aggregate of facts; and it is to these we turn. It were empiricism of the grossest kind to suppose that such phenomena could exist, without a deep and peculiar reason. Nor will it be said, by any who has true insight, that they can be solved by the general theory of a philosophic striving, more or less alike in every age. An analogy so remarkable, so varied, can only come from circumstances and inward principles, pertaining to those two eras, as to no others; and it is when we study these, we find the light which reveals this extraordinary page of Christian history. We have, then, already seen that in its appearing our religion must have existed as a spontaneous

faith, and equally that it must have had its after-time of scientific expansion. Yet, in the attainment of doctrinal form, it must have passed through a long process of inward and outward struggle, must have grappled with the ideas of the age, and stood as a revealed truth in the midst of erroneous and of partially true systems. The varied phenomena of that period were the necessary results of conflict, the necessary conditions of a future unity. But we must not suppose that such a contest could wholly cease, even after Christianity assumed a more definite form of truth. It is rather the design of God, while the foundations of the faith are eternal, to allow His religion to have its natural career, in connection with the free activity of human intellect. Nor, while we have and may have in the creed and worship of Christianity, the settled groundwork of practical religion, may we expect to attain a perfect, changeless system of Christian science, until the advancing knowledge of man has reached its fullest harmony with the truths of revelation. It may be said indeed that, allowing a necessary progression in Christian science, it is a real progression, not a retrogression, or a ceaseless oscillation we should look for; and that, after eighteen centuries it is somewhat discouraging to behold the world still in the state of primitive chaos. And, viewed in itself, it is so; viewed in regard to the self-will of men, it is most lamentable; yet it is a fact, capable of an explanation that supplies hope and assurance. It has not been a retrogression, but, as has been said of social progress, "an advancement in a spiral line." If, then, we examine philosophically the state of the age succeeding that of the Reformation, we shall find special causes which produced this chaotic condition of things. In the will of God, and the free development of history, the church passed through centuries of decay; and while we cannot agree with those who look on the middle age as without light or life, while it had its mighty minds, and eras of thought, it was an age of cramped energies, of narrow and distorted growth. Philosophy followed as a slave bound at the chariot wheel of Aristotle. The Bible was not a lost, yet it was a sealed, book. An iron dogmatism was riveted upon the mind of Europe. It was of necessity that a change, should it come, must rise, not by degrees, but in the sudden untamed activity of a whirlwind. The intellect of Christendom, roused into reaction, like the pent stream, which at the furthest point of pressure, bursts the rock, and makes its own wild outlet, broke the barriers of a Romish system; and in proportion to its former slavery was the excess of its new freedom. Religion felt the impulse, and partook in its influences; while a Luther and a Melancthon thought to go no further than the position of a

scriptural Christianity, the movement swept over and beyond them. Natural science passed into the wide field of discovery, and as it laid down results hitherto unknown, they were not found in harmony with the received dogma. The study of language opened the books of Hebrew and Greek learning; and the criticism exercised on all ancient records, was severely dealt on the sacred volume. Metaphysical philosophy entered on the free career of speculative error and truth. All those revenged themselves on Christianity for their long bondage; and there arose among men of science that fearful era which has so long prevailed. Christian dogmatism, in turn, strong in its inner fortress of authority, would not at first come forth to meet its enemies in the open plain, but dealt out its indiscriminate and haughty defiance. In the closing half of the past century, this movement seemed to have reached its zenith. There appeared no longer a settled religion left in the world. As in the first it stood, grappling with all enemies, labouring for a foothold; and as then all varieties of error manifested themselves, and truth was seen only in an imperfect form, so was it again.

The eighteenth century saw revelation and science in direct hostility. Metaphysics boldly asserted the baselessness of a supernatural faith. Ethics severed morality from belief and worship. Natural science laughed to scorn the cosmogony of Moses, the miracles of the Old and New Testaments. Criticism found interpolations and falsehoods in the text. Neology tore it in pieces as a tissue of myths. History cast aside Judaism, and hurled the works of the Fathers with contempt among the rubbish of tradition. It is lamentable, indeed, to look back on the annals of that past epoch, when a material philosophy of unbelief was succeeded by a spiritual philosophy of unbelief, when an unchristian literature and science reigned over Europe: but we can only take refuge in a Christian optimism, and believe that, as it sprang from natural and necessary causes, it will yet come out in a right channel. It could not be expected that such a state of things should subside at once; for more than forty days had the deluge of error been swelling to its height; it must be more than forty days before dry land could be seen, and then it was a waste left by the waters, an overturning of all landmarks, a needful rebuilding of each habitable home. There was demanded a gradual re-construction of Christian science. It could only be, as in deeper insight, in more patient labour, falsehood should be met with truth; as a better natural science should find its facts harmonious with a rightly-interpreted Scripture; as a better criticism should find a pure and settled text; as a better metaphysics should discover the way of union with historic revelation, that there should be restored the identity of reason and faith.

Such was, and is yet to a great extent, the chaotic state of Christendom; such its phenomena, and such their causes. Never, since the birth of our religion, has been seen so stupendous a conflict as has been waged between the truth of God and human error; no other age, except the primitive, whatever its importance in philosophic or religious culture, can compare with this in which we live, in the grandeur of its efforts, the variety of its issues, the momentous problems which hang on its results. Nor have we yet reached its conclusion. The battle is not yet over: nay, we are to expect the mightiest attempts of error in proportion to the advances of truth. But, while the chaotic condition of Christendom yet remains, it is evident from what has been said that the whole character of the strife is changed. It is not now, as in the past, an utter hostility of science to Christianity. The materialism and sensualism of the eighteenth century are gone; and on every hand is felt the demand, not of destruction, but of re-construction. Pantheism itself, as well as Christian belief, is aiming in its own way at this. It is the tendency which underlies the grand movements of the age, intellectual, social, religious. The question on which the mightiest results depend, which must be felt by all deep minds as the most momentous of all, is, what shall be the character of this coming era of re-union? The inquiry is one which has its different answer, according to the different attitude of each in regard to both science and revelation. On one side the transcendental unbeliever expects the time when Christianity shall be acknowledged the transient phenomenon of a less advanced period; a millennium of pure reason in science, in art, in society, in worship. On the other, the timid religionist sees only the signs of despair; and, between the two, are found many who remain in utter doubt, hardly knowing whether to fear or hope the more for the cause of truth. But we turn to this question in calm confidence. It appears almost blasphemy, to him who believes in the power of Christian truth and the promise of its Author, to be troubled with misgiving. That lofty sentence of the apostle should be our motto: "We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth." And yet more, to him who feels the necessity of a harmony between revelation and science, and has rightly studied the history of these successive strivings after it, it is a hope, founded not only on faith, but on a faith which is "the substance of that hoped for." In this very analogy that we have drawn, do we read the assurance of triumph. It was necessary that primitive Christianity should pass through its fearful conflicts, before its victory, yet that victory came. Poor and imperfect, as viewed in the broader light of modern science, that early philosophy appears; yet when we compare

its results with the character of the time before it, when we remember that before even that imperfect Christianity, a more imperfect heathenism and scepticism passed away; when we remember the constellation of genius and learning which shone upon the fourth century, we may see in it a sure advancement. And in like manner, when we regard the equally necessary causes which led to our struggles, and on every hand the omens of the present, we may expect similar results. Such is our view of the present attitude of Pantheism. As the early speculations of a Proclus, a Philo, only formed a partial step in the process which produced a true philosophy, so we look upon the overshadowing system of Hegel as a transient effort to grasp those supernatural truths, which will themselves reveal its emptiness, and mould a higher and more satisfying system. Yet it will be asked, what special ground of hope is given here, if, according to this very analogy, we may only look for a partial and short-lived success, for an after-age of worse confusion? Our answer is given in the difference, as well as in the likeness, of the two eras. The contest of this time, though like, is deeper, and the result will be deeper. The first witnessed an incipient struggle; the last has witnessed the meeting of philosophy and revelation on the final ground of battle, and the victory, when it comes, will be proportioned to the grandeur of its causes and its issues. Compared with the Pantheism of modern Germany, the most stupendous system of error the mind can create, heathen unbelief was puerile; compared with the boldness of neology, the attacks of a Celsus and a Porphyry were harmless; compared with the results of a Clemens and an Origen, the Christian philosophy of a Schleiermacher, a Twisten, a Müller, an Ullmann, are an immeasurable progress. And on every hand we may see the signs of this new unity. Geology and astronomy are taking Christian ground; criticism is producing her learned men of thoroughly believing mind; history is recognizing the place and influence of revelation; metaphysics and ethics are striving after the harmony of reason and conscience with faith; and in the most important domain of all, scientific theology, we have already traced the striking phenomena of our age. Out of the bosom of Protestantism is proceeding a new and living Christian philosophy; and whatever the fears of many, there has never been a period, when in every part of Christendom has been such a vigorous awaking of both speculative intellect and devotional feeling, in the direction of belief. Even Romanism has passed, with a Möhler, into the ground of scientific inquiry, and his position and method are utterly different from those of a former dogmatism. Our trust is in that progressive development through which not the reason of man only, but of God, is leading His Church.

Christianity cannot die. Her triumphs are sure. Unbelief will pass, as it has passed away. We may lament the evils of the present; we may look for no immediate conclusions, but we must not, cannot fear the end. We must view these movements as the inundations of a mighty Nile, which, although they do not leave untouched the dwellings planted on the level of the shore, prophesy fair harvests blooming on soil fertilized by the waters; and we must wisely learn, before the next overflow, to rear our houses on firm piles above the highest mark of the rising element. This is our hope, and this our labour. In such a retrospect of the past, and such cheering omens for the future, we may look forward to a better era than any already reached; an era that shall achieve what the primitive and succeeding times have only "known in part and prophesied in part;" an era when a nobler constellation of genius than that of a Clemens, an Athanasius, an Augustine, shall gild the firmament of the church; when, after her most gigantic conflicts, she shall win a lasting triumph, and to the centuries of a dissevered Christendom shall succeed the age of faith and living worship.

ART. IV.—EXPLANATION OF SOME PASSAGES IN GENESIS.

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I. GENESIS, NINTH CHAPTER, VERSES 25—27.

"And he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren. And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japheth; and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant."

It will be recollected that these words follow the account of the planting of a vineyard by Noah, his yielding to the temptation to drink of the wine, and consequent exposure, and which his son Ham, father of Canaan, not only beheld, but reported to others, whilst Shem and Japheth thoughtfully took measures to screen it from view. This conduct brought upon the transgressor the curse of the father, contained in the 25th verse, and more particularly explained in the following verses, by contrasting the fate of his posterity with that of his brothers. We should expect to find Ham in the place of Canaan in these verses, and some versions have substituted that name, or have

translated, as if the text were **חָם אָבִי כְנָעַן**, but without critical authority. The 22nd verse, in which Ham is called the father of Canaan, prepares the way for this verse, and the simple meaning is, that Ham shall be cursed in his posterity, the son bearing the iniquity of the father. The crime of Ham, according to oriental notions, was not a trivial one. "No greater offence could have been committed against him (Noah) than Ham, who was himself a man of mature years and had sons, committed in this case." The laws of filial reverence and modesty in domestic intercourse were in that early age regarded as sacred. The transgression was a domestic one, and so the punishment. When the penalty was inflicted upon the father, depriving him of the right of a son, his children naturally and necessarily suffer with him. Herder *Hebr. Poetry*, I. 221. **עֶבֶר עֲבָדִים**, servant of servants, that is, the *lowest servant*, the opposite of **מִלְכִּים מְלָדִים**, *Comp. Heb. Gram.* § 117. 2, and Ewald, § 488.—**לְאָדָיו**, to his brothers, as is plain from what follows, Shem and Japheth.

In Shem and Japheth is plainly included their posterity, and hence the suffix pronoun **לָם** (to them) at the end of the 26th verse is used instead of **לוֹ**, according to Grammar, § 101. 2. Expl. 1. Ewald, § 421.

Noah does not proceed directly to the blessing that he is to pronounce upon Shem, but foreseeing his future prosperity he more vividly portrays it, by breaking forth in a song of praise to God, who is the author of this good fortune. A somewhat similar usage is found in such passages as *xiv. 20*, *Ex. xviii. 10*, *2 Sam. xviii. 28*. **יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵי שֵׁם**, *Jehovah the God of Shem*, the author of the blessings bestowed upon Shem. It should be noticed that *Jehovah* (**יְהוָה**) is only used in reference to Shem, to whose posterity, as the chosen people, he especially reveals himself by this name. See Tuch and Hengstenberg upon the passage.

The first clause in the 27th verse is more difficult of interpretation; **יִפֹּת אֱלֹהִים לְיִפֹּת**; the paronomasia here between the first and last words at once meets the attention. This verb, **יִפֹּת**, future Hiphil (Jussive) from **פָּתַח** was undoubtedly chosen for the sake of the similarity of sound with **יִפֹּת** instead of a form of **רָחַב**, with which it is here synonymous, although the primitive signification of **פָּתַח**, *to open, expand*, is nearly the same, and this is the usual signification of the same verb in Aramæan. The latter verb followed by **ל** as **פָּתַח ל** here, is translated in *xxvi. 22*, *made room for*, and that is the literal idea in the

present passage: to place in a free, unrestricted position, i. e. to make prosperous, and it should be rendered as expressing a wish: see Grammar upon the Impf. (Future) Jussive, § 126. 2. "May God make room for Japheth," So, in general, most of the ancient translations. The Sept. *παραύξει ὁ θεὸς τῷ Ἰαφὲθ*: Vulg. dilatet; according to the Arab. of Saadi: Beneficiat Deus Japheto. Comp. also in the use of *י* Is. 'iv. 2, xviii. 20, et al.—*יִשְׁכֵּן בְּאֹהֶל שֵׁם* "Let him dwell in the tents of Shem." The object of *יִשְׁכֵּן* is undoubtedly a pronoun referring to Japheth. The parallelism of members seems to require that this verse should have regard to Japheth, as the preceding had respect to them; and, besides, the last words of the verse, and "let Canaan be his servant," are a useless repetition from the preceding verse. But a more decisive argument for this interpretation is as Hengstenberg (Christology, Vol. I. p. 44) indicates: As Noah intentionally used the name Jehovah in speaking of Shem, and Elohim in speaking of Japheth, the name would undoubtedly not have been left to be supplied by the reader. The word *יִשְׁכֵּן* is also variously interpreted. Some expositors, as Gesenius, Michaelis, and others, make it an appellative noun, meaning *name, illustrious name*, with *אֹהֶל* "renowned habitations;" but there should be some good reason for giving this word a totally different meaning here and in the preceding verse, and as none appears, we do not hesitate to render the clause: "and let him [Japheth] dwell in the tents of Shem," that is, let them be partakers with Shem in the blessings which are peculiarly his. The interpretation which makes this phrase mean that the posterity of Japheth shall some time gain possession of the country of the posterity of Shem, and reduce them to subjection, is so much at variance with the context, which requires that the blessings of Japheth should be only subordinate or supplementary to those of Shem, that it needs no confutation.

The question naturally arises, what are the blessings desired and predicted, for the posterity of Shem, and in which Japheth is to be partaker? Von Bohlen, Tiele, and others, endeavour to make out a literal fulfilment in the temporal condition of the posterity of the three brothers, but the futility of this attempt is apparent on close inspection. Even Tuch, who cannot be accused of an undue partiality for the spiritual interpretation, rejects their theories, and says: "This declaration [referring to the clause, 'and Japheth shall dwell in the tents of Shem,'] goes back to the united act of filial piety of both brothers, and is intended to represent the ideal union in which at a subsequent time their posterity shall, as their progenitors now, be

united, for a higher object. That is here first indicated in a more general way, which is distinctly declared in the subsequent history, chap. xii. 3, that the salvation of all nations shall proceed from the offspring of Shem, who, making Zion the common centre of their efforts, shall without distraction be united in the fear of the Lord."

This may be considered as the second stage in the revelation of the blessings which are to be bestowed upon the human race, and which shall have their consummation when the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ shall be fully established in the earth. The most general declaration immediately followed the fall: "it (the seed of the woman) shall bruise the serpent's head," Gen. iii. 15. But here it is indicated, that the deliverance shall be wrought through the posterity of Shem; in chap. xii. 3, xviii. 18, et al., it is declared that in Abraham, of the lineage of Shem, shall all the families of the earth be blessed. The same is made to Isaac, the son of Abraham, xxvi. 4, and to his son Jacob, xxviii. 14, with which compare Zech. xii. 7, and Mal. ii. 12, where we find *יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ*, and *יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ* corresponding to *אֱלֹהֵינוּ*, in this passage of Genesis. And subsequently, as is well known, the promises became much more explicit and numerous. Comp. Is. ii. 2—4, Zech. xiv. 16 sq., Ps. xxii. 26 sq., and Hengstenberg Christology, I. p. 25. In the Chaldee paraphrase of Jonathan, the interpretation which is given above is recognized: "proselyti fient filii ejus et habitabunt in schola Semi." So Jerome, Augustine and others. Calvin explains these verses in substance as follows; "there shall be a temporary division between them and Japheth. Afterwards a time shall come when they will again be united into one body, and have a common abode.—Then the sons of Shem, of whom a greater part had scattered off and separated themselves from the sacred family, are to be collected together, in order that they may abide under the same tabernacle. People also of the stock of Japheth, which had been a long time wandering and scattered about, are to be received into the same household. For God by a new adoption has made one people of different races, and has effected a fraternal union among those who were aliens," cf. ii. 14, 19.

II. GENESIS, TWENTIETH CHAPTER, VERSE 16.

"And unto Sarah he said, Behold I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver; behold he is to thee a covering of the eyes unto all that are with thee, and with all other: thus he was reproved."

The last part of the verse alone occasions any difficulty: Behold, *וְהָיָה* not *he* referring to *אֶתְרֵךְ*, thy brother, but *it*, that

is, the thousand pieces of silver, shall be **בְּסוּרַת עֵינַיִם**, a covering of the eyes, a recompense or penalty both with thee and with all: **וְנִכְרַת**, and thus justice is done thee. Abimelech, it is said in the 14th verse, made a present to Abraham of sheep and oxen and servants, when he restored him his wife, who had been called his sister. These seem to be given as an expiation for the wrong done him. But he is not satisfied with this; he says to Sarah, I have given thy brother a thousand pieces of silver, which shall be a recompense to you individually for the wrong done, and to others. It is plain from the whole narrative, that Abimelech did not, at least after the explanation in the 12th verse, "she is my sister," intend to impute any blame to Abraham and Sarah for what they had done. On the other hand, he seems to understand the injury is all on his part, and that it consequently behoves him to make the proper expiation. This consideration aids us in explaining the words, **בְּסוּרַת עֵינַיִם**, "a covering of the eyes;" for if it means, as Rosenmüller and others suppose, that Sarah shall make use of this money to buy her a veil, so that she by this means appear in future to be a married woman, and not deceive others as she had done Abimelech, the reproach would be palpable. And besides, it yet needs proof that the veil was used in this early age as thus distinctive. See Gesenius Lexicon, under **בְּסוּרַת**. We must, then, give another explanation of these words. And it seems to us that chap. xxxii. 21, leads to the correct interpretation here. **וְאֶכְפְּרוּ פָנָיו בַּבִּנְהוּהוּ**, "I will cover his face," (Eng. vers. appease him,) with the present. The original idea seems to be that of turning away the attention from, by means of a gift, and hence expiatory, so that the injury may no longer be seen. And injury or transgression, according to the Biblical representation, is before the person injured or concerned, so that he sees it, and when forgiven, it is covered, Ps. lxxxv. 3, or cast behind their back, Is. xxxviii. 17, or what is equivalent, the eyes or face are covered, so that it is out of view. The Seventy seem to have rightly understood the passage under consideration, who render *ἔσται σοι εἰς τιμὴν* (fine, penalty) *τοῦ προσώπου σου*.—But this expiation was not made for Sarah alone, but also for all who were concerned; hence the words **לְכָל אֲשֶׁר אָתָּךְ וְאֵת כָּל** "in respect to all that has happened with thee and with all." It is a matter of some question whether the word **וְנִכְרַת** is in the 2nd or 3rd pers. fem. præt. of Niphal, but probably the former. The meaning given to it is very various. Gesenius: "And she was convicted, had nothing to say in excuse." Rosenmüller: *et "reprehensa est;"* but how this is consistent with

the explanation that Gesenius gives of the preceding words, and with the spirit of the whole passage, is difficult to see. For, of what was Sarah convicted, or for what had she to render an excuse? We find that *נָקַדְתִּי* in the Hiphil sometimes means to judge, to procure justice, and hence in the Niphal it may mean, to be judged, to have justice done one; and accordingly here: and recompense is made, or justice done thee. See De Wette's Translation, and Tush's Commentary on Genesis.

III. GENESIS, FIFTIETH CHAPTER, VERSE 26.

"So Joseph died, being an hundred and ten years old; and they embalmed him in Egypt."

In the second verse of the same chapter, it is said, Joseph commanded his servants, the physicians, to embalm his father, &c. These are the only instances in which embalming is spoken of in the Bible, and here the object is apparent, namely, to enable them to remove the bodies of the patriarchs from Egypt to the land of Canaan. The custom of embalming, as is well known, prevailed in Egypt even from a very early age; according to Rosellini II. 3, mummies have been found of the dates of the earliest kings. The office in the cases mentioned above, was performed by the physicians of Pharaoh, v. 2. The manner of embalming is described by Herodotus, 2. 86, and by Diodorus, 1. 91. The latter says, generally, They prepare the body first with cedar oil and various other substances, more than thirty (according to another reading, forty) days; then, after they have added myrrh and cinnamon and other drugs, which have not only the power of preserving the body for a long time, but of imparting to it a pleasant odour, they commit it to the relatives of the deceased. According to Herodotus, the time employed in embalming was seventy days, the time during which they mourned for Jacob, and the forty days of the embalming, spoken of in verse 2, relates to the time in which the body was kept in the salts of nitre, after the infusion of the spices, which completed the embalming. So that, when rightly understood, there is an agreement between the classical and biblical writers. Comp. "Egypt and the Books of Moses," p. 70 sq.

The phrase, "he was put into a coffin (*קִבְרֵהוּ*, a wooden chest) in Egypt," has been adduced as a proof that the author of the Book of Genesis was not familiar with Egyptian customs. But it proves, on the contrary, to be in accordance with Egyptian usage. For it is plain from various sources that wood was the common material for coffins, and basalt the exception. Herodotus says: "Now, the relatives take away the body (i. e.

after the embalming) and make a wooden image in which they inclose it." And if this were not the case, a sufficient reason for preferring wood in this instance, arises from the injunction in the 25th verse: "Ye shall carry up my bones from hence," as the weight of stone would render the transference difficult.

ART. V.—AFFINITY OF ROMANISM AND RATIONALISM.

FROM THE GERMAN.

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[The substance of the following article is taken from the *Beiträge* of Dr. Ernst Sartorius, of Königsberg, Prussia, formerly of the University of Dorpat. He may be known to some of our readers as the author of "Lectures on the Person and Work of Christ." It is found in the First and Second Parts of his *Beiträge*, or Contributions to the Defence of Evangelical Orthodoxy, and in his Reply to Kant. I intended at first to translate the whole, but as the original occupies about 150 pages, and the arrangement and division were peculiarly *German*, I concluded to give the substance of it digested, and more adapted, I trust, to the taste of the English reader. Occasionally I have translated closely, and at other times I have condensed the argument, omitting the more obvious refutation of erroneous doctrines. I have retained everything of importance in this valuable essay. It is enriched with quotations from the decrees of the Council of Trent, the works of the principal Rationalists and of the Reformers, many of which will be found here. The discussion of this subject is peculiarly seasonable at this time, and may be of service in the controversy between truth and error.]

It is the design of the present essay to prove the affinity of the systems of Romanism and Catholicism in their fundamental principles. Such an attempt cannot be deemed unreasonable at a time when true Protestantism is assailed in different quarters by both.

The striking difference between the two systems in *form*, might appear to many, at first sight, as highly unfavourable to our object. While on the side of the Rationalists we find the most unbounded license of private speculation, and no apparent external or internal unity, we perceive on the side of the Romanists a compact and connected system, which pleases the eye of the spectator by its symmetry, and which he would look upon with complacency, if founded upon pure truth. So striking is this apparent difference, that my attempt to prove their fundamental agreement has been considered as paradoxical, nay, a ridiculous fancy. But every one acquainted with the subject knows, that this argument is nothing new, that it is to be found in Schubert *De Naturalismo Ecclesiæ Romanæ*,

1750, and in Chemnitz' Examination of the Council of Trent, and that hints of this accordance are to be met with in the writings of Melancthon, Luther and Calvin.

The erroneous opinion that there is a wide and essential difference between the two systems, has been designedly kept up by those who, to divert attention from themselves, and to repel any suspicion of such agreement, have always expressed the utmost horror of Rationalism; and who have been always ready to charge those with it who are, in truth, the furthest removed from it, and the least in danger of it.

If our limits allowed, and if it fell within the scope of this essay, we might show from history, that the relation of the Reformation to the scholastic philosophy was the same as that of modern orthodoxy to the Kantian philosophy. The Reformation began in the attacking by the reformers, of the scholasticism of the Church of Rome. The most superficial historical research, and the slightest acquaintance with the writings of the reformers, will convince any one of this.

But, we proceed to consider some of the principal points of agreement between the two parties, dwelling upon some at greater length than upon others.

Both, then, we should first remark, agree in setting up a different *source and rule of faith* than the written divine word. They place the subjective word above the objective, and make the former the judge of the latter. They differ indeed widely in manner as to the nature of this human authority; the one holding to a Pope, governed by tradition and the decisions of councils; the other making of every man himself such a Pope, and maintaining, as Wegscheider expresses it, that everything is to be determined "by the precepts of sound reason, *tanquam verbum vere divinum internum*." This difference in *form* is accidental, and in no way inconsistent with their identity in principle. In both, there is human authority: in the one case, that of the intuition of reason; in the other, that of Papal supremacy. Both alike leave the sure canon of the external word, and derive their true origin from the subjective. Both are natural religions, and we might also term them, with propriety, fanatical religions; for as soon as we leave the written word, we have no security against falling into mysticism, or any other form of fanaticism. We might show, *pari passu*, that the system of mysticism remarkably coincides with those of Romanism and Rationalism.*

But we proceed to show their remarkable agreement in the doctrines of sin and the justification of the sinner, of which

* Beiträge 2. 4—13. The enthusiasm of Romanism in maintaining a successive inspiration for individuals.

Melancthon said, that error could be more safely admitted in any other than these: and that he, who did not understand these, could not be called a Christian. It has been admitted by Kant, that outward differences in manner constitute no objection to inward affinity in principle in different systems; and that all systems which expect to merit the grace of God, in any way, are accordant. But we would first remark generally, before going into detail, that the Romish and Rationalistic systems may be characterized as Pelagian, while the true Protestant system is anti-Pelagian. Nor do the Rationalists themselves, though wont to deal so arbitrarily with church history, venture to deny that their system is Pelagian, or call in question this assertion. They evade the charge of apostacy from the faith of the church, by alleging, that these distinctions are of little consequence, and that a man may hold what opinion he pleases about them, and yet retain the faith of the church.

The orthodox doctrine of the sinfulness of man, so clearly taught by the most explicit and decisive language of Scripture, especially in the 5th and 7th chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, is refuted by a Decree of the Council of Trent, that concupiscence has not the true and proper nature of sin.* Bel-
larmin, the great defender of the Church of Rome, has devoted a long series of chapters to the defence of this Decree against the Protestants. The Rationalist, Wegscheider, in his Manual of Theology, and Paulus, have no hesitation in adopting this decision of the Council of Trent, as the correct one. "The Romish Catechism has correctly decided that concupiscence, if not wilful, is far removed from the nature of sin."

Both parties thus, in defiance of the most explicit language of Scripture, coincide in opinion, that original sin is only so far to be considered sinful, as the man consents to it, and acts it out in what is forbidden. They both reason in the same way, that it is impossible that our natural desires should be sinful. This is true, as they were originally implanted in our frame; they were then pure and pleasing to God. They are not even now to be extirpated from human nature. And far be from us that iron system of philosophers and monks, which would require this of men, as Calvin says, "*Nihil nobiscum ferrea ista Philosophia!*" and Melancthon, "It is not to be supposed that all affections are to be expelled from nature, as the fanatics vainly talk of their stoical apathy." But while this is true, it is certain that none of our passions now exist in their original

* Concupiscentiam, quam aliquando apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus declarat. Ecclesiam Catholicam nunquam intellexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie in renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est, et ad peccatum inclinat. Si quis autem contrarium senserit, anathema sit.

purity and order, as the ornament of our nature. Their equilibrium has been disturbed; they now overstep their proper bounds, or lag far behind; they glow with heat, or are frozen with cold; they are selfish, and love the creature more than the Creator. This disorder within, which cleaves to us from our earliest childhood, since it is opposed to the standard of the divine law, is sin, whether the will consents or not; nay, so far from being subject to the will, it brings the will unconsciously into subjection to it, as Melancthon says: "Tanta est vis concupiscentiæ ut malis affectibus sæpius obtemperent homines, quam recto iudicio;" and as Pascal has strikingly remarked, in his well-known passage on this subject: "It is concupiscence which gives to the will itself a perverse tendency, infuses a selfishness into its volitions, robs the best services of man of their true value, and destroys the peace of the soul in the conflict within."

So emphatically is the orthodox doctrine taught in Scripture, that both parties have no other resort than to wrest such passages, by a common exegesis, from their plain and obvious meaning. The Rationalists, when the literal sense would oppose their system, have recourse to forced interpretations, accommodated, as they term it, to a "rational exegesis," and thus make Scripture suit their purpose. The Romanists not only do this, but appeal against Scripture to the Decree of the 5th Session of the Council of Trent. While the Rationalists avoid the term "*merit*," and instead of it use "make worthy," the Romanists likewise make a subtle distinction between meriting *de condigno* and *de congruo*.

What we have said is sufficient to prove the undeniable affinity of the two parties in the doctrine of *sin*; we proceed now to consider their agreement in principle as to the sinner's *justification*, and we shall be able to show that both have departed in equal degree from the truth.

From the false view of the natural condition of man, the common *πρώτον ψεύδος* of the two systems, we should expect to find them equally in error as to the sinner's justification. Let us examine for a moment, more particularly, their view of man as a sinner, and of his ability to prepare himself for justification. According, then, to their systems, every man is a sinner, in so far as he now and then transgresses the divine law. With these occasional slips, he is in the main good and blameless, with sufficient natural strength of reason to teach him his duty, and of will to influence him to do good works, acceptable to God, and worthy of justification. While there is something sinful in every man, there is much that is good, and if the balance is struck, it would be in his favour. We quote here the whole of

an important passage from Wegscheider, which shows fully the rationalistic view of justification: "Quicumque e vita turpi ad virtutem emerit is eadem proportionem, qua jam in virtutis studio progressus fuerit, in gratiam cum Deo reversus, ab eodem præmiis dignus judicabitur. Deus ex universo vitæ tenore dignitatem hominis cujusque æstimans, peccatori resipiscenti sortem æternam justa lance ponderatam tribuet, atque prout vera virtus in animo peccatoris crescet, ita fiducia ei restituitur. Venia igitur peccatorum recte ponitur in conversione gratiæ divinæ ad peccatorem, et pænæ imminutione, pro ratione dignitatis præ moralis justissime definita."

What now is the Romish view of justification? The Romanist may say that he is justified by faith, using evangelical terms, but he means by faith something far different from the true Protestant. He does not regard it as confidence in the divine promise, appropriated to himself, so that faith and the word of God are correlative; * but as he terms it a *fides formata*. He considers it as put by synecdoche for love, and all the good works which flow from it. He looks upon it as a meritorious quality in us—a good disposition, which we are to manifest, before we receive justification. He introduces into the idea of faith as much as possible of obedience to the law, and declares that by this active faith men are justified. In the same manner the Rationalist speaks of obedience to the principle of natural religion and inward culture, as making us worthy of the grace of God. If the sinner now works in himself this acceptable state of heart, and gives the preponderance to his virtuous disposition, by this faith co-operating with good works, as the Council of Trent expresses it, "co-operante fide cum bonis operibus," he cannot fail of obtaining a *justificatio prima*, of which we see his good works are the efficient causes and grounds. This justification, instead of being, as Melancthon expresses it, "similis et æqualis est omnium," varies in every man according to the degree of his worthiness; while justification, according to the orthodox view, is the pronouncing just through the obedience solely of Christ from his most holy nativity even to the most ignominious death of the cross. To use the language of the Conc. Form, "sola sua, tota et perfectissima obedientia a natiuitate sua sanctissima usque ad ignominiosissimam crucis mortem,

* Beiträge 1. 131. *Justificatio fit per verbum*. Mel. How strikingly similar is the language of Hooker on this subject! "We cannot be justified by any inherent quality; Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in him. God accepteth them in Christ, as perfectly righteous, as if they had fulfilled all that was commanded them in the law. Shall I say more perfectly righteous than if themselves had fulfilled the whole law? I must take heed what I say; but the Apostle saith, 'God made him,' etc. Such are we in the sight of God, as is the very Son of God himself. Man hath sinned; God hath suffered; God hath made himself the Son of Man, and men are made the righteousness of God."

est justitia." And again : " Justitia fidei coram Deo in gratuita et benignissima imputatione justitiæ Christi absque ulla nostrorum operum additione consistit." The Helv. Confess. : " Passio vel mors sua, omniaque, quæ a suo in carne adventu nostra causa fecit et pertulit." Melancthon, in his Apology : " Christi merita nobis donantur, ut justî reputemur fiducia meritorum Christi, tanquam propria merita haberemus." Calvin : " Eo solo nos habemur justî, quia Christi obedientia nobis accepta fertur, ac si nostra esset." But the Heidelberg Catechism is even more decisive : " Sine ullo meo merito ex mera Dei misericordia mihi perfecta satisfactio, justitia et sanctitas Christi imputatur ac donatur, perinde ac si nec ullum ipse peccatum admissem, nec ulla mihi labe inhaereret, imo vero quasi eam obedientiam, quam pro me Christus præstitit ipse perfecte præstissem." We have presented these passages as showing the unanimous agreement of the Protestant Confessions.

Let us now compare the Romish view. Justification, according to the Council of Trent, is not only remission of sins, but sanctification and renovation. Sanctification is not the fruit of justification, but a part of it, and enters into the act. The sinner is not regarded only, and pronounced righteous, but is made so by the operation of the Holy Ghost. He does not become righteous through a gracious sentence of God, but actually so through his indwelling virtue ; and owes his eternal life and salvation far more to his own inward righteousness, (*justitia inherens*), than to the grace of God. This inward righteousness, meriting *de condigno* the grace of God, is thus partly a gift of God, and partly a work of man. But as a comparison of the Romish and Protestant view is just here so important, we give the Decree of the Council of Trent. " Hanc dispositionem, seu præparationem, justificatio ipsa consequitur, quæ non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis. Non modo reputamur, sed vere justî nominamur et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes unusquisque suam secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout vivet, et secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et co-operationem. Quanquam enim nemo potest esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur, id tamen in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissimæ passionis merito, per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret. Unde in ipsa justificatione, cum remissione peccatorum, hæc omnia simul infusa accipit homo per Jesum Christum, cui inseritur per fidem, spem et caritatem."

As justification is thus obtained by man's worthy predisposi-

tion,* so is it to be preserved and increased by his own strength and good works; according to the Romish system, the man can go on from a first to a second justification.

If righteousness is an imputation of the perfect righteousness of Christ, it cannot admit of degrees of greater or less, higher or lower; it can neither be increased or diminished, but must for ever remain one and the same, or we deny perfect righteousness to Christ. If we can become still more righteous by our works, and deserve a higher degree, we are imperfectly justified by Christ, he becomes a minister of sin, and the true idea of righteousness is destroyed. This the Romish system does in its doctrine of progressive justification. It has decreed thus on this point: "In ipsa justitia per Christi gratiam accepta, co-operante fide bonis operibus crescunt atque magis justificantur. Si quis dixerit justitiam acceptam non conservari atque etiam non augeri per bona opera; anathema sit."

It follows from this view of justification, that, as it has been earned by our own qualities and merits, and is to be preserved by the same, we can never be assured of our justification. The Council of Trent denounces accordingly an anathema against all who hold such a doctrine: "Nemini peccata dimitti, vel dimissa esse dicendum est. Neque aliud asserendum est, oportere eos, qui vere justificati sunt, absque ulla omnino dubitatione, apud se ipsos statuere, se esse justificatos. Quilibet, dum se ipsum, suam propriam infirmitatem et indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia formidare ac timere potest." It calls such a doctrine, *inanis fides Hæreticorum*, and forgiveness is refused to those who hold it. That this doctrine flows naturally from the Romish view of justification, and is a gainful part of the Romish system, has been shown by Chemnitz. The man thus forced to look to himself, to his own infirmity and indisposition to what is good, the more conscientious he is, the more will he perceive his deficiencies, and stand in constant doubt of his justification. This doctrine of the Church of Rome must lead either to a careless security in sin and presumption, or else to despair, as Melancthon says: "Hæc doctrina Legis vel ad præsumptionem vel ad desperationem adducit. It fails us in our greatest extremity, in the trying hours of life, when the oppressive consciousness of our unspeakable deficiencies fills the soul with alarm; it makes us ashamed in the decisive hour of death, and as the last and bitterest fruit of false doctrine will perish with us before the bar of an infinitely holy God.

If we compare the view of justification advanced by Wegscheider, which has been quoted, and the declarations of Kant, that by an imitation of Christ's example, and by forming in our-

selves the ideal of humanity, which is acceptable to God, we are to be justified, we find no essential difference in the two systems. They know of no other justification than that by the law. Both are natural legal systems, and of both it is true, in the language of Melancthon: "Non videt ratio aliam justitiam, quam justitiam legis."

And from the fundamental error, that justification is incomplete without good works, must necessarily spring an entire confounding of the proper office of the law and the Gospel. The highly important and essential difference between them is either falsely represented, or alike rejected by both. Both parties agree that the object of the coming of Christ into the world was, as a new moral lawgiver, to prescribe a higher and more perfect moral law than Moses, and present in his own person a perfect example of its fulfilment, by imitation of which, men may be justified before God. They both regard him as a masterly teacher of a moral system, freed from the Mosaic ceremonial. They consider the gospel as differing from the law only in this respect, that the law requires external works; the gospel, besides, internal affections, a distinction which though sufficiently refuted by the tenth commandment, still Kant and his followers repeat. What is this, as Melancthon says, but to teach the law and destroy the gospel, and confound the proper office of both? How full and clear was the voice of the Reformers as to the office of both! Says Melancthon: "The office of the Gospel is to receive good gifts from God, that of the law to offer our own. They divided the uses of the law into three parts; the civil (*usus politicus*), to bring man to an external reverence; the pedagogic, to bring him to Christ; and the didactic use for the regenerate, and partakers of Christ by faith." Of this last use, Melancthon says: "The law is to be taught even to the regenerate, that as their knowledge and penitence for the sin that dwelleth in them increases, so may also their faith increase. The law is to teach us these good works, which God has prepared for us to walk in. We are not to invent such, but to be governed by his word." And again he says very forcibly: "Hæc particula *gratis* facit discrimen legis et evangelii." Luther, in his sermon on the office of law and gospel, says: "The gospel does not tell man what God requires of him, but what he has done for him; it bids him believe and be sure that God will forgive him his sins, and receive him as his child." The whole sermon is worthy of an attentive study.

We have thus seen the remarkable agreement of the two systems in their doctrine of justification. They both teach sinful man to trust in himself, in the works of his own hands, and in his inward righteousness. They would begin and end,

as we have proved from their own words, the salvation of man in his sinful self. Both maintain that man, by virtue of the natural light of reason, and by the power of his free-will, can attain to the favour of God and to eternal life.

It was against soul-destroying errors like these that the Reformers, with the Bible in their hands and in their hearts, raised up a standard; and though the world and the rulers of its darkness set themselves against them, yet they boldly and loudly confessed the old Bible faith in Jesus Christ, the crucified, the Saviour of the lost, the eternal Son of God, whose power and glory are only surpassed by the greatness of that love which moved him to veil the splendour of his divinity in the form of a servant; the divine becoming human that the human might become divine, and be restored to pure and holy fellowship with God. They declared that everything that man put in his place must be rejected; and the word of God sounding forth in its power and greatness, penetrated the humbled hearts of thousands, and brought them in faith and love to the feet of Jesus, where alone the soul can find peace, sanctification and eternal life. They have bequeathed their faith, as their most precious legacy, to us. Their confessions have ever been the bulwark of Protestantism, the inviolable Magna Charta of its freedom. While these are preserved, like the ancient Palladium, the church is safe.

Are these the boasted advances of our age in Theology, that after three centuries we should relapse into the same errors from which we were then happily relieved by these great-hearted men? Shall we extinguish the Sun of Righteousness, that we may be enlightened by the *ignes fatui* of Reason? Truly the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God! The wise of this world receive not the wisdom of God; nay, they despise it as foolishness. They are for ever erecting their children's houses, which fall down as fast as they are set up, while his foundation, other than which no man can lay, standeth sure and immovable. God often leaves his enemies now, as he did of old, to turn their swords against each other, and thus destroys them by themselves. I would mention only the systems of Kant, Fichte and Schelling. How remarkable, that just at a time when human reason is so highly extolled, and the divine word so greatly despised, these systems are in conflict with each, and some have already fallen! Did the preservation of God's truth in the world depend upon human faithfulness we might well despair. But a divine power sustains it; it conquers by its own irresistible might. When most depressed, as all history shows, it has often risen and crushed its adversaries. We must be then, indeed, of little faith if we despair of its

final triumph. The grass of human doctrine withereth; the flower of human wisdom fadeth, but the word of the Lord endureth for ever.*

ART. VI.—REVIEW OF RECENT FRENCH WORKS
IN METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande depuis Kant jusqu'à Hegel.
Par J. Willm, Inspecteur de l'Académie de Strasbourg.
Ouvrage couronné par l'Institut (Académie des Sciences,
Morales et Politiques.) 4 Tom. 8vo. pp. 528, 630, 466, 648.
Paris. 1846-1849.

De la Philosophie Allemande. Rapport à l'Académie des Sciences, Morales et Politiques, précédé d'une Introduction sur les doctrines de Kant, de Fichte, de Schelling, et de Hegel.
Par M. De Rémusat, Membre de l'Institut. 8vo. pp. CLVIII.
210. Paris. 1845.

In 1836, the Academy of Moral and Political Science of the French Institute, at the suggestion of the Philosophical section, proposed a critical examination of German philosophy, as a subject of competition. The result is contained in the above works.

The competitors were to adhere to the following conditions: 1. By extended analysis to render an account of the principal German systems, from Kant to the present time. 2. To give special attention to the system of Kant, with which all the others are connected. 3. To give a critical estimate of the German philosophy; to discuss the principles on which it is founded, the methods it employs, the results it has attained; to seek out what of error and what of truth have met together in it, and to discriminate what, in the last result, may legitimately remain in one form or another of the philosophical movement in modern Germany.

In 1838, six memoirs were presented. They were adjudged insufficient, and the proposals were renewed, with a limit of two years. Seven competitors then offered their works; the section "jugea ce concours fort et brillant;" but no one essay was

* "Verbum Dei manet in æternum." This was the motto of the Elector of Saxony, and his servants wore its initial letters embroidered in their garments. See a sermon of Sartorius, delivered at the Commemoration of the Third Centennial Anniversary of the Augsburg Confession, on The Glory of the Augsburg Confession.

thought sufficiently complete to fulfil the conditions of the programme. The final judgment was prorogued till 1844; and then three memoirs survived, which are the subject of the Report of De Rémusat.

This report is admirably drawn up; it is a kind of model of what such reports should be; and it is such a document as perhaps only a Frenchman could produce. It is eminently candid, and also strict; there is an air of courteous authority about it which is as it should be; it goes into the subject-matter just about enough, and it gives a full account of the memoirs themselves, in all their parts. Honourable mention is made of M. Fortuné Guiran, the author of one of the essays; but the prize is decreed to M. Willm, as having given the most satisfactory exposition of the whole subject. His work is described as solid, faithful and conscientious; executed with care rather than with art; the style is simple, just, and for the most part clear; he shows, however, the traces of familiarity with German idioms, and sometimes has too many words, and too many strange words, though the latter fault is natural to one who is trying to transfer German philosophy into the French tongue. Parts of his work are specially signalized as of unusual ability and novelty—that, for example, upon the philosophy of Hegel. The report concludes, of course, with an assertion of the claims of the French philosophy as compared with the German. The results of the latter, it is said, inspire distrust; they are contrary to that truth which it is the object of philosophy to methodize, and not to annul. Neither in its method, nor in its results, neither as a matter of science nor as a matter of truth, can the French philosophy fully accept the Germany philosophy. “Germany has been unfaithful to that wise and sure method inaugurated by Descartes,” whom all philosophic Frenchmen delight to honour. To explain ourselves clearly, and in technical terms, in that psychological method which does not indissolubly connect ontology with psychology; and in the autological doctrines which are not constantly based upon psychology, we cannot recognise the philosophical method of modern times; we do not recognise the fundamental condition of science. “The French philosophy may be enlightened by the lights of the German, and enriched by its ideas, but it ought to remain indissolubly faithful to the fundamental beliefs of human reason, and to the method of Descartes.” Such is the constant *refrain* of the French, ever since Cousin took up the word. What they really mean by their “psychological method,” as distinguished from the German method, it is not so easy to ascertain. As distinguished from the method of the materialistic philosophy, it has indeed

a sense; but what its significancy is as definitely exhibiting the scientific peculiarity and honour of their school, as contrasted with the Germans, we have endeavoured in vain to discover in the repeated eulogies of it by Cousin and his zealous adherents. Nor does the exposition which M. De Rémusat gives of it in his preface, aid us much, especially when he assures us that Plato had this psychological point of view; and that the science of man (i. e. psychological science) is the science of reason.

The introduction to this report gives us a kind of sketch of the leading opinions of the chief German philosophers. It is written with clearness; but its criticisms are too general, and its appreciation of the real questions and problems of the German schools, is insufficient. And yet it is perhaps the best general and succinct exposition of these systems which is readily accessible.

The work of M. Willm, inspector of the Academy of Strassburg, and corresponding member of the Institute, is comprised in four large volumes; and it is undoubtedly the most complete and faithful and candid exposition of German philosophy, to be found outside of that speculative country. The author is not himself a great philosopher, but he is able to understand and describe the systems of great philosophers. He is not remarkable for acuteness, and he is often too vague and general in his criticisms; but in respect to learning, to impartiality, and to general philosophical ability, he is well fitted for the great task which he has here undertaken. It has been the work of years of laborious research. It was begun before the prize of the Academy was instituted, and his last volume was published five years after the award had been decreed to himself.

This work is not only the most important and able in the French literature, upon the subject of German philosophy, but it is also the only one which can pretend to any degree of thoroughness or completeness. In 1836, M. le Baron Barchou de Penhoen published a history of German philosophy, in two volumes; but it is rather a narrative about the systems, than a philosophical exposition of them. The work of L. F. Schön (Transcendental Philosophy, Paris, 1831) is restricted to the system of Kant, and gives only a tolerable view of his Criticisms of the Pure Reason and of the Practical Reason. Cousin's Lectures on Kant (1844) present a rapid and brilliant sketch of the main principles of the Pure Reason, with a skilful attempt at the refutation of them in their bearings on the great interests of morality and religion. Besides this, in his lectures on the history of Moral Philosophy, we have an account of Kant's Ethical system; but he has nowhere attempted even a complete outline of the schemes of the later German Philosophers. The

work of M. Matter, on Schelling, (1845,) is more valuable as a contribution to the history of literature, than as a philosophical production. M. Ott, doctor of law, published in 1844 a work with the title, "Hegel and the German Philosophy; or, a Critical Exposition and Examination of the Principal Systems of German Philosophy since Kant, and especially of the system of Hegel." His notices of the earlier systems is superficial; it is a book upon and against Hegel, avowedly written in the interest of the Roman Catholic church against Protestantism. "Protestant Philosophy," he assures us, "is done; Hegel has given it the last word." And the result of it is "universal confusion." That Hegel's system left M. Ott's mind in this state, is quite probable. Besides these, and some earlier productions, now past use, which give an account of the German systems, the French literature also contains translations of some of the more important works of the German philosophers, all the leading ones of Kant, Fichte's *Destination of Man, Destination of the Learned*, also his *Theory of Science*, Schelling's *Bruno*, *System of Transcendental Idealism* and *Philosophical Fragments*, (translated by Willm,) and Hegel's *Lectures on Æsthetics*.

These were the forerunners of Mr. Willm's more arduous attempt, under the impulse of the Academy.

In a long introduction of some eighty pages the author expounds the points of view under which his criticism is conducted; gives a rapid sketch of German philosophy from the time of Leibnitz; and vindicates the general division of his work. He divides the modern German Philosophy into three parts; the first, the period of Critical and Transcendental Idealism, comprises Kant, Fichte, and their great opponent Jacobi; the second, the period of Absolute and Objective Idealism, gives the systems of Schelling and Hegel, with the dissenting and opposing schemes, especially those of Herbart. Each of these two parts is in two volumes.

The first volume and one-third of the second is devoted to Kant, and it is perhaps the most complete and satisfactory portion of the whole work. The extent of it was demanded by the programme, and is justified by the inherent importance and influence of Kant's position and system. The remainder of the second volume is devoted in about equal portions to Fichte and to Jacobi. Upon the dissent of the latter, and upon the merits of his dissent, great stress is laid, not more perhaps than is justified by the importance of the principles which Jacobi advocates, but more than is due to the actual influence or the philosophical acuteness of his works. Nearly four hundred pages of the third volume are occupied with Schelling, and the remainder of

this, with three hundred and fifty pages of the fourth volume, gives a full and most valuable account of Hegel's various productions. Under the head of Dissenting and Independent Philosophy, we have the system of Schleiermacher, Baader and Krause, and even those of Göthe, Jean-Paul and Alexander v. Humboldt. And last of all, Herbart is described as the great representative of the opposing philosophy, and of his various works a better account is given than can be found in any of the histories of modern philosophy. And yet our author's critical estimate of the value of Herbart's system hardly assigns him his due importance; for his philosophy may now be said to be the only system which is making progress in Germany. The works of Drobisch and Hartenstein are contributing to rescue it from the silence, and even contempt, with which its realistic positions have been treated by an overbearing idealism. Under these six names, then, Kant, Fichte, Jacobi, Schelling, Hegel and Herbart, M. Willm recounts the history of modern German speculation. Incidental notices of the writings of their followers, the lesser lights, are scattered through the volumes and the notes.

The whole work is one of an impartial historian of philosophy. The plan uniformly followed is to give a full analysis of every important work of each philosopher. This analysis is often minute, not to say tedious. The main points are fortified by translated citations. At the end of this analysis, M. Willm gives a general view and criticism of the whole system. At the end of the whole work there is the same for the whole. These citations are generally generous and manly in their tone; they have a certain air of independence, but they lack precision. It hardly seems to us that in this respect the work answers the design of the Academy. The author is worthy of praise, however, in not lending his authority to that glorification of the French philosophical supremacy, with which most of the French accounts of German philosophy abound. His philosophical training has evidently been rather German than French. His position at Strasburg is favourable to an understanding of both the nations. And we think that no one can doubt that he has been more successful in transferring German philosophy into a foreign land than almost any of his predecessors. A comparison of his account of Hegel's work with that of Ott, and even of his exposition of Schelling's system, with that of M. Matter, shows his superiority. Cousin is here his only rival. The German categories do indeed often seem strange in their French garb, but that is unavoidable: and the author has not sacrificed faithfulness to elegance.

Our author is no blind panegyrist, and still less is he a blind reviler of these daring German schemes. He gives to Kant the

honour of freeing philosophy from the fatal grasp of sensualism, and of vindicating the authority of our moral nature, while he dissents from all the main conclusions of his criticism of the Pure Reason. He vindicates Fichte from the charge of an absolute denial of an external reality, and yet is not sparing in his condemnation of him for denying the Divine personality. While he maintains that the primitive form of Schelling's system, that of identity, rests on a gratuitous hypothesis, and contains decided pantheistic tendencies, he dare not deny its influence in elevating our ideas of nature, and in contributing to a more vivid impression of the immanence of God in his works. Of the later system of Schelling he does not give an account; and this would be a serious defect in his work, were it not to be supplied in a future volume, which is promised. His criticism upon Hegel's philosophy is better than that of any other excepting Kant, assisted as he is by the able logical works of Trendelenburg; its defects are carefully stated, its pantheistic tendencies and practical conclusions are opposed; while full credit is given to its immense systematic power, its grasp and comprehensiveness, and to the almost unrivalled philosophical genius and attainments of its originator.

It may be interesting to give a concise statement of the character and results of this great philosophical movement as they are presented by so able an historian. To do this we will abridge and translate some portions of M. Willm's concluding summary.

The insufficiency of sensation (or "sensible experience") to explain the facts of consciousness, and the impotence of materialism in rendering an account of moral and intellectual phenomena, are now generally conceded; sensualism, with all its theoretical and practical consequences, is for ever banished from science, thanks to the united efforts of the French and the German philosophy. And this triumph of a spiritual philosophy in the nineteenth century is so much the more remarkable, since it is not a simple re-action, but has been obtained at an epoch when the physical sciences are making the most rapid progress, and when thought has been expressed with the greatest freedom.

While Kant recognizes internal and external experience as the only source of all real knowledge, he makes this experience itself to be a product of the activity of mind, and in the general laws and forms of sense and of understanding. Jacobi and Herbart are realists; they maintain the independent reality of external objects; but the former at the same time regards consciousness as the guaranty of this reality, and as the natural seal of moral and religious truths, of which reason is the organ;

the latter recognizes the right of intellect to rectify, to modify, and to complete the data of experience according to the demands of logic, and seeks for truth far beyond the empire of the senses.

Fichte has made too much of the subjective element ; but he has put beyond question the spontaneity and the power of the subject, of the *ego*. The results of his system confirm the position that the *ego* cannot by itself alone comprehend the world, that the real world will escape us if we renounce seeing with the eyes and feeling with the organs that are put at our service. Thus it is evident that besides the thinking subject it is necessary to admit the existence of an independent object ; which is, however, in relation and harmony with the *ego*, acting upon it and ready in turn to be acted upon.

Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, are idealists ; yet in different degrees. Kant professes what he calls the *critical* or *transcendental* idealism, and he protests against the system of Berkeley. His philosophy is idealistic in respect to phenomena, and not in respect to things as they are in themselves. The idealism of Fichte is more radical, and this philosopher was able to keep himself from nihilism and from atheism only on the basis of that same faith in our moral reason, by which Kant re-established the truths which he regarded as theoretically problematical. The idealism of Schelling and of Hegel is absolute and objective, not like that of Berkeley, but in a wholly new sense ; it might be more justly called *rationalism* or *absolute intellectualism*. They do not deny the real existence of the external world, but they present it as the issue of mind or spirit, as made what it is by spiritual ideas, which alone are primitively and essentially true and real. They admit experience, but they say that this only gives us the surface of things, which are not at the bottom that which they appear as immediately known through the senses ; their endeavour is, if we may so express it, to intellectualize experience by means of rational intuition and by the necessary evolutions of sovereign thought.

Kant assigns to reason, as the faculty of cognition, authority only in the way of criticism, and pretends to restrict it, so far as real knowledge is concerned, to the limits of the phenomenal world ; yet he attributes to it a relative authority as a logical faculty, but an absolute value only in the form of practical reason. The rationalism of Fichte is more decided than that of Kant, but, not being able to explain the real world by the movements of thought alone, he denies it in theory and admits it on the faith of practical reason alone.

Jacobi, with all his distrust of discursive speculation, of the speculation of the *understanding*, which wrongly applies the

maxims of experience to matters metaphysical, is yet a rationalist in according entire confidence to the fundamental convictions of man's rational nature, to consciousness fertilized and developed by observation and thought.

Herbart is a rationalist in conceding to the intellect, not the right indeed of abstracting from facts and of exercising itself in the void, but that of interpreting facts, of making them complete by analogy, and of transforming them by reflection.

Schelling and Hegel, in fine, make human reason equal to the divine intelligence, make it the depository of eternal ideas, and pretend, by the necessary evolution of thought, to comprehend and re-construct the universe, the natural and the moral order things.

Rationalism is then everywhere dominant in the German philosophy; it is the soul of it, both when it claims to explain the world *à priori*, and when it acknowledges the necessity of starting from the data of experience.

In respect to religious questions, Kant, Jacobi, and Herbart are theists; but Kant recognizes only a *moral* theology, Jacobi only a theology of *feeling*, and Herbart only a *physico-theology*. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are pantheists, yet with differences. Fichte professes a sort of moral pantheism. The pantheism of Schelling is more material;* that of Hegel is altogether idealistic or logical. That gross pantheism which makes matter divine, and which is the equivalent of atheism, is foreign to all these systems, and the immoral and irreligious consequences deducible from it were far from the thoughts of their authors.

As to the immortality of the soul, it appears incompatible with the pantheism of Schelling and of Hegel. Yet Schelling himself and a fraction of the school of Hegel have endeavoured to reconcile personal immortality with pantheistic principles. Jacobi believed in it with all his soul; Kant made it a necessary condition of the moral law, certain as this law itself; and Herbart finds this dogma so simple and so evident, that it seems to him superfluous to prove it; it is the necessary result of his doctrine respecting the soul, which is, that it is in its essence simple, and hence eternal and imperishable.

In respect to ethics, Kant, Jacobi and Herbart may be placed on one side, over against Schelling and Hegel; Fichte occupies the centre between the two parties. The ethical principle of Kant is wholly rational; that of Jacobi wholly from feeling; and the morals of Herbart are derived from both reason and feeling. Fichte advocates a kind of mystic morals, yet strong and generous, full at once of personal dignity and of self-denial,

* This can only apply to the first form of Schelling's system, and even in application to that it is hardly an intelligible statement.

of independence and of devotedness. In the idealism of Schelling and of Hegel the practical reason is absorbed by the theoretical, and morals properly speaking occupy a secondary place. The absolute precept of pantheistic idealism is this—*know thyself*; and the whole destination of man, in this system, seems to be to arrive at a knowledge of himself as absolute mind.

Moral freedom is not equally guaranteed by all these systems. According to Kant, liberty is the only immediate rational fact, the only law which we know of the "intelligible world." According to Jacobi it is so certain, that it is his scale for measuring the truth of systems. He is ready to reject without further examination, every scheme of fatalism. Fichte makes freedom to be the very essence of spirit, the principle of self. Though Herbart does not deny liberty, yet he does not consider it as a primitive fact, but he makes it the product of the development of the intellect, of the concurrence and mutual action of ideas. Schelling and Hegel profess an intellectual fatalism. Liberty presupposes an individuality, a real personality, such as pantheism does not admit.

As to the philosophy of nature, Kant, Schelling and Hegel explain everything dynamically; opposite to them is Herbart, whose physics are entirely constructed on mechanical principles, although he grants that such principles are not sufficient to explain all the phenomena of the organic world.

All these philosophers have had, and still have, numerous adherents: it is then natural to suppose that there is in each system a fund of truth; for though error may seduce for a time, it cannot long carry the best minds in its train.

There was a time when almost the whole philosophy of Germany was of the school of Kant; some were drawn along by the force of the current, but others by their convictions, and among these were men of the highest distinction. That part of his system which deserved their assent, is that which will be abiding—and that is, the idea of a criticism of the human understanding, and the general spirit of his ethics. Such a criticism of the nature and limits of our knowledge founded on an examination of the primitive elements of reason, upon an analysis of consciousness, will ever be the obligatory beginning of philosophy. Such an examination will always lead to the result that the system of our knowledge reposes upon an intellectual basis; that the "forms" of our knowledge are furnished by the understanding. From this it is not necessary to conclude with Kant, that all our knowledge is subjective, but only that our knowledge of the world is from our point of view alone, limited and inadequate indeed, yet true in itself though incom-

plete. And as to Kant's ethical system, the general formula may be modified, and its rigour attempered, but the sovereign principle presented by him in all its purity and majesty can no longer be misconceived. Kant has conquered for ever, at least in the view of science, the ethics of prudence and self-love. His indirect proof of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul, as necessary conditions of the moral law, will also remain, though in other forms; and his idea of an universal and just state, as the providential end of history, will also abide. His theory of the sublime and beautiful [to which he was instigated by Burke] has been the commencement of a new system of *Æsthetics*, not false but incomplete, for beauty and sublimity are in the objects as well as in ourselves.

In Fichte we have a singular union of an heroic idealism with an ethical system of pure self-denial; no one has more strongly insisted upon the sovereignty of self; no one has carried further a regard to duty; and if, for a time, the moral order was his God, he, at least, showed that he was ready to sacrifice everything to the object of his worship. His idealism will remain as a testimony how far the human mind can go in the attempt to draw everything from its own substance—a proof both of its activity and of its inefficiency. To have the right to profess realism, we must have tried the way of idealism according to Fichte.

Besides the examination of the power of self, which was the aim of Fichte, and of the pure reason which was the object of Kant, we have in Jacobi an evidence of the necessity of an analysis of our actual consciousness, illustrated also by the Scotch and French schools of philosophy. Though this will not give us a system of philosophy, yet it is the necessary basis of such a system. Here are revealed our fundamental religious and moral and æsthetic feelings, the disinterested love of truth and science, all those elementary dispositions which go to make up the rational nature of man. Jacobi did not make a system; but his merit consists in having constantly opposed the voice of consciousness to the aberration of the philosophy of his times.

Schelling and Hegel have exaggerated a true principle, and that is the harmony between our spirits and the external world, between the subject and the object, the concord of legitimate thought and of objective realities. This principle is tacitly recognized by every positive philosophy. It is perverted in the doctrine of absolute ideality, and in the pretension that man can attain a divine and absolute science, and re-construct the universe by a dialectic process. The idea of Schelling, in his philosophy of nature, of an immanent and dynamic principle, by

which the universe is made an organic whole, is indeed only an ideal, and it may not ever be absolutely proved and traced out; but still it is by the light of such an ideal that we must study nature; for only thus can we have a science and a progressive science of nature, instead of a mass of facts without inherent unity. And this may be done without ceasing to consider each thing as having its relative independence, without seeing in man nothing above a production of animal life, and while we still admit that God is the cause of all the order of the universe.

The idea of Hegel is still more vast; it is to the whole of philosophy that which Schelling's is to the philosophy of nature. Hegel has the merit of having laid hold of the problem of speculative science in all its grandeur, and having attempted to carry it through all the departments of human thought. Such an idea of unity and system as he propounds, has always been the soul of philosophy, though it can never be absolutely realized. There is, indeed, no true philosophy of history, without the supposition that the human race is advancing to realize some great end, that of universal freedom, of a perfect state. There is no true history of philosophy, if we see in its causes only a fortuitous succession of systems. We may not adopt the end or the scheme which Hegel propounds, either for philosophy or for history; but we say, that history can be rationally conceived of only as a progress towards some one end, and that the history of philosophy is instructive only as we view it as a constant means of arriving at real truth.

The philosophy of Herbart is contributing to the overthrow of the purely idealistic systems, and may be the transition to the re-establishment of a veritable realism.

Idealism, as an absolute and final system, must be abandoned; but only in its ruins, and in part from its ruins, will a new system be re-constructed. This philosophy will not be the old dogmatism which Herbart has striven to re-establish; it will be a realism attempered by idealism, a rational realism, founded, not on the dogma of the real identity of subject and object, of thought and being, but upon the harmony which God himself has established between our reason and the external world, between intelligent nature and real nature, between the reason which is in us and that divine reason of which the universe is the expression.

Such is the substance of the conclusion, the final summary, of these elaborate volumes. Though many points here are stated too indefinitely, and though others are not at all peculiar to the German system, but a part of all philosophy, yet it seems to us that the summary is upon the whole cautious and

candid. It may appear cold, in view of the theological and moral questions which are at stake; but the clear, intellectual dissent of a candid historian of philosophy is a more influential authority against a false dogma than many an impulsive invective of those who know not the difficulty of the problems, especially when it is addressed to the members of the French Institute.

Of all the works that have appeared upon the German philosophy, this one is to be most commended. The account of these bold and difficult systems in the able and popular *History of Modern Philosophy*, by J. D. Morell, is the least satisfactory portion of that interesting work; it is less thorough, and the results of less independent investigation than are his sketches of either the French or the English schools.

M. Willm promises another volume to complete his work, which shall give an account of the later philosophy of Schelling; of the various parties in Hegel's school; the rage of Bauer and the desperation of Feuerbach; of the disciples of Herbart and Fries; of Reinhold in Jena; and Ulrici in Halle; of Weisse and the younger Fichte; of Beneke in Berlin, and others still. The whole is to be completed by a bibliographical review of those works in German philosophy since the time of Kant, which still retain their value in the various departments of science. And he trusts that the final impression left upon the reader will be the conviction, that "in the country of Kant, sound reason will eventually triumph over the vagaries of speculative imagination, and the excesses of a haughty dialectics, which can only be done by constantly putting ourselves anew in the right position for hearing the voice of consciousness and knowing the eternal interests of humanity."

ART. VII.—COMMENTARY ON THE SECOND AND
THIRD CHAPTERS OF THE GOSPEL OF MAT-
THEW.

FROM THE GERMAN OF H. A. W. MEYER. BY B. B. EDWARDS.

[Dr. Meyer is consistorial counsellor at Hanover, and pastor primarius of the city church. Nine Parts of his *Commentary on the New Testament* are published, embracing the four Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles to the Romans, Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and Philemon.

Owing to the demand for new editions of the earlier parts, and the pressure of other engagements, Dr. M. has called to his aid Prof. Huther, of Schwerin, who has prepared a Commentary on the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, and Dr. Lünemann, of Göttingen, who has published a Commentary on the Epistles to the Thessalonians. Second editions of Meyer's commentaries on the first three Gospels, and on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, have appeared. The later volumes, and especially the second editions, exhibit very marked improvement both in ability in expounding the text, and in orthodox views and feelings. In the Preface to the Commentary on the Colossians, 1848, the author writes: "It is the spirit of God which quickens the church; and it is the old, simple truth of the Gospel, which makes the church free, and one and invincible. On this rock, on which the church is placed, will the waves and foam of the spirits who affect another gospel than that of Nazareth, break and disappear." "The stock remains the same as that which the Reformation drew from the divine germ of the Gospel. All life which does not proceed from this stock, is the life of destruction, the more feverish, as now, the more it is nourished only from without; and only the more dangerous, when placed, as now, under the power of the restless spirit of the times. Experience has sufficiently proclaimed, and it exists in us, that we are to grow up in conformity with the Scriptures, to that unity of Gospel faith, which, with all the variety of individual views, takes not away the unity of the spirit, and stands and remains on the foundation, which is God's living Son, his Light and Life, his Work and Spirit in his Word, which endures forever, while the fashion of this world passeth away."

The following passages will present, perhaps, a favourable specimen of the author's mode of exposition, though his views are still more conservative and sober now than they were six years ago, when the second edition of the Commentary on Matthew was published. We have omitted some comments and references as not interesting or important to the English reader.—TR.]

CHAP. II. v. 1. Γεννηθέντος. The star is conceived as appearing contemporarily with the birth, v. 7. How long it was after the birth before the Magi came, appears approximately from v. 16, according to which, with all Herod's cruelty, and with his aim to make sure work, we may place the arrival of the Magi, with the most probability, somewhat over a year after the birth. Δέ is metabatic, serving to introduce another narrative. "Bethlehem Judah," to distinguish it from Bethlehem in the tribe of Zebulun. Josh. xix. 15. Our Bethlehem (Ephratah,

Gen. xxxv. 16, 19) lay in the tribe of Judah, comp. Judges xvii. 9, xix. 1; 1 Sam. xvii. 12, six miles south of Jerusalem.* 'Εν ἡμέραις, מִיָּמֵי Gen. xxvi. 1, 2; 2 Sam. xxi. 1; "of Herod," Herod the Great, son of Antipater, received in the year 714 U.C., from the Senate the kingly dignity, through Antony, by whom, not long before, he had been made tetrarch; but he did not attain actual possession of his kingdom till 717, after the capture of Jerusalem by himself and Sosius. He died in 750.† Magi, מַגִּי, formed, among the Persians and Medes, a much respected priestly class; they employed themselves especially with the mysteries of nature, astrology and medicine.‡ There was also among the Babylonians, Jer. xxxix. 3, at the time of the Chaldean dynasty, such an order, at the head of which was Daniel, Dan. ii. 48. The name Magian was then in general transferred to all without distinction of country, commonly wandering orientals, who had dedicated themselves to those sciences.§ 'Απὸ ἀναρ. belong to μάγοι, Magians from the East, i. e. oriental Magians. By this connection, the position of the words is the most natural; the article οἱ ἀπό, etc., is not required, since μάγοι is without the article. The indefinite phrase "eastern countries," is to be left indefinite.|| It has been conjectured that the Magi came from Arabia, Persia, Parthia, Babylonia, Egypt. But neither from the entirely indefinite expression, "from the East," nor in the kind of gifts, v. 11, have we anything but an approximately sure datum. Wholly groundless is the attempt to determine the number of the Magi, from the *three* fold gifts, and on account of Ps. lxxii. 10, Is. xlix. 7, lx. 3, 10, to regard the Magi as kings. Are we to view them as heathen, as most, since the time of the Fathers, have supposed, or Jews? In favour of the first supposition, is the inquiry, "Where is he who is born king of the Jews?" and how consonant also was the Messianic idea that the heathen appeared to pay homage to a Jewish king! Is. x. 3 seq. The expectation of the Jews, also, of the universal dominion of their Messiah, might have been then sufficiently extended in the oriental countries,¶ to lead actual heathen astrologers to the Jewish capital, with the intention of making

* Reland Pal. p. 642. Rosenmüller Bibl. Handb. II. 1. p. 123. Robinson Researches II. 158.

† Wieseler Chronol. Synop. 1843, p. 50. On the whole Herod family, Wolf Curæ, p. 60. Jahn's Archæologie II. 1, 563. Schlosser Geschich. d. Fam. Herod. Leip. 1818. Winer Realwört. 1847, I. p. 481.

‡ Herod. I. 132. Diog. Laert. 1, 1-9. Ælian, V. H. 2, 17. Porphy. de Abstin. an. 4, 16. Cic. de Div. 1, 41. Plin. N. H. 24, 29, 30, 2.

§ Wetstein in loc. Winer II. p. 45.

|| Mat. viii. 11, xxiv. 27. Luke xiii. 29. Rev. xxi. 13.

¶ Suet. Vesp. 4. Tac. H. 5, 13. Joseph. B. J. 6, 5, 4.

the inquiry.* "Jerusalem." In the capital they expected the most reliable information.

VERSE 2. Γάρ gives the reason of the question. "His star," the star pointing out his birth. We are to conceive of an extraordinary star, not before seen by them, at whose appearing they conclude from astrological rules, the birth of a new Jewish king. From the word ἀστήρ, not ἄστρον, and unquestionably from v. 9, it appears that a constellation is not meant. This is contrary to the opinion of many,† who refer to a very near conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn in the constellation Pisces, which occurred U. C. 747; with which still, Ebrard, defining ἀστήρ more exactly, sees in the star of the Magi, not that constellation itself, but the *new* star of the first magnitude, which Kepler saw in 1604 at the conjunction of Jupiter and Saturn, but which disappeared in 1605, while Wieseler has recourse to a comet observed in China in A.D. 750. The Jew Abarbanel ‡ concluded from a similar conjunction in 1463, that the birth of the Messiah was near, and indicates the constellation Pisces as significant for the Jews. But v. 9 points only to a *remarkable* star, to one going and standing in a wonderful manner; so it is clear that neither a comet, nor a planet, nor a meteor is meant. The church fathers conceive it to be an angel.§ The splendour of the star is wondrously painted by Ignatius ad Eph. 19. It was a general belief of antiquity that the appearance of stars denoted great changes, and particularly the birth of important men.|| The Jews especially believed in a star of the Messiah. ¶ — ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ. Some translate, "in the rising."** But on account of v. 9, where the antithesis of ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ, and οὗ ἦν τὸ παιδίον obviously bring out the *local* difference; and on account of ἀπὸ ἀναρ. in v. 1, the translation "in the East" is to be preferred, which also well agrees with the καὶ ἤλθομεν following—προσκυνεῖν, by casting one's self down with the face on the ground, before one, reverence and subjection were denoted. Gen. xix. 1, xlii. 6, xviii. 2, xlviii. 12. Herod. I. 134. Nep. Con. 3. Curt. 5, 2. 6, 6.

VERSE 3. Herod trembled as he feared the overthrow of his throne; the inhabitants were troubled as they expected the cruelty of their tyrant, revolutions and political horrors, it then

* Comp. Cass. Dio. Hist. R. 45. 1. Suet. Oct. 94.

† Kepler de J. Ch. vero anno natalitio, Franc. 1606. Münster Stern d. Weisen Copenh. 1827. Ideler Handb. d. Chronol. II. 399. Paulus, Neander, Leben J. 29. Olshausen doubtful. Krabbe Vorlesun. 96. Wieseler Chronol. Synop. 62. Ebrard Krit. d. Evang. Gesch. p. 248.

‡ Maajne haschuah, Amst. 1547.

§ "A divine and angelic power, appearing in the emblem of a star." Theophyl.

|| Wetstein in loc. Baur. Symbol. u. Mythol. II. 308.

¶ Bertholdt Christol. Jud. p. 55.

** Ebrard, Wieseler, etc. Comp. Stob. Ecl. Phys. 1, 20. Luke i. 78.

being the belief that very sad times would precede the Messianic kingdom.* 'Ιεροσόλυμα fem. form. Comp. 3, 5, Jos. de Bell. J. 1, 5, 7, 18, c. Ap. I. 1047.

VERSE 4. Πάντας—λαοῦ is not considered by Fritzsche after Grotius† as a meeting of the Sanhedrim, but as an extraordinary convention of *all* the chief priests and scribes, in order to investigate the thing more exactly. But the words themselves admit the meaning *Sanhedrim*, since this is denoted even without the third class of assessors, who with them are called the πρεσβύτεροι.‡ Besides, it was in the highest degree in accordance with the importance of the matter and the interests of the king, to lay the question before the Sanhedrim, so as to obtain an official solution of the same as a basis for further proceedings. Hence I prefer the common explanation "a full session of the Sanhedrim;" so that all the chief priests and elders who belonged to the Sanhedrim are meant§—ἀρχιερεῖς included partly the actual, directing high-priest,|| partly those priests who had before filled that office (for then, through the arbitrary caprice of the Romans, this honour was often changed, Jos. Antt. 15, 3), and probably also the leaders of the twenty-four classes of the priests, 1 Chron. xxiv. 6, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 14, Jos. Antt. 28, 8, 8.—γραμματεῖς, סופרים, in Luke, νομκοί and νομοδιδάσκαλοι, were the teachers and interpreters of the divine law, who as counsellors in religious and civil relations, mostly belonging to the sect of the Pharisees, and partly to the Sanhedrim, were highly esteemed.¶—γεννᾶται not in the future sense, of a certain future represented as present, Bernh. Syntax, p. 371, but purely present. The inquiry was, "Where is the Messiah born?" The Sanhedrim were to say what they knew on the birthplace of the Messiah. In this general form the question is to be left, in which Herod reserved wholly to himself the question whether the birth had already happened, or was still to take place.

VERSE 6. In Micah v. 1, which passage is here freely quoted, and not according to the Sept., the sense is, "Though Bethlehem is too unimportant to be reckoned among the principal cities, still a governor of Judah shall proceed from thence." In

* The dolores Messiae, Sanhedr. f. 98. 2. Shabb. 118, 1. Lightfoot Hor. ad Marc. 13, 19. Schöttgen Hor. II. 512. Bertholdt. Christ. Jud. p. 45.

† "An assembly of learned men, *extra ordinem*, convened by the king."

‡ Comp. xx. 18, xxvi. 3; on the contrary in xxvii. 1, the γραμματεῖς are not named. See also Acts xv. 15, xxiv. 1.

§ On the סנהדרין consisting of seventy-one members, the highest politico-religious court of the Jews after the exile, see Buxt. Lex. Talm., p. 1514. Selden de Synhedriis. Reland Antt. Sacr. 2, 7. Hartm. Verbind. d. A. T. 173. Winer Realw. II. 551.

|| 'Ο ἀρχιερεύς, כהן הגדול, Lev. xv. 10. Winer I. 502.

¶ Reland Antt. Sacr. 3, 9, 17. Lightfoot Hor. in loc. and at Mat. xxiii. 4. Suicer Thesaur. on γραμμ. Winer II. 426.

Matthew this thought, with a little variation, is reversed: "Bethlehem is surely an important place, since," &c. Hence it is unnecessary with Grotius and others, to take the passage in Micah interrogatively, "Art thou, then, Bethlehem, too small," &c.? *— $\gamma\eta$ only in derived sense *city*, then, and properly the district in which the city lies.— $\xi\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota$, according to Mat. nascetur, thus, $\aleph\aleph$ Gen. xvii. 6†— $\pi\omicron\mu\alpha\nu\epsilon\iota$, comp. the Homeric $\pi\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma\ \lambda\alpha\omega\nu$.‡ Finally this passage, which in Micah refers to a great king of David's family, is also explained in the Rabbins of the birth of the Messiah. Schöttg. and Wets.

VERSE 7. $\Lambda\acute{\alpha}\theta\rho\alpha$ inconsistent enough, since secrecy could only awaken suspicion, but to work privily is natural for a bad man! The inquiry for the time of the appearance of the star has its ground in this, that the suspicious Herod already thought of the possibility of not again seeing the Magi, and that then he should still have a datum for further proceedings against the fated child, comp. v. 16.— $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \phi\alpha\iota\nu\omicron\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$. "Not the beginning, but the continuance is denoted." Grotius. Herod asks: "How long since the star appeared?" How long it has been visible, namely, in the East, v. 9. So the Part. is to be construed as in the present tense, not in the sense of the Aor. or Imperf.

VERSE 8. $\Pi\omicron\rho\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ and immediately after $\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$; these, and like participles, are not to be explained as Hebraistic pleonasms, but they serve in all languages, especially the ancient, to impart, by a peculiar circumstantiality, a vividness to the commencement of sentences and the by-clauses.§

VERSE 9. "After they had heard the king they departed. A simple description of their artless deportment.—"And behold the star," &c. They travelled by night, according to the well-known oriental custom. Bengel on $\iota\delta\omicron\upsilon$, "toto itinere non viderant stellam." Winer 318— $\pi\rho\omicron\iota\gamma\epsilon\nu$. In the opinion of some, the star did not again appear till the Magi reached Bethlehem, and they translate the verb in the Plup., *had preceded*. But

* [The quotation made by the Sanhedrim is not verbally accurate. The great object, however, for which it is cited is perfectly clear, namely, that the Messiah was to be born in Bethlehem. This point only was important. Great freedom in the matter of quotation from the Old Test. is everywhere obvious in the New Test. " $\aleph\aleph$ " in Mic. v. 1, is pr. the families into which each tribe was divided, the

heads of which were called $\aleph\aleph$ Zech. xii. 5, 6; and Mat. by meton. puts $\gamma\gamma\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, chiefs of families, for the families themselves, as also for the cities in which they dwelt. Robinson's New Testament Lex.—Tr.]

† Comp. Heb. vii. 5. Lib. Enoch. p. 196.

‡ Examples from the classics in Raphel, Kypke, Alberti, Wetstein and Elsner. So $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ of a governor, 2 Sam. v. 2. Jer. xxiii. 2 seq.

§ Kühner Gr. II. § 666, A. 2. School Gr. Eng. Tr. p. 472. On this use of $\pi\rho\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma$, see Gersd. Beitr. p. 103.

προῆγεν is Imperf., and is never used in the sense of the Plup., and the entire theory proceeds only from the effort to diminish what is remarkable; and it is contrary to the character of the narration. The common explanation only corresponds to the words and the connection: "The star went before them on their journey from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, and remained standing over the place (house) where the child was."

VERSE 10. Σφόδρα, on adverbs at the end of a sentence, see Schäfer ad Demos. V. 367. Bornemann Xen. Anab. 2, 6, 9.

VERSE 11. It is not to be said that Matthew knows nothing of the stall (Luke), or of the hole (Apocrypha), for the Magi did not come till after the birth. "The child with Mary" so naturally come together, that the omitting to mention Joseph is to be attributed to no design. "Treasures." Symbolical applications of particular gifts are arbitrary.* It was and is still the custom of the East, not to come before princes without presents. Gen. xliii. 11, 1 Sam. x. 27, 1 K. x. 2, Ælian V. H. 1. 31.

VERSE 12. Καὶ the simple *and*, further narrating.—κορηματισθέντες. "An answer having been received," "being admonished by a divine response." The preceding inquiry, where it is not mentioned, is presupposed. Comp. Acts x. 22. "Thus they had desired, or had asked." The Pass. occurs only in New Test. and Josephus. This direction to the Magi was not designed to secure the safety of the child, vs. 13, sq., but their own.

VERSE 13. Φαίνεται. The historic Pres. in lively, vivid narrative †—ἕως ἂν εἰπω σοί, "till I shall have given thee direction."—τοῦ ἀπολίσσαι. This construction of the Infin., with the Gen. of the article, expresses intention.‡ It is not a Hebraism (‡ with the Infin.), but genuine Greek, when that language was flourishing, but still more common in the decline of the Attic.§

VERSE 15. Τὸν υἱόν μου is referred to in Hos. xi. 1 (cited after the original text, not after the Seventy), to the Israelitish people, who are called in the Old Test., in the theocratic sense, Son of God, Ex. iv. 22, Jer. xxxi. 9. The Seventy have τὰ τέκνα αὐτοῦ. The ἵνα πληρωθῇ here refers to the carrying down of Jesus to Egypt, and his abode there, which must take place, in order that the prophecy might be fulfilled; [no, ἵνα here

* "They had brought frankincense and myrrh to him as God."—Chrys. "They had given gold to him as king, frankincense as God, myrrh as to him about to taste of death."—Theoph.

† John i. 29, 44, ix. 13; Acts x. 10. Matthiæ § 504, 1. Kühner II. p. 68. School Gr. p. 337. Winer 309. Zumpt Latin Gr. p. 431.

‡ Fritzsche in loco and Excur. II. Winer, p. 376.

§ Matthiæ, p. 1257. Bernh. Synt. 357.

means, not *in order that*, but *so that*. The event took place, so that there was a fulfilment. This is commonly regarded as an accommodation of language to our Lord, which was originally applied to the Israelites.—Tr.]

VERSE 16. Ἀπὸ διετούς sc. παιδός, "of two years," so the Syr. and Arab.; also Beza correctly, *a bimulis*. Others suppose διετούς to be Gen. neut., *a bimatu*. This is entirely contrary to the *usus loquendi*, for in all the parallel passages from the Heb. and Seventy, a masculine is to be supposed from the context, Numb. i. 3, xx. 45, Esr. iii. 8, 1 Chron. xxvii. 23, 2 Chron. xxxi. 16. The males of two years *and* younger, Herod, according to this narrative, caused to be murdered, in order to accomplish his design the more unerringly. He had ascertained from the Magi, that according to the time of the appearing of the star, the child must be in his second year. "In all its districts:" single houses and hamlets outside of Bethlehem, which yet belonged to its territory.—ἐν παντί, Calvin correctly: "Matthew speaks according to the feeling and opinion of Herod."

VERSE 18. Jer. xxxi. 15, here freely cited according to the Seventy, treats of the carrying away of the Jews to Babylon, whose calamity, their ancestor, Rachel, laments. According to the typical explanation of Matthew, the lament of Rachel, represented by the prophet, is transferred to the murder of the children of Bethlehem, whose children are *hers*, since she was Jacob's wife, and the mother of Joseph and Benjamin, Gen. xxxv. 18; and this typical significance of Rachel's sorrow was so much the more present to Matthew, as Rachel lay buried near Bethlehem, Gen. xxxv. 19. Some think that Matthew has conceived of Rachel as the representative of Bethlehem, or of the Bethlehem mothers. But why, according to the typical explanation of the prophetic words, should not Rachel herself appear as wailing over the slaughter of those children? Now, Ramah, where, according to the prophet, the lamentation is heard, is viewed by Matthew as the type of Bethlehem. After the old expositors, Kuinoel arbitrarily explains: "The place is not indicated where the lamentation arose, but that to which it extended, so that it signifies, 'that it was heard far and wide.'" Ramah was in the tribe of Benjamin, six Roman miles north of Jerusalem, the border fortress of the kingdom of Israel towards Judah, not far from Gibeah.* Here were the exiles held in custody. Jer. xl. 1.—ἑρῆνος, &c., three similar conceptions are placed together, to strengthen the common fundamental idea. See examples in Wets. The old canon, that the Part. stands for the finite tenses, is false.† A simple, easy connection of the

* Reland Pal. 959. Winer Realw. II. 300. Robinson II. 315-17.

† Winer Gr. p. 395. Döderlein ad Soph. (Ed. Col. 593. Fritz. Dis. II. ad 2 Cor. p. 43, ad Rom. I. p. 281. Herin. ad Viger. 776.

Part. with the finite verb is possible with ἡκούσθη or with οὐκ ἤθελε, so that καὶ would be *also*, "Rachel weeping—was also inaccessible to comfort."* The first I prefer as the most natural and most agreeable to the pathetic style, so that "Rachel weeping," follows in apposition; for the writer, moved by the gravity of the succeeding sentiments, turns from a Part. to a finite verb.†

VERSE 20. Τεθνήκασι—ζητοῦντες is to be understood merely of Herod. The Pl. very often occurs where a generic idea is expressed, and then denotes the object, not in respect to the number, but the category to which it belongs.‡ This construction is often, especially in the tragedians, emphatic.§ Some explain the word of Herod and his counsellors, but against v. 19.; others, of a *pluralis excellen.*, in the highest degree inconsistent with the declaration of an angel in regard to a deceased tyrant; still others, because the words are borrowed from Ex. iv. 19. But the similarity is either accidental, or designedly chosen for the sake of the historical parallel.—ζητεῖν τὴν ψυκὴν, "to seek after the life."|| Herod died of a loathsome disease, in the 37th year of his reign, and in the 70th of his age.¶ The tyrant died in despair.

VERSE 20. Augustus, after the death of Herod, divided his kingdom among his four sons, as follows: Archelaus had Judea, Idumea, and Samaria; Antipas, Galilee and Peræa; Philip, Batanea, Trachonitis and Auranitis. The last two were named tetrarchs. Archelaus had the title of ethnarch, which he would have exchanged for the regal title, if he had been found worthy of it, Josh Antt. 17, 11, 4. On account of his cruelty, he was banished, after nine years, by Augustus, to Vienne in Gaul, Jos. Antt. 17, 13, 2. B. J. 2, 73, and died there—βασιλεύειν is here used in a general sense, "to govern."**—ἐφοβήθη, for Archelaus was like his father in a suspicious temper and cruelty, Jos. Antt. 17, 11, 2—ἐκεῖ ἀπελθεῖν a well known case of attraction, according to which adverbs of rest are connected with verbs expressing direction towards an object.†† "Parts of Galilee," i. e. to Galilee. The voluptuous Antipas was known to be milder than Archelaus.

VERSE 23. Ἐλθὼν to Galilee—εἰς πόλιν. Εἰς belongs not to

* On the difference between καὶ οὐκ and οὐδέ, see Hartung Partikell. I. 212.

† Kühner ad Xen. Mem. 2, 1, 30, Robbin's ed. p. 270. Kühn. Gr. II. 376.

‡ Winer Gr. p. 200.

§ Herm. ad Viger. p. 739.

|| Comp. Rom. xi. 3. The Part. Pres., as often, is here used substantively, Rom. iv. 4. Gal. i. 23. Eph. iv. 28.

¶ Jos. B. J. I. 33, 1, 5. Euseb. II. E. 1, 6, 8. Jos. Antt. 17, 8, 1, 17, 9, 3.

** Pape's Lex. I. 365.

†† John vii. 35, viii. 21, xi. 8, xviii. 3. Seventy, Deut. i. 37. 2 Sam. xvii. 18. So ⲁϣ is connected with verbs expressing direction, aim. Deut. i. 37. 1. Sam. ii. 14.

ἁλθών, but to κατέκνησεν with which it stands; κατέκ. involves the fact of the preceding motion connected with the settlement, and so that this fact was predominant in the mind of the writer.* Nazareth was in Lower Galilee, in the tribe of Zebulun, on a hill, Luke iv. 20, with pleasant environs.†—δπως not ecclastic, but *in order that*.‡—διὰ τῶν προφ. not the Pl. of category, according to which Isaiah only would be meant, but the prophets in general.—δτι not the recitative, which only introduces the words of another, Kühn II. p. 478, but *that*, since no express declaration is quoted.

CHAP. III. v. 1. Ἐν—ἐκεῖναις, Ex. ii. 11, 23, Is. xxxviii. 1, a lax designation of time, which still always points to a foregoing date, Mark i. 9, Luke ii. 1; here "in the time while Jesus still remained in Galilee." Matthew leaps over the history of the youth of Jesus, and goes at once to his forerunner, partly, as he might be ignorant of this early history, partly, since he was concerned only with the leading facts in regard to the Messiah. The vague expression, "in those days," belongs to the simplicity of unstudied historical writing, as Ex. ii. 11, where, with the same expression, the time is meant in which Moses remained at the Egyptian court; not the time of his childhood, v. 10, but of his manhood. Bengel: "Jesus dwelling at Nazareth; an interval is denoted, not brief, but marked by no greater change." δέ is metabatic—παρὰ τὴν. is present historical. "Desert of Judea," Judges i. 16, Josh. v. 61, a tract devoted to pasturage, little built upon or inhabited, beginning at Tekoah and extending to the Dead Sea.§ The local notice in Luke iii. 2, 3, is more exact, but that of Matthew, with whom the wilderness is not bounded by the valley of the Jordan, is not incorrect.

VERSE 2.|| Μετανοεῖτε denotes the change of the moral feelings, which was requisite in order to a participation in the Messianic kingdom. Sanhdr. f. 92, 2. "If the Israelites exercise penitence, then they are liberated by the Redeemer." In the mouth of John, the conception could only have been that of the Old Testament, expressing a deportment according to the moral demands of the law, but not the Christian, according to which, repentance has faith in Christ as its immediate consequence, after which the Holy Spirit received, establishes and completes the new moral life, Acts ii. 38.—ἤγγικε is *near*, for John expected that Jesus would establish his kingdom.—ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν, the kingdom of the heavens, (the Pl. is to be explained

* Comp. iv. 13. Acts. vii. 4. Kühn II. p. 317. Wilkie New. Test. Rhet. p. 47.

† Reland Pal. p. 96. Winer Realw. II. p. 142. Robin. III. 183—200.

‡ [It seems, however, to be ecclastic, and to be equivalent to ἵνα πληρωθῇ, v. 16, viii. 17.—TR.]

§ Rob. Pal. II. p. 182, seq. Winer Realw. II. p. 698.

|| See Von Rohden Joh. d. Tafer in s. Lcb. u. Wirken, Lubeck, 1838.

from the conception of the seven heavens. 2 Cor. xii. 2,) so named only in Matthew;* elsewhere in the New Test. "kingdom of God," "kingdom of Christ," or absolutely "the kingdom." It is called the Messianic kingdom, not because the words of *οὐρανοί* express *God*, but because this kingdom is conceived as descending from heaven and entering the world, Gal. iv. 26. The common idea of the Jews in regard to the Messianic kingdom, was predominantly politico-national, with the fanatical stamp of an universal dominion, to last a thousand years; the Messiah awakes the descendants of Abraham; then follow the reign of a thousand years; the resurrection and condemnation of the heathen; the descent of the heavenly Jerusalem, and the eternal life of the descendants of Abraham on the earth, which is to be transformed, along with the universe. With Christ and the apostles the idea of the Messianic kingdom is not national, but universal, i. e. so that the participation in it is not conceived as depending on a connection with Abraham, but on faith in Christ and the moral state conditioned thereby, without distinction of nations; hence the religious and moral point of view—the idea of an actual theocracy—comes into the foreground, without the idea of the universal dominion, the expectation of the renovation of the world, the resurrection, the judgment and eternal glory, losing their positive significance, truth, and worth. These expressions, "kingdom of heaven," &c., never signify else than the Messianic kingdom, even in those passages where they *seem* to denote the church, the Christian religion, &c. That John the Baptist had embraced the idea of the Messianic kingdom in its moral aspect, and free from Jewish prejudice, without still giving up the political element, xi. 3, is shown in vs. 7 seq.

VERSE 3. It was the Jewish belief, originating from Mat. iii. 1, that a greater prophet would precede the Messiah. Men generally expected Elijah; others, Moses, Jeremiah, Isaiah.

VERSE 4. *Αὐτός*, "but he himself, John, who was speaking," forms a transition from the prediction in respect to the Baptist, to the delineation of the historical person. "He had his garment of camel's hair," distinguishing him, and constantly worn by him.—*αὐτοῦ* is neither to be written *αὐτοῦ*, nor is it a pleonasm. It is appropriate from the position of the narrator, and is without reflexive emphasis. Coarse garments for clothing and for tent-coverings, are still prepared from camel-hair, Winer I. 645. "Leathern," not from a luxurious material, but such as Elijah wore. The dress and food of the Baptist corresponded to his stern character.—*ὀσφύν* the Sing. denotes the part of the body around which he wore the girdle. Several kinds of locusts

* Targ. Mich. 4, 8, and often in the Rabbins, Wets. p. 256.

were eaten, Lev. xi. 22. This is still done in the East, specially by the poorer classes. The wings and bones are removed, the remainder is sprinkled with salt, and either cooked or eaten raw.*

VERSE 5. "The country around the Jordan," כְּנֶרֶס הַיַּרְדֵּן, Gen. xiii. 10, 11; 1 K. vii. 37, the country on both sides of the river, now el-Ghôr.† On the custom of symbolical washings among the Jews, Gen. xxxv. 2; Ex. xix. 10; Num. xix. 7, and other nations, see Wets. in loc., Meiners's History of all Religions, p. 81, &c. John's baptism was not a modified use of the Jewish proselyte baptism. For the latter—the oldest witness in respect to which is in the Gemard Babylon. Jebamoth xlvi. 2, and about which Philo, Josephus, and the older Targumists are wholly silent—was not introduced till after the destruction of Jerusalem. While the temple stood, proselytes were admitted by circumcision and the presentation of an offering, which last was preceded, as every offering was, by a lustration, which the proselyte administered to himself, as a Levitical purification. But, John's baptism is to be viewed in connection, not only with this lustration, but in general with the religious usages of the Jews in respect to washings, and their symbolical meaning. That there was an expectation of a special Messianic baptism, is improbable—ἐξομολογούμενοι. Is a summary or a specific confession meant? one or the other, according to the difference of individuals and their relations. The compound verb marks the open and earnest confession, Acts xiii. 33.

VERSE 7. "Pharisees," (from שָׁרָפָה to separate, the separated,) received, besides the law, traditions; taught a doctrine of fate, still without denying the freedom of the will; immortality (and as it respects the pious in other bodies, not a resurrection of the body, and not a transmigration of souls); good and evil angels, and they affected a holy life.‡ The Sadducees (from צַדִּיק?), acknowledged merely the written law, not the Pentateuch only, but the whole Old Testament, but with the exclusion of traditions, denied the existence of superior spirits, fate, immortality, and held to severe morals; they were in less esteem among the people than the Pharisees, against whom they formed a determined opposition; still they were numerous among the principal men and the rich.§—ἐντὶ the moral direction of the aim, L. xxiii. 48. Winer Gr. p. 485. It has not the meaning of *against*, "that they might oppose his baptism." They came with the design of being baptized, but were

* Niebuhr Reise I. 402. Winner I. 487.

† Winer I. 601. Robinson II. 596.

‡ Jahn Archæol. III. 117. De Wette Archæol. § 274. Winer II. 244.

§ Jahn II. 203. Winer II. 252. Grossmann de Philosoph. Sadd. Lips. 1836.

offended by the preaching of repentance and of punishment, Luke vii. 30.—ἐχιδ. artful, wicked men, Is. xiv. 29, lix. 5, Ps. lviii. 5. "Wrath to come," the Divine wrath to be poured out, when the Messiah comes to judgment, 1 Thess. i. 10. The Jews appropriated this wrath to the heathen, John to the godless, who repented not. The wrath of God is not the punishment, but the holy feeling of absolute displeasure towards the wicked, from which punishment proceeds as a consequence, Rom. i. 18, Ephes. ii. 3.—φυγεῖν ἀπό is a pregnant construction "to flee and thus remove themselves," Is. xlvii. 20. The Aor. Infin. denotes the action as momentary, Kuhn. II. p. 80, exhibiting the point of the outbreaking of the wrath, in which also the flight is realized. Meaning: "Can no one have taught you that ye should flee," &c.

VERSE 8. Consequence from the preceding: "With your present character, ye cannot escape punishment; consequently, so conduct as is meet for those who have repented." "To bring forth fruit," a figurative expression, borrowed from a fruit tree, Acts xxvi. 20.

VERSE 9. Δοκεῖν is never pleonastic, and can in no place be neglected, Winer Gr. p. 697: "think not that ye may say," &c.; "in yourselves," reflection represented as the language of the inner man, comp. Heb. "he said in his heart," Ps. iv. 5, x. 6, xiv. 1. "Abraham to your father." The Jews believed that the children of Abraham would, as such, share in the salvation of the Messianic kingdom, for Abraham's righteousness would be imputed to them. "God is able." "He may exclude you from salvation, and from these stones lying around the Jordan may raise up others, who shall be Abraham's *genuine* children," Rom. iv., Gal. iv., John viii. 39, 40.

VERSE 10. The deciding moment is already near, after which the unworthy shall be excluded from the kingdom of the Messiah, and be cast into Gehenna.—καί 'also,' 'even.' The verbs in the Pres. tense, ἐκόπτ. and βάλλ. mean "what will happen immediately and certainly," with special definiteness, not the general sense, "accustomed to be hewn down," &c.

VERSE 11. "Still, I am not the one who shall decide in regard to the reception or rejection, but it is the *Messiah*.—εἰς μετ. denotes the *aim* of the baptism, Winer Gr. p. 473.—ἐν ὕδατι instrumental. The opposite higher baptism of Jesus "with the Holy Spirit and fire" shows that the points indicated as instrumental are reciprocal, comp. Mark. i. 8, L. iii. 16, and that εἰς μεταν. is only a more exactly defining by-clause. In Mark and Luke the coming of the Messiah as such is brought out emphatically. The Pres. denotes the near and definite commencing Fut.—οὐ οὐκ εἰμὶ, &c. "Compared with the Messiah I am too small

to be his most menial slave." To carry, to put on and take off the sandals, was the office of the meanest slaves, among the Jews, Greeks and Romans.—*ἐν πν. ἁγ. κ. πνεύ.*, 'with the Holy Spirit,' those among you who shall believe in the Messiah; with the fire of Gehenna, those who reject him. Both ideas are figuratively represented as "to baptize," so far as the two are the opposite aspects of the Messianic lustration, by which believers are sanctified, unbelievers are cast into hell.

VERSE 12. Οὗ is not pleonastic; "he has his fan, appropriate to him, in his hand, ready to use." Comp. Is. ix. 5 in Sept. *ἀλωνα*, *לָאָה*, an open, circular, smooth place in the field itself, where the grain was trodden out, either by oxen, or a threshing sledge drawn by oxen. Rob. Pal. III. 143. Winer II. 591. "The floor is purged in order that the grain and chaff may be separated, and each collected for their appropriate destination." In the image, "the floor of the Messiah" does not denote mankind, but the place where he has assembled them, and determines the separation of the judgment, Mat. xxv. 31—33. The compound *διακαθ.* denotes the purification throughout, from one end to the other. The granaries were mostly dry, subterranean vaults.—*ἄχυρον* not simply chaff in the narrow sense, but the worthless parts of the stalk and ear, which remain after the threshing. "The Messiah will take the worthy—those who repent—into his kingdom, but the unworthy he will give over to the eternal punishment of Gehenna."

VERSE 13. *τότε*, then, as John was announcing the coming of the Messiah, and was baptizing the people. Jesus would be baptized by John, because he was conscious that it was the will of God, in order to inaugurate him formally and solemnly as the Messiah.

VERSE 14. This passage does not contradict John i. 33, as the latter asserts that John had not known Jesus as the Messiah, or he needed to have his belief confirmed by the visible proof of the descent of the dove.—*διδέκωλυν*, more emphatic than the simple verb—*ἐγὼ χρεῖαν*, "If either of us is to be baptized, I have need to be baptized by thee as the most worthy," Grotius. "And comest thou to me?" a question expressing astonishment, for nothing was said of baptism in the divine announcement, John i. 33.

VERSE 15. *ἄρτι*, now, allow it now.—*ἡμῖν*, thee and me. "All righteousness," everything which it becomes us to do.

VERSE 16. *Εὐθύς* is connected with *ἀνέβη*. "after he was baptized, he went up immediately." "The heavens were opened," not a brightening up of the sky, not a storm quickly disappearing, but an actual opening of the heavens, in which the Holy Spirit descends, Ez. i. 1, John i. 52, Acts vii. 56, Is. lxiv. 1.—

αὐτῷ refers to Jesus, and is the Dat. commodi, "for Jesus."—εἶδε the subject is not John, but Jesus; ἐπ' αὐτόν is not for ἐφ' αὐτόν, Kühn. § 628, 1.—"as a dove." Luke, iii. 22, says expressly that the dove descended ἐν σωματικῷ εἶδει, in a bodily form, which determines the more indefinite expressions of the other evangelists.

VERSE 17. Φωνή — λέγουσα. We are neither to supply ἐγένετο, nor does the Part. stand for a finite verb, but we are to translate, "and see there a voice," etc., Luke v. 12, xix. 20, Acts viii. 27. Ὁ ἀγαπῶς, the Article does not make the expression emphatic, *dilectissimus*, but it is grammatically required. The divine voice solemnly proclaims Jesus as the Messiah, ὁ υἱός μου, which designation of the Messiah from Ps. ii. 7, in the Christian consciousness was not a mere official name, but was at the same time of a metaphysical import, denoting the *genesis* of Jesus in his spiritual nature.

ART. VIII.—SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. ROBERT TURNBULL, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT.

1. *An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century.* By J. D. Morell, A.M. London. 1850.
2. *Cours De L'Histoire De La Philosophie Moderne, Par M. Victor Cousin.* Didier, Paris. 1847.

Few terms are more indefinite in their meaning, and more variant in their application, than that of Philosophy. Sometimes it is used as equivalent to Psychology, or the science of mind; then it is made to denote some particular branch of speculative inquiry, in the realm either of matter or of spirit. It is no uncommon thing to hear of the philosophy of life, the philosophy of health, and the philosophy of digestion! Indeed philosophies wonderfully abound in modern times, and one might suppose, from the prevalence of the term, that we live in the most philosophical era that ever dawned upon our race. We have philosophies of religion, of morals, of language, of rhetoric, of art, of history and of politics. In Germany, and to some extent in France, and in this country, the term philosophy is frequently used to designate ontology, or the science of absolute being; but the province of this science has never been exactly defined, and is to most persons, a *terra incognita*. Natu-

ral philosophy has a province tolerably well defined, though physical or positive science is its more common and certainly its more appropriate designation. Philosophy, properly so called, or speculative philosophy, is occupied, though not exclusively, with the nature and manifestations of spirit. It transcends all physics, and is thence justly styled metaphysics.

"The first man that *reflected*," says Morell, "was the first speculative philosopher;—the first time that ever thought returned to inquire into itself and arrest its own trains was the commencement of intellectual philosophy; and once commenced it was inevitable that philosophy should continue as long as a problem was left in the mental or moral world to be solved. The primary efforts of reason to get at the ground principles of human knowledge, were naturally weak and imperfect; but as reflection advanced, the path became clearer, until some individual of more than ordinary reflective power arrived, as he considered, at a solution of the main problems of human life, and sent it forth into the world. This was the first system of philosophy."—p. 20.

But inquiry does not stop at the human mind; all things both in the realm of matter and of spirit have their causes; and hence philosophy has been viewed by some as "that which is to explain the principles and causes of all things." Hence we may have a philosophy of all possible matters in heaven above, and in earth below. Speculative philosophy may be made to cover the entire ground of human knowledge, and include both psychology and ontology. It may constitute at once the science of man and the science of God, in other words, it may cover the whole domain of being and thought, and thus stand forth to the world as the science of sciences, the primal and essential philosophy of the universe. "By some," says Morell, (p. 21,) "it is termed the science of the absolute and universal; others denominate it that branch of human knowledge which is conversant with abstract and necessary truth." In a note, he says, "the following definition has been suggested to me as comprehending every essential point—*philosophy is the science which reduces all things to the region of pure ideas, and then traces their connection and unity.*" He adds, in the text; "All these definitions, and many others which might be mentioned, amount in fact very nearly to the same thing. If it were necessary to make the idea of philosophy still clearer, perhaps we might say that it is the science of *realities* in opposition to that of mere appearances,—the attempt to comprehend things as they are, rather than as they seem. Starting originally from phenomena, internal or external, it seeks to discover what reality there is beneath them,

what is the law of their development, and what the ground of their existence. Thus, if it treat of the subjective world, it inquires into the nature and validity of our faculties, into the true foundation of our knowledge and faith; if, on the other hand, it treat of the objective world, it strives to look through the outward appearances of things, and comprehend the essence by which they are upheld; having done this, it next seeks to determine the connection that subsists between subject and object, and the common origin from which they both proceed. In carrying on this process of inquiry, the human mind can never content itself with a superstructure of knowledge which is either uncertain in its foundations, or imperfect in any of its parts; accordingly the philosophic spirit, when once begun, ever strives after a perfected system, in which every phenomenon within or around it shall be accounted for, and every problem analysed or solved."

In this view, philosophy must take an illimitable range. It may have a beginning, and even a progress towards perfection; but when and where can it end? When or where attain perfection? In a word, when and where can it assume the character of a true science? Every secret revealed, every problem solved, every mystery illumined, knowledge will be complete. Man, nature, God, the universe—all will be explained, without a difficulty, or a doubt! Such a pursuit may well be termed, in the honest language of Morell, "the striving of man's reasoning to comprehend the great problems of the world within and the world without, to probe their real nature, and assign their real origin."—p. 22. Well, too, may Cousin say, that philosophy is, *la lumière de toutes lumières, l'autorité des autorités*—"the light of all lights, the authority of authorities," and exclaim, in a sort of rapture, "that mystery is a word which does not belong to the language of philosophy."* If some thoughtful person would here offer a suggestion touching the limitations of the human mind, and the inevitable ignorance of mankind, or, at least, the incapacity of most persons to understand even the first elements of such a philosophy, Schelling will reply, with a superb disdain: "Really one sees not wherefore Philosophy should pay any attention whatever to incapacity. It is better rather that we should isolate Philosophy from all the ordinary routes, and keep it so separated from ordinary knowledge that none of these routes should lead to it. Philosophy begins where ordinary knowledge terminates."† Language this quite natural in one who claims to be, *par excellence*, the expounder of what Plato calls, "the royal Science."

* Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 18, 97.

† Neue Zeitschrift für Speculativ Physik, Vol. II. p. 34.

Allowing that such a philosophy is possible in the present condition of man, allowing at least that contributions with reference to its attainment may be commenced and indefinitely prosecuted, it will be admitted that its first and most essential department must be a well-digested account of all our mental phenomena, or what is ordinarily termed psychology; and yet strange to say, Morell, Cousin, Hamilton, and other eminent philosophers, speak of such a psychology as yet a *desideratum*.* True we have psychologies for schools and academies, but they are either mere compilations, or fragmentary disquisitions, or, what is worse, mere hypothetical speculations on the science of mind. Rauch's Psychology, Upham's Mental Philosophy, and works of a similar character, contain many good suggestions, but their intelligent authors, we are sure, would not claim them as complete scientific accounts of our mental phenomena. In the writings of Locke, Kant, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Cousin, Hamilton and others, we have valuable contributions to the science of mind, but assuredly no complete and consistent psychology.† Still the great majority of philosophers, as we courteously term them, have plunged into the deepest questions of Ontology, have discussed the nature and origin of ideas, the essence and "genesis" of the universe, nay the very nature and constitution of God, and confidently published their lucubrations as systems of Philosophy! Thus we have the Subjective Philosophy of Fichte, the Absolute Idealism of Hegel, the Nature-Philosophy of Schelling, and the Eclectic Philosophy of Cousin. Yet an insatiable curiosity will lead all reflective minds to pry into the causes of things, not simply into their occasional or phenomenal, but their absolute and essential causes. The highest problems pertaining to themselves, to nature, and to God, in spite of all hazards, will engage their attention. Bold and speculative minds will sweep, or attempt to sweep, the whole field of thought, and give us the true theory both of matter and of spirit. In such efforts doubtless some grand and lofty ideas may be struck out, some magnificent and finely-wrought theories projected, some ineffable glimpses may be opened into the very centre and essence of things. But surely a comprehensive, coherent philosophy of the universe, to say the least, is only an imaginary possibility, to which, thus far, we have taken only some initial, and, it must be confessed, rather unsatisfactory steps.

Be this, however, as it may, a historical and critical account

* Schelling, who in this respect differs from Cousin, frankly abandons psychology as utterly useless in his system of rationalistic science. To him it is a thing altogether *empirical*.

† The metaphysical writings of Descartes, Leibnitz, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are mostly rationalistic. Facts, if used at all, are pressed into the service of abstract theories.

of such speculations, if properly executed, must possess great interest and value, and deserve the profound study of every thoughtful mind. The materials for such a history are accumulating with great rapidity. Brucker, Tiedemann, Tennemann, Hegel and Ritter among the Germans, Stewart and Hamilton in England, and Cousin, Damiron, Saisset and Saintes in France, have laboured successfully in different departments of this field. Though availing himself of the labours of his predecessors, Morell has added a valuable contribution on the philosophy of the nineteenth century, particularly that department of it which includes the more recent speculations of the German philosophers. His style is clear, vigorous and even elegant, though frequently diffuse and declamatory, and on this account, occasionally wanting in philosophical precision, though for this very reason probably more agreeable to most readers. His mind also is orderly and systematic, and his powers of analysis and criticism are certainly considerable. It is true that his fundamental principles of criticism and even his historical arrangement of details are those, almost word for word, of Cousin and Damiron.* Many of his finest analyses are borrowed from these or similar sources, and what is of greater consequence, most of the results to which he seems to have arrived, are precisely those of the French Eclectic School. He has made some slight criticisms on Cousin, and taken some gentle exceptions to one or two of his positions; nevertheless he has adopted nearly all his fundamental principles, both of historical criticism and systematic philosophy. This is strikingly the case with reference to the doctrine not only of the spontaneity and absolute authority of the "pure reason," but of its *impersonality* and consequent *divinity*. He seems to be satisfied with the mode in which Cousin professes to make "the passage from psychology to ontology," and justifies the system of fundamental ideas, by which he "construes the universe." He cautions his readers against the pantheistic tendencies of Cousin's philosophy, but defends the principles from which that pantheism is deduced. If Cousin is himself to be believed, he is as little of a pantheist as Morell. Cousin distinctly affirms the existence of an intelligent and personal God.† But his doctrines of the impersonality of reason, and of the *necessary* production of the universe, involve him in difficulties, from which Morell furnishes no way of escape. But more of this anon.

* Morell acknowledges his obligations to Damiron.

† In a Note to his "Introduction to the History of Philosophy." He seems, however, to use these words in a sense different from that ordinarily attached to them, as we shall show in another part of this Article.

We have seen the comprehensive sense in which Morell, in common with most of the German and French philosophers, uses the term philosophy. With him it is not simply mental or moral science, not psychology or even theosophy, but all of these combined, the science of "the absolute and unchanging," the interior science of all things, the spiritual philosophy of the universe. Now, while we have serious objections to this use of the term, we will not urge them at present; we will even consent to assume its legitimacy; but it ought to be distinctly understood what it really comprehends. It goes, in its last analysis, as every one must see, into the unconditioned essence and interior constitution of all that exists, including being and thought, action and law. It comprehends the nature and movement both of mind and of matter, the last secret of the universe without and the universe within, the nature of the absolute substance, and infinite cause, in its interior essence, as well as in its external manifestation, genesis or creation of all dependent being. Its real sphere thus lies back of all the positive sciences, and of all the mere phenomena of matter and of mind, back of all the possible relations and conditions of the universe, and reveals to us the absolute and immutable Being, the ultimate and eternal law. Indeed, as the created universe lies in God (for "in him we live and move and have our being,") this philosophy, in its final aim, is nothing less than the science of God—not as manifested or revealed in finite forms, but as existing in his own absolute and boundless perfection. It must not only find God, which we grant to be a possible attainment to the human soul, but so find him, as to be capable of "construing," or, as the Germans say, "ideally constructing" the universe from that simple idea or primary fact. First finding the centre of all things, and not only apprehending but comprehending it, it must thence proceed through all its radii to the vast circumference of created things, and give the metaphysical history of the whole. The place of starting, the original basis of all this generalisation, of all these vast analytic and synthetic processes, the real *πρὸς σῶ* of the philosophic speculator, is his own individual consciousness! The process, in fact, is double—it proceeds from the circumference to the centre, and thence again to the circumference. Its real point of starting, however, and the consequent foundation of the entire speculation or philosophy, is the individual consciousness. The whole must be drawn from this, as the web of the spider is spun from its own bowels. "Accordingly," says Dr. Richard Rothe, Professor of Theology at Bonn, as quoted, with approbation, by Mr. Morell in his "Philosophy of Religion,"—"Accordingly the position which the speculator takes is essentially this: he falls back upon the datum of his

consciousness, which has for him the most immediate certitude; and leaving all other possible data in abeyance, *construes the universe* out of that alone, purely by virtue of the dialectic residing in it. This primary datum too for our thinking must contain in it the logical necessity of not remaining fixed in it alone, as immediately given, but of going forth beyond it; it must by virtue of its inherent dialectic break off before it comes back again to its starting point, but forms itself into a veritable system in which the Universe lies ideally included.*

The universe, in its interior nature and original genesis—what an illimitable ocean of thought; how far transcending the range of the finite intellect, and how densely covered, to ordinary minds at least, with clouds and darkness!† That its dim outline, or one or two of its sides, if outline or sides it can be said to have, where all is infinite, may be discovered by us; that some slight excursions, in calm weather, may be made upon its broad bosom, we will not positively deny; and yet we are here using terms borrowed from the finite and contingent, which in reference to the infinite and absolute, for that very reason, have no definite or adequate meaning. For, it is not the universe, visible and bounded, which is proposed as a subject of philosophical inquiry; but the universe, as invisible and boundless, not God as revealed in the finite, but God as existing in his own absolute and inscrutable essence. That the supreme cause of all things, the true and eternal Jehovah, may be discovered, though never adequately comprehended, by the finite reason of man, as an existence, with vast attributes of power and wisdom, that he may be recognised as the centre of the universe, the only true object of adoration and worship, we admit; but a philosophy of such a subject, a science of the absolute, the boundless, the ineffable, where is it, how is it, and what can it be? Man is unconditioned and finite, how then can he find out to perfection the unconditioned and infinite? If it exist for him as an object of faith, of a sublime and inexplicable intuition, how can it exist for him as an object of science? Thought, however wide and magnificent its range, is yet finite and conditioned. In every possible case, it involves a relation and a limit, that of subject and object; and

* Philosophy of Religion, p. 334.

† We say "ordinary minds," *ex concessio*. We might well say, "any minds." The infinite alone can measure and construe the infinite; and we know of no minds that are infinite. God alone comprehends God. Man may *apprehend* him, as revealed, but can never *comprehend* him. Even the finite absolute—the real essence of soul, or the real substratum of body, utterly elude our grasp. We may know it as revealed in forms and utterances, or by an ineffable consciousness as a simple existence, or power, but cannot adequately comprehend it. It too is a mystery. So God is a mystery, and man, his image on earth, is also a mystery. Back of all we know, ever lies the unknown.

except in the case of the fundamental elements of all knowledge, the ground principles of all science, is a deduction or an inference. How then can it grasp and so limit and comprehend the illimitable, the incomprehensible? Revelation, of course, is not to aid us in such a philosophy. That is ruled out by the very terms. It is a science, a philosophy of the absolute we are after, a science from which the very idea of mystery is excluded.* Our consciousness indeed has wonderful scope and fertility. It mirrors, philosophers tell us, the universe and even God, which sounds a good deal like saying, that the finite includes the infinite, the part the whole.† At all events, it has great fundamental laws or principles of reasoning, universal and authoritative intuitions, from which it can deduce what we somewhat vaguely term the infinite and eternal. By its constitution, it gains or rather *possesses* the idea of cause, and thence from the relative supposes, perhaps reaches, the absolute, from the finite the infinite, from the phenomenal the real, from the human the divine. All this we cheerfully grant; for as intelligent and moral beings we are made "in the image of God," and have "large discourse of reason, looking before and after." Faith involves intellect, as the Christian fathers uniformly teach, having its "grounds in the nature of man."‡ All religion supposes God, and the Christian faith everywhere takes this truth for granted, as something already proved or admitted. But the question turns upon a philosophy of God, an absolute science of the universe, to be constructed from the facts of consciousness, the very idea of which supposes a certain limitation in the conception of subject and object. If you say it is not absolutely impossible, and may be attained at some indefinite period in the future history of man, if not on earth at least in heaven, you will certainly admit, that it is unspeakably vast and difficult, and if all speculators for a thousand years to come should miss their way here, and fall into grievous errors and inextricable difficulties, no thoughtful person can feel the least surprise.

* "Mystery," says Cousin, "belongs only to religion." "Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie," p. 97.

† In this view, they call man a *microcosm*, a little universe, a universe as it were in embryo, but in such a case the universe, however vast, is bounded, and if bounded then conditioned and finite. Reason may be a reflection of God; after all the reflection cannot measure and comprehend the reality. It indicates its presence as an *infinite* mystery—that is all.

‡ Hooker in his "Ecclesiastical Polity," Vol. I. p. 310, 311, speaks of Philosophy as one of the grounds of faith, but defines it as "true and sound knowledge attained by natural discourse of Reason," and quotes Tertullian to this effect: "Even in matters of God, we may be made wiser by reasons drawn from the public persuasions (general convictions) which are grafted in men's minds. . . . For there are some things even known by nature, as the immortality of the soul to many, and our God to all."

You know matter, you say. Do you know it except by some of its more obvious qualities? It is extended, divisible, porous, etc. Yes, but to what do all these qualities belong? What is the nature of the being in which they inhere? It exists, you say; but what is it? What is the relation between subject and object here? How much of those qualities are due to the mind itself? How many are simple forms of the intellect, or mere appearances of the sense? Where are they, and what are they, when the mind is gone? Whence came they; whence indeed came matter at first? Is it the product of spirit? Is it the creation of God? If so, what is its relation to spirit, what is its connection with God? If it had a beginning, will it have an end? And is that which has a mediate, and temporary existence, which once was not, and which by and by will cease to be, worthy of the name of a substance or an existence at all? It is changeable—it is fluent—it is divisible *ad infinitum*—it passes away! What is it then? A phantom, or, peradventure, a force, but a force proceeding from an infinite centre, a real and everlasting essence? In a word, what is it? *

You know mind also. Do you know it except by its attributes of thought, feeling, affection, etc.? Yes, but what is mind, what is spirit? in other words, what is that ineffable something in which all these attributes inhere? Is it created, dependent, conditioned? How, and to what end? In what way is it linked to the infinite? How, above all, is it separate from the infinite? God made man in his own image, is the belief you hold. Made him! Of what? Of something, or of nothing? Made him! How, when, where? Did God make him out of his own ineffable nature? And if so, is man, too, *divine*? divine, and yet finite, changeable, dependent, and above all, sinful? He is composed apparently of two diverse elements, two contrary systems, the physical and the spiritual, or what we call the body and the soul. Is man, then, dual? and if so, how are the diverse elements blended? How acts the soul upon the body; the body upon the soul? Man has a beginning. Has man an end? His body decays, falls back to its kindred nature, of which it forms a part; what becomes of his soul? Nay, what is his soul?

You know God, O sage and profound philosopher! His nature, you say, is entirely comprehensible.† Well, then, what

* Morell states, over and over again, that the vulgar notions of matter are clearly erroneous, and that philosophers are coming more and more to the conclusion, with which he seems to coincide, that it consists, solely of "a combination of forces." This, at least, is the view of Leibnitz and Cousin.

† Cousin ("Introduction à l'Histoire de la Philosophie," p. 26,) maintains the comprehensibility of the Divine nature, but not in an absolute sense, as he explains in a note; which is the same thing as saying, that we can know God only in part, that is by limitation. As revealed, we may comprehend the character and claims of God, sufficiently for practical purposes. But, the instant we penetrate, or attempt to pene-

is God? The absolute Being; the uncreated Essence—the necessary, all-creative Cause, the Cause of causes, the Source of all existence, in whom the universe, we and all things “live and move.” These are good words and true. But what do they import? What is that absolute, that uncaused, that unconditioned, that Infinite, of which you speak? What is that awful, that unutterable Being of which you predicate so much? You can speak of some of his attributes and actions, as revealed in finite forms, and by that revelation *limited*, and therefore in part *concealed*; but what is God himself? Are you, too, infinite, that you can know him thoroughly? Did you lie in the bosom of his boundless Essence before “the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy;” and did you see, with your omniscient glance, the light spring from chaos at his first command? Has your mode of being any relation or resemblance to his? Can you tell how he creates, creates out of nothing, or, which is the same thing perhaps, creates out of himself? How passes the infinite into the finite, the one into the many, the absolute into the relative, the immutable into the temporary, the Divine into the human? You say you are a producer, a creator, perhaps. Cousin says as much in one of his Lectures, much applauded by his Parisian audience; * but can you create out of nothing? can you produce from yourself? How can the finite compare itself, in essential relations and acts, with the infinite? If, in your imagination, you “bridge over” the chasm which seems to yawn between the relative and absolute, the creature and the Creator, have you solved the problem scientifically? Have you not rather deceived yourself by a play upon words? The infinite, the self-existent, the absolute, we recognize it and adore it; but to reduce it to a science, to construct it into an ideal philosophy, is surely not a science, but a delirium and a folly.

We are not reasoning the matter here; for this our limits will not suffice. We are merely suggesting some obvious considerations which the notion of constructing an ideal God and an ideal universe naturally suggests. “Philosophy,” says Morrell, “is the science which reduces *all things* to the region of pure ideas;” and which, thence, constructs for us, on the basis of consciousness, an universal spiritual science.” We are certainly safe in saying that its constructions, thus far, have not proved very substantial and enduring. We think there is a true philosophy, as there is a true religion; but such a philoso-

trate, into the absolute nature of God, we find the limits of our powers. Cousin himself says, (“Introduction,” p. 143,) “There remains, then, in God, notwithstanding the universe and man, something *unknown, impenetrable, incomprehensible.*”

* Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, 2 s. Tome I. pp. 100-101.

phy is modest and pains-taking. It begins with facts, proceeds with facts, ends with facts.* These it seeks in the realms both of matter and of spirit, where it reverently watches the revelations of the eternal mind; and as fact after fact, principle after principle, discovers itself in beautiful harmony, rejoices to advance nearer and nearer to the great central fact of the universe, from which all other facts spring, and to which they for ever gravitate. Ideas and hypotheses, however plausible or splendid, and consequently ideal systems, however ingenious and profound, must after all give way to facts or realities. The ideal world must correspond with the real world—the ideal God with the real God. To reduce all things, or even many things, to the region of pure ideas, must involve a task more than human; for it implies a knowledge of all things to begin with, which even German philosophy has not yet attained. Some things come to us in the form of original *à priori* conceptions, enough, perhaps, to form a basis for our faith in a revealed religion, which assumes the idea of God, and enough, probably, to assist us in “the conduct of the understanding;” but in matters of such difficult investigation and boundless range, it is always best to “begin at the beginning,” and advance slowly and cautiously towards higher attainments. To soar like a seraph on the wings of light, into the boundless empyrean, might be more brilliant and imposing. But whether it would be equally satisfactory in the end, may admit of question. For, alas! men are not winged angels, but plain, plodding mortals, who must laboriously climb the hill of science, and be satisfied with the expanding prospects ever opening upon their vision, as they ascend from point to point into the infinite depths. That speculative science, or spiritual philosophy, is yet in its infancy, we are quite assured; and that in order to its intelligent progress, much of what, in past ages, has been dignified with this name, must be abandoned as useless rubbish. It would be pleasant to be gods; but we cannot cease to be men.

And here we beg to call attention to a most important fact connected with this matter. “The past history of philosophy,” says Sir William Hamilton, universally acknowledged the first philosophical critic of the age, “has in a great measure been only a history of variation and error.”† One system has devoured another, till the very thought of a system of philosophy, to most persons, seems little less than a ridiculous imposition. Cousin, indeed, with much learning and ingenuity, has gathered together the fragments, *disjecta membra*, of all past philosophies,

* We use the term *fact* here as equivalent to *reality*. It may be a phenomenon, a relation, a cause, a principle, or a being.

† Reid's Collected Works, Vol. I., Note A., p. 747.

and by adding several items of his own, has attempted to construct the whole into an Eclectic Philosophy, with what success we shall presently see. Certainly it appears well, and evinces great analytic, as well as constructive talent, on the part of its learned author, whose orderly arrangement, and pellucid, and even splendid style, have a wonderful charm. But portions of it are so extravagant, and even puerile, that one is half tempted to believe what many intelligent Frenchmen, when interrogated as to the opinion of their great philosopher, say, shrugging their shoulders, "Monsieur Cousin! Monsieur Cousin est un charlatan!"*

Let us suppose the science of astronomy, or that of chemistry, to have undergone the perpetual variations through which speculative philosophy has passed, and is still passing, should we dignify it with the name of a science or a philosophy? Should we not say, as we gazed upon its multitudinous and contradictory theories, that it belonged to the "Ptolemaic era" of human thought, and had yet to enter into the true path of scientific investigation?

But, it will be inquired, perhaps, has not some progress been made in certain departments of speculative inquiry, in psychology, for example? Have not many interesting facts been classified? Have not some great and primary principles been established? Surely the human mind is better understood at the present day; the science of logic has advanced; the fundamental axioms of all reasoning have been recognized, and surely some light has been thrown upon our relations to the infinite and the eternal! Allowing this to be true, at least in a modified sense, where can we find anything like a true and coherent system of philosophy, or even of mental science, about which any original or really distinguished investigators are agreed? How confused and fragmentary the speculations of our greatest philosophers! how empty and even preposterous some of their conceits!†

* We ourselves have no such idea of Cousin as this language implies. He has certainly great ability both as a thinker and writer. His translation of Plato alone is an illustrious monument of his learning. His style is clear, felicitous and eloquent, and his Lectures, especially, on the History of Philosophy, are quite readable and instructive. Occasionally, however, he betrays the vanity which seems peculiar to the great majority of French writers, especially those of them who claim to be *par excellence* philosophers, and sometimes falls into great extravagances. His notions on the philosophical character of England and of France, and especially of the destiny of the latter, are simply preposterous.

† Let any one peruse carefully Sir William Hamilton's "Supplementary Dissertations," that particularly on "Common Sense," (Reid's Collected Works, Edin. Edition, Vol. I. p. 742,) and he will be satisfied that psychology itself is yet to be investigated afresh, and reconstructed on a firm and permanent basis. We have in Reid, Stewart, Cousin, and others, lists of fundamental axioms of human thought, but they are all inadequate and imperfect. Reid laboured in this field more success-

But variation in speculative philosophy has uniformly taken a specific direction. Indeed, it is a singular circumstance, and one deserving our careful study, that its leading theories in all ages have terminated in some form of scepticism. A material Atheism on the one hand, or an ideal Pantheism on the other, have been their logical and necessary result. There is not one of them which cannot be run into some insuperable difficulty, some absolute and even monstrous error. In all times, indeed, some philosophical thinkers have had glimpses of the truth; and others, terrified at the abyss which yearned before them, have taken refuge in some form of authoritative religion, or philosophical mysticism, in which faith rather than reason was the predominant element; but the general current of philosophical speculation has been in the direction of a material or a spiritual pantheism.

This fact is so important, that we shall be forgiven, if for the sake of verifying and elucidating it, we enter into some historical and critical details.

Let us begin then with the very dawn of speculation, in the ancient philosophies, vast, gorgeous and shadowy, like the countries which gave them birth. Whether these philosophies were founded upon religion, or religion upon them, is a question not yet decided—though the probability is, that they were engrafted on the popular superstitions. Religion is the first want of our nature, philosophy the second; and we have no reason to believe that this order was reversed among the Hindus. Their worship, however, was more a worship of the outward and the carnal, than of the inward and the divine. Hence, they deified the universe, and adored its ever-varying aspects. For the same reason, the speculations of the sages, dreamy and often profound, uniformly revolved about the universe as divine; and their worship, if such it may be called, was always a worship of nature, or of themselves. Cousin states decisively, that the first fruit of their philosophy, the moment it became independent of the Vedas, or sacred books, was atheism.* This system, which goes far back into the annals of India, was called Sankhya, the author of which was Kapila, and is an avowed

fully than all his predecessors: but his works, interesting and profitable as they are, are rather preparations for a science of mind, than the science itself. Many of Cousin's analyses are striking and beautiful, but they are mingled with errors and extravagances, arising from the very nature of his fundamental theory, the aim of which is to give us a universal science from the collation and combination of all other systems. So far as we know, the Germans have not even attempted the formation of an inductive science of mind. Their labours have all been in the field of the *absolute*.

* "Histoire de la Philosophie," 2 s. Tome II. p. 120. See also Tennemann "Manual of the Hist. of Ph." p. 41.

system of scepticism. Coincident with this, but diverging from it, was the philosophy of Pantandjali, which, as the other made nothing of God, made everything of God. According to Kapila, all thought is derived from sensation; consequently there is nothing but matter. Opposed to this sensualistic and atheistic philosophy, was the theory of rationalism, called Nyaya, which is nothing more nor less than a system of subjective idealism. As in Fichte's scheme, the soul is the centre of this philosophy, and is infinite in its principle. True, it is distinct from the body, is a special substance, and is different in different individuals; so that this form of idealism was not at first consistently carried out. This, however, was subsequently done; so that the idealistic philosophy, usually styled Vedanta, denied the existence both of matter and of mind as finite realities, and made God the All. The final, definite, absolute verity, according to Karika, a celebrated commentator on the Sankhya, is as follows:—

"I neither am, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist."

But transcendental mysticism, in which God is recognized as the All, and the absorption of thought, feeling, and even existence in him, is the prevalent philosophy in India. According to this system, God is creator and destroyer, spirit and matter, heaven and earth, time and eternity, light and darkness, beginning, middle and end, subject and object, love and hatred, father and mother, saint and sinner. The Hindu Brahm is the absolute God of the pantheistic philosophy: and although idolatry is prevalent enough in India, yet the sentence has become a proverb, *Ek Brumho dilt'yo nashti*: *One God, and beside him no other*. From Brahm the absolute abstraction, comes Brahma, an emanation of the former, and the first person of the Hindu Triad. Brahm is without beginning or end, unchangeable and omnipotent, but unconscious, without mind, without will, without action. The one, however, becomes the many, becomes Brahma, Vishnu, Shiva, in a word, the visible universe. God, therefore, is all—all is God. Man is God, and like a flame, returns to his centre of heat and beauty. All things form a circle, in which there is perpetual revolution, but no change. Matter is mind, mind is matter, and both are God.* Hegel is mightily pleased with this pantheistic philosophy of India, and quotes with approbation the Bhagavad

* Consult Sir William Jones, and particularly Colebrooke's *Miscellanies*, Cousin's "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," 2 s. Tome II. Sixieme Leçon. See also Ritter's *Ancient Ph.* V. I. pp. 60—128. Tennemann's *Manual*, pp. 40-41.

Gita, in which Krishnu is introduced addressing the warrior Ardjouna: "I am the author and destroyer of the universe, &c. I am the breath which dwells in the body of the living, the progenitor and the governor. * * * I am the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things. I am under the stars, the radiant sun, under the lunar signs the moon, the sweet perfume of the earth, the splendour of the flame, the life in animals, &c." Hence the key for the deliverance of the soul, according to the school of Vedantam, is in these words, which the Hindu philosophers have to repeat incessantly: *I am the Supreme God, Aham, Ava, param Brahma*—the last practical result of a fanatical pantheism.*

Professor Tholuck, in his interesting work on the Pantheistic philosophy of the Persians, (Ssufismus) informs us that the Mohammedan heretical philosophers, the Soofies, teach that God is everything, in the most absolute sense of that expression—*nilhil esse præter Deum*; that the creation is an emanation of God, and that the absorption of self in Deity is the highest good. In a word, their doctrine is that of a sublime but inexorable pantheistic fatalism, in which all distinction between matter and mind, sin and holiness, God and man, is swallowed up and lost.

Let us turn now to Greece, manifestly under the influence of the Oriental mind, but acute, restless, penetrating, practical, and pressing philosophy, as all else, to its extreme logical verge. Given to nice distinctions and subtle reasonings, with a language rich, pliant and delicate, they seized with avidity upon the great problems of speculative inquiry, and projected an infinite variety of plausible and splendid theories. Here, if anywhere, philosophy might have reached perfection and solved the enigma of the universe. But we find it constantly vacillating between sensualism and idealism, atheism and pantheism, and finally running out into a flat and arid scepticism.

The early Greek philosophers were divided between the Ionian and Eleatic schools, the first of which was a system of absolute naturalism, and took the form of a material pantheism, or rather atheism, for a material God is no God; the second, or Eleatic school, a system of pure idealism, which ran out into a refined, but equally pernicious pantheism. Thales, the founder of the Ionian school, derived all things from water; but whether he admitted any power superior to this, or recognized any species of God distinct from the material universe, is a matter of dispute. Anaximander advanced a step further, and maintained that all things, or the material universe in its totality, is the

* Tholuck's Ssufismus, p. 214, quoted from *Lettres Edifiantes*, Paris, 1809.

only God. Anaximenes, and, somewhat later, Diogenes, of Apollonia, maintained that air and not water is the true source of all existence; while Heraclites, the last representative of the Ionian school, found it in the more beautiful and resplendent element of fire.

According to this school, the soul of man is a mere mechanical power somewhat refined—consequently fatalism in its direct form, was its last and necessary result.

From this school was derived the atomic theory of Leucippus, and Democritus, according to which the body, the soul, and the entire universe external and internal, are composed of definite atoms. The soul is a collection of such atoms igneous and spherical, producing at once motion and thought. As to God, they said nothing of his existence, the universe was the only object of their worship; if, indeed, the term worship be not a misnomer in such circumstances. They recognise nothing but matter in its various forms and movements.

Between the Ionian school, with its mechanical universe, and the Eleatic with its abstract and idealistic pantheism, we find the Italian school, founded by Pythagoras, who with a profounder insight than most of his contemporaries, penetrated beyond mere phenomena, and recognized the interior relations of things. But his whole spirit was cast into a mathematical mould, and so he constituted the universe of numbers, and recognized the Deity only as a numerical unit.*

The Eleatic school was formed under Pythagorean influence. Unity being its central principle, diversity or plurality came to be despised. At last this diversity was given up by Zeno, who denied the innate energy, and consequently the real existence of the external universe. Absolute spiritualism, the most appropriate form of pantheism, was the natural result, and constituted the dominant principle of the Eleatic school, and equally with the grosser, atheism of the Ionians, destroyed all just conceptions of the nature and government of "the true and living God." Still, it is quite evident to an attentive reader of the early Grecian philosophy, that many individuals were blindly seeking after God, if haply they might "feel after and find him."

These opposing schools combated each other with various success, the consequence of which was, the rise of many sceptics who despised them both, and of a very few eclectics who attempted, but without any decided success, to blend the prin-

* Our account of the Grecian schools is drawn chiefly from Ritter, Tennemann, Lewes, and Cousin, except in the case of Socrates and Plato, in reference to whom we have followed Plato's own works, with such assistance as we could draw from the philosophical historians referred to, and other sources of information.

ciples of the two systems. Anaximines, however, on this ground, gained some idea of a great first Cause of all things; but failed, after all, to reach a true spiritual conception of the Supreme Ruler, not only as the primary cause of all things, but as the ever-living Sovereign both of matter and of mind. The principal result of these contradictory speculations was the universal prevalence of a frivolous and sceptical spirit.

At last, Socrates, the shrewdest and best of all the Greek philosophers, the friend and teacher of Alcibiades, Xenophon and Plato, who, like Reid in Scotland, recalled his countrymen to the principles of common sense, made his appearance, and by his contempt of sophistry and by innumerable casual suggestions, formed an era in Grecian philosophy.* He poured infinite contempt upon the sophists, and endeavoured to turn the minds of men in upon themselves. "Know thyself," was his great maxim, virtue his end and aim. He had no theory, no system, properly speaking, wrote no book, founded no school: a circumstance well for him, and perhaps well for the world. He followed common sense, and the higher instincts of his nature, "the good demon," as he symbolized it, and which, in the case of every true and candid man, will evermore suggest the reality of a Supreme Being, the beauty and authority of virtue. Man is made for God, and he has only to open his eyes to see him, his heart to feel him. But, the instant he begins to speculate on "the absolute," by means of ideal abstractions, he falls into error and sin. Socrates seemed to understand this, by a sort of sacred intuition; and his glory consists in following that intuition to its legitimate, practical results. That he had better views of God, or of the gods, to use his own expression, and of the true destiny of man, than the majority of his contemporaries, cannot be doubted. But what were his real ideas of the divine nature, and of the immortality of the soul, is yet a matter of dispute. He was wise enough to know his ignorance, as he himself playfully suggests, when accounting for the fact that Apollo had pronounced him the wisest of men. Other men, he said, were ignorant, and he too was ignorant, but possibly he was wiser than they, because he was aware of the fact, and honestly confessed it! His teachings, however, obviously tended to the production of a more just and comprehensive theology than had ever prevailed in Greece. Properly

* It was not, however, in precisely the same import of the term as that attached to it by Dr. Reid, that Socrates appealed to the principles of common sense. He made no attempt to ascertain the fundamental axioms of thought. He called attention only to common convictions, conceded principles, and obvious every-day uses, and exhorted men to study themselves, and not be cheated by logomachy. His method, if he had any, was that of *clear definitions*, useful within certain limits, but liable to infinite abuse.

speaking, he was a moralist rather than a metaphysician, and longed for some higher light than could be furnished by reason alone. Plato, in one of his Dialogues, represents Socrates meeting one of his disciples, and endeavouring to convince him that he knows not well what to pray for, and adding, "It seems best to me that we expect quietly, nay, it is absolutely necessary that we wait with patience till such time as we can learn certainly how we ought to behave towards God and man." In the *Theætetus*, the following reply is made by an interlocutor to Socrates, reasoning on the immortality of the soul, uttering, as it seems to us, the true spirit both of Socrates and Plato: "I agree with you, Socrates, that to discover the certain truth of these things in this life is impossible, or at least very difficult. We ought, therefore, by all means, to do one of two things: either, by hearkening to instruction, and by our own diligent study, to find out the truth; or, if that be impossible, then to fix on that which appears to human reason best and most probable, and to make that our raft while we sail this stormy sea, unless one could have a still more sure and safe guide, such as a divine revelation would be, on which we might make the voyage of life, as in a ship that fears no danger." The death of Socrates, one of the most sublime in the annals of the world, crowned his life with imperishable glory; but even then, while serene and self-possessed, in the consciousness of truth and virtue, and hoping doubtless for something better beyond the grave, his modesty, perhaps his doubt, mingled in the touching words addressed to his friends: "It is now time that we depart, I to die and you to live: but which has the better destiny, is unknown to all except the Gods."*

Notwithstanding the beauty of his life, and the sublimity of his maxims, it is singular that under the very eyes of Socrates, and as one of the immediate results of his teachings, as Cousin confesses, sprang two schools, the Cynic and the Cyrenaic, the one resulting in a fanatical rigour, the other in the grossest licentiousness. Scepticism was defended by the Socratic dialects under Euclid of Megara.

But the grandest development of Grecian speculation is found in Plato and Aristotle, men of vast and varied powers, but of diverse temperaments and somewhat opposing philosophies, the one tending to the inward and ideal, the other to the outward and real, though not absolutely denying either.†

* Plato's "Apology for Socrates." The following is Cary's translation: "But which of us is going to a better state, is unknown to every one but God." The import is the same, and sufficiently expresses the force of the original.

† Aristotle, who rejected the existence of Plato's ideas or abstractions, as actual entities, and maintained their simple subjective character, was not quite consistent

The God of Aristotle is a grand entity of some kind, the primal cause of all things, but inaccessible to the minds of men, entirely separate from his works, and indeed caring nothing for the universe; so that the natural effect of his philosophy, decidedly empirical in its tendency, was one of indifference to religion and final scepticism. By far the most learned man of his age, more learned even than Plato, with whom he studied twenty years, intensely acute and methodical, the author of the syllogism,* and the father of natural philosophy,—Aristotle made a near approach to the inductive and experimental method of modern times, and yet he became decidedly rationalistic, indulged in the most subtle speculations on entities and quiddities, and finally fell into a notion respecting the primal substance, first as absolute or unknown, then as active or realized, making God the mere thought of the universe, *objectified* in the creation, and coming to consciousness in man, a system reminding us more of Fichte and Hegel, than of Bacon and Locke, and giving birth, in its last result, to a cold and cheerless atheism.

Plato does not deny the facts of the external world, any more than the simple facts of consciousness. He starts from these, but speedily transcends them. His system is ideal and sublime. It mingles the Grecian and Oriental minds, and is not without its difficulties and contradictions. He reduces all things to ideas, which he regards, not merely as names or abstractions, but as actual entities, having a necessary and eternal existence. To him, being and thought are identical, the process of thought is the process of the universe. He finds the summit of all things in the pure and universal Reason, whence he constructs the outward world of abstract and permanent ideals.† He despises the outward and phenomenal, and while he recognizes the Supreme Cause, as a real and infinite essence, he makes him so absolute, in other words, so abstract and ideal, that he seems to transcend all our approaches of thought, above all of affection and worship.‡ The reason of man is a part or a reflection of the Universal Reason, and finds its highest aim in mingling with its perfect ideal. It is fallen from its primitive state, for it existed in the past eternity, whence it has innate ideas, or dim recollections of a higher and purer being, and

with himself, and in the end constructed the universe of Thought, and so became, in a different direction, almost as ideal as Plato. Lewes, Vol. II. p. 126. Ritter III. p. 176-178.

* Perhaps not absolutely so, as the syllogistic form of argument has been found in the writings of some of the oriental Philosophers, and must have been known in Greece before the time of Aristotle. Still he gave articulate form and system to this method of reasoning.

† Timæus, p. 348. De Repub. VI. 116-124. See also the Theætetus, passim.

‡ De Repub. VI. 484.

must ascend once more to that primitive perfection, by abstraction from the sphere of matter and sin.* The Supreme Reason organized chaos into beauty. But as there is nothing beautiful but intelligence, and no intelligence without a soul, he placed a soul in the body of the world (*kosmos*, or the universe), and represented the world as an animal. Being an animal, with organization, activities, life, warmth and movement; like a human body, it resembled the Creator, as human beings resembled the world, or, *τὸ πᾶν ζῶον*, the Universal Animal! This was the work of the Supreme Reason; so that the instant this vast animal began to move, live and think, God looked upon it and was glad.†

But as there was Good, so Plato concluded there must be Evil. This, however, exists only in the lower region of matter, or the phenomenal world, from which we must make our escape into the region of perfect and supreme ideas. We must seek the good, the true, the beautiful, by departing more and more from the outward, the contingent, and temporary, into the inward, the necessary, and eternal.‡ Indeed the only true reality is the Ideal, and to mingle with it ought to be the constant aim of the immortal soul.

We say nothing here of Plato's notions (developed in "The Republic") touching a community of property, and, what is more shocking, a community of wives; it may be well, however, to remark that his mind was eminently mathematical as well as imaginative, and that his system is only a refinement, and, if the expression may be allowed, a spiritualization of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, unity being the central idea, plurality the necessary development. It is well known that over the door of his Academy he wrote: "Let none but geometers enter here." The Pythagoreans said that "Things were the copies of Numbers;" Plato said they were the "participants of Numbers." Causes, however, he made "Intelligible Numbers," that is, Ideas; and the Things which represent them, "Sensible Numbers."§ God, the Supreme Reason, he represented as the Supreme Geometer, who evermore, from his own archetypal and eternal ideas, "geometrizes," or produces the universe. Doubtless, this was a prodigious advance in Grecian philosophy. Indeed, it had now reached its culminating point. It never rose higher than Plato, and instantly began to dege-

* *Phædo*, *passim*.

† *Timæus*, p. 36.

‡ Plato very strikingly develops his idea of the soul, in the *Phædrus*, by a sort of "mythic hymn," as Socrates, who gives to *Phædrus* his views upon the subject, calls the beautiful allegory which he recites for this purpose.

§ *De Republica* VII. 525, 529. Aristotle, *Meta. I. c. 6*—*I. 7*. Lewes *Biog. Hist. of Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 66.

nerate. Plato is the father of Idealism. His method and principle were abstraction and transcendentalism—all things in his view proceed from God, the Supreme and Absolute Idea, and are constituted by ideas. Their archetypes are eternal as God, although in one place he represents them as created by God. It was but a step to say that the external world is only an appearance, a beautiful but bewildering masquerade; or, as Emerson has expressed it, that "God is the only substance, and his method illusion." Plato scarcely says so, but he supplies the premises from which others deduced the appalling error. An infinite idealism, consequently an absolute pantheism, is the logical and necessary result of the Platonic philosophy.

From Plato and Aristotle then we see the Platonic and Peripatetic schools rapidly rushing to absolute spiritualism on the one hand, or absolute sensualism on the other. At last, about the time of Christ, the two prevalent forms of philosophy were the stern doctrine of the Stoics on the one hand, founded on the idea of absolute idealism, and consequent pantheism with its coincident principle of inexorable fate; and on the other, the system of the Epicureans, a mechanical naturalism, which denied the existence of a supreme Deity, and resolved all virtue into a calculation of prudence, or a judicious pursuit of pleasure.

Among these, and especially among the Stoics, the philosophical Calvinists of their day, were many great and good men, some of whom, as Cleanthes, in his memorable hymn, which seems all but inspired from heaven, made occasional approaches to the highest truth, and sacrificed much for virtue; but the constant tendency was to extremes of spiritualism or of sensualism, or, as a recoil from these, to an unreasoning mysticism, or a contemptuous scepticism.* Indeed, an absolute scepticism was the fearful shadow which constantly accompanied the ancient philosophy, and seemed eventually to take possession of the entire Grecian mind.

Scepticism, however, can never satisfy the cravings of the soul; and hence we find, subsequently to the Christian era, a revival of the Platonic philosophy in Alexandria, mingled with a predominant element of transcendental and pantheistic mysticism. The oriental theosophy, too, came in to modify speculation, giving it a more pantheistic as well as a more gorgeous and imposing character. Grecian philosophy then assumed a new aspect altogether, mingling with religion and theosophy, and sometimes with Christianity, even at the moment of opposing it. Indeed it could scarcely be called Grecian at all. It

* After all, Cleanthes, oppressed with doubt and fear, committed suicide.

was rather eclectic in its character and cosmopolitan in its aim. Both Plotinus and Proclus borrowed largely, not only from Plato, but from the Eastern Magi. Their philosophy had some grand and imposing features, but it could not escape the vortex of the absolute, and went out in a paroxysm of mystic transcendentalism.

Wherever Christianity came, it modified the prevalent philosophy. It was long opposed, however, by the Gnostics, the speculative philosophers of their age, who aimed at absolute knowledge (*γνώσις*), and looked with contempt upon the common Christianity, as a weak superstition. In process of time, it grew somewhat eclectic, and took Christianity under its wing, rejecting the Old Testament, and giving the New a philosophical explanation. Every one acquainted with the subject, knows that most of the Gnostic theories were founded upon pantheistic ideas, mingled with the dualistic notions of the Parsees. God, according to their system, is the absolute Being, from whom emanate all other beings, gods, and men, in regular succession and gradation. Creation is represented, as in the Hindu mythologies and philosophies, as an emanation, pure and resplendent at its first issue, but becoming grosser and darker at its extremities.*

As soon as the doctors of the Christian church began to philosophize with freedom, they lost themselves in the theory of emanation. Justin Martyr, Tertullian even, Clement of Alexandria, Origen especially, nay more, Athanasius, and above all, Arius, with their divergent doctrines respecting the Divinity of Christ, all lapsed into this error. Their reverence for the Holy Scriptures kept them from wandering too far into the labyrinths of speculation, but they greatly marred the simplicity of truth by their subtle reasonings and fierce polemics. They wonderfully mingle spiritual and material notions, in their conceptions of the Divine character, and the creation of men and angels.† In the middle ages, the predominant philosophy, if we may dignify it with that name, was the philosophy of Aristotle applied as a form or method of logic to the dogmas of the church. This produced an elaborate and imposing system of theological dialectics, controlled and limited by ecclesiastical authority. The schoolmen, therefore, could not well rush into the extremes of philosophical speculation; and yet how frequently is the God of their worship a mere logical quiddity, or metaphysic abstraction!

* Ritter, Vol. IV. pp. 545, 607. *Histoire du Gnosticisme*, par M. J. Matter, Tome I. pp. 220-339. For an abridged statement, see same author, "*Histoire du Christianisme*," Tome I. pp. 160-178. Neander's *History of the Church*, I. pp. 366-500.

† Let any one read a few pages of Origen and Tertullian, and he will be satisfied of this.

It must be confessed, that within certain limits this was an era of immense intellectual vigour among the few that did think at all. The very names of the theologians and doctors of the middle ages suggest to those even slightly acquainted with their literature, a certain feeling of respect and even veneration. "Scholasticos," says Leibnitz, "agnosco abundare ineptiis; sed aurum est in illo cœno." In truth, there were giants in those days, though confined within narrow bounds, and beating, with heavy tread, the same circle of mystic speculation. Anselm of Canterbury, who, with the profoundest reverence for the teachings of the church, ranged the whole field of the higher metaphysics, much in the imaginative spirit of Plato, mingled with the logical subtilty of Aristotle, gave the process of "reason seeking the faith," and of "faith seeking the reason." He endeavoured to establish religion on the simple idea of God, and that again on the idea of the absolute, as existing in the human mind, the precise argument of Descartes and Leibnitz on the same subject, the validity of which as a metaphysical proof of the Divine existence has been vehemently disputed to the present day. Anselm is entitled to the appellation of the doctor transcendentalis. Others followed him, some tending to sensationalism, others to idealism. Among these we have Peter Lombard, Magister Sententiarum Sapientum; Alexander Hales, the doctor irrefragibilis, count of Gloucester, author of the *Summa Universæ Theologiæ*; and Thomas Aquinas, the doctor angelicus, that learned and high-born Dominican monk, author of the celebrated *Summa Theologiæ*, and founder of the school of the Realists, called by his schoolmates at Cologne, the Dumb Ox, who fulfilled the prophecy of his master, Albertus Magnus,* by "giving such a bellow of learning as was heard all over the world." He was a profound thinker and a good man, being justly denominated by his contemporaries "the Angel of the Schools." Having spent a long life amid the loftiest abstractions, where ideas, as with Plato, took the form of archetypal entities, mingled with prayers and canticles, he died in peace at Terracina, Italy, saying, "This is my rest for ages without end." Still later, we find John of Fidanza, commonly called Bonaventura, the doctor seraphicus, who taught that philosophy is true religion, and true religion philosophy, and rose to the sublimest heights of mystic fervour; Henry of Göthüls, or Henry de Gand, the doctor solemnus; Richard of Middleton, the doctor solidus; Giles of Cologne, the doctor fundatissimus; Vincent de Beauvais, the teacher of St. Louis, and author of the *Speculum Doctrinale, Naturale, Historiale*; and above all, John,

* Albert of Bollstädt, Professor at Cologne and Paris, and one of the most celebrated doctors of his day.

Duns Scotus, the doctor subtilis, that keen but somewhat arid Scotchman, or rather Northumbrian, the founder of the Nominalists, who taught that the end of philosophy is to find out "the quiddity of things—that everything has a kind of quiddity or quidditive existence—and that nothingness is divided into absolute and relative nothingness, which has no existence out of the understanding."* Belonging to the same era, and climbing the same dizzy heights of philosophic speculation, were Roger Bacon, the doctor mirabilis, so learned for his times, that he was deemed a sorcerer; Raymond Lully, (Lullé,) the doctor illuminatus, a fervid Spanish monk, half African and half Arabian, who invented the logical system called *Ars Universalis*; and John D'Occam, the doctor invincibilis, singularis et venerabilis, that redoubtable Franciscan monk, who told Louis of Bavaria, that "if he would defend him with the sword, he would defend him with the pen." He studied under Duns Scotus, revived the discussions of his master, and taught with such success that the Nominalists became victorious in a dispute which, in the spirit of the times, often proceeded from words to blows.† Nor ought we to forget, in this connection, those other philosophical or religious doctors who illumined the dark ages, (so called, though not with exact propriety,) Francis of Mayence, magister acutus abstractionum; William Durand, the doctor resolutissimus; Walter Burleigh, the doctor planus et perspicuus, author of the first history of *Mediæval Philosophy*; and especially Gerson of Paris, doctor christianissimus, who, possessed of all the science and learning of the times, abandoned the whole for the knowledge of Christ, passed a life of great purity and devotion, vindicated communion with God as the only true philosophy, and wrote, there is every reason to believe, that admirable manual of Christian devotion, "The Imitation of Christ, by Thomas A'Kempis."‡

It is singular, but true, that nearly all the arguments and

* Roscelin, a canon of Compiègne, who belonged to the latter part of the 11th century, is the proper father of Nominalism, if indeed we are to refer it to Aristotle. But Duns Scotus and Thomas D'Occam were the great expounders and defenders of the system. Roscelin was followed by the celebrated Abelard.

† The period of which we are speaking, extended from the 10th to the middle of the 14th century.

‡ For a brief and elegant account of the *Mediæval Philosophy*, see Cousin's "Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie," 2 s. Tome II. pp. 221-257. His "Fragmens Philosophiques," article "Abelard," ought also to be consulted. Tennemann's *Manuel* will supply many particulars, pp. 218-258. Portions of Anselm's works have been recently published. They are very curious, as containing speculations and modes of expression similar to those of the French and German philosophers. Descartes and even Leibnitz are anticipated in many things. Ritter's recent work on the History of Christian Philosophy, is doubtless characterised by the same traits of accuracy and thoroughness which are manifest in his *History of Ancient Philosophy*. Some information, but not much that is satisfactory, may be gathered from

theories of the rationalistic school of modern philosophy, have been anticipated, in forms more or less perfect, by the philosophers of the mediæval period. Descartes, Leibnitz and Schelling seem only to echo their speculations. They proceed on the same *à priori* principles, and except that the latter are less restrained by ecclesiastical notions, arrive at much the same results. Among the schoolmen, the same speculative disputes touching the nature and origin of ideas, the relation of the finite to the infinite, which in other ages led to absolute spiritualism on the one side, and absolute materialism on the other, were carried on for generations, giving rise to the rival schools of the Thomists and Scotists, the Nominalists and Realists of that thoughtful and stormy era. The practical effect of the whole is strikingly symbolised in the proposal made by some of the most illustrious doctors to canonize Aristotle as pre-eminently "the philosopher of the church!"* The great truths of religion mingled and modified by the errors of the times, were reduced, by the help of Aristotelian dialectics, to "the region of pure ideas," and then set to fighting on scientific principles. The irresistible consequence was, the prevalence, in the fifteenth century, within the precincts of the Catholic church, of a heartless and godless scepticism, making the reformation of the sixteenth century a matter of absolute moral necessity.

Previous to this, however, Philosophy began to emancipate herself from ecclesiastical authority, but it was only to rush, as usual, into the extremes of atheism or pantheism. The revival of learning in Italy introduced Plato and the Greek philosophers. The reign of Aristotle and the schoolmen began to wane. The change was hopeful, but blind, irregular, spasmodic. Much generous enthusiasm prevailed, and some grand truths were dimly descried, or passionately grasped. But the most vigorous and independent thinkers of the new era called the revival of

Hallam's "Middle Ages," and his "Introduction to the Literature of Europe," as well as from Villemain's very interesting and instructive "Cours de Littérature." In Brucker's 3rd vol. of the Critical History of Philosophy, may be found a mass of valuable, but poorly-digested facts.

* If Aristotle had been a god, he could not have been regarded with greater reverence in the age to which we refer. His very name was a synonyme for reason. His logic and physics, so far as known, along with the Ptolemaic astronomy, constituted the science of the church. He, not Jesus Christ, was the sun of their intellectual heavens. They made an anagram of his name, "Aristoteles," *iste sol erat*. Some one having detected spots on the sun, made known his discovery to a priest. "My son," replied the priest, "I have read Aristotle many times, and I assure you there is nothing of the kind mentioned by him. Go, rest in peace, and be certain that the spots you have seen are in your eyes, and not in the sun." Are you for, or against Aristotle? was the great question of philosophy; and yet the disputants on either side knew little of the real opinions of the immortal Stagyræ. A more ample study of his works has discovered more points of resemblance to Plato and the Pythagoreans than most persons even now dream of.

philosophy, the Picos, the Telesios and the Brunos, most of them, if not material pantheists, or rather atheists, were ideal pantheists. On the side of the naturalists and materialists, we have Pompanato, Achillini, Cesalpini, Vanini, Campanella, with a strong tendency to atheism, indeed, with a decided leaning, in some cases, to this horrible dogma. On the side of the idealists, the two Picos de la Mirandola, Ramus, Patrizzi, Marsilio, Ficino, and Giordano Bruno, with a decided tendency to pantheism. Giordano Bruno, the most celebrated of these, the most original and enthusiastic, and, withal, the martyr of his school, rushed into the boldest and most extravagant idealism. He maintained the absolute unity and identity of all things, and adored *the All* as the true and eternal God.*

The Reformation under Luther and Zuingli effected a prodigious change in the study of philosophy. Luther called the attention of men to the simple Word of God, as Bacon subse-

* Giordano Bruno was born in 1550, ten years after the death of Copernicus, in the vicinity of Naples, and was publicly burned by order of the Inquisition, at Rome, on the 17th of February, 1600. He was "a true Neapolitan child," with many faults, fierce, fervid and fickle, like its burning atmosphere and volcanic soil, yet brave, generous, and confiding, full of poetry and passion. Indomitable and restless, he threw off the restraints of custom, rejected the Aristotelian philosophy, and in Italy, Germany, France and England, did battle for what he thought the truth. He was now earnest and sublime, then witty and facetious, and anon extravagant and even licentious. At times he seems more of a buffoon than a philosopher. Everywhere he created a prodigious sensation, and made more foes than friends. He especially hated Aristotle, and as the Aristotelians made the world finite, he declared it infinite, subject to an universal and eternal revolution; the Aristotelians defended the immobility of the earth; Bruno, following Copernicus, pronounced for its rotation. Pythagoras, Plato and Plotinus were his favourite authors. He believed in God, as Spinoza did, but that God was the one substance, the one intelligence, of which all the forms of matter and all the energies of mind are but modes and manifestations. As thought is distinct from the mind in which it exists, so the universe is distinct from God, in whom it exists. It is not, therefore, created or made, it simply exists as the energy or embodiment of God. He informs it, lives in it, as the cause of causes, the energy of energies. Diversity is the manifestation of identity. God is in all—God is the all—all, therefore, is divine. It comes from God, returns to God. In a word, God is the universe, the universe is God. He is the whole, we and all things are the parts. He is the Being of beings, the Unity of unities; without whom is nothing, besides whom is nothing. *Deus est monadum Monas nempe entium entitas*. These views are developed, though not in systematic or logical order, in his two principal works, "*De la Causa*," and "*De l'Infinito*."

The germ of Leibnitz's *Monadology* may be found in Bruno. Spinoza, it is supposed, borrowed from him some of his principal ideas. The immanence of God in the universe, and the distinction so much insisted upon by Spinoza, between *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*, are found in Bruno. Schelling has entitled one of his works "*Bruno*," and makes no secret of his admiration for his Italian prototype. It is a curious fact that Bruno, like Descartes, makes what is clear and evident to the mind the criterion of truth, a principle which forms the basis of Spinozism. At the stake Bruno welcomed death as a passage to a higher life, a transition from the finite to the infinite. More of a poet than a philosopher, he was, like many of his countrymen, a wayward child of genius, in whom the good and the bad were strangely mingled. His method is imagination; his reasoning, rhapsody. Hence he says himself, "*Philosophi quoad modo pictores atque poetæ*," an honest confession, to which he adds with simplicity, "*Non est philosophus nisi fingit et pingit*."

quently called them to the study of nature, as the great field whence the facts and doctrines of Christianity were to be derived. He denounced the authority of Aristotle as well as the authority of the Pope, and vindicated the great Protestant doctrine of rational and thorough investigation. This suggested the true method of philosophy, and Bacon, therefore, followed by calling men from vague and abstract speculations and theorizings, to the study of nature and of themselves, and founded science upon the simple methods of experiment and observation.* His attention, however, was directed less to the study of the mental than of the natural world, though by no means insensible to the value and importance of the former. Induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, on the basis of fundamental axioms, formed the simple but sublime circle of his method, the method of nature and of God.†

Hobbes of Malmesbury immediately followed, and attempted to apply the same method, though with a vague and imperfect conception of its nature, to the study of mind. Misunderstanding its most essential principles, he began to theorize like all his predecessors, and finished his speculations by giving to the world, in language of surprising clearness and force, a system of absolute materialism and fatalism. In his view, the one great fundamental fact of mind is sensation, a result produced by "the impact of material objects around us upon a material organization, which men call mind." Atheism, of course, naturally results from such a system. With one fell swoop, it extinguishes all religion and virtue. But as religion and virtue are both necessary to society, Hobbes proposes to secure them by physical force, that is, by an absolute civil despotism, in the hands of the reigning monarch!‡ Hobbes, however, was speedily eclipsed by Locke, one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the metaphysicians whom England has produced. Of great acumen, vigour and comprehensiveness of mind, patient, candid and sagacious, he succeeded in throwing new light upon the whole subject of mental philosophy. Religious, too, with great reverence for the teachings of revelation and a proper estimate

* Stewart's *Dissertations*, pp. 80, 81, 82.

† The method of Bacon is often spoken of by the speculative philosophers of Germany, as if it were that only of classification, which certainly would make it empirical enough. This would give us only phenomena, in their most outward forms, and never lead to the knowledge of nature as a system of forces. Bacon's organism uniformly proceeds upon the fundamental notion of *cause* or *power*, and gives us not only phenomena but principles. It recognizes spirit as well as matter, and gives as its last result, the idea of spiritual forces, in other words, of a supreme and eternal God, the Cause of causes, who is "above all, through all, and in all."

‡ Hobbes' views, philosophical and political, are developed in his work entitled, "*Leviathan*," respecting which, see Stewart's "*Preliminary Dissertations*," Part I., pp. 98-105. Notes, p. 238.

of the limits of the human mind, he never permitted himself to fall into those extravagances into which the majority of his predecessors plunged. Still his generalization was altogether too narrow; and he either denied or explained away some of the most fundamental facts of mind. Right in rejecting the innate ideas of Descartes, he did not perceive the great primal truth which underlies the unfortunate nomenclature of the French philosopher, and resolved all the facts of mind into a modification of sensation and reflection. He was not a mere sensationalist, as some of the German and French Philosophers affirm, far from it. Practically he was a spiritualist, and recognised the great interior facts of our spiritual and moral nature, the existence of God and the immortality of the soul.* But falling at the very outset, and before the existence of anything like a thorough psychology, or even the slightest investigation of the phenomena of mind, into a speculation on the origin of our ideas, and making reflection through a spiritual power, dependent for its action and its materials upon mere external phenomena, or the simple facts of sensation, without the capacity of transcending them, except by artificial inference, he constructed a system of philosophy which easily gave rise to a narrow and sensual materialism. For if the mind, however vast its reflective powers, or beautiful and elaborate its combinations, has no absolute intuitions or fundamental principles of common sense, as the Scottish philosophers call them, primitive and authoritative axioms of belief, independent of all external matter and the mere sensations or impressions thence derived, it can never reach the real, the spiritual, and especially the unconditioned and the infinite; or if it reach them, can never prove their existence. No combination of sensations or even of reflections, however modified and exalted, can give us the idea of absolute cause or ultimate power, far less of spiritual unity, infinity and eternity; in other words, of God and the universe, and the relations between them as cause and effect.

It is not therefore matter of surprise, if in England the principles of Locke, in the hands of less scrupulous men, and particularly of the deistical writers as they are called, perhaps improperly, for they are less deistic than atheistic, were used to defend all the errors of sensualism and fatalism. "Collins aimed chiefly at establishing upon a firm basis the doctrine of necessity; Dodwell struck out boldly into the path of materialism, while Mandeville, assuming with Locke that there are no innate principles in the human mind, dealt a mischievous blow at all moral distinctions."†

* In proof of this we might cite page upon page of the "Essay on the Human Understanding," but it is unnecessary.

† Morell, *Hist. of Philos.*, p. 96.

The principles of Locke are not indeed to be confounded with those of such narrow materialists as Hartley, Horne Tooke, Priestley and Darwin; nor is he to be regarded as responsible for their aberrations; for Locke distinguishes between sensation and reflection, as sources of our ideas, and vindicates the existence of spiritual and moral realities.* But upon this point he does not always express himself with equal clearness and precision; occasionally he forgets his own distinctions, and everywhere rejects the absolute and intuitive character of our primary or fundamental convictions. In a word, his system supplies no means of actually proving on scientific principles, the very foundations of our belief in the reality of a spiritual and moral world. In the last analysis he makes the mind dependent upon the senses, and its highest generalisations mere combinations of observation and experience. In this respect he went far beyond Bacon himself, who in his "Advancement of Learning," insists upon the reality and supremacy of a spiritual, or what he calls a primal and divine philosophy.†

Against the principles of the materialists we find in England many ingenious and profound thinkers uttering a loud and earnest protest. Among these, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, Clarke and More are especially distinguished, both by learning and genius. But it was Berkeley, the amiable and gifted Bishop of Cloyne, good as well as great, who revolted from them most strongly; so strongly indeed as to rush into the opposite extreme of spiritualism. With much originality, subtilty and vigour of mind, and a style of great clearness and vivacity, he demolished the ordinary arguments for the palpable existence of the material world. Assuming one of the grand errors of all preceding philosophy, that our knowledge of the external world is mediate and not immediate, representative and not presentative, a something as it were figured to us by the mind, and standing for the outward fact, which we can never know; in a word, that all our knowledge, according to Locke, consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness, he showed, on the clearest and most logical principles, that the existence of matter separate from the mind can never be proved, and thus cut the roots, as he supposed, of materialism, fatalism, and atheism. Berkeley was too acute to deny the actual existence of the external world; nay, he was willing to accept it for all practical purposes; all he maintained was the impossibility of proving its existence as separate from mind or independent of spirit.‡ Mind, in his

* Works, Vol. I., pp. 78-92. Stewart's Dissertations, Part II. pp. 32-37.

† Works, Vol. I. B. II. pp. 193-195.

‡ Hence he says (Principles of Human Knowledge, §§ 35, 6, 7-40), "That the things which I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, *really exist*, I make not the least question. * * * That what I see, hear, and feel, doth exist, i. e. is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being."

view, is first, is fundamental, is real, is the only thing real and fundamental; and matter, if it exists at all, is dependent upon it, receives its costume and colouring, nay its very being and reality, from mind. Pure and ethereal himself, he exulted in the idea of the apparent and evanescent character of all gross and outward things; for along with these he saw vanishing all infidelity and sin. In the pure, spiritual or ideal world still left, his lofty and reverent soul, guided and controlled by Revelation, saw nothing but God and truth and duty, radiant, immutable and immortal. Others however, less pure and reverent, and it may be, still more thorough and logical in their reasonings, saw these sublime realities, based upon mere subjective principles, and determined by the action of the individual soul passing away with the dreams of fancy, or sinking in the abyss of an absolute spiritualism.

Starting from precisely the same premises, but pursuing a different route, Hume, cold, subtle and profound, disproved the real connection between cause and effect, and the consequent existence of the supreme God, as he well might, if cause is to be regarded as a mere subjective notion of the finite mind, without a corresponding reality in the nature of things, and thus left nothing in the world of matter or mind but an universal, all-devouring scepticism.*

The Scottish mind, generally practical and sagacious, and withal enamoured of the ideal and the divine, as the real basis of human thought, and the true source of all that is highest and purest in man, was shocked at these aberrations, and uttered against them a vehement protest. The most distinguished philosophers of Scotland, Hutcheson, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton, while admiring both Locke and Hume, have been wonderfully preserved from the extremes of absolute naturalism and absolute spiritualism.† In consequence of this, the views of Hume were never permitted to take root in the national literature. Indeed, it is to Reid, a Presbyterian clergyman, and professor in Glasgow University, to whom the honour is due of demolishing the representative theory, and thus refuting the opposite errors of Berkeley and Hume. But these distinguished thinkers have been preserved from error and extravagance chiefly by confining themselves to a patient investigation of mental and spiritual phenomena, and steadily eschewing all

* Hume's views are developed partly in his "Essay on Human Nature," but chiefly in his "Enquiry into the Human Understanding." His scepticism is brought out chiefly in the 12th section of the "Enquiry."

† Brown, with great powers of analysis and a towering imagination, was caught in the snare of Hume's speculation on cause and effect, and, if he did not fall into it, approached the very borders of the abyss. His elaborate work on "Cause and Effect" is a splendid failure.

attempts at ontological speculation. While others, with more venturesome wing, have been soaring into the empyrean of absolute thought, or rather perhaps plunging fruitlessly into the awful depths of mystic speculation, these modest but acute and learned men have been opening the secret chambers of the spirit, and revealing, in a calm and steady light, the secret laws and processes of the intellect, the conscience and the heart. How firmly and loftily has Sir William Hamilton, the last and the greatest of these intellectual giants, while mastering all philosophies, ancient and modern, and apparently more at home amid the speculations of transcendentalism, than the transcendentalists themselves, for the last twenty or thirty years, resisted all the seductions of ontological speculation! Grasping with the ease of a Titan, the whole mass of philosophical investigations, he has calmly pursued his inquiries, without projecting a single theory, or hinting at the possibility even of a philosophical system. And yet we hesitate not to say that he is the only man since the days of Reid, who has made anything like effective and solid contributions to the science of mind. Others have speculated, in many cases with much learning and genius, but so far as we know, without adding anything essential to mental philosophy, or the solution of the vast problems of the finite or the infinite nature.*

It must be confessed, however, that in England and Scotland, the speculations of Locke, while quickening the national mind, and enlarging the boundaries of mental and moral inquiry, have checked the influence of a higher and more spiritual philosophy, and too often stifled the aspirations of a heaven-born faith. They have originated and perpetuated a system of arid and secular morality, and run out into the gross and vapid utilities of Priestley and Bentham.

But it is in France especially that the material philosophy has been expounded and applied in its baldest and grossest forms. By a singular, but not unnatural, perversion, claiming Locke as its father, it proceeded, in that country, by a gradual process, to the most monstrous extremities. Denying not only the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, but the common obligations of morality, it found its natural result in the horrors and impieties of the first revolution.—Taken up, in the first instance, by Gassendi and Condillac, both of them ecclesiastics, and men of talent, who derived all knowledge from sensation and all virtue from expediency, it was carried out by Helvetius, Condorcet, and the Baron D'Holbach, whose "*Système De La Nature*," Voltaire himself pronounced to be

* In moral science some advance, we think, has been made. Jacobi, Jouffroy, F. Schlegel, Vinet, Mackintosh and Wayland have done good service in this department.

"illogical in its deductions, absurd in its physics, and abominable in its morality."*

According to these philosophers nothing is real which does not appeal to the senses; the soul itself is the effect of animal organization, thought the product of the brain as chyle is of the stomach, the universe a huge machine, moved for ever by inexorable fate, man a link in the vast and interminable chain of revolutions, life a bubble which floats for a brief hour on the heaving bosom of nature and then sinks back into the abyss, morality the interest of the individual or the State, God the phantom of a diseased imagination, and immortality the dream of a fanatic superstition! A system this, if system it can be called,

"Which leans its idiot back
On folly's topmost twig." †

The Revolution, like a fire fed by the combustibles which it consumes, swept away these extravagant notions; and a better era dawned upon France. A great re-action ensued, in favour of a more spiritual philosophy, which has received its present development in the eclecticism of Victor Cousin. It leans, however, to the absolute idealism of Germany, and is yet crude and imperfect in its principles and forms. Materialism, too, is far from being extinct in France. It lingers among many of her celebrated thinkers, and has been defended, with great learning and ability, by Auguste Comte, who finds nothing in the universe around him or within him but laws and phenomena.‡ Profoundly versed in natural science, he renounces the idea of a providence and a God as the greatest hindrance to science, and constructs the universe from a vast generalization of mechanical forces. The idea of an ultimate or a final cause has escaped from his investigations, and his universe is nothing but a vast and eternally revolving machine, without mind or heart, without end or aim. Man quivers, for a moment, on the wheel of fate, and is then swept into the vortex of all-creating, all-devouring law!

Leaving much that might be said upon these and kindred facts, as developing the progress and results of the materialistic or sensational philosophy, we proceed now to consider the more spiritual philosophy of continental Europe, including France and Germany, certainly the most brilliant page in the history of speculative inquiry. It has called into action all the resources

* Morell, *Hist. of Philos.*, p. 112. See Damiron, "*Histoire de la Philosophie en France.*"

† The essence of the sensual philosophy is all contained in the following sentence from Cabanis, "*Les nerfs voilà tout l'homme*"—*the nerves are the whole of man!*

‡ "*Philosophie Positive,*" Par Auguste Comte.

of the human mind, and has passed through all conceivable changes of truth and error, now bathing its wing in the very light of God, and anon plunging amid the horrors of abysmal night.

Descartes, with a mind profound, energetic and free, spurning the restraints of custom and authority, and fired by a noble ardour to comprehend the nature of things, has been recognized, on all hands, as the father of the true philosophy of the human mind.* Less sagacious, indeed, than Locke, and really contributing less to the stock of human knowledge, he saw, with great clearness, the vast distinction between mind and matter, and commenced his studies with a purely psychological and inductive method. He did not, indeed, carry out with full consistency, his own fundamental principles of inquiry, and finally lapsed into some egregious errors. At first he refused to take anything for granted not proved by the facts of consciousness; but at last seemed to take everything for granted; so that D'Alembert is justified in saying, that "Descartes began with doubting of everything, and ended in believing that he had left nothing unexplained."

As nature is to be studied in itself, and by means of simple observation, so Descartes justly concluded that mind is to be studied in itself, and by means of consciousness, or conscious reflection.† "*His cogito ergo sum*," though a *petitio principii*, on the ground that the *I think*, involves and indeed expresses the *I am*, after all furnished him with the fundamental principle of all mental and spiritual science. For, of whatever we doubt, we cannot doubt that we doubt. Conscious personality is involved in every mental act, and consciousness therefore must supply us with the facts of mind. Psychology, therefore, or a well-digested account of our mental phenomena, must form the basis of all speculation as to the nature and destiny of mind.‡

On this ground, Descartes asserted the pure spirituality or rather immateriality of mind, for spirituality is only the negation of what we term material qualities, and thus did an immense service to the cause of truth. This, however, with slight exceptions, is about the whole amount of his contributions to mental philosophy. His theory of innate ideas, as explained by himself, the criterion of which he makes clearness and distinctness, a criterion manifestly inadequate if not absolutely false, led him to assert the validity of every notion lying clearly and distinctly in the mind.§ Here, therefore, he found the idea of

* Stewart, Cousin and Morell equally concede to him this character.

† "*Meditations Metaphisiques*."—*Premiere Meditation*.

‡ "*Meditation seconde*."—*Cœuvres* (Ed. Charpentier), pp. 68, 77.

§ *Meditation Quatrieme*, p. 93.

the absolute and infinite, that is of God, and concluding that such an idea could not come from finite nature, though infinite and absolute are but the simple negation of finite and relative, he concluded that it was a necessary idea, an idea from God himself, and therefore proving *à priori*, that is an absolute way, the Divine existence.

But how do we prove the existence of the external world, as well as the existence of God? In other words, how do we prove the finite reality as well as the infinite reality? This, too, exists in the mind clearly and distinctly, and it is not to be supposed, argues Descartes, forgetting utterly his inductive or psychological method, that God would deceive us in such a matter: he concludes that the external world has a real and not merely apparent or phenomenal existence.* Our mental faculties prove the existence of God, and the existence of God proves the validity of our mental faculties, is the vicious circle which throws inextricable confusion into the Cartesian philosophy.†

ART. IX.—HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.‡

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PSYCHOLOGY—the word, the reason, the science of the soul. “It is *only* a developed consciousness,” or a development of consciousness, says the writer of a famous article on Reid and Brown in No. CIII. of the Edinburgh Review. The objection here is to the word *only*. The definition is true as far as it goes. Psychology is a development of consciousness; but is it not something more? Dr. Hickok, as well as others of the general class of thinkers to which he may be said to belong, and among whom this work will, beyond all question, give him a very high standing, maintains that it is. He would probably find no fault with the statement, if the term consciousness were so extended, beyond what is commonly called the soul's experience, as to embrace the inward contemplation of the truths which the experience awakens it to find within itself as among the conditions of its own being. To avoid all such confusion, however,

* Meditation Quatrieme, p. 93.

† Meditation Cinquieme—particularly the close, pp. 107, 108.

‡ Rational Psychology, or the Subjective Idea, and the Objective Law of an Intelligence, by Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., Prof. of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Auburn. Published at Auburn, 1849, by Derby, Miller & Company.

he has entitled his examination of the soul—*A Rational Psychology*. It is, in other words, the soul's experiences seen in the light of its own reason,—not as dispensing with experience, or preceding it in the order of time, but taking it first as a guide to that position from whence it is *seen*, not only that such experiences *are*, but that they must have been just what they are, and could have been in no other possible way. This is his use of the term *à priori*, which occurs so frequently. It is not the absurdity of *à priori* knowledge as actual consciousness in the order of time, but the gaining, through experience or consciousness, taken in its widest sense, of an advance position from which the soul looks back and sees that there was but this one path, and that thus its guide experience was itself determined all along by that higher light to which it has at last conducted the spiritual consciousness. Hence it is called an *à priori*, or *rational* psychology. It assumes to show us, not only *how* we feel, how we perceive, how we understand, how we comprehend, or—to use the general term which embraces them all—how we know, but also that so we *must* have known, in a mode as surely determinable and determined as truth itself, which is the object of knowledge, is determined, and could have been no other than what it is. Thus there is an *à priori* idea for each power and department of the soul, whatever, or how many, they may be, and there is to each an objective law in perfect harmony with it. There is an idea of the sense, and corresponding to it an actual law of feeling and perceiving. There is an idea of an understanding and a corresponding law of thinking. There is an idea of a reason (whether we have it as faculty or not, although the one would certainly seem to necessitate the other) and there is within us a law presenting in consciousness the ends to which such a faculty may be directed, and the intellectual and moral wants, above the region of the sense and the understanding to which it may give a satisfaction and a meaning.

This distinction of the understanding and the reason has been claimed, by his ardent followers, as exclusively belonging to Coleridge. Nothing, however, can be more unfounded. There is no doubt that Coleridge everywhere obtrudes it upon the reader as his own, and yet there can be as little doubt that he borrowed it, or might have borrowed it, to say the least, from the German metaphysicians. It is equally clear, too, that the same distinction was held by the two master minds of antiquity, and what is more, that it is inseparable from the very spirit of the language in which they wrote. We may say, moreover, that the more common division employed both by the learned and the unlearned,—we mean that of the sense

and the reason, in which the department of the understanding is shared between the two, or that of the sense and the understanding, in which the reason is merged in the latter,—is by no means so inconsistent with the threefold distinction as might at first be imagined. No one of these faculties, it may be said, ever acts alone. There is no pure sense, (at least, in man, whatever may be the case with the lower animals,) without some act of the understanding. It is never, as Aristotle says, purely *ἄλογον*;* and, moreover, there is no exercise of the human understanding without some faint co-operation of the reason. Hence, by conjoining the second with the first, and the third with the second, we naturally fall into a twofold division; especially if we employ the terms more in reference to the objects about which the mind is employed than the mental exercises themselves. Hence the understanding employed on the objects of the sense is, with no great impropriety, called by the general name of the sense, as distinguished from the reason (or the understanding which is in this mode of speaking connected if not confounded with it), regarded as occupied with those enduring notions of the one, or those universal truths of the other, which sense alone could never give.

The distinction, then, is the author's own, as much as it is Coleridge's, or Schelling's, or Kant's. It is his own, because no one, we will venture to say, has more carefully thought it out, or more scientifically marked out the field of each faculty, than has been done in the work before us. This, however, is a matter of but little consequence. The threefold division of objects and of corresponding powers must present itself to every mind that truly reflects. There are three energies of the soul (call them by what name we will) ideally distinct, although it may be that they are seldom actually separate in their operation. There is that within us which takes notice of appearances, or phenomena, or the forms that dark sensation assumes under this gaze of the soul, and which, if it were the only mode which the intelligence energized, would give us nothing else. There is another which takes cognition of things and events, or, in other words, the realities, which this faculty informs us these phenomena represent; and had the soul no higher power, there could be no interest in, and therefore no knowledge of, aught beyond. There is, however, another power of the spirit which all must be conscious of, obscure as may be its operation in some minds, and which occupies itself with the meaning of things,—affirming *à priori* that they must have a meaning, and seeking to explore what that meaning is. Thus we

* Aristotle De Anima, Lib. III. 9. 2.

have appearances,—things—and the meaning, or reason* of things. We have the phenomenal, the natural, and the supernatural. We have the present, the temporal, the eternal,—in other words, that which has no existence but in the moment or moments of impression,—that which the law of the understanding, transcending the sense, compels us to regard as having a perduring being,—and that which a higher faculty, transcending both sense and the understanding, presents as beyond all limitations, either of present or flowing time. To fill up this outline a little,—we may say, appearances have construction in space and time, although without some other faculty than the sense they would come and go isolated and unremembered. Things and events are connected by the notions, cause and substance, into a system we call nature; but without some other faculty than the understanding, it would have only a scientific value, raising no question of a higher interest, and doing nothing to answer such a question when raised in some other way. But there is an operation of the soul, which, however obscure in some, and however limited in all of us, does to some extent comprehend sense and nature, or, at least, awaken the interest which demands such comprehension in order to give meaning and reason to appearances and things.

We might, to some advantage, vary the view by presenting it in the form of the three great questions in regard to the universe of being,—The what? The how?† and The why? The τι, and the ὅτι, and the διότι. The sense and the understanding would try to find an answer to the first, understanding and reason to the second, and the reason (especially the moral reason) to the third. And this answer, in its most comprehending terms, would be given in the words, God, the Soul, and Immortality.

In regard to the first of these, or the Great Reason of Reasons, the scientific understanding might likewise attempt, and does attempt, the solution; but it would ever bring it under the how, the πῶς instead of the διότι of the universe. It has ever been inquiring—whence came nature, and the world, and how do they exist, or trying to explain the fact (ὅτι) that they do exist; but ever as questions of curious or scientific interest. Cosmogony was the earliest problem in philosophy; geological and nebular hypotheses furnish the favourite speculations of the most modern science. In such inquiries the understanding seeks its God, but it never gets anything more than a first

* All who have been in the habit of confounding reason, design, and motive, as meaning about the same thing (and there are many such), will, of course, see no demand for any faculty distinct from the understanding.

† Or the fact.

cause, a first power, a first mover, a developing principle, taken, too, at last, as a necessary notion of the wearied mind, and although assumed as beginning nature, yet never in fact regarded as out of nature; in other words, a scientific God in whom there is no ethical interest. There was no irreverence in the assertion of a most eloquent writer, that "such a belief in a great first cause" may have as little moral value for us as a belief in the existence of the great sea serpent.*

The true meaning of the universe is a question put by the moral reason. It is no question for the animal; it would hardly seem to be one (if we may judge by the *animus* they often display) for some men of the highest scientific and even æsthetic attainment. There may be a great exhibition of designing intelligence, but ever as the adaptation of physical means to physical ends, which, after all, are never ends, or to artistic ends which never go out of the workmanship. But reason and conscience ask, what is the design of all designs, going clear out of nature into some acknowledged region beyond and above it. We may trace the long road, and the countless ages, from infusoria up to bimana; or we may hunt them backward until, for the mere satisfaction of the cause-tracing understanding, we bring into the chain the notion of a first Power, or a first Principle of development. We may find, too, all along our way, abundance of artistical design, an armoury of means and contrivances for devouring and defence, a wondrous apparatus of life, and death, and reproduction. But what is the meaning of it all? Strange as may seem the paradox, yet in this respect, and without some higher teacher, and some higher text-book, the darker and darker grow the rocks the more they are scientifically understood. This must be so until they, together with all nature, are comprehended in relation to man and immortality, and, above all, to the supernatural creating power of Him to whom "a thousand years are but as one day, and one day is as a thousand years." Here, too, even reason requires aid from above, and it is at last "by faith we know that the worlds were made by the word of God, so that the things that are seen were not made of things which do appear." And *for* His glory were they made. Unless this is seen, we are yet in the region of the $\pi\omega\varsigma$, and all our science is valueless just in proportion as its objects are unmeaning. The all-explaining word benevolence does but little to dissipate the mystery. It only calls up some awful facts, which, unless nature is more misinterpreted than ever Scripture was, can never find their explanation in any mere happiness-theory that is not itself comprehended in some higher idea.

* Foot Prints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller, p. 42.

Thus may we say, by way of accommodation, that these two faculties have each their deity, but with this immense difference. In the judgment of the one, God is *for* the universe; in the *à priori* demand of the other, the universe is *for* God. In the one, the deity is needed as the first term in the infinite series, or as some assumed unknown quantity without which it could not be mathematically summed, or as some first mover, without which the dynamical problem cannot be solved. The pantheistic understanding, too, according to the one or the other aspect of its most ancient philosophy, requires a similar conception, either as the *starting* principle of the world's outgrowth, or as its *terminating* development. In all these cases, when once brought in, it is needed no more for any moral or religious ends. God is *for* the universe. Reason and the conscience, on the other hand, reverse this entirely. They demand the idea of a God such as revelation more clearly presents, who is not only beginning, but end, who is alpha and omega, the first and the last, by whom, and through whom, and for whom, are all things, and who, "for his own eternal glory, hath fore-ordained whatsoever comes to pass." It is only in the doctrine of *à priori* moral decrees that we escape that iron-bound physical fatalism, which the superficial sciolist is so fond of charging upon the creed most opposed to his own. The reason finds refuge in the supernatural, not regarded as something away at the end of nature, and thus, in fact, a continuation of it, but as everywhere above, or as reigning high over nature in all its extent of time and space.

And thus, too, can the human soul alone truly comprehend itself. So far as humanity is nature and nothing more, it comes and goes like all other nature; it is *γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλόμενον*; it is born and perishes, just like all other physical powers. But as belonging also to the supernatural, it has immortality, and as thus connected with the Father of Spirits, all things are for it as one of the ends or rather as included in the great end for which nature and the world were made.

But we are too much drawn, at present, to those sublime topics on which the author, at the end of the volume, exhibits his chief strength, and which must, therefore, be deferred to some succeeding part of our review. Our first business is to give a rapid sketch of the contents of the work before us; and here, the utmost we can do is to present the merest outline of the author's views, and of his peculiar method. We commence by stating, that in his map of the human soul, the three great departments are, the Sense, the Understanding, and the Reason, each of which are considered, in a three-fold way, in respect to the idea, the objective law, and the ontological verity of its

objects. This division, rigidly maintained, imparts to the work great scientific symmetry. Corresponding to these departments are the three chief characteristic operations: conjunction or rather construction in space and time, connection in cause and substance, comprehension in meaning and idea.

Part I., *The Sense*, is introduced by definitions which are marked by etymological clearness, and then maintained with mathematical strictness throughout. The sense includes the whole faculty for bringing an object within the distinct light of consciousness. The intellectual agency which takes up appearances as distinct objects of knowledge, is apprehension; and this may be of the external sense, or of that inner state of the mind which may be justly called the internal sense. The completed process in the sense is perception, or the taking of the appearance as object through some medium. The appearance,* as object perceived, is phenomenon; and this whether of the external or the internal sense. Phenomena have matter, that is, content given somehow in the sensibility, and form, or the modifications of the matter which permit it to be classified in relation to other phenomena. The capacity for receiving the content is sensibility; the affection induced is sensation. The faculty for giving form to the matter in the sensation, is the imagination, or the imaging faculty, which is the same essentially with that which constructs form in pure space without sensation,† p. 113. See also p. 145.

An object void of all content in sensation is called pure; with

* This might seem liable to the objection of being a mere tautology. Appearance is phenomenon. It might perhaps have done to have said, "Sensation, as object perceived, is phenomenon."

† There *may be* sensation even here. In the empirical imaging process from without, the content in the sensibility, whilst in the last matter of the material sensorium, affects the inner or spiritual sensorium where the dark and formless sensation is *envisaged* in the spiritual light, and thus becomes *perception*. The pure imaging, to which the name imagination is most commonly given, may be regarded as the reversing of this order, or as proceeding first from the pure energy of the mind, by which it is directly envisaged in the spiritual sensorium; from whence, in our present embodied state, we have reason to believe, it also affects, or rather re-affects the material sensorium, or brain, or last matter, whatever and wherever it may be—thus producing in it an affection similar to that which came from the external process. This is weaker and less distinct, not from want of power in the spiritual action, but because the sensorium is at the same time filled with images crowding in from without, or with recollections of those images passing to and fro; which is ever more or less the case in our waking hours. In sleep, this internal imaging power is unobstructed, and then its pictures are as vivid as the external images in our waking state. Just as the reflection seen in ordinary window glass is dim and shadowy, because the objects from without are pressing through, and the thin and pale reflection appears like a mere ghost among them. Put quicksilver on the other side, or in other words, cut off the supply from the external, and the interior envisaging reflection stands out perfectly distinct. If this view be correct, then there is a point, or rather line, of intersection, at which perception and imagination, though originating, the one from without and the other from within, are essentially the same affection of the sensorium.

sensation it is called empirical. Intuition is immediate beholding. Pure intuition is that of a pure object as above defined; empirical intuition of an empirical object. A judgment is a determined relationship between two or more cognitions. It is analytical, that is, obtained by an analysis of the conception in the consciousness,—or synthetical, that is, obtained in some other way, and added to it.

These definitions prepare for the specific method of the process of rational psychology for the faculty of the sense. First, there is to be obtained the "subjective idea" of how perception is possible; next, the "objective law" in the facts; and thirdly, the outline of "an ontological demonstration" of the valid being of the facts and objects.

1. The pure intuition (Ch. I. Division 1, Sec. 1.). This, though chronologically last, is logically first. By abstracting from the phenomenal all that has come into consciousness through sensation, we find that which was prior to and conditional for the perception. Thus we have the pure form for all phenomena of an external sense. This remains as void place for the intellect alone, pure and indestructible; and for the intellect it is much, whilst it is nothing for the experience. This is pure space as given in the intuition, and this intuition of pure space is the primitive intuition.* We know it through experience, yet that very knowledge is, at the same time, a knowing it as something independent of experience, prior to experience, and without which it is seen to be impossible that any experience should be.

In pursuing the same process of abstraction with the phenomena of the inner sense, whether contemplated as passing emotions or mere sensations, we get the conception of pure period, or pure time, which, in like manner, remains for the intellect pure and indestructible,—known chronologically from the experience, yet known from this very knowledge, as a knowledge prior to, and conditional for, all experience. It is real form for the content of thought that once filled it—it is the pure intuition of time.

From these *à priori* cognitions the author proceeds (Section II.) to state other *à priori* positions necessarily connected with them; such as—Space and time are no part of the phenomena which appear in them,—Phenomena are conditioned upon but not caused by these cognitions,—Space and time have a necessity of being, independent of phenomena,—They have no signi-

* We are compelled, in this sketch, to mingle the author's language and our own. Sometimes a single sentence in his own words will give, at a glance, a sufficient outline of a chapter. At other times, condensation requires the use of other terms, which we have freely employed.

ficancy in respect to any other cognitions than such as are phenomenal,—Next in reference to each other. After we have the general cognitions, we know *à priori* such as these—Space has three dimensions—It *must* have three dimensions and can have no more—Time can have but one dimension—Space in respect to time has no significancy—Time in respect to space has significancy—The concurrence of both space and time is conditional for all determination of motion, etc.

Having obtained the cognitions, we now reverse the process (Section III.), and seek to construct real forms from the formless and limitless space and time as given in these primitive intuitions. This the primitive intuition cannot do. It is mere beholding. An *ab extra* agency is required, and this is the imagination, to which allusion was before made,—the imaging, or as Coleridge calls it, the *eisemplastie* power. This agency is given here in its results, whilst there is reserved for future sections the more difficult work of attaining the *à priori* principles of the process. In getting an idea of the sense, or of a sense, let there be given, then, an intellectual agency which may come upon the field of the primitive intuition. In the as yet uncollected diversity of pure space a position is assumed. The void is no longer empty. A point stands out (*φαίνεται*, “becomes phenomenon”) in the intuition. As the agency moves on, other points are attained. These are brought into conjunction as continuous contiguity. Here, then, is real form. The mathematical line *appears*. It has reality, but as yet only subjective reality. Nothing hinders the going forth of the intellectual agency, in this way, to the construction of all possible forms in pure space, through any conjunctions of points, and lines, straight and curved, with all possible angles, and hence all possible figure.

And so for the construction of pure forms in time. As time is for the internal sense, so all construction of period demands that the inner sense be, in some way, modified in its affection. This may be conceived by assuming a line as permanent in the space intuition, and also every point of that permanent line as, for this purpose, a permanent point. The intellectual agency moving along this line gives continual modification to the inner sense;* and thus a definite period is constructed, in which the passing instants have been conjoined in unity, and limited on each side into totality. In this way all possible period may be constructed, and in this way, too, all *must* be constructed, if constructed at all.

* It does so in the birth and change of the conceptions, *here, there, away, from, to, &c.*, in the space of the phenomenal intuition, although the *woù*, the where in a whole of space, or in a nature of things, actual or ideal, is as yet a conception unknown to the sense.

The author next proceeds (Section IV.) to remark on the Categories of Aristotle, and the twelve predicates of Kant, as preparatory to his own view. In this he finds that there are three distinct modes of intellectual agency demanded for the completion of the phenomenal in the experience,—that each of these three agencies has three elementary principles conditional for carrying on the process, and that these three principles are all that can possibly enter into the work. In making out this scheme, he is compelled to differ from Kant (whether rightly or not we do not now inquire) in giving to the department of the sense some things which the German philosopher brings under the understanding. Kant regards the sense as the receptivity merely of content for perception. The author includes in it an intellectual agency competent to complete the perception. We might perhaps take some ground of exception here, rather to the arrangement than to the essence of the author's view; but for the present we pass on. Of these three, then, there are thus brought into the sense the two intellectual operations answering, the one for Kant's category for quantity, the other to his category of quality, whilst the third, or that of relation, is still allowed to keep its place, and is accordingly postponed to the second part of the work.

Next for the three elements in the operation of conjunction. The intellectual agency does not merely *move* in the primitive intuition, but collects within itself what it takes up in passing,—in this way only being an *intelligent* agency (*intus legens, εν-νοών*). Hence we have unity. As the agency moves on, that which was taken up becomes a collection, a diversity in unity, and this is multiplicity (*multi impliciti*), "many united." As this proceeds, it is ever one, and more, and more, and more, and thus whilst the agency is in progress, it has ever within itself the second element, plurality. In the termination of the agency, when it ceases to collect any more of the diversity in unity, and defines what has been united, we have the third element, totality. These are the three elements of quantity. It is not possible that an intellect should give quantity in pure space and time in any other way.

But the intellectual agency cannot be conceived of as collecting in unity without having a higher unity in itself, and a still higher unity in that light in and by which it works. Before proceeding, therefore, to investigate the intellectual operation for the distinction of quality, which falls within the second division for empirical objects, the author goes back a little, and introduces his views of consciousness (Sect. V.) as necessary to satisfy the question, What is conditional for the intellectual agency, that it may be competent to such conjoining and dis-

tinguishing operations? And here we can only rapidly state his positions. First, It must be more than the simple act. There must be a unity of the conjoining agency. There must be more than this,—a unity of self-consciousness. The agency must act, not now in one light, and then in another, but ever in one and the same. For consciousness the author is somewhat peculiar, and we think very happy, in regarding, not so much under the notion of a faculty, an energy, as of a light in which the intellectual agency stands as well as its object, and through which it sees, not only what it does, but also itself doing, although it cannot see the ultimate or personal self which stands behind both the intellectual agency and its doing. Thus the constructed product becomes an object. In the mirror of consciousness it is thrown face to face before the self in the intuition (*obvius jacens*). The object as pure only *seems* (*δόκει*), but when given as actual content in the sensibility, then it *appears* (*φαίνεται*). Both however are real. There is a real *seeming*, and a real *appearance*.

Thus also it is manifest, why pure objects in space and time are incommunicable; although there may be, by symbols, the inducing the agency and the light in another self to construct and reveal similar pure objects in his subjective apprehension. A real communicableness would demand, not only a unity (of the two) in the revealing light, but also an invisaging of the very self,—all clairvoyant pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding. With some remarks on the distinction between knowing that a self is, and knowing what it is, and also on the manner in which we awake to self-consciousness (a subject on which we may make some comment in another part of this review), the author closes the first division in the idea of the sense—*the attaining it in the pure intuition*, in the proof that so it *is*, and so it *must* be.

The Second Division is the idea in the empirical intuition. The first requisite (Section I.) is the attaining a transcendental position for an *à priori* examination. Here we cannot, as before, proceed by abstraction of all content in the sensibility; for this would be in contradiction to the idea to be obtained. We are driven, therefore, to an anticipation, a taking or assuming beforehand, or, as the Greek philosophers termed it, a *πρόληψις*, of such content in its most generalized aspect. This prolepsis is of no one organ, or organism. It may be for one sense, or for five, or for five hundred, if there should be so many ways of affecting the sensibility. It is mere matter for all possible phenomena, as affording the additional principles for any empirical intuition which may possibly be, and according to

which alone it can possibly be. Such a prolepsis being given (Section II.) as mere content undistinguished, an intellectual agency broods over the chaos. As before, in the pure intuition, it *conjoined* in unity; now, it discriminates or *distinguishes* in an individuality. The intellectual agency in the mere apprehending of sensation (whatever, and of whatever degree, the sensation may be) discriminates it first from non-sensation. There is thus a determination that the sensibility is not void, and hence there is born for the mind the first element, reality. We have the $\tau\acute{o} \delta\upsilon$. The next discrimination excludes from this appearance all other possible appearances, thus affirming its own reality as distinguished from every other,* and here we have the second element, particularity. It is not only $\delta\upsilon$ but $\delta\upsilon \tau\iota$. Next, then, is found in it that which is not in any other reality, and thus it is separated positively, and not merely negatively, from all reality but itself. Here is born the third element, peculiarity. The appearance is not simply $\tau\iota$, but $\tau\iota\acute{o}\delta\upsilon \tau\iota$. The completed result is quality for all sensation, and of all kinds. The operation here, in reference to its result, is called distinction; as an intellectual work bringing the diverse sensation into a precise appearance in consciousness, it is termed observation.

There follows next (Section III.) the *à priori* determination of what diversity must be in quality. This diversity may have two directions. First, the matter, as content in the sensibility, may be diverse. It may come through different organs of sense, and thus be diverse in kind; there may be colours, sounds, smells, &c. Or it may give different sensations in the same organ, and thus be diverse in variety; there may be red, blue—bitter, sweet, &c. Here in the reality there is difference in contrariety, and it may therefore be termed the heterogeneous. Again, there is diversity involving no contrariety in the reality which may possess similarity throughout. The redness of one place is a different redness from that of another, one coldness from another coldness, one pain from another pain. There is thus a diversity which may be termed homogeneous. And this again may be diverse in three ways. It may be diverse in degree, through any limitation from zero, or the absence of all reality, upwards. This may be termed intensive diversity. It may be diverse in space, or extensive. Quality may also be homogeneous and yet diverse in respect to time; and this we may term *protensive*.

To get form, then, to the content in the sensibility, there

* Kant's Negation.

must be, not only a distinction of the heterogeneous, but also a conjoining of the homogeneous diversity. Hence (Section IV.) we have not only the questions—What is the quantity absolutely? and then again, what is the quality? but also a third—What is the quantity of the quality? How much is the quality in extent, in intensity, and in protensity? In the pure intuition there is only quantity. In the empirical all quantity has its quality, and all quality has its quantity. The only quality of quantity is the *extensive*: and so the quantity and its quality are both given in the same constructing operation. But not so with quality. Here both operations are required. To find the precise quality we distinguish; to find how much it is, we conjoin, and this demands a threefold construction in extent, in intensity, and in protensity. The operation before was called observation; now it is called attention. The one gives distinctness to quality, the other definiteness to quantity; one gives us the distinct matter, the other the definite form of the phenomenon. Thus we have intensity within the sensibility, extension without in space, and protensity both within and without. Without observation the consciousness would be "void;" without attention the matter would be "without form." Sensation is the chaos; the intellectual energy the spirit that broods over it. Consciousness is the light in which it moves.

Thus we have the field of the sense in its ideal possibility. The author pauses a moment (Section V.) in his straightforward scientific course, to review briefly the opinions of others who have, wholly or partially, traversed the same region. We cannot now follow him in that *excursus*, except to take notice that he regards Plato's famous cave (Repub. VII.) as a method of exhibiting the manner of phenomenal cognition, where the qualities of things perpetually occupy the attention, and the sense is forced to absorb its entire functions in attaining appearances, whilst an *à priori* philosophy alone can reach the living realities. Reid and Stewart regard this as employed simply to explain the process of sensation and perception. Coleridge denies that it can be limited to any such meaning at all, but assumes that it represents rather the incompetency of the understanding to attain the verities of the reason. The scholar who actually examines this most interesting passage in all its bearings, must be satisfied that our author is nearer to the truth than either. Notwithstanding Coleridge's very contemptuous criticism, the application which Reid and Stewart make of the passage is perfectly fair and legitimate, besides being sanctioned by good authority. It may, however, be legitimately extended, and is so extended by Plato, in what follows, to a higher contrast between all of our humanity that

is in any way connected with the material, and all that is purely spiritual.

We next proceed to the sense in its objective law (Chap. II. Section I.) And first for the distinction between an hypothesis and an idea with its correlative law. An hypothesis is but an assumed circumscription of facts to be diminished or widened as the exigencies of the facts may demand, as the nebular theory in astronomy, or the hypothesis which explains the phenomena of the planets as being pieces knocked off the sun by the stroke of comets. An idea is a systematic unity necessary and universal for all possible facts that may come within it. It is seen in its own evidence, and is, therefore, wholly an *à priori* cognition. Yet still, it is but the knowledge of the possible, and must rise to science through its correlation to an actual law. There remains, then, to find the law in the facts of the sense as corresponding to the IDEA.

Here are two heads of investigation. There are, first, facts closely bound up in the idea now taken as hypothesis for examination; and secondly, more remote facts, which, although apparently disconnected, seem to "leap unexpectedly within the law," and thereby furnish a more striking if not a more conclusive proof. The one is styled the *colligation*, the other the *consilience* of facts.

We can only briefly refer to them. Under the first head (Sect. II.) we have, 1st. Facts connected with obscure perception. This, in general, is shown to be always more or less in connection with the degree of freedom or hindrance to the above operations of distinction in quality and conjoining in quantity. 2nd. The relative capabilities of the different organs of sense. The organ which has the highest capability for the distinguishing and conjoining acts of the intellectual agency, or furnishes the best facilities for them, attains to the best perceptions whether of figure in space, of period in time, of intensity in degree. Hence the superiority of the eye and touch to the taste and smell. 3rd. Facts connected with deceptive appearances. Here an operation of conjunction has been effected, and form appears, but the agency in attention has been led astray by some imperfection in the condition of the sensation, producing just the effects that must result from what was shown *à priori* in the idea. Under each of these heads the author traces the law through a great variety of facts, presented at great length with most convincing clearness, and forming to some readers one of the most interesting parts of the book.

Under the second head of *consilience* (Sect. III.) are brought many facts from the art of painting and the science of perspective, all verifying the hypothetical law, and as presented by

the writer, possessing not only a deep scientific interest, but an exceeding beauty of thought and illustration.

The appendix, or third division, under this head of the sense, according to the author's admirably arranged scheme, is an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the phenomenal. It divides itself under three aspects: 1st, As against materialism, 2nd, Against idealism, and 3rd, Against universal Pyrrhonism. But as we wish to occupy a good part of our general review with an examination of the principal arguments under these heads, we pass on to the second grand department of the whole work, OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

Perception in the sense (Part II.) gives us phenomena,—fleeting, isolated, and standing wholly in one self. If we would know them otherwise, a higher faculty is necessary. Sense conjoins, or to embrace in one word both its operations, constructs; the understanding connects. One is collocation; the other is an inner bond (*nexus*, a tying, binding, interweaving together by something which runs through all). The sense shows qualities in one place and one period; the understanding affirms a connection in one ground by the inner super-sensual bond of substance, and a connection in one source by the inner bond of causality. This of itself wholly separates it from the faculty of the sense.

But there are other wide and essential differences (Part II. Ch. I. Sect. I.). The conjunction, &c., is perceived; the connection or dynamical bond is thought. In the one we have phenomenon, in the other *νοούμενον*, which, for want of a similarly-formed English word, we call notion (*notio*)—pure knowledge, that is, knowledge which is known without being perceived. Phenomena are conjoined *with* phenomena, but are connected *by* the notion. The notion stands under the phenomena, as their bond of connection. It is therefore understood; and hence the faculty, by an appropriate figure, is called the *understanding*. We perceive the collocation and succession of phenomena; we understand for them, or that they have, substance and cause. As there is pure and empirical sense, so there is pure and empirical thinking. The one gives a train of thought, the other an order of experience. When phenomena are thought as connected in their ground, the product is called a thing; when in their source, an event; when in both, a fact. Thus sense is intuitive, a direct beholding; understanding is discursive. It goes from phenomenon to phenomenon through the understood notion, and thus connects them by a super-sensual bond, not perceived but thought.* The judgments of

* Yet understood or *thought* as a reality just as much as any phenomenon is *seen* as a real phenomenon.

the understanding are truly *à priori* as they are conditional for all experience. In the judgment—the sun warms me—there is assumed *à priori*, or understood, the notions both of ground and source; without which notions all sensation is isolated, and all experience unconnected.

But how determine the validity of the notional? (Section II.) Hume resolves it into a habit of observation. Brown utterly annihilates it, and leaves only a collocation of phenomena and an order of sequences. Reid jumps the difficulty with his dogmatic dictum of common sense. To give in full the striking illustration of the author, (p. 342,) "How shall we answer the sceptic who says that he has examined all these, and has satisfied himself that their whole induced conviction is a mere mist and fog-bank deceptively rising over a stagnant understanding, and which is utterly dissipated into thin air whenever the sunlight strikes upon it from above, or the ebb and flow of active thought agitates it from beneath?" We must give it up, or attain the operation of connection in its *à priori* elements. In this, if successful, we shall have the understanding, as we before had the sense, in its *idea*.

We can only determine (Section II.) how an objective experience is possible by taking some *media* which are common, both to the construction in the sense, and the connection of experience in the understanding. Such *media* are found in space and time, which are common to both, and are also *à priori* or necessary conditions for both.

And now to find (Section III.) how such an experience may be determined in space and time. There are three, and only three, suppositions which can be employed for this purpose. The first is that of the sensationalist, and "constructs space and time from the phenomena." The objection to it is, that though for the sense,* time and space may exist in continuity, yet when construction ceases, then conscious extension and duration cease; every phenomenon is isolated; there is no bridging the chasms, and thus attaining in this way, to any *whole* of space, or any *whole* of time, to serve as connectives. The second supposition is, that of the idealist—"That space and time as thought in a whole of each may determine the connection of phenomena in experience." Here, to begin with, we have indeed the two all pervading and enduring connections perfectly thought in their only possible modes, namely, space in its one mode of permanency, and time in its three modes of perpetuity, succession, and simultaneousness. But the objection is, that though there might be the same space and time

* The author cannot mean here, that we get the conceptions of space and time, in any way, from the sense. A fuller view of this is taken in another part of our article.

thought as a whole for each man, yet each one's perceptions of the same or of all phenomena, might differ, and so each one would have his own world without anything to determine his experience to be objectively common to others, or to give it any ground of permanent and producing independence out of himself. Phenomena are perceived; space and time are only thought, and cannot be made to appear. The author's illustration here is so clear and apposite that we give it in full, although desiring to be as brief as is in any way consistent with clearness. "I can determine the place of one phenomenon, rising in a lake and then sinking, compared with another phenomenon afterwards rising and sinking, and can tell their bearing and distance; but this is because the lake itself is perceived, and connects and determines the places of the appearance. But such is not space and time as a whole. They are thought,—not perceived." The phenomena alone, whether coming from an objective world or not, can never give the thought; and the thought, merely as thought, cannot determine the phenomena objectively in their places and periods.

One only supposition remains. "We need a notional connective for the phenomena which may determine them in their places and periods in the whole of all space and time, and may give both the phenomenal and their space and time in an objective experience." In other words, we want something which shall be in itself pure notion, and yet be seen *à priori* to determine, when realized in an objective law, an objective experience. We want something in which we may use both the sense and the understanding, and *combine perception and thought* in one process. Something which shall be a pure notional, and yet prove an occasion for phenomena appearing in consciousness. For this alone, if attainable, can bridge the passage from one to the other. Again, sense, or the intellectual agency (the author might have said) in the field of the sense, may answer the question *how much*, but cannot say *where* in a whole of all space and time the phenomenon is. The assumed notional must, therefore, be connected, not only for the phenomenal with other phenomenal, but also for the phenomenal with its place and period in such whole of space and time.

This required notional the author professes to have thought out, as it is given to us in the next section (Section IV.). First, in respect to space. The position is so important, that we give it at length in his own words. "Let there be the conception of a force in a place which maintains its equilibrium about a central point, and completely fills a definite space, and which forbids all intrusion within its place, except in its own expulsion from it, and we will here call that conception the

space-filling force. Its equilibrium every way upon its own centre secures that it must remain steadfast in its own place, unless disturbed by some interfering force *ab extra*, and thus constancy and impenetrability are the necessary *à priori* modes of its being" (p. 361). The author would mean, that this space-filling force is something both thought and perceived; for though he says, "It may be an *occasion* for phenomena in consciousness," yet he recognizes it as furnishing a content for the sensibility in an organ of touch, by opposing resistance to muscular pressure, and thus producing perception of hardness, figure, &c., as also for the other senses when certain requisite conditions are supplied (p. 362). He would thus maintain, that it has a mode of being in the understanding as that of a force constant and impenetrable (which are purely *thought*), whilst it has also a mode of being in the sense, as that of perceived quality. In other words, it is both νοητόν and αἰσθητόν; it is both νοούμενον and φαινόμενον, although the author says, it cannot itself become appearance. And yet he must mean, we think, that what as thought we call *force*, that as perceived in the content it furnishes to the sensibility, we call *matter*.*

It thus secures that its phenomena be objective to all. It determines its place the same for every self-conscious agent, as a *constant* in the understanding, remaining whether the sense is withdrawn or not—the same for every percipient, or for no percipient. Or to give the author's own words (p. 365), "Only as space is filled with that which, as understanding conception, is competent to furnish constant occasion for that which, as sense conception, may *constantly* appear, is it possible that any *determination* of space should be given in experience."

And here, for the present, we must arrest our sketch, to say, that in this prolepsis of a space-filling force we have reached that which, for some important matters, though not for the whole work, may be called the author's position. The careful reader, after he has once mastered the conception, will see that it is the keystone of his argument against the idealist. It is, however, not merely an attempt to bridge over the chasm which is supposed to yawn (objectively) between the understanding and the sense. The same conception is employed in the third

* Is it *real solid matter*? From some things the author has elsewhere said, especially p. 555, we infer that he would not hesitate to call it thus, after a supposed superinduction of other forces upon the original conception, and which would make it palpable to our grosser senses. He, however, seems here to regard it in its most abstract state, or as that which is left for the pure notion of the understanding, after everything which might modify is abstracted, just as in the sense, by a similar abstraction, pure space is left for the pure intuition. He would doubtless hold, however, that this remote ἀρχή or beginning of matter might perhaps give its phenomena to some possible organ of sense.

department of the work, and on a large scale, as furnishing a ground in the reason for the belief of a comprehending agency in a real *creation* of the universe.

In short, his full meaning is, that this space-filling force is *substance*, whilst its phenomena are the sense modes of its manifestation. It is substantial entity in space as opposed to *non-ens*.

To a reflecting mind, thinking intensely on matter and substance, and occupied, perhaps, by some such theory as that of Boscovich, the idea may have often occurred, for a moment, that what we call by these names may be an energy, a constant force, space rendered impenetrable, or "the manifestation of the Divine power in space."* There may have occurred something like the *ἄπειρον* of Anaximander, or the *hyle*, the mother of matter of the Greek philosophers, which belonged to the *νοητά* rather than to the *αἰσθητά*; or there may have been some similar thought which more or less resembled our author's. But whether the same or not, it is, as here presented, emphatically *his* conception; because he has worked it out in a system of his own, which, whether true or not, is certainly remarkable, not only for its scientific beauty, but for the many interesting results the author seems to have drawn from it towards the building of an *à priori* natural philosophy in its conditioning principles. The fact that it can be made to harmonise well with the most general phenomena of a nature of things, and to give them an *à priori* interpretation of great simplicity and beauty, is alone an argument of weight in its favour. It is certainly enough to conciliate the reader to a favourable examination.

Such has been its effect on the reviewer, although there are difficulties in the way of its full reception, which he has not yet been able to overcome. The notion of substance is that of a simple unity, or rather oneness; force, on the other hand, ever seems to imply a duality of opposition. The notion of substance, or at least of material substance, seems to be that of an *ens* not only wanting but excluding the conception of motion, or tendency to motion, unless as superinduced *ab extra*; force, on the other hand, ever seems to hold the idea of motion, or tendency to motion, or that resisted tendency which is equilibrium in distinction from the absolute rest of immobility. Again, there are the cravings of the understanding, which seems imperatively to demand a notion of something still back of the force, of which the force *is*, and thus to create the apprehension of falling into one of those amphibolics which arise from the

* If the reviewer may be pardoned in referring to some statements of his own in a work entitled "Plato contra Atheos," p. 279.

attempt to sublimate a thought into an occasion for objective experience, and which the author has himself, in so masterly a manner, set forth in respect to the difficulties of other schools in Section VI., Part II., of this book. With respect to this last objection, he might perhaps resolve it into a bad habit of the understanding which has been so accustomed to regard the notion as ever lying back of, or under, phenomena, that it rejects it when at last it actually seems to make its *appearance*; but waiving all such difficulties we can only say, at present, that we have been deeply impressed with the author's view, and that, with some modifications and explanations, we might be prepared to accept it as containing a substantial verity. As we wish, however, to find room in the present article for a review of the argument against the sensationalist, all consideration of this interesting subject of the space-filling force, and especially of the views to which it leads, of the supernatural and the absolute, as presented in the third part, must be necessarily deferred to another part of our examination. For more in reference to it, in the work itself, the reader is advised to study pages 383 and 555 in continuation. Our further sketch is also deferred in like manner, and for a similar reason; together with a discussion of those intensely interesting moral and theological topics which the author so ably treats in his third department, or, The Reason.

In the work before us, the examination of each faculty very appropriately closes with an argument to prove the valid being of the objects of which it takes cognizance. First—There are real phenomena, and there are real things, causes, events, &c. Secondly—There are real intellectual operations, such as pure intuitions of time and space, conjunctions in quantity, collections in unity, plurality and totality, distinctions in quality, together with certain *à priori* cognitions, which cannot be created from sense, or come from any reflection on sense that does not bring them with it as the conditional means for the performance of its work; and there are also other real intellectual operations, such as the viewing of phenomena in one whole of space and time, and connecting them in the notions substance, cause, &c., which never could have come from any objective order of experience merely, had there not been, *in* the mind itself, and *from* the mind itself, such intuitions, notions, connections, &c., as conditional for all possible experience. The argument thus, in both departments, of the sense and of the understanding, divides itself into three parts—against the materialist or sensationalist,—against the idealist,—and against the sceptic who makes use of the war and con-

traditions of the two, to deny all grounds for a true belief in the existence of anything either objective or subjective.

The argument against the first is comparatively easy. Some little confusion may arise from allowing him to use the word reflection, which has really no meaning in his scheme, and only serves as a delusive foil to turn away objections he cannot answer. Some slight difficulties, too, arise from confounding the sense as a field, or one of the fields, for the operation of the intellectual energy, with the sensitive powers that furnish the objects on which it energises, and to which sensitive powers the name, the *sense*, truly belongs, when employed by itself to denote a department of our nature. Thus, leaving out the terms, sense and understanding, we may speak of the intellectual agency as *constructing* phenomena in form, in quantity, and quality, and of the same or another intellectual agency, as *connecting* things and events in substance and causality. Whether we regard them as two distinct faculties, or the same faculty energising on two distinct fields, and in two distinct ways, must depend upon other parts of our psychological scheme; but on either view, it remains, with equal consistency, that the intellectual agency, with the constructions, connections, intuitions, and notions it brings with it as the light in which it works, are high above—that is, are distinct from and transcend all sensation and all experience. They are brought into the field of the sense, not found there.

There is, we think, some of the same confusion which may arise from the careless reading of our author, not from the want of the utmost clearness in the use of terms (for we think he has seldom been surpassed in this respect), but because it may not be borne in mind that he departs from Kant and others of the kindred school, in bringing the notions of quantity and quality into the field of the sense, rather than of the understanding. The difference, however, we think, is more apparent than real. Kant restricts the sense to the first of the views we have taken of it, as furnishing content merely for perception. The author gives it a larger range, and “includes within it an intellectual agency competent to complete the perception” (p. 158). How far this may be in itself correct, or how far this restricting of one field and enlarging of the other may be merely for the advantage it affords in presenting what is conceived to be a more symmetrical view of the mind’s operation, we do not now inquire. Rather, however, than admit that these intuitions of time and space, these cognitions of unity, totality, &c., could be given by the mere sense, we should altogether prefer Kant’s division, however ill-proportioned it might seem to make the map of the mind. It is clear, however, that the author,

although classifying these cognitions and intuitions under the sense, never intended to make them the product of sensation in the sense of Locke, nor of any barren reflection mirroring in a blank mind only what sense had given it. Proof abundant of this may be found in almost every part of his argument, and we should not at all have dwelt upon it, had it not been for the possibility that some might carelessly regard him as thus deriving from the sense whatever he treats of as being in the field of the sense.

The opposite view is justly styled materialism, from its inevitable tendency. Writers may differ much from what their systems would make them, and this because their souls have been formed under far different influences. Locke, although originating a philosophy identical with that which Condorcet carried to pure atheism and materialism, was a devout man, who feared the Lord and revered the Holy Scriptures. Cousin, who finds so much sensualism in Locke's philosophy, is, to say the least, in nowise distinguished for any of that true spirituality which comes from a hearty love of God's written revelation, and the Christianity which has ever been taught in the Church. Edwards may have carried Locke's doctrine of sensation and motive to the very borders of a physical fatalism (although the reviewer is far from coinciding in any such opinion), and yet who could doubt the high spirituality of Edwards, living as he did ever in holy communion with "the things unseen and eternal," or even institute a comparison between it and that of the boasting German idealists, or of any even of those more serious minds among them who profess a form of evangelical mysticism.

But whilst we cannot always judge men by their philosophical system, the system itself *must* manifest its tendency, and it is this alternate tendency which alone furnishes its most appropriate name. Says the pious author of the *Horæ Solitariae*, "The false or heathen philosophy which derives all knowledge from sensation, naturally enough ends there." It cannot get above its source, and however much it may be buoyed up, for a time, by props drawn from an earlier and a better philosophy, must at last terminate in denying the reality of anything above sense, and, finally, of the sense or sentiency itself as having any true entity aside from the body that *feels*.

Thus viewed, the argument against the sensationalist is clear and direct. It is simply throwing on him the whole *onus probandi*. Concede to him all the advantage of holding, in some way, to a blank spirituality (if he would not wish to rank with those who deny all but matter), and yet he is not essentially helped. He is to show how certain things can ever get into this *capacity from* the sense, unless put into the sense by the

very mind that is to receive and reflect them back again. We meet him with the common-sense argument (for if there can be an argument drawn wholly from sense this is one), that he is trying to get out of a thing what was never in it—a feat which no mere capacity, or faculty, or blank power of reflection, can ever accomplish. He is reversing the famous maxim of his older brethren, *de nihilo nihil*, in the very case where it is most applicable. He is trying to get something out of nothing; for *he* does this who attempts to bring more out of less. In other words, he is deducing very great effects from causes altogether inadequate. There is an immense range of the mind which can neither be originally extracted from sense, nor regarded as having grown out of it. It would comprehend, in fact, all above mere feeling—all that involves the conception of space and time.

Let us suppose such a blank spirituality slumbering in connection with a power of sensation which is to furnish it with its *ideas*, and which is itself as yet unawakened. The former is to receive, and reflect upon, only what it may derive from the latter. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*. It is not only the occasion, but the very containing and developing seed whence is to grow up all future knowledge! In these circumstances the sense is once aroused to sentiency; suppose by the puncture of some sharp instrument in the brain or material sensorium. It feels its first feeling, and transmits it to the blank intelligence above. We might speculate on this one *feeling*, and show that even here the awaking mind must *receive*, or rather *perceive*, what could not have been in the sense. Here is change, here is *ens* and *non-ens*, here is unity, here is the diversity of being and not being. All this, too, might be fairly supposed of the pure inner sense, once, in some way aroused to a consciousness that it *is*. But we pass on. The sensibility goes to sleep again, and is again aroused by a similar token from the objective world. It feels its second feeling, and transmits it to the blank spirituality above. Like causes must produce like effects. This second feeling is like the first, and can, therefore, only bring to the mind a like result. If there be a difference, either from excess or diminution in the second, or from the addition of something from the first still remaining in the sentiency, it can be no difference of kind, but only of degree, or intensity. It will be just the same sensation (in kind) over again, giving no other product in the soul, or at the utmost, only a plus or minus of sensation, such as might have been given by the first impression on the sensorium, had it been so proportioned in force and direction. But here we are met by the startling fact, that there is connected with this second feeling something which was not in the first. It is, too, not a mere differ-

ence of intensity, or even variety of sensation, but something radically *distinct in kind*. There is the cognition of something as past or of *pastness*, if we may employ such a term. There is an intuition of time. The soul is awakened to find this within herself. She is aroused by the sensation, but it is of herself she knows she has been sleeping. It is from her own light, and not from any reflecting back on sense what sense has given, that she knows there has been a before, that there is a now, and that there is coming a hereafter. This intuition of time alone, thus coming from herself, though kindred from without, lights up far and wide the interior of her being, and shows her that it is no void place, but well supplied with goodly store of intuitions, cognitions, notions, ideas, ready instantaneously to give forth their own illumination, whenever the objects are presented which they are adapted to embrace in their beholding. We may be years in taking a full inventory of this spiritual house, ταύτης τῆς οἰκίας τῆς ἀχειροποίητου, but as neither sense nor even consciousness gave them existence, so can neither, by its absence, detract aught from the constant reality of their being.

The same arguments might be applied to all our perceptions of space, of figure, of quantity, of quality. Sense cannot answer the question *when*, and it remains equally silent to the question *where*. We feel hardness, we see colours, we hear sounds, and these singly or combined produce sensations of varying intensity, but it is only in the light which the pure spirituality sheds upon them that we perceive unity, or duality, or plurality, or totality, or number, or ratio, or figure even; for these can be only seen in the intuition of space which sense cannot give. And so, *à fortiori*, may we say, that it is by a still higher knowledge of the soul we know that phenomena must inhere in substance, and cohere in mutual causality.*

Sense may draw its line upon the retina, or the brain, or the last matter that intervenes, but the spirit measures it by its own canon of straightness. So also it may protract its varied lines, but the soul surveys their relations by its own ideas of parallelism, angularity, rectangularity, ratio, equality,† &c. If it be said that these are manifestly furnished by sense, we appeal to the fact that they are nowhere found throughout the sensible world in their perfection. There are no perfectly straight lines lying, as the old Greek geometers defined them, εἰς ἴσον, equally

* Every time we read Plato's argument in the Phædon respecting these "reminders" of the τὸ ἴσον, τὸ καλόν, &c., we are the more and more convinced, that, instead of being the egregious quibble which some pronounce it, it is absolutely unanswerable.

† The idea of *equality* comes into that of *straightness*. Evenly—that is, nothing on one side that is not on the other. The modern definition substitutes a different and less simple notion.

between their extreme points. There are no perfectly straight lines exactly parallel; there are no perfect circles. Sense and experience, the more minutely they are examined, are found never to come to the perfect ideal models which the mind has *somehow* got into its possession. They could, therefore, never have given us these ideal standards, because, without such previous ideal, we could never know how much the sensible imitations were below it, or, in fact, that they were below it at all. We may talk as we will of the association of ideas, but if the chain is not originally fastened to something permanently in the mind, and which regulates the whole association, how shall we ever mount up by it into the mind itself? It is maintained that, though imperfect, they are near enough to the truth to represent the perfect idea, and that so the mind reaches down and gets it from this representation. But what is meant? What is representation but a throwing back of what had been imparted? It ever, of necessity, implies an *original*; and by what does the mind correct the imperfect copy after it has thus got it in possession? The mathematician may make his demonstration from a very ill-drawn diagram, because he easily rectifies it in his mind's eye, from his own pure ideal; and so it is near enough for his purpose, though a clumsy obtuse angle may have to represent rectangularity. The accomplished musician can use a very imperfect instrument, and enjoy the intellectual pleasure of the harmony,* notwithstanding some gratings on the sense, because he mentally brings up its jarring strings to the perfect attuning of his own mind. It is enough if it suggest the perfect chords which the musician's soul knows so well. But where would either of them be, if they had no other, and never could have any other, standard than could be obtained from the clumsy diagram, or the ill-tuned piano? In short, there cannot well be conceived a grosser *hysteron proteron* than that which derives the rule, or, in general, the accuracy of the rule, from the very imperfection whose deficiency it is brought to measure.

We see that the line is straight, and that the spaces are equal, because we, *à priori*, know what straightness and equality are. The seeing is determined by the knowing. Otherwise there would have been immeasurable diversity, and no unity, or approach to unity, either of name or idea. The word *suggest* will not remove the difficulty for the disciple of Mill and Locke. It is a term which belongs to the other school. The imperfect approach cannot create the ideal rule, but it may very well put the soul in mind (if we may use the familiar expression) of one it had before.

Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu. We would not be

* It may seem a paradox, but in this way a scientific musician might be less offended by a poor instrument, than one who had a good ear and no science.

so extravagant as to invert this famous maxim, and say that there is nothing in the sense which was not previously in the intellect; but in view of what has been said, we may maintain, that little or nothing in the sentiency, or which comes from the sentiency, would appear what it does appear, were it not for its connection with the intellect, or, in other words, the light-giving spirituality above. Even the sense, says Aristotle, is not wholly *alogal*—οὐχ ὡς ἄλογον καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν δεῖν ἂν τις ῥαδίως; by which he evidently means, that what the sense has in itself is rationalized and made different from what it would be, by its connection with a higher or lower intellect. We see nothing as we should see it, if we had only sense and a blank spirituality,—even admitting that that were possible. Every reader must be familiar with examples in which our intuitions, our notions, or, if any choose to call them such, our assumptions, be they original or acquired, do greatly vary our perceptions, and even, sometimes, the very sensations themselves. Our perceptions of distance ever depend on an assumed size; and even here we get nothing absolute, because, on the other hand, our perceptions of size do ever depend on an assumed distance, either spontaneously taken, or given to us by circumstances. We speak of the real size of objects. But how shall we ascertain it as matter of sense? Not even the famous Auguste Comte, with all his parade of “experience” and “positive knowledge,” could give us the mathematical formula for this apparently simplest of all problems. No man on earth can make a definition of it, that does not immediately involve something *out* of what might seem to be a direct perception of size itself, or, in other words, demand an ideal measure. I look out of my window in the evening, and behold what appears to be a great light. For some reason I had fixed its locality across an extended valley. This was my *notion*, my understanding. It makes no difference now whence that understanding came, and whether original or acquired. It had its instantaneous effect upon the perception. Again, some cause modifies it, and I am convinced that the place of the phenomenon is just across the street. Not only the perception, but the very sensation is changed. There is a dwindling at once in brightness and size, and all that remains is the *appearance* of a dim candle in the window of a neighbouring house.

This is a familiar case; and yet it might be shown that almost all the affirmations of our senses, instead of giving us the most *direct* knowledge, as some would say, do, in a similar manner, involve some hypothesis, and are liable to similar modifications. Unless rectified by a continual judgment, of which, in its intuitive rapidity and frequency we take no notice until revealed to

us in the analysis of perspective science, the mere sensual revelations of our eyes would often be distorted and delusive pictures. Hardly anything appears to one sense exactly according to what another sense, or the understanding, judging according to another sense, would pronounce reality; and it may be unhesitatingly affirmed, that we never see anything of its true shape from whatever position it may be viewed. We talk of correcting one sense by another, as though that would help the present difficulty, or repair the broken arches of the materialist's crumbling bridge. We need again some plank from the other shore. We bring in again the thought of a rule or model out of sense. In affirming that we correct one sense by another, there is of course implied some higher standard than either. Without it, we have no means of determining which is most correct, and therefore best entitled to be used as a measure for the other, or how far one or both fall below the standard of absolute correctness. Without this, it would be like measuring the yard by the foot, and then the foot by its assumed multiple the yard.

Education, arts, associations, do all, on the same principle, vary our perceptions, and make them to appear different from what they otherwise would have done. One man sees that in the picture which another does not see; and this too from no deficiency in the mere sense, or of vividness of painting on the retina, or on the brain. One man hears a voice in the music, the other cannot hear, although it may be endowed with even more correctness and power of the mere acoustic organ. Cicero in a most striking manner adverts to this dependence of perception on the inner state of the soul—"Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia quæ nos non videmus; quam multa quæ nos fugiunt in cantu exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati."* To use the language of the author (p. 224), though applied to a somewhat different purpose, "the intellect fills up the chasms which may have been truly voids in the sensation, and, by re-construction, restores again the original, guided by the content which is given;" or, as we might say in the present cases, guided by its own ideal in supplying the defects of the content, or in correcting its perversities and redundancies.

These views are strongly confirmed by the examples which the author brings forward in his section entitled, "Colligation of Facts" for the objective law of the sense. We are inclined, however, to suspect him of error when he says (p. 252), that "all conjoining into figure, or giving shape or outline of object, by the ear, is impracticable." If the general philosophy he has so clearly presented, be correct, the eye has doubtless a great superiority in awakening such perceptions (and this is all that is

* Acad. Prior. II. 7.

necessary for the argument there), but not the exclusive power. We cannot easily decide how small an avenue may be wide enough for the soul's cognitions, not to *come in*, as the disciple of Mill would say, but to *go forth* to the shaping of the chaotic notices in the sensibility. Even the inner sense alone might awaken the ideas of number in all their immensely varied relations. Whatever suggests the *à priori* thought of distance,* from or towards, or, in other words, of separation from the percipient in space, may, in time, bring out all the other perceptions of figure. The fact of such perception being achieved *through* a low or obscure organ of sense, would strongly prove that, for the completion of the process in all, there is required a pure spiritual *eisemplastic* operation from the mind itself. The delusion which makes us believe that we not only feel, but perceive directly by the organ, has come from the ease and rapidity of construction through the finer feeling of the eye. In tracing the slower process through the other senses, in which we are distinctly conscious of almost every step the mind takes in completing the perception, we more readily admit the belief in a purely intellectual act, which, if necessary in one, is necessary in all, to give form to the content in sensation. There can be but little doubt, that had the whole human race been confined to the organ of hearing, there might in time have been suggested by it, distance, figure, size, hardness, &c.—that is, in a highly improved state; and this would consist, not merely in an increased sensual acuteness of the organ, but in a higher and readier facility of adapting to its sensitive notices the forth-going cognitions of the intelligence. There would be no extravagance in supposing this carried so far as to make it perfectly natural and proper to say, It sounds hard, and soft, or round, or square; or even to enable us to distinguish the presence and qualities of objects which we now think of as pertaining solely to the eye. And so in respect to the deficiency of sight. The senses may all be said to vary in two ways—in distinctness, and in strength of impression. In the first of these, the eye is pre-eminent; in the second, it is the lowest in the organic scale. Yet, still there can hardly be a doubt, that if we had only the sense of seeing, without muscular feeling or the power of locomotion, there would be enough of force in the eye to call out of the mind its dynamical cognitions, and through these to introduce it to an acquaintance with the world of dynamical causation.

The common explanation of correcting one sense by another,

* It would be the third in order of the elementary cognitions which the soul employs in giving form to the sensation,—*ens*, *ex-istens*, *di-stans*,—the first, the being of that which is perceived; the second, its being as distinct from the percipient the third, its separation, away from the percipient.

strongly suggests an argument in the *Theætetus* of Plato, that some might regard as involving mere verbal fallacies, but which, we think, will bear the closest examination into its substantial soundness. It is to show, that as each sense has its separate office for distinct sentiences, and that what we become sentient of by one sense, we cannot become sentient of by another; it therefore follows, that whatever notions or thoughts have reference alike to two or more senses, and may be equally predicated of the objects of each, could have come from neither, but must have belonged to the spiritual mind, and have been seen *by it* in its own light, and not *through* the sense. We hope our readers will pardon us in giving a short extract from this interesting dialogue:*

"*Soc.* Sense you said was *knowledge*.

"*Theæt.* Just so.

"*Soc.* Should I ask you, then, By what does a man see the white and the black, and by what does he hear the acute and the grave? You would say, I think, by the eyes and the ears.

"*Theæt.* I certainly would.

"*Soc.* The free and easy use of words without too strict a regard to the mere niceties of language is, in general, not only to be allowed, but commended. Nevertheless we are sometimes compelled to take a contrary course. As now, for example, there is an absolute necessity that I should take a tight hold of your answer, my dear boy, in order to show wherein it is not exactly right. For look carefully now—which answer would have been most correct, to say that the eyes are that *by*† which we see, or *through* which we see? and so of the ears.

"*Theæt.* As it now appears to me, they are the means or organs *through* which we perceive their respective objects, rather than *by* which.

"*Soc.* True, my boy, for it would be an awful thing, indeed, were it so that there sit within us many independent sentiences like the Greeks in the wooden horse, instead of their all tending together to one—call it soul or what you will—*by* which, yet *through* these senses, we become sentient of all sensibles. (Thus it is *by* the soul, *through* the organs of sense, that we become *even* sentient.) But more—could you also grant me this, that what you become sentient of *through* one sense, you cannot possibly become sentient of *through* another sense?‡ As, for

* Plato *Theætetus*, 184, B.

† The distinction in the original is made by the use of the dative in the one case, and *διὰ* with the genitive, in the other. The first denotes the agent, the second the organ.

‡ The objector would pronounce this a verbal fallacy. We do *see* and *hear* the same *thing*, he would say. But this is the very point in question. Do we hear and see, or hear or see, *things* at all? Or do we hear its sound, and see its figure, and

example, what you become sentient of through the hearing, you cannot become sentient of through the sight; and again, what you become sentient of through the sight, you cannot become sentient of through the hearing. Do you grant this?

"*Theæt.* Most certainly.

"*Soc.* If, then, you have any thought or notion in your mind about both sensations, you could not have become sentient of it either through the one or the other, seeing that it is a notion that belongs to both.

"*Theæt.* It would seem impossible.

"*Soc.* Take sound and colour, then—have you this thought, the same in respect to both, that they ARE?

"*Theæt.* I have.

"*Soc.* And also the thought that each is (not simply different, but) a different thing from the other, while it is the same with itself?

"*Theæt.* Why, surely.

"*Soc.* And, moreover, that both are *two* and each is *one*?

"*Theæt.* That, too, beyond all doubt.

"*Soc.* Through what, then, have you all these notions concerning the two? For neither through the hearing, nor the sight, is it possible to receive any such common thought. And now I will give you another proof in this. For suppose (if such a case were conceivable), that in respect to both—that is, sound and colour—we were examining this question, namely, whether they were salt or not, either one or both—you know very well by what you would make the examination, and that this would not be sight, nor hearing, but something else.

"*Theæt.* It would be the sentient power that resides in the tongue.

"*Soc.* Very well. Now tell me again. Through what does that power operate which manifests to you what relates to all the senses, as much as to these two just mentioned—I mean such common notions as those to which you give the names (or of which you say *it is*, or *it is not*, &c.), besides the others of which we just now asked?

"*Theæt.* It is substance and being you are now talking about, and not being, and likeness and unlikeness, and identity, and diversity, and, moreover, oneness and number generally. It is clear, too, that your question has respect to even and odd, together with all those notions of number that are involved in them. And you mean to ask—through what one of the bodily organs we become sentient of—these, as we became sentient of

taste its savour, and smell its odour, and feel its hardness? If there is any thought which belongs no more to one sense than to another, are we sentient of it by either, or by both, or are we sentient of it at all?

the other first mentioned (namely, colours, sounds, &c.), through the organ of sense and by the soul.

"*Soc.* Most admirably done, my boy Theætetus—you take me well. That is just what I meant to ask.

"*Theæt.* By Zeus, then, Master Socrates, I can give you no other answer than that there seems to me to be no such organ or organs at all for these as in the former cases (that is, we are not sentient of them at all or derive them through sense), but the soul itself, as it seems, both *by* and *through* itself, *sees* all these notions which we have in common respecting them all.

"*Soc.* Beautifully answered. You are, indeed, a beautiful boy now, Theætetus, and not at all homely, as Theodorus represented you. And, besides the beauty of it, you have done me a great favour in delivering me from the necessity of quite a long explanation; since to yourself it thus appears, that some things the soul looks at and sees itself, and *in* and *through* itself, whilst the knowledge of others it derives through the organs of the body. But to what class would you assign these—beauty and the contrary, good and evil?

"*Theæt.* To the latter class most certainly. These, above all things, does the soul survey in their being, and in their mutual relations, ever, in so doing, calling up *within herself* the past, the present, and the future."

In other words, colour, and sound, and hard, and sweet, the soul becomes sentient of through the organs of sense; but unity and number, and identity and likeness, &c., together with the good and the beautiful, and their contraries, she sees both by and through herself, because these notions, or knowledges, are in herself, and never came out of sense, nor from any blank reflection of, or reflecting on, what was merely given by the sense.

The followers of Mill would claim to be the common-sense school. Their explanations, they would say, are easy—their terms intelligible to the common mind. They involve none of that mystical jargon which belongs to the "exploded doctrine of innate ideas." But will this claim bear the test of careful examination? There has been already shown, we think, the utter barrenness of their word reflection. Another explanation in very common use with some is made by the still more notionless word *capacity*. There is no mystery in the mind's operations, if we only suppose it to have a capacity for this, and for that. But pray—what is a capacity? It is a place for holding—*δεκτικόν τι*. When we say, moreover, the soul *has* a capacity, we only double the figure, and it makes it thus doubly unmeaning.

It then becomes a capacity holding a capacity, or a capacity for a capacity, and so on *ad infinitum*.

But granting that there may be such a merely holding place, or vacuum, in the soul,—the question still remains. We have not advanced a hair's breadth towards its solution. How do the intuitions, notions, ideas, aforesaid, ever get into it? If they are there *à priori*, then are they innate, or *in-born*, to use the better Saxon phrase, and then there would be good *sense*, as well as good *reason*, in saying, the soul has a capacity for them. If not, we are just where we were, and the unmystical psychologists must find room for them in the sensation, and this, it has been shown, they can never do.

There is the same barrenness in the word faculty, which others would employ in this common-sense operation of getting something out of nothing. The term is all very well, if we do not take away all meaning for our present purpose, and reduce it to a blank agency, by attempting to conceive of a *faculty* (*facilitas*) without the distinct appropriate energies, means, *supply* (according to the best sense of the word) for doing what it was appointed to do—having, moreover, no knowledge of what it is to do, or how to do it—comparing without any previous rule of comparison, distinguishing without any known ground of distinction, combining without any *à priori* unity of aim, or aim of unity, to which, and by which, the combination is to be directed,—and, above all things, remembering without any knowledge of time, and estimating motion without any knowledge of space; for these most inconceivable of all absurdities flow directly *à posteriori atque à fortiori*, from the common-sense explanation, that we get this very knowledge, or the ideas of time and space by induction, from the perception of motion and the exercise of memory. We relieve the term from absurdity, only by making it wholly unmeaning. Faculty for this, or that, becomes synonymous with possibility, a term which may be predicated of almost any one thing in *rerum naturâ* in respect to almost anything else. In this way, for all we know, the plant has a faculty, somewhere, that is, a possibility to become an animal, and the animal has a faculty to become a man. We need only say, that nothing can be more opposite to all this barrenness, than the manner in which our author invariably employs the term, defining ever, with the most satisfactory clearness, the intuitions, notions, and comprehensions, it must carry along with it in all the operations it is appointed to perform. The same objections apply to the common use of the terms, *belief*, *habit*, *association*. All is contingent. There is no *à priori* ground for the belief, no starting principle by which

the habit and the association may be originally determined, or that can give the law through which they subsequently cohere.

No writers are more apt to impose on themselves and their readers, in this way, than those of this school who have the most to say of experience and "positive knowledge" as the "fruit alone of sense and experience." Often when they think they have presented the more easy and intelligible explanation, they have only covered up a difficulty by giving it a name. We need *only* suppose the soul to have a capacity, or a faculty, or a power of reflection, or of memory, and all mystery is dissipated at once. With these as our machinery, and sense and sensible experience as the foundation, we can raise any superstructure we please. The school are ever fond of ridiculing the doctrine of occult qualities in the ancient physics, whilst they introduce it with all its darkness into the realm of mind. An example of this very ready way of explaining things occurs in a remark of Sir John Herschel as quoted by Prof. Davies in his late work on the Logic of Mathematics. His position is, that mathematical knowledge comes from experience and induction, in the same way as outward physical science; which is also a favourite position with Mill. They are the same, he says, "*only* that in the one case the mind *spontaneously* presents the facts on which the induction rests,"—as though this spontaneous presentation were a very non-essential affair, and did not constitute the immense difference in the two cases, making, in fact, an impassable chasm between them!

If we must have a metaphor, the best that could be used would be the one the author has so happily employed in respect to consciousness, p. 169. Instead of a capacity, or rather, together with a capacity, which is a very good figure in its place, we may say the soul has a light which she sheds upon the opaque content in the sensibility, and which immediately brings form and distinctness out of chaos,—a light through which sensation becomes perception, and phenomena are *known* as representing things and events in a permanent and enduring nature of things. This light we may metaphorically suppose, either to be of the very essence of the soul itself, or to be generated by a spiritual energy, which, in its own working (above and aside from sense) gives birth to both light and heat,—or, in other words, the purely spiritual emotion of interesting knowledge, and the purely intellectual illumination by which it is seen.

It was held as a part of the ancient Greek physics, that in seeing, a real light went forth from the eye to meet that which was conveyed, through the diaphanous medium, from the object itself. Whatever modern science may object to this, there was, we believe, a substantial truth, if not in the optical theory itself,

at least lying right behind it. We may take it as meaning, that even sense is not pure passivity. The soul sends forth an energy, even in sense-seeing; instinctive it may be, rather than voluntary, yet none the less its own spiritual act. She does something instead of simply receiving. She communicates to the eye a light without which it would be in darkness, and the pictures on the retina, or the brain, would never be read. And then, could we conceive of the eye as a separate existence, this infused light might be regarded as its spiritual principle. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ζῶον ψυχὴ ἂν αὐτῷ ἦν ἡ ΟΨΙΣ—"If the eye were an animal," says Aristotle (De Anima, Lib. II. 1. 9), "*vision would be its soul*."

But why not at once call it knowledge, *ideas*, from the intellectual meaning and tenses of εἶδω*—a meaning which we have reason to regard as being no more metaphorical, and no less real, in the one case than in the other. Why not then call it knowledge (*notio*), since the moment it finds its object it knows it, and remembers it moreover as cognized by something which had an *à priori* being. It is easy to anticipate the plausible objection, that it can be no knowledge until it become itself an object of consciousness, and thus sees itself seeing, and knows itself knowing, or that there is an absurdity in the conception of a *dormant* knowledge,—in other words, a knowledge unknown, and thoughts unthought. But have we not the same mystery (for we would not dare to style it absurdity), in respect to what we call our acquired knowledge?—for, whether inborn or acquired makes no difference here. It is one of the most indubitable facts of our spiritual constitution, that there is a knowledge which we may be said to *possess*, and yet to *have* or *hold it not*,—κεκτηῖσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν—according to Plato's well-illustrated distinction, in his simile of the aviary, or spiritual pigeon-park, toward the close of the Theætetus, 197. A. And so also Aristotle (De Anima, Lib. II. c. 1. 5). "It may be spoken of," says he, "in two ways, as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in itself, and as knowledge in actual spiritual beholding (ἐν τῷ θεωρεῖν). For in the very being of the soul itself there is a sleeping and an awaking.† The awaking is analogous to the spiritual *beholding*; the sleep to the *having* and yet not *energizing*"—τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν.

There is to each man a knowledge which is truly *his* knowledge, belonging to his being as it belongs not to another, and yet it may be truly said he *knows* it not; he *thinks* it not. It

* Some of these, it is well known, signify to *see*, others to *know*. Εἶδωλον (*idol*) would be from the one class, ἰδέα from the other. Both are alike literal—alike metaphorical.

† He means, doubtless, aside from the animal sleep which it has from its connection with the body and the sentient nature.

is as truly asleep within him as when the whole soul, including the visual as well as the *theoretical* (τὸ θεωρεῖν) is buried in the profoundest slumber. Take then our acquired knowledge, we say again, and the mystery is not at all diminished. It is rather increased. Notwithstanding our familiarity with the fact, there are some elements in it, which, when we examine them closely, enhance the wonder. How very small a part of that immense store of intuitions, thoughts, feelings, facts, scenes, events, which go to make up the knowledge of one single man (be he one of the most narrow information), is at any one hour of his life in actual exercise, that is *actually* known or thought! How small the ratio of his waking being, at any one time, to that far greater part which is sleeping; much of it too—perhaps the most of it—having thus slept for many years!

But, where is it? What relation has it to his spiritual constitution? Does it truly enter into his very *esse*, so that he ever carries it with him, the past in the present, and *is* all that he is during every moment that he *exists*? Twenty years ago a thought was thought, an event was witnessed, a scene was beheld, a feeling was felt. Now it comes up again in my actual waking knowledge; but during all this time it has been unthought, unseen, unimaged, unfelt, and may we not say, as far as this argument is concerned,—*unknown*? Some of it has fallen into so profound a slumber, that it will perhaps never awake until carried into the fixed and changeless state of another existence. But, where is it? We repeat the inquiry; for the question seems to involve some truths of most serious moment. Has it been all this time a *non-ens*? If it has had a true being, can it be conceived of except as in relation to my soul, or (for no other preposition can suit the exigency of the thought) as *in* my soul,—in my spiritual being, as it is not in the spiritual being of any other personality? We say spiritual being, for we do not now argue with that lowest class of materialists who would think that an easy and sufficient explanation of this whole matter could be found in the supposition of ten thousand times ten thousand configurations of a material brain, moved by ten thousand times ten thousand material springs, touched by innumerable associations, themselves all strung together by material ligaments, and among which material configurations, each comes up, when in the endlessly complicated movements of this machinery its own spring is touched, and the whole structure of every other part of the brain at once corresponds thereto. Even such obtuse men, ἀντίτροποι ἄνδρες, as Plato calls them, such hard-headed materialists as these, who resolve all knowledge into touch and resistance, might be

puzzled by the question, What is to prevent, if perhaps one man's brain, amidst these endless convolutions, should get into a material state exactly corresponding to that of another (a case by no means inconceivable,)—what is to prevent that the one should immediately find himself endowed with all the knowledge, and all the experience of space and time, past and present, of the latter brain?

But our argument is with those who believe that man has an immaterial spirituality, whether they regard it as a mere capacity or not. We ask them to look intently at the difficulty, and then explain it. They may reply that they discover none. Some might be ready to ask, What do such inquiries mean? Does the interrogator himself know? There is surely no such difficulty in the case. The solution is plain enough even for a "child's book on psychology." The word memory explains it all. This knowledge about which there is vainly supposed to be something so occult, is simply *remembered*. When the soul wants to use it, she remembers it by a capacity, or faculty, she has for that express purpose. Should there be an attempt to go a little further, we are told of the association of ideas.

We "recall" it, too, it is said, as though it had flown away to some extra mundane region, and were not somewhere within the domain embraced by the personal *we*.

But this is only a name for the fact; it explains nothing. There is yet the deep "*mystery of memory*," as St. Augustine somewhere styles it. We may doggedly try to put up with the dogma of Reid, that "memory is an *immediate* knowledge of the past;"* but in that word, the past, the difficulty all comes back again; and we ask ourselves—How can the past be in the present, unless we carry our whole being with us, and all the knowledge of the past is bound up in the present by those original notions, cognitions, intuitions, ideas, or knowledges, which were born in the soul, which ever abide in it irrespective of all time, out of the combinations of which all other or outward knowledge arises, and into which it may be ultimately analyzed as its constituting elements, without at the same time losing that distinct objective reality which it has obtained through their form-giving power.

If we reject, then, as exploded, the doctrine of inborn knowledge, or treat it as a mystery and an absurdity, we have yet, in some respects, this deeper "*mystery of memory*"—*the present knowledge of the past*, the unknown and yet known, the *for-gotten* and yet *gotten*, or as the same is expressed in Plato's Greek, and with nearly the same idiomatic metaphor, the *unheld* and yet *possessed*.

* Intellectual Powers, Essay III. Chap. I.

We have dwelt the longer on this part of the argument, not to supply any deficiency in the author's treatment, but to present in the most familiar way we could, what the nature and plan of his work compelled him to give in a rigid scientific manner. We wish especially to draw attention to it as an important part of his general view, and as furnishing the best position for the proper appreciation of other parts of the work.

Of this we can only say, that it increases in interest on every page. Some of the discussions in the latter part of the book are of the profoundest moment. All readers who have suffered the comparatively dry details of statement and definition, in the first part of the volume, to deter them from the close study of the whole, may be assured that they have lost much which possesses not only a philosophical and a scientific, but also a high moral and religious, value.

ART. X.—THE PROGRESS OF CHURCH HISTORY AS A SCIENCE.

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CHURCH HISTORY, like every other branch of learning, has its own history, serving to bring its true object and proper method gradually more and more into view. It may throw some light on the nature of the science, and at the same time assist our sense of the necessary qualifications of a church historian, to trace its progress from the beginning down to the present time. In this sketch we shall pay particular attention to the Protestant historians.

I. HISTORIANS BEFORE THE REFORMATION.

§ 1. *The Fathers.*

Here, as in all other departments of theology, the *Greek* church leads the way. Leaving out of view the Acts of the Apostles by LUKE, and the five lost books of Ecclesiastical Memoirs by HEGESIPPUS, a Jewish Christian writer of the second century, the title "father of church history" belongs undoubtedly to EUSEBIUS († 340), the learned and truth-loving

bishop of Caesarea. In his church history, which reaches in ten books to the year 324, he has made faithful use of the libraries of his friend Pamphilus of Caesarea and Alexander bishop of Jerusalem, the canonical and apocryphal writings, the works of the disciples, of the apostles, the apologists and oldest church fathers, including many valuable documents which have since perished.* Less worthy of confidence is his biography of Constantine the Great; he was too much blinded by the favours which this emperor had shown towards the church, not to sacrifice the character of the historian frequently to that of the panegyrist. He was followed and continued in the fifth century, first by two jurists of Constantinople; SOCRATES, who carried forward the history of the church, in seven books, from the beginning of Constantine's reign (306) to the year 439, in unpretending, often careless style, but without prejudice and with more critical tact than Eusebius; and HERMIAS SOZOMENUS, of Palestine, whose nine books embrace the same period (323—423), but have more respect to monasticism, of which he was an enthusiastic admirer. Then comes THEODORET, bishop of Cyrus, who wrote his work, in five books (from 325—429), about the year 450, and excels both the last-named in style and richness of matter. In his *Lives of Thirty Hermits* however (*φιλότητος ἱστορία*), he relates in part the most marvellous events of his heroes, without leaving the least room for doubt. While all these writers belonged to the Catholic church, PHILOSTORGIUS, on the other hand, wrote in the interest of Arianism; of his twelve books, however (from 300—425), we have only extracts, in the *Bibliotheca* of Photius. From the sixth century are to be named, THEODORUS of Constantinople, who continued the history to the year 518, and the Syrian lawyer, EVAGRIUS of Antioch, who brought it down to 594. Photius boasts of him, that he was more orthodox than all his predecessors.† The later Greek church, whose life altogether since its separation from the Latin may be styled a progressive stagnation, has accomplished but little for our science. In the fourteenth century NICEPHORUS CALLISTI, a monk of Constantinople (about 1333), compiled out of two older historians a new church history in twenty-three books, of which, however, only eighteen (to A. D. 610) are preserved in a single manuscript of the Vienna library. From the close connection of Church and State in the Byzantine empire, however, the so-called *SCRIPTORES BYZANTINI* may also be reckoned in part to the literature of church history.

* A detailed account of his sources, sixty in number, is given by Flügel, *Versuch einer Geschichte der theolog. Wissenschaften*, Halle, 1797. Part II. p. 321 ff.

† All these seven historians have been published together, in Greek and Latin, with notes, by VALESIIUS, in three volumes folio (Par. 1659—1677; also Amstelod. 1695, and Cantabr. 1720).

The *Latin* church historians were wholly dependent on Greek models. RUFINUS, presbyter of Aquileia († 410), translated the work of Eusebius, and added two books, carrying it on to the death of Theodosius the Great (395). SULPICIOUS SEVERUS († about 420) wrote a *Historia sacra* from the creation of the world to the year 400, which however hardly deserves the name of a history. CASSIODORUS, consul and monk († about 562), towards the end of his life, from the works of Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret, which he had translated for him into Latin by his friend Epiphanius Scholasticus, composed his *Historia tripartita*, in twelve books; and this extract served the Latin church as a manual through the whole period of the Middle Ages.

§ 2. The Middle Ages.

This period furnished no independent exhibitions of general church history, for the *Historiæ ecclesiasticæ* of HAYMO, bishop of Halberstadt († 853), in ten books, are a mere extract of the translation of Eusebius by Rufinus; and the *Historia ecclesiastica* or *Chronographia tripartita*, of the Roman presbyter and librarian ANASTASIUS († about 886), is partly a translation of the Chronography of Nicephorus, and in part an extract from the works of Syncellus and Theophanes. On the other hand, we have from this time a multitude of chronicles, biographies of saints, histories of single convents and monastic orders, which are mostly indeed simple, often uncritical narrations, but full of valuable material; and then, works on single national churches, as the church history of the Franks by GREGORY OF TOURS († 595), the old British and Anglo-Saxon church history by VENERABLE BEDE († 735), to the year 731, the four books of the canon, ADAM OF BREMEN, on the period from Charlemagne to the year 1076, which is important for the spread of Christianity among the Saxons and in Scandinavia, in particular for the archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen. The revival of classical studies roused here and there the spirit of critical inquiry; of which we have an example in the Roman canon, LAURENTIUS VALLA († 1457), who ventured to prove the utter groundlessness of Constantine's donation to Pope Sylvester, and combated also the traditional opinion that the apostles had each composed a part of the Apostle's Creed.

In all these works from the time before the Reformation, invaluable as they are in their way, we have church history in its infancy or childhood. The church was not brought yet to reflect on her own existence, the power of tradition was unshaken. For this reason, the spirit of free inquiry, and genuine

scientific method, were almost entirely wanting. The whole apprehension of what history is was one-sided, as it embraced properly only facts, or the activity of the spirit in its outward direction. No real history of dogma had place at all, as implying the idea that the doctrine of the church itself goes through a living process of development. The only form in which this most important branch of historical theology existed, and made its first appearance, was the history of heresies, as may be seen in the principal works of ecclesiastical antiquity on this subject by EPIPHANIUS and THEODORET.

II. ROMAN CATHOLIC HISTORIANS SINCE THE REFORMATION.

§ 3. *General Character of Roman Catholic Historiography.*

From the old Catholic church historians, we pass forward directly to the *Roman Catholic* since the Reformation, as most nearly related to them in spirit and tendency. With these two the idea of development is wanting, and along with it all free and unbiassed criticism. Their position is settled for them beforehand; it is the position of *fixed orthodoxy* and *exclusive churchdom*. Their doctrine of the infallible authority of the papacy cramps inquiry on all sides, and since the conception of the church is for them that of the Roman church, they look upon all variations from this of course as apostasy and corruption, as damnable heresy and schism. Hence no justice is to be expected from them towards non-Catholic movements, and this exclusiveness stands out most harshly in the treatment of the last three centuries, which it is plain have been ruled predominantly by the spirit of the Reformation. The pure historical character is here troubled and disturbed by apologetic interest for the papacy, and polemic zeal against all that is anti-Roman. The endeavour is everywhere to carry up the Roman doctrines and institutions into the most gray antiquity, and to vindicate for them, if possible, apostolical authority, which of necessity involves the greatest violence in many cases to history. Still the Roman Catholic historians are not wanting in extensive learning. On the field of their own church they have gone into the most searching and profound investigations, moved to them mainly by the antagonistic force of Protestantism itself, and altogether deserve well, in many ways, for what they have done to promote our science. In the nature of the case too they could not fail, particularly the most influential among them, to proceed more cautiously, giving up many manifest fables and superstitions which had been received

before without question as historical facts, and accommodating themselves more to modern taste, both in matter and manner.

§ 4. (1) *Italian Historians.*

The first Protestant church history, the Magdeburg Centuries, created such a sensation, that the Roman Church was forced to bestir itself earnestly for its counteraction in the same form. This service was undertaken by the Neapolitan, CÆSAR BARONIUS, properly BARONIO, at the instance of his teacher, Philip Neri, in a very learned and acute work, on which he laboured for thirty years, till his death (A.D. 1607) with unwearied diligence, and for which he was rewarded with the dignity of a cardinal. His *Annales ecclesiastici*, which appeared first at Rome (1588—1607), and which have been since many times reprinted, as well as excerpted from, translated, and continued by other Italians, though with small skill, embrace in twelve folio volumes as many centuries, from the birth of Christ to the year 1198. They furnish from the papal archives, and from many libraries—in particular from the Vatican—a multitude of documents and public papers which were previously unknown, and contain so much that is valuable, with all their faults, that to this day it is not easy to dispense with them in a thorough course of study. The cardinal came forward with the feeling, that the first true church history was that offered by himself. He complains of Eusebius that he had favoured the Arians, of Socrates and Sozomen that they had favoured the Novatians, and of all his predecessors that they had gone to work without critical discrimination. The Magdeburg Centuries he styles up and down Centuries of Satan. He wrote in the interest unconditionally of the absolute Papacy, and endeavours to show that it was instituted by Christ, that it has remained always the same in doctrine and constitution, that the Reformation accordingly was an apostasy from the true Church, and an insurrection against the order of God. This purpose required however the help of many fictitious or corrupted facts and spurious documents, as well as the suppression or distortion, on the other hand, of important records. Hence he found opponents, not only among the Protestants, but among the Catholics also; above all, in the profoundly learned French Franciscan ANTON PAGI.

For single portions of church history, valuable collections of documents, and editions of older writers, distinguishing credit is due among the Italians to MURATORI, ZACCAGNI, ZACCARIA,

MANSI, and GALLANDI. The most genial and free-minded among the Italian church historians, is PAOLO SARPI (1623), from whom it is to be regretted that we have only a history of the Council of Trent.

§ 5. (2) *French Historians.*

The first merit, among the Catholic writers in this department, belongs collectively to the *French*, whose free position over against the Roman See has here been in their favour. The defence of the Gallican church freedom indeed served itself to call forth, in part, the most interesting and thorough investigations. In this view wrote first Bishop GODEAU, of Vence, in popular form (1685), coming down however only to the end of the 9th century, then the far more learned Dominican NATALIS ALEXANDER (*Noël*), whose work, in twenty-four volumes (1676—86), comes down to the year 1600. He defends, in direct opposition to Baronius, the rights of the Church and of the secular princes against the Popes, and declares the reformatory councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basel to be œcumenical; justifies still however the cruel persecutions of the Albigenses, and is full of zeal against the Protestant heretics. Innocent XI. prohibited this work, in 1684, under pain of excommunication; but thirty years later, Benedict XIII., also a Dominican, set it free again. In the year 1690, CLAUDE FLEURY, confessor of Louis XV., who lived however as an anchorite at Court, began the publication of his *Histoire ecclésiastique*, which reaches in twenty volumes to the year 1414, and was continued by FABRE, though with no inward vocation, down to the year 1595. Fleury writes diffusely and in the spirit of a monk, but with taste and skill, in mild temper and strong love for the Church and Christianity, and with a view always to edify as well as to instruct. He follows the order of time, though not slavishly, prefacing some of his volumes with general characteristics. He also defends antiquity and the Gallican ecclesiastical constitution, without however surrendering at all the credit of the Church, its general tradition, or the necessity of the Pope as its head. His principal concern is with doctrine, discipline, and practical piety. The spirited and eloquent bishop, BOSSUET, in his universal history (*Discours sur l'Histoire universelle*, 1681), which reaches from the creation to Charlemagne, exhibits religion and the Church as the soul and centre of all history. The Jansenist TILLEMONT pursued a new plan, composing a church history of the first six centuries, in sixteen

volumes (1693—1712), from original sources purely, with the most accurate and conscientious fidelity, and adding his learned investigations in the way of notes.

In addition, however, to these general works, great service has been rendered to the science by the learned monastic institutions of France, in single departments of church history, costly editions of the fathers, and other auxiliary apparatus. Special mention here is due to the St. Maur Benedictines, D'ACHERY, RUINART, MABILLON, MARTENE, DURAND, MONTFAUCON,* and to the Jesuits SIRMOND and PETAU (*Petavius*), who by his celebrated work *de theologicis dogmatibus* (1644—50) forms an epoch in dogmatic history.

§ 6. (3) German Historians.

Among the Catholics of *Germany*, an independent and free interest in church history began to show itself first in the Josephine period, but still more through the stimulus of Protestant theology; so that the most has been done there for the science recently. General works, though in part unfinished, have been furnished by ROYKO, DANNEMAYR, the well-known convert, Count STOLBERG,† RITTER, LOCHERER, HORTIG, ALZOG, DÖLLINGER; valuable monographs, by HURTER,‡ HEFELE, and others. The fullest inward call must be allowed in favour of the ingenious

* In the congregation of St. Maur, a complete system of studies prevailed. The general was authorized, in extensive literary enterprises, to assign their parts to the different members according to their talents and tastes, so that one collected material, another arranged, a third manufactured, a fourth finished off, a fifth took charge of the press, &c. Each was required to labour, without regard to his own credit, for the benefit of the world only, and the honour of the order. In many cases, the authors are not even named. By this co-operation of different scholars, who were at the same time free from all secular cares, and favoured with wealth and the most ample literary helps, vast works were produced, such as an academy of sciences even could hardly undertake. The best edition of the church fathers, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, &c., we owe to the diligence of the St. Maurists, which was not equalled, in a literary respect, by the Jesuits.

† HASE says of him strikingly, that he has written and *composed* (gedichtet) the history of the Jewish nation, as well as of the ancient Church, with the zeal, the unction, and unreserved devotion of a proselyte, but with a heart also full of enthusiasm and love.

‡ HURTER, it is true, when he wrote his learned and skilful work, (in four volumes) on Innocent III., was nominally still Reformed antistes in Schaffhausen; but the Roman Catholic tendency already shows itself, beyond all mistake in his unqualified praise of his hero, and of the age to which he belonged, as also in his strongly-marked partiality for a brilliant hierarchy and pompous ceremonial. It is plain everywhere, that with the author, in his blind infatuation for the Middle Ages, the dome of St. Peter stands higher than the manger of Bethlehem, and the decretals of the Popes than the word of God. His dissatisfaction with the moral insecurity of the present age, and the politico-religious distractions of his own country, decided and justified to his conscience finally a transition which was inwardly complete long before.

and pious MÖHLER († 1838), the greatest Roman Catholic theologian since Bellarmine and Bossuet. He has helped his Church again to self-consciousness, and breathed into it a new polemic zeal against Protestantism; although he betrays himself in truth throughout the influence, which the study of Protestant theology, especially that of Schleiermacher, and the whole modern culture, have exercised over his own idealistic apprehension and defence of the Roman dogmas and usages. He wrote indeed no church history; but his larger works (*Symbolik, Patristik, Athanasius M.*), and shorter tracts (as that on *Anselm, the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals, Gnosticism, Monasticism, &c.*), have to do almost all, more or less, with the historical sphere, particularly with the history of doctrines; and in freshness of spirit and vigorous animated style surpass all the writers now mentioned.

III. PROTESTANT HISTORIANS.

§ 7. *General Character of Protestant Historiography.*

With the Reformation of the sixteenth century commences a new era, as for the Church and theology in general, so also for our science in particular; yea, we may say that church history first became a free and independent science only by its means. The historian before was, so to speak, of one growth with his subject; but now he raised himself by reflection above it, and instead of accepting on mere authority whatever was catholic as at once true, and condemning everything non-catholic as false, began to subject the whole development of the Church itself to critical trial, making the word of God and common reason the measure of judgment, without regard to Papal decrees. This involved the possibility of a negative tendency, the contempt and rejection of all history, such as we meet with in Rationalism and among Sects; but at the same time the possibility also of such unprejudiced inquiry and free conviction, as should reconcile the subject in full with the objective course of God's kingdom, causing him to see in it the rational and necessary evolution of its inward sense or plan; and to this result the most important recent labours in church history would seem continually more and more to lead.

It required considerable time, however, to bring the Protestant science here to a clear perception of its mission, and it had itself to pass through different periods, which fall widely asunder from one another in the view taken of its object and proper method. We may distinguish five such

periods, the *orthox-polemic*, the *unchurchly pietistic*, the *pragmatic-supranaturalistic*, the *rationalistic*, and the *scientific*. Among these, the first and fourth are related to each other as extremes, the second and third as stages of transition from the position of church orthodoxy over to that of rationalism, while the fifth seeks to unite the advantages of all before, without their errors; falling itself again, however, into different schools, which makes it difficult to bring it under any general character.

§ 8. (1) *The Period of Polemic Orthodoxy.*

This embraces the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Reformers themselves did nothing directly for church history, save only as they gave it new interest and roused a new spirit of inquiry; which however must be allowed to be itself a very great merit. They were mainly occupied with the settlement of points of faith and the exposition of the Scriptures. Argument from the Scriptures alone, however, could not permanently satisfy. As the Catholics appealed continually to the Fathers, and declared the Reformation to be a novelty, which had no ground whatever in the past, it became an object with the Protestants to wrest the historical argument out of their hands, and to draw ecclesiastical antiquity to their own side. For that pure Christianity had disappeared from the earth, and again come to light only in the sixteenth century, they could not admit, in face of their Lord's promise to be with his church to the end of the world; and they wished to be counted also, not heretics, but true catholics. It was an apologetic interest, then, and their conflict with Rome, that urged the Protestants into the study of history. Of course, their first productions bore throughout, directly or indirectly, a polemic character.

The *Lutheran* church takes the lead; here too, not the moderate and irenical school of Melancthon, but that section which set itself stiffly against all attempts to come to an agreement with the Catholics and the Reformed, and which came to its symbolical expression afterwards in the Form of Concord. MATTHIAS FLACIUS, one of the most zealous controversialists of his age, composed (A.D. 1552) and onwards, while settled at Magdeburg, in connection with several rigid Lutheran divines (Wigand, Judex, Faber, Holthuter), and younger assistants, the celebrated *Centuriæ Magdeburgenses*, as the work is called, making use of published and unpublished sources for the purpose, with the liberality of princes and cities to support his undertaking. This work, which forms an epoch, exhibits in thirteen volumes

as many centuries of the Christian era, each century in sixteen sections, with the express design of justifying the Reformation and confuting the Papacy. The Centuries found such approval, that for a hundred years after it was counted sufficient to compile text-books out of their material and in their spirit. In the dogmatic works of the seventeenth century, however, particularly in GERHARD'S *Loci theologici*, and in QUENSTEDT'S *Theologia dogmatico-polemica*, we find collected, under the same controversial view, a vast mass of material for dogmatic history, which is still in part of great worth; while among works treating of single periods, the most important place belongs to SECKENDORF'S History of the Reformation.

In the *Reformed* church, JOHN H. HOTTINGER, of Zurich, proposed to furnish a counterpart to the Centuries. His work* shows great knowledge, particularly of the East, also order and love for truth, but is unequal, five volumes being given to the sixteenth century alone; and drags in much foreign matter, according to the taste which then prevailed, the history for instance of Jews, Pagans and Mahommedans, notices of remarkable natural phenomena, as foretoking the fortunes of the church, earthquakes, locusts, famines, floods, monstrosities, eclipses of the sun and moon, &c. FREDERICK SPANHEIM, of Leyden, grounded his *Summa historie eccl.* (A.D. 1689) on an accurate use of sources, and searching criticism, having in view also the confutation of Baronius. The two Frenchmen, JAMES BASNAGE,† minister at the Hague, and SAMUEL BASNAGE,‡ minister in Zütphen, wrote with controversial reference, the first to Bossuet, the last to Baronius, both proposing to show (but especially James), that the true church of Christ has never failed, and that it has had true witnesses at all times.

With far better success, however, the Reformed church, the French especially, cultivated during the seventeenth century, in controversy with the Roman Catholic theologians, *particular parts* of history, shedding light on patristic antiquity, the course of the Papacy, and the period of the Reformation, with profound learning and keen penetration, though not indeed without some controversial bias. Such monographies, still of great value in part, reflect credit on the names of HOSPINIAN and HEIDEGGER among the German Swiss; BEZA, DU PLESSIS MORNAY, PETER DU MOULIN, DAVID BLONDEL, JEAN DAILLE' (Dallæus), CL. SAUMAISE (Salmasius), JEAN CLAUDE, ISAAC BEAUSOBRE, among the French; Archbishop USHER, H. DODWELL, J. PEARSON, W. BEVERIDGE, GILBERT BURNET, JOSEPH

* In 9 vol. Tig. 1655-67.

† Histoire de l'Eglise depuis Jésus Chr. jusqu' à présent. Rotterd. 1699.

‡ Annales politico-ecclesiastici, &c. 1706, 3 voll. (reach only to A.D. 602).

BINGHAM, GEORGE BULL, W. CAVE, J. E. GRABE,* and later the Dissenter NATH. LARDNER, among the English, who directed their main attention to the government and antiquities of the church, with an eye to the Presbyterian controversy, as well as to that with Rome.

§ 9. (2) *The Pietistic Period.*

The next epoch after the Magdeburg Centuries was produced by GOTTFRIED ARNOLD (†1714), a friend and follower of SPENER, for a short time professor at Giessen, by his "Impartial History of the Church and of Heretics from the beginning of the New Testament to the year 1688" (Frankf. 1669 f.), which precisely reverses the principle that reigned before. Instead of the prevailing church, he made the *sects* rather to be the channel of progress for the Christian life, and is the historian accordingly of *unchurchly separatistic religion*. This grows out of the decided practical tendency of Pietism, and the resistance it suffered from Lutheran orthodoxy. Arnold placed the essence of Christianity in experimental personal piety, which seemed to him at home with the oppressed and persecuted minority, while the reigning visible church, Protestant as well as Catholic, was felt to be more or less an apostasy. The orthodox church historians of the seventeenth century also took part, indeed, with the Albigenses and Waldenses, with Wickliffe, Huss, and other "witnesses of the truth," in the Middle Ages, against the reigning Catholicism. Arnold, however, carried the same way of thinking back also into the first six centuries, or at least to the age of Constantine, as well as forward into the Protestant church; which of course made a very material difference. Still he could not carry out absolutely his own principle. Being a pious man, and holding fast to the essential doctrines of the Reformation, he stood more in harmony at bottom with the ancient church orthodoxy, than with the Gnostics, Arians, Pelagians, and other such sects, although he espoused their cause as far as possible. Thus bent on showing fair play, however, as no historian before, to all sorts of heretics and schismatics, particularly to the Mystics, for whom he had a special predilection, Arnold fell into the most gross wrong towards the representatives of orthodoxy, ascribing to them the basest motives, and aspersing their character in every possible way; so that his work, in contradiction to its own title, is a passionate party interest against the Catholics, and still more against the orthodox Protestants, most of all the Lutheran church. It makes a most gloomy impression, and is adapted to upset all faith in one holy apostolical church, to

* A German Lutheran originally, who passed over to the Episcopal church (†1711).

undermine confidence in God's presence in history, and in the ultimate triumph of good, and to promote in this way a hopeless scepticism. Many Pietists indeed were highly pleased with the History of Heretics, and the celebrated THOMASIVS, of Halle, who stands half way between Pietism and the "Aufklärung," proclaimed it the best of books next to the Bible. SPENER however was by no means satisfied with it, and the orthodox Lutherans, CYPRIAN, for instance, VEIEL, CORVINUS, GÖTZ, LÖSCHER, FAUSTKING, WACHTER, exposed a mass of perversions and errors in it, matching its intemperance in some cases however with the intemperate passion of their replies.*

Arnold, at all events, has the merit of having introduced a new way of looking at the sects, and of having laid special stress on the relation of church history to the purposes of piety. He was the first, also, who wrote in the German language instead of the Latin, though in that tasteless periwig style, it must be confessed, full of half and whole Latinisms, which characterizes the period after Mitz down to Bodmer, and makes it the most gloomy in the history of German literature.

By the side of Arnold may be placed, in some sense, the later English historian JOSEPH MILNER († 1797), a pious minister of the English Episcopal Church. His Church History, in five volumes, reaches to the Reformation, on which he is specially full, and follows the current division by centuries. He too saw in the sects, even in the Paulicians and Catharists, the main bearers of piety, and in the Middle Ages accordingly, which find very poor favour at his hands, by far the most room is given to the Waldenses. He, too, wrote for edification, in the spirit of Methodistical piety, which is intimately related to that of the Pietists, though it has less sympathy with the inward contemplative life and the different forms of mysticism. Greatly surpassed by Arnold in learning and original research, Milner excels him, on the other hand, in popular style and in fairness towards the reigning Church of the first six centuries. Pope Gregory the Great, for example, fares much better in his hands. His aim, moreover, is *exclusively* practical, leading him thus to pass over entirely all subjects that serve not the purpose of edification, after his own narrow view, such as church government, most theological controversies, the scholastic and mystical divinity, sacred art and learning. He proposes to exhibit only the spiritual *life of the invisible church*.† Milner's work accord-

* These writings may be found quoted in the third volume of J. G. WALCH'S *Bibliotheca Theologica selecta*, Jenæ. p. 129, sqq. They appear at large, with replies and illustrations, in the third volume of the Schaffhausen edition of Arnold's History (1742).

† Or as he himself says in his introduction: "Nothing but what appears to me to belong to Christ's kingdom shall be admitted, *genuine piety is the only thing which I*

ingly is almost entirely free from controversy, which abounds with Arnold, and is so far much better suited for practical and popular use, a work still worthy, indeed, of recommendation. Nay, we may even say that it was the best church history of *this* sort, till NEANDER again raised into credit the interest of practical Piety, the truth in Pietism and Methodism, only on a vastly more liberal scale indeed, and with immensely greater knowledge, without consigning other interests for this reason to omission or neglect.

§ 10. (3) *The Pragmatic Supranaturalistic Period.*

The third form of Protestant church history here named, resulted from the conjunction of the two previous principles, the Old Orthodox and the Pietistic. By *supranaturalism* in the historical sense,* we understand the last outshoot of the Protestant orthodoxy, that tendency, namely, in theology, which, under the influence of Pietism and Liberal Christianity, relaxed considerably from the strict and exclusive orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, took refuge in the Bible simply instead of the church symbols, and in a number of its representatives approached itself, the very threshold of Rationalism. The church historians also of this period accordingly, including some who date before the proper supranaturalism, show no longer the old stiffness and severity; confessional controversy and horror of heretics, in whom Arnold had found so much good to celebrate, fall more and more into the back ground, and make room for a

intend to celebrate." He was right so far in styling his work "An Ecclesiastical History on a New Plan." How one-sided his views of piety were, however, may be seen in his judgment, for instance, of Tertullian, of whom he says: "Were it not for some light which he throws on the state of Christianity in his own times, he would scarcely deserve to be distinctly noticed. I have seldom seen so large a collection of tracts, all professedly on Christian subjects, containing so little matter for useful instruction." (Vol. I. Boston ed. p. 220.) When, on the other hand, he exalts Cyprian so high, defends him against the reproaches of Mosheim, and places him far above Origen, he is inconsistent with himself, since Cyprian was formed throughout on Tertullian's writings, making them his daily food, and contributed more than any of the older fathers to the development of the principle of Catholicism, the hierarchy in particular. He was in fact the first who saw in the Roman See the *cat'hedra Petri*, and the centre of church unity (*unde unitas sacerdotialis exorta est*), or at least the first who distinctly spoke of it in this way. Augustine, Anselm, and Bernard, Milner owns as truly pious men, and dwells upon them with delight; but still he presents them only on one side, so far, namely, as they seem to agree with *his own* theory of religion; their decidedly Catholic features, he either overlooks altogether, or else treats them as accidental, merely outward appendages, which are to be excused in them on the ground of the reigning spirit of their age, whereas, in truth, they enter most intimately and influentially into their whole system of teaching and manner of life.

* For in the doctrinal and philosophical sense the old orthodoxy, and every Christian theology, indeed, is also supranaturalistic; that is, it rests upon the view that Christianity is a supernatural revelation; while Rationalism allows no such revelation, either declaring it impossible, or else in its undue estimate of man's powers, his reason in particular, holding it to be of no use.

conciliatory irenical spirit, of which an example had been previously given, in several monographies, by CALIXTUS, that man so actively persecuted by the orthodox zealots of the 17th century. The effort prevails to do justice to all parties; and, in truth, the works of a Mosheim, Schröckh and Walch must be allowed the praise of an *impartiality*, which belonged to neither of the schools before noticed. This virtue, however, it must be owned, loses itself at times in doctrinal indifference and latitudinarianism. We style the period *Pragmatic*, in view of its reigning method. It had come to be required of the historian, namely, from the time of Mosheim and Walch, that he should proceed pragmatically; that is, that he should not simply relate events, but investigate also their causes psychologically in the secret springs and inclinations of the human heart, for the purpose of making history practically useful. This gave the treatment of it a very subjective character, especially in time, under the hands of the Rationalists, the reference of events being for the most part to very external, accidental, and arbitrary causes, as their supposed principle and reason. In the diligent explanation of these subjective factors, sight was lost of the claims of the objective idea, and, in the end, of the highest and most sacred power in history, the all-ruling providence of God, the spirit of Jesus Christ immanent in his own Church.

Here it is to be remarked, that since the middle of the last century our science has been cultivated and advanced almost exclusively in Germany, by the Lutheran or more lately the United Evangelical Church especially, whilst in other Protestant countries it has made no progress whatever.

Among works of a universal character is to be mentioned first, CHR. E. WEISMANN'S *Introductio in memorabilia ecclesiastica historię sacrę N. T. &c.* (Tübingen, 1718), distinguished for its pious, mild spirit, its quiet, moderate tone, its predilection for the school of Spener and the better Mystics, and its regard to practical ends in the selection of its matter. He was soon eclipsed, however, by the celebrated chancellor of Göttingen, JOHN LAWRENCE VON MOSHEIM († 1755), who holds the first place among the church historians generally of the last century. His *Institutiones historię ecclesiasticę* (Helmstadt, 1755), in four books, translated into German also, and continued by SCHLEGEL and VON ENIM, gained in England and North America a still greater authority than in Germany, being used even to this day as a text-book in most Seminaries. But little known, on the other hand, out of Germany, are his valuable monographies on the Period before Constantine, on the History of Heretics, (the Ophites, Apostle-Brethren, Michael Servetus,) and his *Institutiones H. E. Majores*, of which, however, only the

first volume (Sæc. I.) was published. Mosheim distinguishes himself in all these works by his thorough use of sources, his critical acuteness, his large culture and knowledge of men, his bold combinatory skill, at times inordinate, his power of historical contemplation, and his mastery beyond all his predecessors and contemporaries, of a clear, tasteful, and agreeable style, both Latin and German. The practical element, on the other hand, falls with him into the background. He, too, takes the side of heretics frequently; not, however, by praising them enthusiastically and heaping reproaches on their orthodox adversaries, like Arnold, but with calm and dignified criticism, showing the sense and inward connection of their systems; as he was the first, for instance, who felt in the Gnostic speculations the presence of the deep sense which they derive from the philosophy of an older time. It is strange that he did not abandon the current division by centuries, and that he should have adopted so mechanical an arrangement as that of external and internal, prosperous and adverse events. His contemporary PRAFF of Tübingen, was equally learned, indeed; but his *Institutiones* are not so clearly and interestingly written, and are too much burdened with citations. The indefatigable scholar, S. J. Baumgarten, brought down his "Abstract of Church History" only to the end of the ninth century. COTTA's "New Testament Church History in detail" (1768-73), remained also incomplete. The most extensive work from this school, showing also its gradual transition over into latitudinarianism and rationalism, is the "Church History" of J. M. SCHRÖCKH, Prof. in Wittenberg (†1808), which makes, with TZSCHIRNER's continuation, forty-five volumes, and was published between the years 1768 and 1810. In spite of its wearisome diffuseness, its want of right proportion, and its wholly injudicious method, it is still invaluable for its faithful transcriptions from the original authorities, and will long remain a real mine of historical learning. Smaller text-books were published by SCHRÖCKH, SPITTLER and STÄUDLIN, the last in the interest of Kant's moral philosophy. J. F. Roos wrote popularly for a larger public.

After these general works, however, a number of others deserve honourable mention, produced by Lutheran theologians in the service of particular parts of church history. J. A. CRAMER, chancellor, in the end, of the university of Kiel (†1788), in his continuation of Bossuet's Universal History, has thoroughly investigated the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and was the next German, after Mosheim, who wrote history with elegance and force in his vernacular tongue. J. GEORGE WALCH, Prof. in Jena (†1775), and still more his son, W. FRANCIS WALCH, Prof. in Göttingen (†1784), belong to the most industrious,

solid, and honest inquirers who have ever lived. The last gave himself mainly to the history of heresies, divisions, and religious controversies, and his work on this field, in eleven parts, is still indispensable. He occupies Lutheran ground fully indeed in his own mind, but shows no polemic zeal, being conscientiously intent throughout on understanding, and representing his sources, in a critical pragmatic way, without sympathy or antipathy. The historical sense is already so far matured with him, that he cannot conceive of history without change, while he distinguishes properly between the immutability of the Christian truth itself and the changing form of its apprehension among men. He lacks, however, organic sense and graphic life. The elder PLANCK († 1833), who has immortalized himself especially by his learned and able history of Protestant Doctrine,* stands at the extreme end of this school, where it is just ready to pass over into Rationalism. He carries the subjective view, pragmatism, to its highest pitch, and sees in history already the dry theatre only of human interests and passions. To the contents of the doctrinal strifes which he relates, he holds himself quite indifferent; his interest in them is not religious or theological, but psychological only and formal.† With such indifference to church doctrine, it is truly marvellous indeed that such a man should expend so much toilsome study and learned industry on subjects so "fully antiquated" as the theological contentions of the 16th and 17th centuries. Of course this work, with all its great and enduring merits, could not fail to have a bad effect, in assisting to sunder the doctrinal consciousness of its age, fully from the position of the older church orthodoxy, and to justify such rupture also as an imaginary progress or advance.

The Reformed church produced, in this period, but one work of considerable size, the *Institutiones h. eccl. V. et N. T.* of the learned Hollander, VENEMA, carefully drawn from the sources and reaching down to the year 1600. It had become the fashion in Holland, from the time of Cocceius, to place church

* Six volumes, 2nd ed. 1791—1800.

† Comp. e. g. his preface to Vol. IV., which brings him to the dogmatico-historical part of his work, where he candidly allows, p. 6, that the subject is one in which even the theological public of his time can hardly take any more a real interest, inasmuch as most of the doctrinal questions about which our fathers contended, "have lost for our present theology not only the importance once attached to them on their own account, but even the negative interest which their history had for the spirit of our age formerly, in its gradually ripening and advancing aversion to them. Ten years ago it might have dwelt upon them with some interest, since ten years ago it had not still cleared itself of their power. . . . Now, however, this bond also is gone. A wholly new theology is founded. Not only those forms, but many also of the old fundamental ideas, are left behind. There is no fear besides that the spirit of our theology can ever return of itself, or be forced back thither, and they are viewed accordingly as an indifferent antiquation." No Rationalist could well express himself more unfavourably on the doctrinal controversies of the church.

history in close connection with the exposition of the Scriptures, especially of the Apocalypse, where the picture of Popery was seen clear as the sun, also with systematic theology, which, of course, destroyed its independence as a science and put an end to its progress. The popular and edifying work of the English MILNER has been already noticed. Smaller text-books, good in their kind, were furnished by the Genevan divine, TURRETIN, A.D. 1734, by P. E. JABLONSKY, professor in Frankfort on the O., A.D. 1755, and by MUNSCHER, professor in Marburg, A.D. 1804. The last has still more reputation from his Dogmatic History, but belongs rather of right already, like Planck, to the Rationalistic school, to which we now pass.

§ 11. (4) *The Rationalistic Period.*

Arnold's *unchurchly* view of history, and his defence of all sorts of heretics and schismatics, as well as the confessional laxness and doctrinal indifference of the last representatives of the Supranaturalistic school, had already prepared the way fully for Rationalism; so that we are forced to admit for this a certain historical necessity. While however Pietism loved the sects for their real or supposed piety, Rationalism was pleased with them for their heresies, and the dogmatic indifference of a Planck and Munscher advanced into formal hostility against the doctrine and faith of the church.

Now Arius with his denial of Christ's divinity was right against Athanasius, Pelagius with his doctrine of an undepraved human will against Augustine, the Paulicians, Catharists, &c., against Catholicism, the Socinians against the Reformers, the Arminians against the synod of Dort, the Deists against the English church. They were, in truth, only congenial forerunners of Rationalism, in its contest with the church doctrine, nay, in the end, with the revelation of God in the Bible itself. For the unprejudiced must allow that, at least, the main substance of the church doctrine is grounded in the Bible; and hence Rationalism in its last phases has rejected, consistently, not only the material principle of Protestantism, but its formal principle also, taking for the source and measure of truth and faith, or of unbelief rather, instead of God's word, human reason (thus *Rationalism*), and this not as it actuates history and the church, but the subjective reason of the reigning spirit of its own age, at bottom the every-day finite understanding, what we call "common sense" in its baldest form. This tendency is constitutionally unhistorical in full; it takes no interest in history as such, but only the negative satisfaction of practising upon it its own destructive criticism. It denies the objective forces of history, and expels out of it, not only Satan, who is for

it the phantom only of a superstitious, heated fancy, but what is, of course, far more serious, God himself, changing it thus into an eyeless monster, a labyrinth of human perversions, caprices and passions. All is referred to a subjective ground. Rationalism fancies itself to have grasped the greatest and most lofty facts, when it derives them out of the most accidental and external, or even the most common and ignoble causes and motives; the doctrine of Christ's divinity, for instance, and of the Holy Trinity, from the active fancy and Platonism of the Greek fathers; the evangelical doctrines of sin and grace, from Augustine's restless metaphysics; the papacy of the Middle Ages, from the trick of the false Isidorian decretals and the ambition of the "rascal" Hildebrand; the Reformation from the pecuniary embarrassment of Leo X., and the impudence of Tetzel; Luther's view of the Lord's Supper, from his own stiff and stubborn humour, &c. This way of looking at history, so supremely subjective, not only cast censure on God, as having made the world so badly that it went to ruin in his hands, or as having no more care of its history than a watchmaker for a watch long since finished and sold, affording rich matter thus for full scepticism and *nihilism*; but it put, at the same time, the greatest possible dishonour on our human nature also, which was robbed in this way of all its dignity and higher worth. That so much diligence and learning should have been expended still on so heartless a work would be incomprehensible, were it not explained by the interest of opposing the church, and the indomitable tendency of the German mind to theory and speculation.*

And yet Rationalism, on the other side, has also its undeniable merits, in regard to church history. In the first place, it has exercised the boldest criticism, setting many things thus in a new light, and opening the way for a more free and unprejudiced judgment. Then, again, it served to advance the conception of history itself, though rather in a merely negative way. Almost all earlier historians, Protestant as well as Catholic, saw movement and change only in the history of *heresies*, while they regarded the church doctrine as something once for all done, fixed and unchangeable, a view which cannot possibly stand before impartial inquiry. For although Christianity itself, the divine plan of salvation, is always the same and needs no change, the same thing cannot be affirmed at all of its apprehension in the different ages of the church, as is sufficiently

* The greatest *English* master of history, however, GIBBON († 1794), in his celebrated *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, has also often noticed the history of the early church, and with a bitterness too towards Christianity, with which hardly any German Rationalist can be charged.

shown at once by the great distinction of Catholicism and Protestantism, and in this last again by the differences of Lutheranism, Zwinglianism and Calvinism. Rationalism now saw, however, in the church as well as in the sects, change, movement, alteration, and prepared the way thus for that idea of organic development which lies at the ground of the latest German style of history. Still it went not beyond this vague notion of change. It overlooked in it wholly the truth contained in the old view, namely, that there is something enduring also with all this change, and that the church in the midst of it remains always in her inmost life one with herself. Church history became, under its hands, a storm-lost vessel, without helmsman or rudder, a wild chaos, without unity or living order, the play of chance, without any divine plan or definite end. It knew of no such development, as proceeds by necessary, rational laws, remains in its progress identical with itself, preserves the sum of every preceding stage, and though it be through many obstructions and much opposition, and in perpetual conflict with the kingdom of evil, makes its way still forward, always towards a better state. Rather it took the course of history for a steady deterioration, or more accurately speaking for a process of continuous rarefaction and dilution, in which the church loses her doctrinal and religious substance more and more, till at last the age of Illumination makes the happy discovery that the whole of Christianity may be resolved at last into a few commonplace moral maxims and notions of virtue.

The man by whom this great revolution in the idea and treatment of church history was mainly brought about, and who deserves with full right the title, father of neology, was JOHN SOLOMON SEMLER, professor of Theology in Halle († 1791). He had been educated in the bosom of an anxious and pedantic Pietism, and retained from this his "private piety," which he held to be independent of all theory, and in virtue of which he opposed the appointment of the notorious Bahrdt, and wrote against the Wolfenbüttel Fragments. To Arnold's "*Ketzer-historie*" he was early indebted for a considerable amount of dislike to orthodoxy and partiality for heretics, to Bayle's Dictionary for all sorts of doubts, and to his preceptor Baumgarten for the conviction, that the church doctrine as it then stood, "had by no means carried always the same form." His own studies showed him more and more, that all is flow and motion, all in transition or past, that every time has its particular veins and modes of thought, a consciousness of its own, into which a man must set himself beforehand in order to understand it. He was endowed with a rare inventive quickness, but without system or method, tasteless in style, unsteady and impulsive,

the very embodiment, indeed, of his own favourite notion of change. With gigantic diligence, and insatiable curiosity, he traversed the most retired works of history, particularly too the Middle Ages, everywhere trying to see if things might not be different from the common previous acceptation. Everywhere he made new discoveries, and roused the spirit of inquiry, without however bringing anything solid and enduring to pass.* His whole activity is merely preparatory, laying the ground, an agitation of all possibilities, a perpetual raising of doubts and suspicions, conjectures and combinations, a vast working up of material. His writings on dogmatic history resemble an unbroken field that is yet to be tilled, a building place where, amid rubbish and ruins, the materials for a new edifice lie still in endless confusion.†

The most characteristic and energetic work from Semler's school, is HENKE's "General History of the Christian Church" in eight parts (1788 ff.). He aims mainly to show the mischief which religious despotism and doctrinal constraint, as he supposes, have produced everywhere through all ages, and presents a flaring, keenly sarcastic picture of enthusiasm, superstition, stupidity and wickedness. VATER, in his continuation and fifth edition of the work, has softened considerably its sharp features, and breathed into it a more kindly spirit.

After Henke and others had thus let out their hatred towards the ecclesiastical past, in full measure, there succeeded a complete indifference to the religious import of church history. In such spirit SCHMIDT of Giessen compiled his instructive work, continued by RETTBERG, purely from original sources. DANZ pursued a similar course.

They were all surpassed, however, by GIESELER, in the skill of his extracts and his judicious criticism. In his indispensable though yet unfinished Church History, Rationalism appears still more cool, and falls into the background behind the interest of learned inquiry and purely objective narration.

§ 12. (5) *The Scientific Period.*

As different causes, the English Deism, the French Materialisms, the Popular Philosophy of Wolff, Kant's Criticism, &c., conspired to raise the vulgar Rationalism, towards the close of the

* Of his 171 works, hardly one is now read, except by historians of profession. They comprise among much else, treatises also on the habit of snails in winter, and on making gold, his interest in which however was owing not simply to his literary errantry, but as Tholuck at least suspects (*Vermischte Schriften*, Th. II. S. 82.) to his devotion to the god Pluto.

† Thus is he described very characteristically by Dr. F. C. BAUR, who himself greatly resembles him in many things. (*Lehrb. d. Christl. Dogmengesch.* 1847, S. 40.)

last century, into general power, so men like Herder, Hamann, Jacobi, the Romantic School, and still more Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel, contributed each his part to overcome it scientifically, and to make room for a theology full of spirit and faith. Thus begins the fifth and last period of Protestant church historiography, in which we ourselves still stand. This has done vastly more than any other for the advancement of the science, both materially and formally. In Germany, during the last thirty years, an active emulation has displayed itself in this sphere, as in science generally; whose results will yet long be felt, and redound to the benefit also of other nations.* Here we must distinguish, 1. Works embracing the whole range of church history, as besides that of GEISELER already named, those of NEANDER, ENGELHARDT, HASE, SCHLEIERMACHER (published after his death, from manuscript sketches), GUERICKE, NIEDNER, GFRÖRER; 2. Such as relate to dogmatic history, as those of BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, ENGELHARDT, HAGENBACH, BAUR; and finally, 3. The almost countless monographies, devoted to a single dogma, or to some one branch of church polity, or worship, or Christian life, or to an important individual, or to a particular period, or to a national church. The relation of the general works to the special is that of reciprocal completion. The first, as *Dr. Kliefoth* strikingly observes,† have a double task: "first to go before the monographies and show the chasms that still need to be filled by such special labour; and then again to come after the monographies, and incorporate their results properly into the living organism of history."

The latest style of history may be designated formally *scientific*, inasmuch as its leading representatives at least, in distinction from the mode before prevalent, propose always to *comprehend* truly the events, ruling ideas and actions of a period, and to unfold them before the eyes of their readers just as they have had place. The object is not merely to know *what* has been and come to pass, but also *how* it has come to pass. To be a historian, it is no longer enough to collect learned material, however faithfully, in an outward and aggregate way, nor yet, in the pragmatic style, to investigate psychologically the simply

* WINER, in the first supplement to his *Manual of Theological Literature*, mentions not less than five hundred works pertaining to the sphere of church history, which appeared in two years only (between 1839 and 41). In addition to this, the theological journals of Germany, such as Ilgen's "*Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*," Ullmann's and Umbreit's "*Studien und Kritiken*," contain a multitude of historical tracts; while almost all the later exegetical and dogmatic works are interwoven with rich historical material throughout. More on this point may be found in the first section of the author's tract, "*What is Church History?*,"

† In Reuter's *Repertorium* for 1845, p. 106, where the reader will find several instructive and spirited essays from the pen of Kliefoth, on "the later ecclesiastical historiography of the German Evangelical Church."

subjective causes and motives of events; but he is bound now to apprehend history as *spirit* and *life*, and this as *rational* spirit, the manifestation of *eternal, divine ideas*, and so to reproduce it also in a spiritual and living way. Only thus can the study or the exhibition of church history have a deep and abiding interest. For it is spirit only that can speak to spirit, and life only that can produce life. But all life is essentially process, development, which runs through different stages, ascends always to a higher position, and yet remains identical with itself, so that the end is only the full evolution of the beginning. Church history thus becomes also an organism, springing from the person of Jesus Christ, as the author and progenitor of the new humanity, extending itself outwardly and inwardly always more widely, engaged in perpetual conflict with sin and error from without and from within, moving forward through all sorts of difficulty and hindrance, and still surely tending always towards a definite end. This idea of *organic development* unites what is true in the Orthodox notion of something constant and unchangeable in church history, with what is true also in the Rationalistic notion of a perpetual movement and flow, and is the only view that makes room for any deep apprehension of the life of Christianity in time. It is a rich gain, never to be given up, which we owe to the later German Philosophy since Schelling, and which the most opposite schools of our time, those of Neander and Baur, though under different modification, alike appropriate to their use. With this view of church history, as an inwardly correct whole, pervaded with a common blood and reaching towards a common end, is intimately associated as a further characteristic of the works in general now noticed, the spirit of genuine *catholicity* and *impartiality*. They show a like interest in almost all the portions of this vast organism, the fulness of whose inward life is thus unfolded in the flow of time; though with due subordination, of course, of the less essential and important, always, to what is of main significance and weight. Christianity is not shaped on the last of a fixed human formula; its own inward boundless and inexhaustible fulness is acknowledged. A Neander kisses the footprints of the Lord, and bows before his Spirit, wherever he finds him, and he finds him of right in all ages and among all nations, though it be with widely different displays of his glory. Church history is now more regarded from a central and universal position, and is exhibited *sine ira et studio*, for its own sake, and just as God has allowed it to come to pass. A one-sided apologetic and polemic interest is no longer suffered to prevail, allowing only a troubled view of the Saviour's majestic person through the coloured spectacles of a particular sect or party, but the

spirit of truth is followed without bias, under the conviction that the boundless life of the Church can be fully represented only through the collective Christianity of all periods, nations, and persons, and with the persuasion that the truth finds its best justification in the simple dispassionate exhibition of its own historical course. In this respect, in general, the spirit of the later evangelical theology of Germany is already raised, principally, above the existing divisions of Christendom, and occupies the position of a union, which carries in itself the pledge of its own full accomplishment in time to come. The later church history in fact, as is already shown by many works of the popular sort, among which BÖHRINGER's Biographies are the most thorough, will win thus a practical influence on life, and from the old foundations of the Church sketch forth the plan for its new structure.

These merits do not hold indeed of all later works, and still less of all in the same degree. In a theological view especially the difference among them is considerable. Looking away from those theologians who present no distinct theological character,* or who belong still in substance to a former period,† we meet mainly two schools, which are related to each other partly in the way of complement, but still more in the way of antagonism, with equal claims to spirit and learning; that, namely, of SCHLEIERMACHER and NEANDER, to which belong in a wide sense such men as HOSSBACH, RHEINWALD, LIEBNER, VOGT, SEMISCH, HENRY, PIPER, JACOBI, BINDEMANN, and others; and that of HEGEL, which however falls again into two essentially different branches, the one *unchurchly* and *destructive*, with BAUR at its head, the other *churchly* and *conservative*, of which DORNER may be taken as the most learned representative. In attempting briefly to characterize these tendencies, we will not forget the personal respect and gratitude we owe to their leaders, *Neander*, *Dorner*, and even *Baur* himself, who were all formerly our teachers, the first at the close, the other two at the commencement, of our university studies.

* As for instance ENGELHARDT, who in his thoroughly learned historical investigations makes it his business simply to report, with scrupulous exactness and monotony, from the sources, withholding all judgment of his own. NIEDNER's "Geschichte d. Christl. Kirche," too (1846), with its strange terminology, offers us no clear theory. Its value consists mainly in the richness of its single views.

† As GUERICKE, where he is independent, falls back to the polemic method of the 17th century. GFRÖRER is, in the commencement of his work, rather rationalizing, afterwards catholicizing. The manuals of HASE and HAGENBACH, full of spirit and taste, remind us often of Herder's humanism, the tinge of which is more æsthetical with the first, more practical with the other.

§ 13. *Neander and his School.*

NEANDER has himself admirably described his immortal work, when, on his first presentation of it to the public,* he declared it to be the grand aim of his life to exhibit the history of the Church, "as a speaking argument of the divine power of Christianity, as a school for Christian experience, a voice of edification, doctrine and warning, sounding through all centuries for all who are willing to hear." Like Spener and Franke, he looks upon theology as a business of the heart, and has chosen for his motto accordingly the words: *Pectus est quod theologum facit*. This causes the treatment of history of itself to assume a practical and edifying character, and to turn with preference to the revelations of the interior religious life, the actings of Christ's Spirit in his genuine followers, whilst those relations in which the Church touches the world and its politics are less, and often indeed quite too little, regarded. Neander has served thus by his writings to bring thousands of youth to Christ, and has contributed largely to the revival of religious life in Germany. His religion however is by no means of the narrow pietistic sort, but possesses rather a broad and liberal character, which owns sympathy with the most different forms of the Christian spirit, shows great leniency of judgment, often perhaps too great, even towards heretical aberrations, while however it finds most delight in contemplative inward tendencies like that of John. As little is he opposed in any way to science, being distinguished rather for profound inquiry, and a great talent for the organic exposition of different theological systems. Hence dogmatic history fills a very considerable space in his work, especially in the patristic period, where he feels most at home and has been most extensive in his studies. His scientific position in theology may be characterized as that of *subjectivity*, which belongs to the Schleiermacherian system in general, making it just the contrary pole to Catholicism, in which the individual is absorbed by the general spirit. We do not mean by this that Neander wholly loses sight of the objective forces of history; on the contrary, he speaks very frequently of universal spiritual tendencies, revealing themselves in individuals; and the contrasts of idealism and realism, rationalism and supranaturalism, dialectic understanding and mystical contemplation, belong to the standing categories of his historical thinking. But he refers these tendencies themselves to a psychological basis only, to the peculiarity of the human nature, still in a certain sense thus to a simply subjective ground. The predominant view

* In the Preface to the first volume, 1st ed. in 1825.

with him is, that the kingdom of God forms itself out of individuals, and so in some sense up from below, and that, as Schleiermacher once says, "the doctrine of the Church is composed from the opinions of single Christians." No theologian has had so high a conception of the worth of the person, so fine a feeling for individual peculiarity, as Schleiermacher; and what he brings out thus in a more speculative and doctrinal way, is turned to account historically by Neander. Hence he so often urges the thought, that Christianity, the heaven which is destined to pervade our entire humanity, does not destroy the natural capacities and peculiarities of men, but only purifies and sanctifies them; hence his great concern to secure for the personal, the individual and particular, the acknowledgment of its full right; hence the powerful impulse given by him mainly, also, through his monographies on Julian the Apostate, Tertullian, Chrysostom, Bernard of Clairvaux, to the culture of ecclesiastical biography, that most valuable species of literature, in which the mirror of a single great personality is made to reflect in concrete view the spirit and sense of a whole age.

Just in this preponderance, however, which is allowed to the subjective interest, is found, along with its strength, the weakness also of the Schleiermacher-Neandrian school. It has an excessive sensibility, where the rights of the individual are laid under limit for the sake of the general welfare, and an undue repugnance towards all law, the distinct assertion of the principle of authority, whether in theory or in practice. In all this it sees at once "bondage to the letter," the "mechanism of forms," "dry scholasticism," "symbololatry," and the like. It does not always distinguish sufficiently the idea of freedom from that of vagueness and arbitrariness, and seems at times to forget that true liberty can prosper only in the sphere of authority, the individual only in due subjection to the general or universal. Christianity and churchdom are taken by it more or less for opposites, which explains how it is that the Rationalists have affected to find an ally in Neander, in their war upon the dogma of inspiration and confessional orthodoxy, although the fundamental principle of their theology is totally different. We cannot deny, therefore, that over against these faults a relative and partial right belongs, in a scientific respect, to the Hegelian scholasticism, in a practical respect, to the unionistic church tendency of Hengstenberg's "Kirchenzeitung," and the rigid Lutheranism of a Harless, Rudelbach and Guericke, particularly in these times of fluctuation, dis-traction and disorder.

§ 14. *Baur and his School. Logical Pantheism.*

In direct opposition to the Neandrian method of history, stands the new *Tübingen* school, in the most close connection with the *Hegelian Philosophy*. This philosophy, which properly carries out only and completes on all sides the principal views of Schelling, is characterized primarily in distinction from Schleiermacher just by its objective spirit. It was in a certain sense a philosophy of restoration, in full antagonism to the revolutionary, self-sufficient "aufklärung" of the previous century. In arbitrary self-will it opposed the earnestness of law, to subjective opinion the general reason, as being alone true. History throughout is, for it, something essentially rational, not the sport of accident and caprice; it sees in it, everywhere, the movement of higher powers, not indeed the Holy Ghost in the biblical sense, but a rational world spirit, that makes use of single men for the accomplishment of its plans. Christianity is recognized by Hegel as the absolute religion, whilst he ascribes to the ideas of the Incarnation and the Trinity, in a sense very different it is true from the church doctrine, a deep philosophical truth, comprehending for instance the whole universe, external nature as well as the human spirit, under his trinitarian view. These general principles, however, allowed room for wholly opposite tendencies, accordingly as true objective forces, from which the process of history according to Hegel, is derived and constituted, might be taken to be essential realities or mere abstract conceptions, accordingly as a living faith in Christianity or a one-sided philosophical interest might lead the way. We notice first the destructive tendency, which has proceeded from the pantheistic elements in Hegel's system.

Dr. FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR of Tübingen, a man of imposing learning, bold criticism, surprising power of combination, and restless productivity, but we may say too philosophical to be a true historian, and too historical to be an original philosopher, has founded within the last twenty years a formal school, which in the negation of the positive has gone still further than the vulgar Rationalism, and brought forth a wholly new view of primitive Christianity. *Baur* is totally destitute of the fairest ornament of the Neandrian style of history, its active sense, namely, for living, practical Christianity. He is a pure theorist, and a true representative thus of a leading disease among German scholars, the one-sided unpractical intellectualism of the study. He has confined himself, accordingly, almost altogether to the history of *doctrines*, and particularly to such as possess a philosophical in-

terest. Thus he has investigated Manichæism, Gnosticism,* the history of the dogma of the Atonement, still more the dogma of the Trinity and the Incarnation, (in three large volumes,) and produced works which make an epoch in their way, and altogether are uncommonly suggestive and instructive. Such dogmatico-historical monographies fall in with his taste much more than biographies, which require a living interest in real persons. Besides this, he has written a great many tracts on primitive Christianity, in which the process (applied by his more consistent disciple, Dr. DAVID FR. STRAUSS, to the Life of Jesus, so as to turn the evangelical miracles into a mythical picture of the idea of the Messiah, as it grew from the unconscious imagination of the early church) is so tried upon the history of the apostles and the age following, as wholly to revolutionize the view previously taken of the two first centuries. This new construction of early Christian unity appears most fully in BAUR'S "*Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ*" (1845), and in SCHWEGLER'S "*Age after the Apostles*" (1846). Christianity as we now have it is here taken to be a product first, from the middle of the second century. In the mind of Jews and the first Christians it existed simply as a perfected Judaism, or Ebionitism, or, what is counted much the same, in the form of Petrinism. Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles, first emancipated Christianity from Judaism, and apprehended it as a peculiar and new system. Of the thirteen epistles, however, which are ascribed to him, only four are genuine, that, namely, to the Romans, that to the Galatians, and the two to the Corinthians; the rest were fabricated, and put forth under his name, in the second century. The Acts of the Apostles, falsely ascribed to Luke, is written from an apologetic position, and misrepresents the apostle of the Gentiles. It is proposed, namely, to defend him against the reproaches of the Jewish party, and this is done by bringing Paul as nearly as possible to Peter, that is, to Jewish Christianity, in the second part, and Peter as nearly as possible to Paul, that is, to the free position of Gentile Christianity, in the first. The final reconciliation of this antagonism of Petrine and Pauline Christianity, and with it the establishment of the church faith, is the work of the fourth Gospel, which, however, flows not from the apostle John, although the author so pretends, but from some unknown person in the middle of the second century—the most profound and spiritual of all productions thus from an obscure nobody, the most sublime and ideal portrait of the Saviour from an impostor—and

* Under this term he understands, not merely the proper Gnosticism of antiquity, but all attempts to reduce Christianity to a philosophical form. *Gnosis* is, for him, thus the same as the philosophy of religion.

is not to be considered an actual history, but a sort of philosophico-religious romance, the offspring of the speculative fancy!! The critical acuteness and constructive method of this panlogistic school has reached a point thus, where, by its contempt for all outward historical testimonies, and by the most palpable extravagance, it confutes itself, so that nothing more is needed than a simple exhibition of this last result, to repel every unsophisticated mind from its method.

But wherein consists now the fundamental fault of this whole historical method of Baur? We find it in *logical pantheism*, the denial of the *personality* both of God and of man. Baur finds fault with Neander as recognising the single only, and nothing general, in the history of doctrine, and claims for himself the merit of having raised it from an empirical to a speculative view, and of having found in the conception of *spirit* the ruling principle of the historical process.* But what at last is this "spirit," the "dogma," which in his ever-recurring terminology, "comes to terms with itself," (*sich mit sich selbst vermittelt*), which "unfolds itself into the boundless multiplicity of its predicates, and there gathers itself up again into the unity of self-consciousness?" Is it the personal living God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Of that this philosophy knows nothing. Are the objective forces, which Baur declares to be the factors of history, substantial essences at all or living realities? No! They are bare forms of the understanding, abstract conceptions, shadowy phantoms. The entire history of doctrine is nothing more, according to this school, than a dialectic process of thought, which thinks thought itself, the tedious mechanism of method, "reeling off of a thin logical thread," that runs out always again at last into Hegelian pantheism. The efforts of the most profound and pious minds for centuries, on the incarnation and the atonement, result simply in *formule* at last of the identity of thought and being, the finite and the infinite, subject and object. Thus withers beneath the simoom breath of a purely dialectic process, the garden of the Lord, with all its endless wealth of flowers, its innumerable fruits of love to the Saviour, of faith, of prayer, of sanctification, the whole transformed into a metaphysical desert, without green oasis or refreshing fountain. Of course this method fails most in those parts of church history, where practical interests take the lead, as in the apostolical and next following periods, falling over here from a pretended objectivity into the most wretched subjectivity of a hypercriticism, that rests on no ground, and sets at defiance all the laws of history. But even the purely doctrinal investigations of Baur need a complete revision, as

* Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte, S. 52 and 53.

from his one-sided position he turns also the church fathers and the schoolmen, Calvin and Schleiermacher, into mere "speculators on the dry heath," sunders their thinking from its religious life-ground, and so not unfrequently loads them with opinions that never in dream even entered into their heads.

§ 15. *Merheinecke, Leo, Dorner, Ullmann, and others.*

Along with this, however, the Hegelian philosophy even before the appearance of the famous "*Leben Jesu*" by Strauss (1835), called forth other wholly different tendencies, which have sought to keep terms with history as it is, and with the Christianity of the Bible and the Church, though some of those Christian Hegelians, as MARHEINECKE, DAUB, GÜSCHEL, have frequently spiritualised it, and at times inflicted arbitrary violence upon it by the logical process. MARHEINECKE, the theological head of the "right" wing of this school, exhibited the German Reformation under a purely objective form, from the sources, in genuine German nationality. This work, unsurpassed in its kind, is fortunately besides free altogether from the heavy dialectic accoutrement in which his "Dogmatic" is made to move. HEINRICH LEO, an original, vigorous mind, not without tendency also however to excess and rudeness, threw off, it is true, in later life the strait-jacket of the Hegelian logic altogether, but the influence of it is seen in his *Universal History*, where religion and the church are also very carefully noticed, but always with the entire subordination of the subject to objective powers, of the individual to the general. These objective powers with him, however, are not dialectic forms and conceptions, but concrete realities, laws and institutions of the personal Christian God, which to resist is sin and guilt, which to obey is man's true freedom, glory, and honour. History in his view forms itself downward from above; God's will, and not popular will, least of all individual will, is its moving force. Hence his favourable treatment of the Middle Ages, and his unfavourable, nay, one-sided and unjust, judgment of the Reformation. Leo's view of history is out and out ethical, churchly, conservative, absolutely anti-revolutionary, we might say catholicising, did we not know that he has too much historical sense to believe in the possibility of restoring an antiquated position, and that just in relentless opposition to the unbound and dissolute habit of the present time he heeds it for his duty to lay the sharpest emphasis on the side of positive authority and law. In the case of so violent, excitable and uncalculating a polemic as Leo, who often falls on his opponents like a bulldog, we must never take single utterances too strictly, as little as

with Luther, whose posture also under different circumstances he would make his own.

Finally, however, there are dogmatic historians, who stand in direct opposition to the new Tübingen school, on decidedly believing and churchly ground, and still have appropriated to themselves all the formal helps that are offered by the Hegelian logic. To this class belong such theologians as TH. KLIEFOTH, G. A. MEIER, but above all Dr. DORNER, formerly of Tübingen, now in Bonn. This last, in his *History of the Development of the Doctrine of Christ*, a great work, which however is not free from scientific pretension and stiffness, has furnished a positive refutation of Baur's work on the Trinity and of his views in regard to primitive Christianity. He is not a whit behind his opponent in learning, acuteness, and speculative talent, whilst he excels him far in sound comprehension, and writes in the service not of science merely, but also of the Church.

Whilst Leo is a man of the extreme, Kliefoth and Dorner may be styled, on the other hand, men of the mean or middle, in whom the different elements of modern culture seek to come to a reconciliation. Still more may this be said of RANKE, whose *History of the Popes and of the German Reformation* entitle him to a place also among theologians, but especially of ULLMANN and HUNDESHAGEN, although with the two last the influence of Schleiermacher carries the ascendancy. They belong, beyond doubt, to the most complete and influential historians of our time. The work of Ullmann on the Reformers before the Reformation is a real masterpiece of thorough, mild, and clear historical representation; and Hundeshagen's *Review of German Protestantism* reveals likewise a heart-sound universal insight into the defects under which it is suffering at this time, while it points with right to the practical path which German theology is called at once to pursue, if that country is to be rescued from the evil consequences of a one-sided literary existence.

Thus then we find mirrored in the latest literature of church and dogmatic history, in Germany, all the manifold elements of modern culture, as they severally repel or attract one another, or seek to come together in a common whole, at one time bound in full or in part by the fetters of a system, at another with free untrammelled spirit, taking all according to its own nature, and allowing to it its separate right. Unite the pious feeling and tender conscientiousness of a *Neander*, the sober investigation of a *Gieseler*, the speculative talent of a *Baur* and a *Dorner*, the energetic decision of a *Leo*, the fine diplomatic wisdom of a *Ranke*, the quiet mildness and clear representation of an *Ullman*, the spiritual vivacity and comprehensive brevity

of a *Hase*; unite all this, we say, in one person, actuated at the same time with the spirit of genuine faith and love, and wholly devoted to the service of the Church, and we have, so to speak, the true ideal of a church historian in full form before us; an ideal which may never be fully realised in any one individual, but which should at all events float before the mind of those who are content otherwise to sit at the feet of great masters.

Whether finally Germany, after being frightened out of its one-sided literary existence, and excessive scientific productivity, by the revolutionary storms of the world-year 1848, shall go on at once to carry into life her theoretic creations, and thus make them to become first really fruitful; or whether, like Greece of old, after it had produced an Aristotle and an Alexander, or the African Church, after it had produced an Augustine, it may be destined to die spiritually, and leave the prosecution of its work and the practical application of its ideas, to other times and other nations—this is a question which the future itself must be left to decide.

§ 16. Church Historians out of Germany.

Casting a brief glance in conclusion on the latest performances in church history *out of* Germany, we are met (not to speak of some works which are only known to us by their titles*), in the French Reformed church, by the name of MERLE D'AUBIGNÉ, of Geneva, whom we are the more bound to notice, as his History of the Reformation, still incomplete, has obtained in England and America an unexampled celebrity and circulation, reaching to circles also where such reading would not otherwise have come.† As regards the contents of the work itself, he has depended almost entirely thus far on German industry, by which this whole period especially has been thoroughly explored, in countless publications, on all sides. This use of foreign inquiry was here also wholly in place, and even a duty. He has had skill however, to work up the matter handsomely, and to clothe it with a high degree of interest, by his uncommon power of lively and graphic dramatic representation. This, taken in connection with his decided evangelical tone, and his polemic zeal against the Papacy, explains also his popularity just noticed, particularly in the Puritanic section of Protestantism. His perfection here however runs by excess, on the other

* Namely, P. HOFSTEEDE DE GROOT, *Institutiones hist. eccles. Gronov.* 1835; and M. J. MATTER, *Histoire du Christianisme et de la société chrétienne*, ed. 2 Paris, 1838, 4 Vols. 8vo.

† He himself informs us in the preface to the fourth volume, that from 150,000 to 200,000 copies of his work had been sold, in the English language alone.

side, into a fault. Merle d'Aubigné presents, likely Macaulay in his celebrated *History of England*, a series of brilliant pictures, without being able, at the same time, to rise to philosophical, universal views. Aiming, moreover, to make all the fortunes and deeds of his hero as interesting as possible, and to secure in this way a constant gratification to the reader, he often wrongs the history itself, and forgets the task of the historian in that of the romance writer. Marheinecke's *History of the Reformation* is of much less pretension, but far more correct and true. A sound simple sense for truth never seeks to make more out of history than it actually is, and takes little or no thought for effect. In the end, however, the quiet passionless objectivity and artless simplicity of the evangelists make a dramatic parade. Then, again, that hot polemic zeal, that finds more enduring impression than all rhetorical ornament and all vent with Merle d'Aubigné, almost on every page, in exclamations and apostrophes against the hated Papists, is not such as becomes the dignity of a historian, who should argue *indirectly* only, though in this way precisely with most effect, by the representation of *facts*. As it is, the authority of this spirited and gifted writer in the sphere of history, is likely to wane, in proportion as with the further progress of his work, his other peculiar sympathies and antipathies may come probably to mix themselves with the narration, along with the anti-Roman tendency, so as to touch many of his past admirers on their own sensitive side. We cannot say, at least, that he has increased his reputation by his late work on *Cromwell*; where, carried away by the fresh impression of Carlyle's book, swallowed without digestion, he makes himself the unqualified panegyrist of a military and political genius, who sought to advance the cause of religion by war and bloodshed, the decapitation of a king, the dissolution of parliament, the exercise of dictatorial power, &c.; the direct opposite thus, in this respect, of Martin Luther, in whom, notwithstanding, the same historian, inconsistently enough, praises as truly Christian and apostolic an aversion to all tumult and violence, while, on the other hand, most undue censure, in the fourth volume, is heaped on the good Zwingli, for becoming in the end a sort of general, and appearing on the battle-field at Cappel. We cannot, therefore, forbear remarking, that the immoderate praise bestowed upon the Genevan Doctor (whom we also hold in high honour, only within proper bounds), by the English and American religious press, reflects a very doubtful credit, to say the least, on its own character.

In England and America thus far it has been held sufficient generally to follow Mosheim, taking along with him perhaps as

a compliment to his learning, the more pious work of Milner. The thoroughly learned and highly valuable monographies of the Scotch theologian, THOMAS M'CRIE, on the Life of John Knox and the Reformation in Spain and Italy, have called forth unfortunately no imitation; and even the Puseyitic controversy has led to nothing more than party illustrations of particular doctrines and usages in Patristic and English-Episcopal church history.* On the other hand, however, we meet at times in English and American *Reviews* with very thorough and interesting essays in the sphere of church history; and the excellent translations of Gieseler by DAVIDSON, and Neander by TORREY, show plainly enough that the later literature of Germany in this department is beginning to be prized, and that it may be expected in due time to lead also to independent productions. England has her MACAULAY, America has her PRÆSCOTT, and why then should they not be capable of producing also a great church historian? True, our system of sects and denominations, with the narrow spirit of party which it seems to nourish, stands greatly in the way of any impartial study and representation of *universal* church history, for this supposes a wide and Catholic mind; but it is to be hoped, that an increasing interest in historical theology will counteract the force of this bigotry, and be itself still further advanced by its decline. Which result may God hasten in his own time!

§ 17. THE USES OF CHURCH HISTORY.

We conclude this sketch with a few remarks on the value and use of church history, as it results from a proper treatment of it.

1. The knowledge of church history is the self-consciousness the church has of her own development, which as such carries its unconditional value and use first *in itself*. This we must lay stress upon over against the one-sided utilitarian view, by which it is cultivated for certain party and private interests only, and so degraded into a mere tool for transient ends. The present is the result of the past, and cannot possibly be comprehended

* The work of WILLIAM PALMER: *A Compendious Ecclesiastical History, from the earliest to the present time*, can make no pretension to scientific worth. The well known convert, Newman, before his transition, passed a most unfavourable, no doubt too unfavourable, judgment on his countrymen, in regard to their acquaintance with church history, where he wrote, among other things, "It is melancholy to say it; but the chief, perhaps the only English writer, who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian, is the infidel Gibbon."—*Essay on the Dev. of Chr. Doct.* Appleton's edition, p. 14.

in full without the knowledge of this in a thorough way. The church consequently also, to understand herself, must know her origin and her genesis. Her past deeds, sufferings and fortunes, belong to the substance of her life, are integral elements of her being, that require the succession of time for their evolution. We need no outward impulse first to engage our interest in the history of the kingdom of God; the nature of the Christian faith itself is sufficient for this with every one, according to inward vocation and outward opportunity. Faith seeks always a clearer apprehension of its object, and thus takes the deepest interest in the ways of God, the words and deeds of his servants, the cloud of witnesses looking forth without and from the past. In the same way that man, as man, according to the old saying, *homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto*, is prompted and bound to take an interest in all that is strictly human, it becomes the Christian also, as a Christian, to have the most active sympathy with the doings and fortunes of all his brethren in the faith, with whom he is joined in one body. Theology altogether, apprehended and pursued in the right spirit, is not simply a theoretic process, but divine worship. Church history then deserves to be studied for its own sake; it is an essential part of the knowledge of the being and work of the Triune God, in which consists eternal life.*

Out of this higher internal worth of church history, flows its practical use and necessity for certain ends and callings, especially for the teachers and leaders of the Christian congregation. Our science, like all human knowledge and activity, should be employed to the honour of God, to glorify his name, and build up his kingdom.

2. Thus the knowledge of church history is, further, one of the most *powerful helps for successful action in the service of the kingdom of God*. The present is not only the product of the past, but the motherly soil also of the future, which he that cultivates must understand, and which no one can understand thoroughly except by intimate acquaintance with the past. No one, for example, is prepared to govern a State *well*, and to advance its prosperity, who has not made himself familiar with its wants and its history. Ignorance can produce only a bungling work, that must soon go again to wreck. History is, next to the word of God, the richest source of wisdom and experience. Her treasures are inexhaustible. Why is it that so much is wrought in church and state, that after a few years is again forgotten? Because the authors had no knowledge of history and

* Comp. John xvii. 3.

no respect for it. *That* tree only defies the storm, whose roots strike far into the earth. So that work only can stand, whose foundation rests in the solid ground of history.

3. Again, church history is the best and most complete *defence of Christianity*, and so is eminently fitted to establish our faith, and minister comfort and edification largely to our souls. It is a perpetual commentary on that word of the Lord, "Lo, I am with you alway, to the end of the world." He moves with the fulness of his grace through all Christian centuries, he reveals himself in the most different personalities, employing them as organs of his spirit, his will, his truth, his peace. The apostles and martyrs, the apologists and church fathers, the schoolmen and mystics, the reformers and all those countless witnesses, whose names are indelibly traced on the pages of church history, form themselves into one choir, which sings an everlasting doxology to the Redeemer, and proclaims with loud voice that the Gospel is no fable, no fancy, but power and life, peace and joy, all, in one word, that man can desire in the way of good or glory. Such examples, in which the life of the God-man comes to actual and as it were corporeal expression, speak far more forcibly than all intellectual proofs and abstract theories. In the same way church history furnishes the strongest argument for the indestructibility of Christianity. To the word of the Lord, "On this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," every century responds, *Yea and Amen!* There is no hostile power on the earth or under it, which has not already conspired against the congregation of the redeemed, and bent its whole force for its annihilation. But it has overcome them all. Stiff-necked and blinded Judaism laid its hand on the Anointed of the Lord and his servants; but the Lord has risen from the dead, his followers have adored his wonderful judgments over the desolate ruins of Jerusalem, the chosen people wanders dispersed, without shepherd and without sanctuary, through all nations and times, a perpetual living proof of the truth of the threatenings of the divine word, and "this generation shall not pass away" till the Lord come again in his glory. Greece applied all its art and philosophy to confute the doctrine of the cross, and make it ridiculous in the eyes of the cultivated world; but her wisdom was turned into folly, or made to serve as a bridge to Christianity. Rome, proud mistress of the world, devised the most unnatural torments, to torture Christians to death, and root out their name from the earth; but tender virgins showed more courage in face of eternity than tried soldiers and Stoic philosophers; and lo, after a couple of centuries of the most bloody persecution, the Roman emperor himself cast his crown

at the feet of the despised Nazarene, and was baptized into his name. The crescent of Islam sought to overshadow the sun of Christianity, and moved blood-red along the horizon of the Oriental and the African Church, nay, passed over even into Spain and France; but the messengers of the Lord have driven back the false prophet, and his kingdom resembles now a decaying corpse. All sorts of heresies and schisms rose in the bosom of the Church itself, even with its earliest history, and seemed for a time to have forced aside the pure doctrine of the gospel; but this has still always recovered its ground again, and brought the army of errorists to shame. The popes surrounded the simple doctrine of salvation with so many human additions, that it was hard any longer to get at it, and they exercised despotic rule over the whole Western Christian world; but the inmost life-force of the Church worked itself powerfully through the rubbish, placed the light of the pure word again in its place, and set conscience free from the oppressive chains of the hierarchy. Deists, materialists, and atheists, in the 17th and 18th centuries, set themselves to undermine the Bible; nay, the heroes of the French Revolution went so far, in their mad fanaticism, as to set aside the God of Christians, and place the goddess of reason on the throne of the world, and the most frightful scenes of cruelty accompanied the act; but in a short time they had to revoke their own folly; the Lord in heaven laughed at them and had them in derision. Napoleon, the greatest potentate and captain of modern times, proposed to substitute for the universal dominion of Christianity, the universal dominion of his own sword, and to degrade the church into an instrument for his own political ends; but the Lord of the Church hurled him from his throne, and the giant spirit that had thrown all Europe out of joint, must die, a prisoner on a lonely rock of the ocean, of a broken heart. In the bosom of Protestantism has risen, since the close of the last century, a Rationalism, which armed with learning and philosophy, has proceeded gradually to the denial even of a personal God and of immortality, turning the history of the Saviour into a mythological book of fables; but over against it has appeared also already a believing theology, which has triumphantly driven its objections from the field, while in the camp of the foe itself division has taken place, and one system of unbelief is found actively refuting another. Spiritual death and indifference, in the train of Rationalism, spread itself over whole sections of the Church; but the Christian life already celebrates again its own resurrection, banished out of one country it flourishes with fresh vigour in another, and extends its activity out to the furthest limits of the heathen world. The most important king-

doms, the best constructed system of human wisdom, have perished; while the simple faith of the Galilean fishermen shows itself at this day as powerful as ever, regenerating the most hardened sinners, imparting strength for good, joy in affliction, and triumph in death. The Lord of hosts has ever been a wall round about his Zion. The gates of hell, through eighteen centuries, have not prevailed against the Church; as little will they prevail against it in time to come. To have stood so many and such various storms, and to have come forth from all only more pure and strong, she must indeed be formed of indestructible material. This church history raises to an absolute certainty, for him who studies it with a truth-loving spirit. It is, therefore, next to the word of God, the best and richest book of devotion, that will not allow us even then to faint, when thick darkness covers the present, and the walls of Zion are beset with foes on every side.

4. Finally, church history, in proportion as it serves to confirm our faith in the divine origin and indestructible nature of Christianity, must exert a wholesome *moral influence* also on our own character and life, and so prove an important help to *practical religion*. It is morality in the form of facts, Christ and his gospel preached from the annals of his own kingdom.* The shining examples of godly men, which it causes to pass before our spirit, powerfully challenge us to imitation, that we, like them, may consecrate our thoughts and actions to the honour of the Lord and the welfare of man, and so continue to be felt with happy influence long after our death. Especially is the study of history adapted, also, to free our minds from all sorts of prejudice, narrowness, party and sect feeling, and to fill us with true catholic spirit; with that love which joyfully acknowledges the most manifold forms of the Christian life in their proper right, in the blooming variety of flowers that deck the garden of God, adores the wonderful wisdom of the heavenly gardener, and feels itself in living union with the pious of all ages and nations; with that love, which must be poured out in large measure upon the church, before her present mournful divisions can be brought to an end, accomplishing thus the

* Luther says admirably: "It is a rare worth that belongs to histories; for all that philosophy, wise men and general reason can teach or think out that is profitable for good life, this history forcibly presents by examples and cases, and sets it at once before the eyes, as though we were by and saw it so happen. And when we look at it deeply, we find that from histories and annals have flowed a'most all rights, art, good counsel, warning, threatening, terror, consolation, strengthening, instruction, providence, prudence, along with all virtues, as out of a living spring. In this view, histories are nothing else than the advertisement, monument and mark, of God's work and judgment, how he upholds, governs, hinders, enlarges, punishes and honours the world, men especially, as every one may deserve, be it evil or good."

precious promise of the One Shepherd and one flock, and the prayer of our great High Priest, "That they all may be one, as Thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me."

Here, indeed, all depends on the mind and spirit with which church history is studied; for, like the Bible itself, it may be, and often has been, scandalously abused in the service of bad ends, as may be sufficiently inferred from the foregoing history of this science.

ART. XI.—NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. DR. ROBINSON'S NEW TESTAMENT LEXICON.*

THE assertion is sometimes hazarded by those who claim to be the guides of public opinion, that there has been but little advance in sacred philology since the days of Calvin; that in his writings we may find the principal expositions of the sacred text which commentators of the present day propound as new discoveries. It is doubtless true that Calvin's Commentaries have much philological merit, and that he furnishes a correct explanation of most of the leading texts on which his system of divinity is founded. Nevertheless, it remains true that great progress has been made in biblical study since this learned and venerable reformer lived. The scholars of the sixteenth century often endeavoured to prove their doctrines by irrelevant texts, by passages which yielded only a verbal support, or whose application was doubtful. We have only to look into the writings of President Edwards, two centuries later, to see how much his acute and profound intellect would have been aided by better principles of interpretation. Within the last thirty years, the texts which sustain the orthodox system have been often subjected to a close and scientific examination, and that system now stands on a much surer basis than it ever had before. Some texts have been given up as untenable for the maintenance of a particular doctrine; others have been found impregnable. Besides, it would be absurd to suppose, that the immeasurable advance made in modern times in the knowledge

* A Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament, by Edward Robinson, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. A new edition, revised and in great part re-written. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1850. pp. 804, 8vo.

of oriental literature and antiquities, of general grammar, and of the Hebrew and Greek languages in particular, should not have cast important light on the great *loci classici*, the fundamental proof-texts to which appeal is made in the last resort. It is a matter of great importance if these passages can be set in a clearer light, and be made to point with a surer aim. But of the rapid, we may say immense, progress which biblical science has made, we need no more convincing proof than the Lexicon now before us will furnish.

Again, it is often said, that we are greatly indebted to German writers for our knowledge of antiquities, history, classical criticism, &c., while they have failed to give us much which is valuable towards the better understanding of the doctrines of the Gospel. For Latin and Greek lexicons and grammars we must repair to Freund, Zumpt, Kühner, Buttmann, Thiersch, and Pape, but when we are to expound divine truth, we must not resort to these "earthern cisterns." Yet, in ascertaining the true, spiritual meaning of divine truth, to what better source can we apply than to the Lexicon before us? It unseals the fountains of living waters. It gives us exact definitions of the inspired declarations. It is a clear, beautiful and consistent commentary on those words "which are spirit and life." Yet it is not affirming too much to say, that this Lexicon would never have been written, if it had not been for the philologists of Germany. On this subject, they have furnished the materials and given the impetus to all the world besides. It is to the labours of Schneider, Passow, Hermann and others, that we owe the true idea of a Greek lexicon, and are not now stumbling over the pages of Schrevelius and Schleusner. It is to them and to their successors in lexicography, grammar and commentary,—Winer, De Wette, Meyer, &c.—that we are able to give the exact grammatical meaning of words on which all true doctrine must be built. The works just mentioned, enable us to reach, in innumerable places, what we believe to be the mind of the inspiring Spirit. By their aid we can see, e.g. in the Epistles of Paul, what may be called a divine harmony, a Christian logic. The bands and joints of the discourse are placed in a striking light.

By a remark made above, we would not imply that Dr. Robinson's Lexicon is not an independent work. The author is no servile copier. He has applied a practised eye and a sound judgment to the immense mass of materials before him, and produced an original and independent work so far as those terms are applicable to an undertaking of this character. We may state the following as prominent qualities of the Lexicon :

First: An engaging outward form. The beautiful Porson type,

the paper, the freshness of the ink, the spaces between the paragraphs, &c., make the page eminently attractive. The external appearance of grammars and dictionaries, we are glad to see, is now regarded as a matter of special importance in this country and in Germany, as it long has been in England. A New Testament lexicon is designed for persons of feeble vision and of advanced age, as well as for those whose eyes have not waxed dim. In this particular, the present Lexicon has not been equalled in our country.

Second: A natural and philosophical arrangement of the meanings of a word. Let us take the noun Πνεῦμα as an illustration. There are three great classes of meanings. I. The word is defined in its primary, or material sense, 1, as a breathing, breath; 2, air, breath in motion, wind. II. The word as applied to man in his present two-fold state, 1, the vital spirit, anima, the principle of life; 2, the intellectual part, the animus, mind, soul, *a* as opposed to the body or animal spirit, *b* as the seat of feeling or emotion, *c* disposition or temper of mind, *d* will, counsel, purpose, *e* including the understanding, intellect. III. The term as applied to simple incorporeal beings; A of created spirits, 1, the human soul, when separated from the body; 2, an evil spirit, demon; 3, good angels; B of God as immaterial; C. of Christ in his exalted, spiritual nature; D the spirit of God, in intimate union with God the Father and Son; 1, the Holy Spirit as a Divine Agent, *a* joined with the Father and the Son, with the same or different predicates, *b* in connection with or reference to God, *c* in connection with or in reference to Christ, *d* as coming and acting upon men and producing various effects; 2, by metonymy, the Holy Spirit for the effects and consequences of his agency, *a* of physical or procreative energy, *b* of that special, divine influence which rested on Jesus, *c* of the divine influence by which prophets and holy men are excited, e.g. in inspiration, *d* by which the apostles were qualified to act as founders and guides of the Christian church, *e* of the divine influence by which the Christian temper is affected, *a* as opposed to ἡ σὰρξ, *β* as the same mind which Christ possessed; 3 meton. of a person or teacher acting, or professing to act, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. The above summary will show in what a clear and orderly manner the primary sense is marked, and the derivative senses traced from it and from each other. To see the progress which has been made in orderly definition one need only compare such words as πνεῦμα and σὰρξ in this Lexicon, with the confused and inaccurate account of them in Schleusner.

Third: The particles are treated with great fulness and perspicuity. No class of words reveal the subtle character of the

Greek language so strikingly as the particles; to exhibit them even satisfactorily in the New Test. dialect, requires the closest attention and a habit of philosophical discrimination; yet no class of words are more important in educing the sense, especially in Paul's epistles. To this portion of the language Dr. Robinson has devoted special attention. The results of the investigations of many able German grammarians on the classical dialects are exhibited in this Lexicon as modified by the New Testament idiom, and cleared of doubtful and adventitious accompaniments.

Fourth: The author's local knowledge of Palestine, as would be expected, is here employed with eminent advantage. The large number of proper names, words descriptive of various objects of natural history, &c., are delineated with a precision which personal observation only would render possible. In this particular, the Lexicon is a great advance upon any similar work which has yet appeared in Germany. In this class of words, e. g. Jerusalem, one is struck with the author's happy judgment in selecting just enough of the most important particulars, where the temptation would be strong to make the description disproportionately copious. A good lexicographer, as well as a good architect, looks carefully to the proportions of his edifice. It would be interesting to write an essay on certain words, rather than to confine one's self to give the exact sense.

Fifth: Minute accuracy. So far as we can see from a daily use of this Lexicon, for nearly eight weeks, there is an extraordinary freedom from error, not only in the typography, but in the almost innumerable references. Mistakes in figures are extremely apt to creep in, even after the most vigilant attention. To turn to commentaries and other books for accuracy in this particular, is in general out of the question. There must be a laborious personal examination.

In short, we congratulate the churches and the clergy of all denominations in this country and Great Britain, that this great work has been brought to a close so successful. To a large extent, it will supersede the use of concordances and commentaries. It is a monument of patient and successful labour, of exact and varied knowledge, and of sound judgment on the most important of all subjects, the elucidation of heavenly mysteries.

II. DAVIDSON'S NEW TESTAMENT INTRODUCTION.*

One of the most striking characteristics of this work is the thoroughness with which the author has gone into the most recent investigations of the German biblical critics. Nothing

* An Introduction to the New Testament, by Samuel Davidson, D.D., LL.D., Vol. II. The Acts of the Apostles to the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians. London: Bagsters, 1849. Pp. 467, 8vo.

seems to have escaped his search. He has patiently threaded the daring speculations and idle fancies of the Tübingen school, —a school that have pressed their subjective criticism so far that it becomes simply ridiculous, and is now deemed unworthy even of the attention of respectable neologists. Yet Dr. D.'s laborious investigation of these cavils may be followed by an eminent practical advantage. It shows to what miserable shifts and subterfuges the oppugners of revelation are now reduced. It should seem that they must be soon driven from the field.

The work is very valuable in another point of view. It brings into a very convenient and readable shape a vast amount of criticism and of instructive material on all the New Testament books, which material is scattered through a hundred German and Latin commentaries, introductions, monograms, reviews, &c. Not a few of these are invaluable in casting light on the argument of an epistle, in removing obscurity from some cardinal doctrine, or in reconciling some serious discrepancy between two writers. There are discussions—whatever may be said of the cavils and destructive course of some of the German critics—which should be welcomed by every friend of the Bible. We are deeply concerned with all which relates to the records of our faith. We not only wish to believe that the foundation standeth sure, but to be able to give reasons for our belief. In the wide diffusion of knowledge, in the great increase of men of acute minds and of sceptical views, in the middle and lowest ranks of society, both in this country and in England, such discussions as are found in these volumes will be very opportune. They will furnish ready weapons for the overthrow of skilful assailants.

Besides, for the advanced philologist, these volumes contain very valuable and timely discussions. Whether he agrees with the respected author, or not, in such questions as the Hebrew original of Matthew, the genuineness of the last verses of Mark's Gospel, only one imprisonment of Paul at Rome, &c., he will be glad to see the topics brought into a convenient form, and all the arguments for a particular position skilfully selected and marshalled. The author evidently seeks for truth rather than victory. His work affords many indubitable evidences that he is an honest, painstaking, and independent, as well as learned investigator. We again commend it earnestly to the attention of biblical students as one of the most valuable works which has lately appeared in the department of sacred philology in any country. Those who are not familiar with the questions here discussed, but who feel an interest in biblical investigations, would be highly gratified and instructed by the study of these volumes. They will open fresh sources of thought and feeling.

III. DECIPHERING OF THE ASSYRIAN AND BABYLONIAN INSCRIPTIONS.

In an article of eighty-three pages, in Part 2nd of the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1850, Major H. C. Rawlinson has given a general view of the results at which he has arrived in deciphering the Inscriptions. We have condensed some of the more important facts.

There are found in many parts of Persia, either graven on the native rock, as at Hamadân, Vân, and Behistûn, or sculptured on the walls of the ancient palaces, as at Persepolis and Pasargardæ, cuneiform inscriptions, which record the glories of the house of Achæmenes. These inscriptions are, in almost every instance, trilingual and triliteral. They are engraved in three different languages, and each language has its peculiar alphabet; the alphabets, indeed, varying from each other, not merely in the fact that the characters are formed by a different assortment of the elemental signs, which we are accustomed to term the arrow-head and wedge, but in their whole phonetic structure and organization. The object of engraving records in three different languages, was to render them generally intelligible, as the governor of Baghdâd would now publish an edict in the Persian, Turkish and Arabic languages.

The Persian cuneiform alphabet was first deciphered, and the language was subsequently brought to light. There are not now probably more than twenty words in the whole range of the Persian cuneiform records, upon the meaning, grammatical condition, or etymology of which, any doubt or difference of opinion can be said now to exist.

As the Greek translation on the Rosetta stone first led to the deciphering of the hieroglyphic writing of Egypt, so have the Persian texts of the trilingual cuneiform tablets served as a stepping-stone to the knowledge of the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions. The tablets of Behistûn, of Nakhshi-Rustâm, and Persepolis, have, in the first place, furnished a list of more than eighty proper names, of which the true pronunciation is fixed by their Persian orthography, and of which we have also the Babylonian equivalents. A careful comparison of these duplicate forms of writing the same name, and a due appreciation of the phonetic distinctions peculiar to the two languages, have supplied the means of determining with more or less certainty, the value of about one hundred Babylonian characters, and a basis has thus been fixed for a complete arrangement of the alphabet. The next step has been to collate inscriptions, and to ascertain or infer from the variant orthographies of the same name, and particularly the same geographical name, the homo-

phones of each known alphabetical power. Here it must be observed, that though two inscriptions may be absolutely identical in sense, and even in expression, it does not by any means follow that where one text may differ from the other, we are justified in supposing that we have found alphabetical variants. Many sources of variety exist besides the employment of homophones; abbreviations may be substituted for words expressed phonetically; or the allocation is altered; or synonymes are used; or grammatical suffixes or affixes may be used, or suppressed, or modified. By mere comparison, however, repeated in a multitude of instances, so as to reduce almost infinitely the chance of error, Major Rawlinson says he has added fifty characters to the hundred previously known through the Persian key. This acquaintance with the phonetic value of about one hundred and fifty signs limits his present knowledge of the Babylonian and Assyrian alphabets.

The Babylonian translations of the Persian text in the trilingual tablets have furnished a list of about two hundred Babylonian words, of which we know the sound approximately, and the meaning certainly. Nearly all these words are found entire, or only with some slight modification, in Assyrian. The difficult, and, at the same time, the essential part of the study of Assyrian, consists in thus discovering the unknown from the known, in laying bare the anatomy of the Assyrian sentence, and guided by grammatical indications, by a few Babylonian landmarks, and especially by the context, in tracing out, sometimes through Semitic analogies, but oftener through an extensive comparison of similar or cognate phrases, the meaning of words which are otherwise strange. This last branch, Major Rawlinson has prosecuted with great care, and he thinks he has added two hundred meanings certainly, and one hundred more probably, to the vocabulary already obtained through the Babylonian translations. He estimates the number of words in the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions, at about 5,000, and he does not pretend to be acquainted with more than a tenth part of that number; but the five hundred already known constitute the most important terms in the language.

The actual language of the Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions, is neither Hebrew, Chaldee, or Syriac, or any of the known cognate dialects, but it has so many analogous points with those dialects, both in grammatical structure and elementary words, that the author thinks it may be determinately classed in the Semitic family. The languages of Assyria and Babylonia can hardly be termed identical, as each dialect affects the employment of certain specific verbal roots, and certain particular nouns and adjectives, but they are at any rate sufficiently

alike in their internal organization to render illustrations drawn from the inscriptions of Babylon applicable to those of Assyria, so far as such illustrations may be of philological value. The Semitic affinities, therefore, of the Babylonian translations at Behistûn are more or less shared by the Assyrian. The pers. pronoun first person sing. in Bab. and Assy. is *anak*, Heb. אָנֹכִי; suffixed to nouns, it is *uá* and *i*, to verbs *ani*. The pronoun of the 2nd pers. seems to be *nanta* or *anta*, Heb. אַתָּה; suffixed, it is a simple *k*; 3rd pers. sing. masc. *su*, Heb. הוּא; among the demonst. pronouns is *haga* הֵיאָה. The author thinks that he recognizes in the Babylonian, Niph., Hiph., or Hoph., and Hithpael conjugations of the Heb., and the Ithpaal, Aphel, Ittaphal, Shaphel, and Ishtaphel of the Chaldee. The Bab. verb in Pret. marks the distinction of persons by prefixes like the Heb. Fut. Among the Bab. particles are *lipenai* before, *itta* with, *ad* to, *anog* in front of. The Babylon. roots are almost wholly biliteral, e. g. *ten* to give, תִּן; *duk* to smite, דָּק; *mit* to die, מוּת; *rad*, to go down, יָרַד; *kun*, to establish, כָּן; *sib*, to dwell, יָשַׁב; *am*, mother; *bar*, a son; *beth*, a house; *erts*, land; *sem*, a name, &c.

The earliest records brought to light, written in the cuneiform character, are the inscriptions in the north-west palace of Nimrûd, belonging to a king, whom the author inclines to identify with Sardanapalus, though he was not by any means the first builder or king in Assyria. In the palace just named, there is an inscription of Sardanapalus, repeated more than a hundred times, commencing, "This is the palace of Sardanapalus, the humble worshipper of Assarac" (Nisroch. 1 K. xix. 37), "and Beltis, of the shining Bar, of Ani, and of Dagon, who are the principal of the Gods, the powerful and supreme ruler, king of Assyria, who was the son of Hevenk, the great king, the powerful and supreme ruler, king of Assyria," &c. The inscription goes on apparently to notice the efforts of the king to establish the worship of the gods; incidentally occurs a list of tributary nations, from which it would appear that the coasts of Phœnicia, the high lands of Media, and the upper provinces of Asia Minor, were not yet reduced under the power of Assyria. The son of Sardanapalus, Temen-bar II., built the centre palace of Nimrûd, and of whose annals the obelisk supplies us with a notice of singular completeness and detail. It gives a brief statement of the events, mostly warlike campaigns, of thirty-one years of his reign. Above the five series of figures on the obelisk, are epigraphs containing a sort of register of the tribute sent by five different nations to the Assyrian king. The third tribute is from a country called *Misr*, Egypt?

With two more kings terminates the series of kings immediately connected with Sardanapalus. Mr. Layard thinks that a new dynasty with a new religion, now acquired the kingdom. Mr. Rawlinson suggests that it may be only an interregnum. The Khorsabad dynasty has been thought to be the monarchs mentioned in Scripture, who were contemporary with the kings of Israel and Judah. "My opinion at present," says the author, "is against the identification; but the evidence is pretty nearly balanced; and if the great difficulty, the dissimilarity of names, were removed, I might possibly become a convert to the belief that in the three kings who built the palace of Khorsabad, who founded Mespila, and who constructed the lions in the south-west palace of Nimrûd, we had the biblical Shalmeneser, Sennacherib, and Esarhaddon." On these and other points, we must wait for further inquiries. The author supposes that the six continuous kings of the Nimrûd line may have reigned from about B. C. 1250 to 1100, and allowing an interval of seventy years for a suspension of the line, the era of the Khorsabad king would fall about B. C. 1050.

The author names the inscriptions at Vân and its vicinity, Armenian; they are written in the same alphabet as that used in Assyria, but belong to a language radically different, the Scythic, though it has adopted numerous words from the Assyrian. Six kings of the Armenian line, in a direct descent, are named. The monuments, Mr. R. assigns to the seventh and eighth centuries B. C.

The Babylonians borrowed their alphabet from the Assyrians, and it requires no little ingenuity at the present day to form a comparative table of the characters. Perhaps the most interesting of all the Babylonian monuments are the bricks. It was a custom borrowed from Assyria, that the bricks used in building the cities on the Lower Tigris and Euphrates should be stamped with the name and titles of the royal founder. It is hoped that ultimately from these bricks, a chronology of the country may be re-constructed. With regard to Babylonia Proper, it is stated that every ruin from some distance north of Baghdâd as far south as the Birs Nimrûd is of the age of Nebuchadnezzar. Mr. R. has examined the bricks, *in situ*, belonging perhaps to one hundred different towns and cities, within the area of about one hundred miles in length, and thirty or forty in breadth, and he never found any other legend than that of Nebuchadnezzar. Lower Babylonia or Chaldea will probably furnish far more important materials for illustrating the ancient history of the country, than are to be found about Hillah and Baghdâd.

Susiana is rich in ancient sites. The cuneiform character employed on the monuments is the furthest possible from the

Assyrian type, and the language appears not to belong to the Semitic stock. Another class of inscriptions is found in Elymais Proper, which varies from all the others.

IV. HARRIS'S PRE-ADAMITE EARTH.*

We have long regarded Dr. Harris as one of the most original, profound and comprehensive Christian writers of our day. The present work is the first of a series of Treatises in which the author is seeking to unfold the successive steps by which God is accomplishing his purpose to manifest his All-sufficiency. It is purely scientific and philosophical; it exhibits good research and power of analysis, clear and profound reasoning and demonstrations.

"This first volume consists of five parts. The first contains those Primary Truths which Divine Revelation appears to place at the foundation of all the objective manifestations of the Deity; the second presents the Laws or General Principles, which are regarded as logically resulting from the preceding Truths; and the third, fourth and fifth parts are occupied with the Exemplification and Verification of these Laws in the inorganic, the vegetable, and the animal kingdom of the pre-Adamite earth, respectively." A considerable portion of this volume is introductory to the entire series, and should therefore be thoroughly mastered in the scope of its reasoning, by those who would follow the author intelligently along the pathway of his grand conception. The attempt is made, and we think successfully, to show "that there is a theology in Nature which is ultimately one with the theology of the Bible." "The whole process of Divine Manifestation, including nature, is to be viewed in the light of a sublime argument, in which God is deductively reasoning from principles to facts, from generals to particulars." Assuming this, he deduces certain primary principles, and applies them to the successive stages of creation. He shows conclusively the harmony of Scripture and Geology, and traces in a fresh and forcible manner the origin of the material universe up to a wise and intelligent Power, while he refutes and silences the cavils and theories of a false and infidel science. J. M. S.

V. ROWLAND'S MAXIMS OF INFIDELITY.†

"Common Maxims" are the most influential forms of belief,

* The Pre-Adamite Earth: Contributions to Theological Science. By John Harris, D.D.

† On the Common Maxims of Infidelity. By Henry A. Rowland. New York: Carter & Brothers, 1850. London: Thomas Delf.

both as it regards error and truth. Infidelity as a public recognized avowed *system*, is dead and buried beyond the fear of a resurrection. It has now a mere *fragmentary* being ; its errors exist in isolated forms, and float loosely and at random through the public mind. But infidelity is wielding a tremendous power in our land, though not apparent to the sight ; and though it wields no potential creed or organized agencies. These "common maxims" are abroad—are "talking" to the unregenerated heart ; they do their mischief without alarming the fears of the popular mind. It is a *guerilla* form of warfare, and all the more dangerous and fatal to individual faith and hope on this account. Mr. Rowland has met infidelity just where its remaining strength lies, and has shivered to pieces the weapons of its present warfare. He has taken up one after another of the popular maxims of Infidelity, thoroughly analysed them, and shown their error and evil tendency. The execution of the work is certainly happy and able. The style is clear, compact, and forcible ; the reasoning is candid and conclusive ; and the book is full of good sense and practical utility. Just such a work was unquestionably needed. It will do good in a line and with a class of minds which are not particularly reached by any similar work. It is in many respects preferable to Dr. Nelson's Cause and Cure of Infidelity, and every lover of the truth ought to desire and seek for it an extensive circulation.

J. M. S.

VI. WILLIAMS'S RELIGIOUS PROGRESS.*

These Discourses are on the following subjects ; Religion as a principle of growth—Faith in its Root—Virtue—Knowledge—Temperance—Patience—Godliness—Brotherly Kindness—Charity.

We do not think the present volume, either in purity of style, or vigour of thought, equal to the previous productions of Dr. Williams, which have placed him in the first rank of the thinkers and writers of the country. Still the topics embraced in it are ably handled, and the teaching is sound and Christian. The progress the Author advocates is in the right direction ; its basis eternal truth ; its elements and laws are found in the Gospel of the grace of God ; and its goal is an eternity of holiness and bliss. It is refreshing in these days, when the multitudes who are shouting "progress" know not what they want, nor in what direction they are going, to hear a bold and manly voice from the heights of Zion giving utterance to the inspired teachings on this great subject.

J. M. S.

* Religious Progress: Discourses on the Development of Christian Character. By William R. Williams. London: Thomas Delf. 1850.

VII. SPENCER'S PASTOR'S SKETCHES.*

The *fourth* edition in three months! This looks as if we had not misjudged the character and value of this volume in the highly commendatory review which we gave of it a little in advance of its publication (see *Bib. Rep.* for Oct. 1850). It is indeed a book of remarkable interest and power of instruction. Its graphic sketches of character, incidents and religious experiences; the thorough knowledge it evinces of the human heart in its most subtle phases of self-deception and unbelief; the skill with which it meets many of the strange difficulties which trouble thousands of "inquirers respecting the way of salvation;" the wisdom and soundness of its teaching upon many of the most delicate and difficult subjects which are wont to embarrass those whose duty it is to guide souls; the glorious views of the Gospel which it unfolds and exhibits to console and encourage the penitent; and the spirit of whole-souled pity and sympathy and earnestness which it breathes in every page, make it a book second in interest to none that we can name, and as instructive as it is interesting. It is just the book which every Christian pastor needs to stir him up and to guide him in his great work. It is just the book for every Christian to study who would be wise to win souls to Christ; and to be put into the hands of every friend, and every sinner whom we would have escape the perils of unbelief and embrace the great salvation.

J. M. S.

VIII. THE FOOTPRINTS OF THE CREATOR.†

The works of this author are full of interest for the general reader, and the theologian. The former will be attracted by the freshness, the homely strength, and the picturesqueness of the style, by the frequent beauty of the thoughts, by the iron grasp which the author takes of his subject, by his self-reliance and originality, and by the conscious mastery of the theme, whatever it is, which comes before him. The attentive theologian will find not simply a discussion of the common relations which geology holds to revelation, or abundant and striking illustrations of the doctrines of natural theology, or the expressions of a benevolent heart for the well-being of man; but a bold avowal of evangelical

* A Pastor's Sketches: or Conversations with Anxious Inquirers respecting the Way of Salvation. By Ichabod S. Spencer, D.D., Pastor of the Second Presbyterian Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. London: Thomas Delf, 1850.

† The Footprints of the Creator; or, The Asterolepis of Stromness. By Hugh Miller, author of the Old Red Sandstone, &c. From the third London edition. With a memoir of the author. By Louis Agassiz. Boston: Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, 1850. pp. 380.

sentiments, and the interweaving, to a considerable extent of the articles of a creed which has been quite distasteful to many scientific as well as literary men. The last chapter of the volume before us is on the bearing of final causes on geological history. Some of the thoughts which are developed at length are such as the following :—We learn from human history that nations are as certainly mortal as men. Geology teaches that species are as mortal as individuals and nations, and that even genera and families become extinct. There is geological evidence, that in the course of creation the higher orders succeeded the lower. The brain—that of the fish—which bears an average proportion of not more than two to one to the spinal cord, came first ; last of all appeared the brain of man, which averages as twenty-three to one. The period when he was introduced upon the scene appears to have corresponded with the state of his habitation. The large reasoning brain would have been wholly out of place in the earlier ages. The period, too, of the mammiferous quadrupeds seems to have been determined, like the succeeding human period, by the earth's fitness at the time as a place of habitation for creatures so formed. By piecing the two records together, that of Scripture, and that revealed in the rocks, we learn that in slow and solemn majesty has period succeeded period, that fish, reptiles, mammiferous quadrupeds, have reigned in turn, that responsible man ultimately entered into a world ripened for his reception ; but further, that this passing scene is not the final one in the long series, but merely the last of the preliminary scenes. There should seem to be a lack of proportion in the series of being, were the period of perfect and glorified humanity abruptly connected, without the introduction of an intermediate creation of *responsible* imperfection, with that of the dying, irresponsible brute. That scene of things in which God became Man, and suffered, *seems*, as it no doubt is, a necessary link in the chain.

Mr. Miller has been for several years editor of the "Witness," the principal newspaper of the Free Church of Scotland. Fifteen years of his previous life had been passed as a stone-mason, and five years as accountant in the bank at Cromarty, his native town. His principal publications, besides the "Footprints," are "The Old Red Sandstone," four editions of which have been published in England, and which is soon to be reprinted in Boston ; and "First Impressions of England and its People," describing a few months' tour, in which Mr. Miller often turns aside into the by-ways, and gives us instructive chapters on the condition and modes of thinking of the middle and lower classes, interspersed with geological speculations.

ART. XII.—SELECT THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Under the above head, we shall condense the most important intelligence which we can procure, especially in biblical, theological and classical literature. Many of our subscribers are clergymen who reside in distant parts of the country, remote from libraries and booksellers' shops. Such, we have reason to believe, regard the information communicated on the last pages of each Number of this journal as particularly valuable. For their benefit, we shall go into some detail in regard to the literary value, cost and accessibility of some of the more important books. A correspondent in China suggests that foreign missionaries and others who are engaged in translating the Bible, would be pleased with notices of books fitted to aid them in their difficult undertaking. English gentlemen have also requested us to furnish a list of the more valuable theological publications which appear from the American press, the notices in newspapers being generally too brief or too indiscriminate to furnish the requisite information.

UNITED STATES.

A new number of the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* will soon be published. Valuable materials for a volume are on hand, and will be printed as soon as the pecuniary means of the Society will justify. Among these materials are essays on the structure, analogies, &c., of some of the languages of Southern and Western Africa; on the Dakota or Sioux language; on the Oscan and South Italian dialects; on the History of the Conquest of Persia by the Arabs, from the Turkish version of the annals of Et-Tabary; on Arabic Versification; a narrative of the Tour of Dr. J. Perkins from Oroomiah to Mosul, in 1849; on the Unity of the Human Race, as affected by Language, &c. The first number of the first volume has been reprinted. Valuable additions have been made to the library. In this connection, it may be stated that H. J. Anderson, M.D., who accompanied Lieut. Lynch in his exploring expedition to the river Jordan, will soon publish an extended Report on the geology of Palestine.

Some important theological works are in the process of circulation by the Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, in Boston. Among these are the works of the Younger President Edwards, in 2 vols. 8vo: and of Rev. Joseph Bellamy, D.D., of Bethlem, Ct., also in two vols. Both are edited by Rev. T. Edwards, D.D., of New London, Ct. To the works of each, a short life of the

ments have other times and countries presented their Christian youth to enter the ministerial profession—and what facilities have they afforded for acquiring the requisite preparatory education? What are some of the circumstances which enhance the difficulty of rearing up a right and abundant ministry in the United States—and by what means can the end so desirable be best accomplished? These are among the questions, on which it would give us pleasure to cast even a few rays of light.

THE FIRST CENTURIES.

The first teachers of religion were selected by the Saviour himself—and during the whole of his ministry, while employed often as his assistants, they were kept always under his immediate instruction and supervision. Soon after the ascension, one of the greatest minds the world has produced, was associated by a supernatural calling with the twelve. The apostles and their immediate successors were endowed with the gift of tongues and other miraculous powers. In the infancy of the church, before time had been given for appropriate intellectual and spiritual cultivation, the teachers of Christianity were supernaturally qualified for their work. The gospel was announced beyond the limits of Judea to a great extent by men driven abroad by the fierce persécution of the times—the ordained and divinely assisted leaders directing the general movement, gathering churches, and perfecting their organization and instruction.

After the first founding of Christian institutions in the prominent cities of the Roman empire, and the gradual withdrawal of supernatural agencies, which were given only, according to the exigency of the times, for the first planting of the church—and especially after the inspired apostles and their pupils the apostolic men, such as Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, were dead—the need of educated and commanding minds began more and more to be felt. This want was met in part by learned Pagans converted to Christianity, of whom Justin Martyr, Pantænus, and Origen, are illustrious examples. Common Christians were unable to cope with learned heathenism—or direct the more and more complicated affairs of the church. Nor were the converted philosophers sufficiently numerous, had they all been otherwise qualified, for the purpose. The church was constrained, therefore, by her circumstances, as well as inspired by the liberalizing atmosphere of a free Christianity which she had begun to breathe, to take measures for the education of her own sons. From almost the beginning, even in deep poverty and distraction, the early Christians are believed

to have taught their children the principles of Christianity, and laid the foundations for their being intelligent and worthy members of the churches. There is no evidence, however, that anything like a regular theological school for the education of a ministry was established earlier than the middle of the second century. The school at Alexandria seems to have grown up gradually, as the necessities of the times urged it forward. Under Pantænus, Clement and Origen, it gradually became an informal indeed, but real, theological seminary. To it flocked learned Pagans—and young men who desired to be instructed in the Christian doctrines and to become teachers in the church. Instruction was here given in the Scriptures, in the dogmas of religion and in Christian manners and duties. It was long the nursery of piety and learning—the alma mater of holy and learned men who were the lights of the church.*

Although we find no traces of schools so celebrated in the West, yet every church was virtually a school, and in it under the superintendence of the bishops young men of promise were educated in Christian principles and letters. Indeed, say the Benedictines on the authority of Fleury (*Dis. 2, n. 14, p. 69*), that though the schools were generally common to all the faithful, this could not prevent the bishops having ordinarily with them a certain number of young men whom they instructed with particular care as their children, and who in process of time became themselves masters. It was thus that the great luminaries of the occidental world were formed even down to the fourth and fifth centuries.†

As to the manner in which young men were selected, supported and educated for the ministry, no very clear light has come down to us. That the bishops began to train young candidates for the sacred office, in schools connected with the central church of their dioceses, there can be no reasonable doubt. And that pecuniary means to facilitate the education of such were not wanting, we have not only the intimation above given, but the fact that enormous funds were early placed at the disposal of the bishops, to be disbursed for the benefit of the church, at their discretion. This was done by abundant oblations from charitable church-members—and by legacies of deceased Christians, to whom the church instead of relatives was often made the principal heir. By the middle of the second century the church of Rome not only supported the clerks and poor Christians of their own city, but bestowed largely of their abundance upon other churches near and remote, supplying food also to Christian prisoners and to many condemned to work

* Mosheim, Vol. I. p. 81. Neander, Vol. I. 527, &c.

† *Histoire Littéraire de la France, par Benedictins, Tom. I. p. 234.*

in the mines. The hope of confiscating the ecclesiastical treasures was among the principal causes that induced the emperors after the death of Commodus, to engage in the persecutions which followed. Great privileges and immunities were granted and new sources of wealth were opened to the church, by Constantine. Up to the commencement of the fourth century, the present custom of leaving estates for specific objects had not been introduced. Christians gave or bequeathed absolutely, and all charitable benefactions were thrown into the common stock to be distributed by "the ecclesiastical colleges called churches" at their discretion. Church property still increased, princes making large grants, and private persons, even to the exclusion of their children, bequeathing estates to the churches, while many widows and damsels were induced to leave their wealth to the common cause. This property soon came chiefly under the management of the ecclesiastics. "The bishops disposed of everything, the deacons executed it, and all the clergy lived upon what the church had, though all did not administer. St. John Chrisostome makes mention that the church of Antioch fed above 3,000 persons at the public expense."*

During the first three or four hundred years, then, of the Christian era, the church had evidently the means of furnishing herself with a competent ministry—its first teachers enjoying the instructions of the Saviour himself—the next generation educated by inspired apostles; then many Pagan philosophers and other learned men of Greece and Rome converted to Christianity, were soon qualified to lead in its affairs; and finally enormous sums, with almost unlimited discretion, were placed in the hands of the bishops, whose business it was, in looking after the general interests of the church, to provide for the supply of its sacred offices, and who, in schools connected with their churches, and in their own families, could educate charitably or otherwise, as the circumstances might be, a competent number of excellent men for these high trusts. Add to this the religious enthusiasm of the times, the eagerness with which wealthy parents would devote their children as well as their property to the church; and we can readily suppose there would be no lack of tolerably educated candidates for the ministry.

From the commencement of the fourth century, the inducements to enter the ecclesiastical ranks were of the most powerful kind. They appealed not merely to the religious feelings of the more ardent and devout, but to the ambition of worldly-minded men. The church had already gained an external conquest over the world. Bishops were nearly its sovereigns,

* A Treatise of Matters Beneficiary. By Fra Paolo Sarpi. Mirandola, A. D. 1676.

and priests and ecclesiastics were sharers in their immunities and advantages. The hope of honour, emolument, influence, power, called loudly upon aspiring and able youth to consecrate themselves to the church, and prepare themselves for the superintendence of its affairs. Many generous and devoted young men entered upon the ministry with honest aims, and hearts ready for sacrifice, while others of feeblér faith and more doubtful piety were not repelled by any expectation of hardship from the inviting field; and others still of much baser character and motive, embraced the sacred office as the surest means to comfort and aggrandizement. The clergy of each diocese, with their bishop, formed a privileged society by themselves. Freed from all personal taxes and public burdens, especially such as are connected with military service, and under which the laity groaned—all comfortably supported, if not absolutely rich, enjoying the best society which the times afforded, revered for sanctity by the people, having the means of improvement in their hands, with a fair prospect for wealth and promotion in view, it would be strange if in this state of things the ranks of the clergy were not filled to overflowing. Such was in fact the case; and as the church became corrupt, and introduced heathenish ceremonies into her simple worship, an increased multitude of clerical leaders and subordinates could find at least a nominal occupation in the sacerdotal robe. In the cathedrals of Constantinople and Carthage, the clerical establishment contained no less than some five hundred ecclesiastical functionaries.*

Opportunities were not wanting for suitable preparatory instruction. We have already seen, that in every diocese there was at least one general or cathedral school, designed not only to instruct catechumens of whatever age, in the faith, but also to carry forward in the principles of Christian learning, those young men who aspired to the sacred profession. These schools were at first under the immediate personal superintendence of the bishops. But when these officers came afterwards to be involved more and more in the complicated affairs of the church, they appointed learned men to act under their general supervision, as teachers of the young. With such masters, the cathedral schools were gradually formed into organizations which were the germs or foreshadowings of those great seminaries of learning which adorn modern ages. It does not appear that the profane sciences were taught in Christian schools previous to the fourth century. But from that time Christians availed

* Neander, Vol. II. p. 151, Gibbon. Vol. II. p. 423. Guizot's History of Civilization, Vol. I. p. 64.

themselves to a considerable extent of the famous Pagan classical seminaries which flourished in all the great cities of civilized Europe. Christian masters, also, though professedly confining themselves to theology and morality, introduced human science as not without its utility in enabling one to understand and defend the dogmas of the church.*

THE DARK AGES.

We have come to the time when the civilized world was visited by a shipwreck of literary institutions, and the general destruction of literature and science in society. The repeated and overwhelming irruptions of the Northern barbarians upon civilized Europe, produced universal desolation, especially as respects those studies which refine and elevate mankind. "The gradation," say the Benedictines, "is very remarkable. The irruption of the barbarians caused the entire ruin of the empire; the ruin of the empire destroyed ambition to cultivate the sciences; want of ambition occasioned negligence, and contempt of letters; these produced idleness, which, as a necessary consequence, was followed by ignorance; and ignorance plunged its victims into anarchy and vice."†

About A. D. 500, monasteries began to be established in Europe, and the benefactions of the liberal were henceforth given to them, instead of the clergy. These institutions acquired immense possessions, which, according to the will of the donor, were spent in supporting monks, in hospitality, in aiding the poor, "in schooling and educating of youth," and in other pious works.‡

Monasticism arose at a very early period in the East. The original monks were eremites; in Egypt and in Syria they dwelt for a time alone. Afterwards, being formed into associations, they lived secluded from the world, and passed their time in labour, devotional services, and in begging their support. In the West, the institution was from the beginning of a more human-like and elevating character. It was designed for religious men who, in retirement from the world, might find enjoyment and discharge duty in Christian studies, devotional services, self-discipline, useful labour and beneficent deeds. Religion fled to them as a covert from the times, and literature and science were saved from utter destruction, by finding an asylum in these retreats. Indeed, of many of them, schools were at first the leading characteristics. The theological

* *Histoire Littéraire de la France.* Par Benedictins. Tome I.

† *Lit. His. Ben.*, Tome II. p. 31.

‡ *Fra Paolo Sarpi, Benef.*, p. 9.

cœnobium under Schaumburgus was intended chiefly for a school and an ecclesia of theologians.*

Monasteries were founded in Gaul and other parts of Europe, originally without much expense to the public. When an association was formed for the purpose, as much wild land was ceded to them as they would cultivate, and their time was divided between prayers, study, and labour on the soil. After preparatory attention to the arts, the time devoted to study was spent upon the great works of the Latin and Greek fathers, and upon the Scriptures. Every convent had its library, and many of the feebler monks were employed in copying ancient manuscripts, instead of working upon the soil. Although their primary business was with spiritual learning, for almost the whole of the Latin and Greek classics which have come down to us we are indebted to their indefatigable labours. Every monastery had its school for the instruction of the youth who came thither to embrace the monastic life. In them were trained some of the finest minds of the age. Of the famous monastery of the Isle de Levins, it was said by S. Cæsaire, "that here excellent monks were educated and sent out for bishops in all the provinces. They were received small, and were returned great. From being weak and without experience, in understanding and influence they became kings. The institution raised its members to the highest degree of virtue, even to Jesus Christ, on the wings of charity and humility."†

Monasteries were multiplied to an almost incredible extent. It is said that there were no less than 15,000 connected with the Benedictines at one time. They were open, on easy conditions, to all classes. The rich and the noble often sent in their sons to be educated for the church. The poor, especially orphans, and many of them from early childhood, were received on charity; while the middling classes, and the wealthy, if they pleased, could here find an asylum for life, on condition of assenting to the rules of the order, and contributing their possessions to the common stock. The cause of this wonderful rush to the monasteries may be found in the circumstances of the times. Some were moved by a fervent religious spirit; some by conscious crimes or sins—mistaking the true means of expiation; but very many were driven by the public confusion which prevailed, by terror of the barbarians, by the exorbitant demands of the ruling powers, and by a knowledge of the fact (which soon became general), that these humble abodes of the professedly self-renouncing were the true, and after a time almost the only, roads to preferment and honour in the church.‡

* Magdeburgh Centuries, seventh century, p. 89.

† Ben., Tome II. p. 39.

‡ Neander, Vol. II. p. 261.

Consequently, says Gibbon, "whole legions were buried in these religious sanctuaries. Here, peasants, slaves, mechanics, as well as some noblemen and noblemen's sons, found shelter and subsistence."*

About the time when so many monasteries were founded on the Continent by Jerome, Columban, Benedict and others, Christianity was propagated in Ireland by St. Patrick, and monasteries were established in that region. "The lands which he received as presents from converted chieftains he applied to the founding of cloisters which were designed to serve as nursing schools for teachers of the people, and from them was to proceed the civilization of the country."† The monastery of Bangor, in Flintshire, where the world-renowned missionary Columban was educated, contained at one time above 2,000 brethren. He was the founder of the famous school of the prophets in Iona, which, though a monastic institution, was for a long period, after the middle of the sixth century, the great light of insular Europe. Many similar establishments sprang up in Scotland, Ireland and Wales, so that during the next 400 years not less than a hundred convents rose and flourished, on the model of Iona.

There were other facilities for ministerial education. The great schools at Alexandria and Athens still flourished, though not perhaps in all their glory. There were schools also in Rome, Constantinople and other places which Christian princes still patronized—some of them like Amalasontha, regent for her son Athalerick about A.D. 530, pledging the teachers their full salary out of the public treasures.‡ The bishop Etherius collected the boys of his community, instructed each one in letters; *eique agros et vineas largitus est*, as the citizens bestowed their liberality on him. Patroclus built an oratorium in which he instructed boys for the church.§ Gregory the Great established a school of young singers which he himself directed and to which he gave revenues and dwelling-houses at Rome. Even to the ninth century there were those who pretended to show the bed on which lying he used to sing, and the rod with which he threatened the boys.|| There were few examples among the religious teachers of this darkening period who attempted to communicate even the elements of philological learning, but sacred psalmody was indispensable to a good theological education. When we think of the Gregorian chant, we cannot but respect the taste of its author, enemy as he was to secular

* Gib., IV. p. 378.

† Neander, Vol. II. p. 124.

‡ Schröckh's *Christliche Kirchengeschichte*, Theil XVI. 60. 61.

§ *Magdeburgh Centuries*, Vol. II., sixth century, p. 205.

|| Schröckh's *Christliche Kirchengeschichte*, Theil XVI. 63.

learning. At the Council of Vauance A.D. 592, it was ordered that all ministers according to the salutary custom observed through all Italy should take the young unmarried readers into their houses, teach them psalms, keep them to the reading of the Holy Scriptures, and instruct them in the law of the Lord.*

Though ignorance, in the sixth century had become deplorable, yet some of the old secular schools still survived. There were also a great number of cathedral schools, one at least in every diocese, under the direction of the bishop or of some scholar or scholars appointed by him. These were spread all over Gaul and other parts of christianized Europe. In them youth were instructed to some extent in the liberal arts, by way of preparation for those sacred studies which constituted the principal business of the schools.†

Pausing a moment at the commencement of the seventh century, we can see, on looking back over the preceding three hundred years, that up to this time there could have been no want of clergymen, qualified according to the ideas of the times, for the sacred office. The vast wealth of the church, the power and immunities of its ministers, cathedral schools, and cloisters—confusion in civil affairs, driving many of the first minds into the monastic seminaries—the ease with which any young man could obtain an education for the ministry—learning concentrated in the ecclesiastical orders, preferment to be hoped for chiefly in the line of the same—these circumstances would naturally crowd the clerical ranks to their utmost capacity.

From this period, viz. the end of the sixth century, down to the time of Charlemagne towards the close of the eighth, the same general system of theological education was preserved. The episcopal schools still sustain themselves, though in waning glory. Distinguished prelates, lights of the age, if lights they should be called, superintended the instruction of these seminaries of knowledge.‡ In the diocese of Vienne the number of the schools was prodigious. Within these limits there were said to be no less than sixty monasteries, without including those of the capital.§ The monks of France were accustomed, under direction of the bishops, to give instruction and preach in the country, hear the confessions of worldly men, and announce the faith in unenlightened regions.|| Some of the monastic schools became very distinguished, and were the literary and religious *cunabula* of many of the finest minds of the age.¶ Such especially were the schools of Luxen and Fontenelle. Young men of the first families flocked to them for

* Schröckh's Christliche Kirchengeschichte, Theil XVI. 64.

† Ben., Lit., Vol. III. p. 30, 31.

§ Ben., III. 432.

|| Ibid. 435.

‡ Ben., III. 425, 428.

¶ Ibid. 437.

he purpose of obtaining the elements of science and the first principles of Christian truth.* The monastery of St. Midard at Soissons was very celebrated both for discipline and letters. Four hundred monks sustained there the perpetual psalmody, while in a public academy connected with the convent, divine and human sciences were taught. In the school of the monastery of Montier la Celle were found many bishops and writers not without merit, while from the monastery of St. Germain at Auxerre were chosen nearly all the prelates who governed the church in that region.† It is easy to judge, say the Benedictines, what great care must have been taken to cultivate letters in these institutions, from the fact that the lights of the age proceeded as much from them as from the episcopal schools. Indeed these last often derived their glory from the former, inasmuch as the greater part of the bishops at the head of the episcopal schools had themselves received their education in the cloisters.‡ The French schools of this age also formed a great number of able missionaries who went forth and established Christianity in the unevangelized parts of Gaul. So that while the church was suffering great losses in the East, it was making great acquisitions by missionary labours in the West.§

The principal difference in the condition of letters between the fifth and seventh centuries, consists in this. Laymen generally, and a part of the clergy, neglected learning, while the monks gave greatly increased attention to it. Few, however, wrote for posterity, or took any pains to preserve original productions.||

Indeed, notwithstanding the favourable account of the Parisian Benedictines, respecting their much-admired Gaul, learning as they also frequently confess, both secular and ecclesiastical, was in a deplorable condition. The time of students was spent on comparatively insignificant studies, while thorough scholarship had almost disappeared from society. But the little knowledge which existed among the clergy was quite equal to the demand. Laical ignorance contented itself with ecclesiastical ignorance for its guide. High offices in the church were open to the most worldly-minded aspirants who had the ability to secure the favour of lawless princes, and were willing to wear occasionally the sacerdotal robes. From the beginning of the year 500, every clerk had been ordained to some office, and lived upon the common maintenance. None were ordained without a benefice, or, in the centuries next following, without at least the expectation of a benefice. But, about the times just preceding the reign of Charlemagne, while

* Ben. III. 438.

§ Ibid. 447.

† Ibid. 441.

|| Ibid. 455.

‡ Ibid. 443.

many made themselves clergymen to secure exemptions, stipends and emoluments, as also to obtain rank, wealth and power, through "the wealthiness of the benefices," chief men of the court, city, or government, were often elevated by their unscrupulous princes to the office and professions of the bishops.* All these circumstances combined go to show that what with some self-denying men who courted hardship for Christ's sake in the more difficult labours of the church, and many partially-educated monks suffering with ennui in their monotonous employments which had now become exceedingly jejune and unprofitable to the intellect, and longing for the freedom of active service—and what with ambitious and unprincipled aspirants to posts of affluence and honour, the ranks of the clergy, educated more or less as circumstances might demand, must always have been crowded to excess.

Charlemagne was the great light of the dark ages. A man of a rough but generous spirit, of indomitable energy, of an intellect gigantic for the times, invincible in war, he had also some natural tendencies towards refinement, a desire to extend civilization, and most of all, a rude zeal for the prosperity of the church. Our subject and our limits will not allow us to speak further of him as a statesman and a soldier. Without early education, he had the sagacity, in his manhood, to see that wisdom is the handmaid of virtue, and that knowledge is power. For the benefit of his kingdom, and especially of the church, he invited learned men to his court, and established a school in his imperial palace. The chief master of this seminary was Alcuin, a distinguished scholar and theologian, an Englishman from the great monastic school at York. Among the pupils were Charles, Pepin, and Louis, sons of Charlemagne; two archbishops—Riculf, archbishop of Mayence, and Rigbod, archbishop of Trèves; several of his privy-councillors, his daughter and his sister, both of the name of Gisla, and a part of the time the monarch himself. For the re-establishment of the monastic and episcopal schools which had now everywhere fallen into decay, Charlemagne published an *imperial circular*, of which the following is an extract:

"Charles, by the aid of God, &c., to Bangulf, Abbott, and his brotherhood, health:

"We beg to inform your Devotion to God, that, in concert with our councillors, we have deemed it beneficial that in the bishoprics and monasteries confided by the favour of Christ to our government, care should be taken not only to live orderly and according to our holy religion, but moreover to instruct in

* Fra Paolo Sarpi, p. 13, 26.

the knowledge of letters, and according to the capacity of individuals, all such as are able to learn." * * * *

"It is certain, at all events, that the allegories, emblems and imagery of the holy writings will be more readily comprehended in their true spiritual meaning, by those who are versed in general learning." * * * * "As you value our favour, fail not to communicate copies of this communication to all the suffragan bishops, and all the monasteries around you."*

Under the influence of such men as Alcuin, Theodulph, bishop of Orleans, and Leidrade, afterwards archbishop of Lyons, the theological schools were everywhere re-established, and began to obtain celebrity. Among the capitularies of Theodulph, are the following: "If any priest wishes to send his nephew or any other of his relatives to school, we allow him to be sent to the church of St. Croix, or to the monastery of St. Argnor, or of St. Lipard, or any other monastery confided to our government." "Let the priests hold schools in villages and districts, and if any of the faithful wish to confide their young children to them, in order to have them study letters, let them not refuse to receive and instruct them in perfect charity." * * * * "And while instructing children, let them exact no price therefor and receive nothing, except when the parent shall offer it them willingly, and out of affection."† The last two sentences are quoted partly to introduce the remark of Guizot, who had so thoroughly studied the history of these times, that "this last article is almost the only monument of this epoch which positively institutes a teaching destined for others than priests. All the measures, whether of Alcuin or Charlemagne, which I have hitherto spoken of, have the literary education of priests for their object."‡ The views of Charlemagne on the subject are more fully expressed perhaps in another ordinance of which we copy a part: "Charles, by the aid of God, king of the Franks and Lombards, and prince of the Romans, to the high ministers of religion throughout our dominions; having it near at heart that the churches should more and more advance towards perfection, and being desirous of restoring by assiduous care the cultivation of letters which have almost entirely disappeared amongst us, in consequence of the neglect and indifference of our ancestors, we would excite by our own example all well-disposed persons to the study of the liberal arts."§

Under the influence of Charlemagne and his learned co-adjutors at court, perpetuated by his immediate successors, Lewis

* Guizot, *Hist. Civ.*, Vol. III. p. 38.

† *Ibid.* p. 60.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 60.

§ *Ibid.* p. 36.

the Meek and Charles the Bald, the episcopal schools and cloister schools which had so degenerated as to be almost worthless, were revived—and others were established all over the empire. They were designed, as already intimated, for the clergy, as much knowledge was not often considered necessary in other stations. Decrees were passed in council that every bishop should employ some learned men to instruct the young priests of his congregation in the doctrines and in the manner of preaching the same according to the purest understanding of the fathers; that church music should be taught in these schools, lest ignorance of this sacred art should lead to ignorance in every other kind of useful knowledge. The bishops established schools in their dioceses, especially to instruct the young ecclesiastics in religion and in the arts, so far as they were thought conducive thereto. It was an established principle in the cathedral schools, that next to their own studies, the wiser and more experienced should devote themselves to the instruction of the younger. Especially was this expected of the cloister schools, which were still richer, more numerous, more firmly established, more flourishing.*

But the splendour which ushered in the ninth century was soon to be eclipsed. The division of the empire, the distraction of society which followed, and the recklessness of princes in seizing upon church property,—though the reformation in letters was never afterwards in all places wholly destroyed, re-plunged the world generally into darkness. And as usually happens, when circumstances allow the re-action its full force, temporary illumination was followed by a deeper night. Before the close of the century, ignorance and corruption overspread society, the clergy and the schools not excepted. “The ignorance of the clergy was so great that few of them could read or write, and *very* few could express their thoughts with precision and clearness.”† Confusion, deterioration approaching barbarity, marked the age. Bishops were distinguished chiefly for voluptuousness, and priests and monks by the vices they were set to reform. Kings and princes seized upon church property, and bestowed it upon their dependents. The powerful who had the command of benefices filled them with inefficient and often immoral ministers, who would suffer vices to pass unproved, or gave them as a means of support to such sons of chief families as by the feebleness of their talents could acquire a living in no other way.‡

In the tenth century, men of learning and piety were still

* Schröckh's *Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. XXI. p. 138, &c.

† Murdock's *Mosheim*, Vol. II. p. 60.

‡ *Ibid.* pp. 60, 61.

more uncommon, and even in the best of the schools little of much value was taught. The century has been justly called the *iron age*, as respects literature and science in European Christendom. But ignorance was not the worst feature of the times. The moral light had become darkness, and how great that darkness! The clergy of this age have been, not unjustly, characterised as "illiterate, stupid, ignorant," "libidinous, superstitious, and flagitious."*

We cannot follow down in detail the gloomy history of the ages immediately following. Partial reformatations were here and there attempted, a few new schools were established and taught with some success; there were ecclesiastics who had mastered the Trivium and even some the Quadrivium; but, with honourable exceptions, the corruption of morals among the clergy was deplorable and astonishing. Everything on the whole went on from bad to worse, down to the establishment of the great universities of modern times, and in some respects even down to the Reformation. Whoever would refresh his memory with the dark side of those dark and dreadful days, may turn to page 369 of the second volume of Mosheim, and read the translator's note, which he will there find, as descriptive of clerical manners in the fourteenth century. It is an exhibition of moral putridity which had been steadily accumulating and festering for almost 500 years.

This brief review of ministerial education in the dark ages shows that clerical ignorance is the sure precursor of public corruption; and that down almost, if not quite, to the times of the Reformation, the church could not have suffered from the want of such ministers as she was willing in her degradation to receive.

UNIVERSITY OF PARIS.

The oldest universities of Europe sprung up in the twelfth century. Distinguished teachers, like William of Champeaux, and Peter Abelard his disciple, proposed to give public instruction to such as would hear them. In the new stimulus felt by the human mind, multitudes rushed to the seats of learning thus established, and for their benefit, suitable charters being obtained, universities were established. That at Paris was chiefly a theological school, and was for several centuries designated the "first school of the church." All its graduates, whether in the faculties of the arts or of divinity, had the power of teaching in the university. Its pupils were exempted from all taxes, customs, personal burdens, and the institution received

* Murdock's Mosheim, Vol. II. p. 119.

great privileges and immunities. In 1453, the school at Paris had 25,000 students, and soon after, it is said, 30,000. It was difficult for the scholars, on account of their great number, to find suitable lodgings. Various expedients were adopted to remedy this inconvenience. But the poorer students being still exposed to great hardships, certain benevolent individuals erected buildings for their use, making provisions in them both for free lodgings and free board, to which afterwards stipends were added to defray general expenses. These foundations were first established by the religious orders, for the benefit of students in theology.* This department was founded and chiefly endowed as a college by Robert de Sorbonne, and thus derived the name of Sorbonna or Sorbonne, which it has retained.† Provisions of the same character became afterwards numerous and abundant.

A good account of what is now called the University of France may be found in Vol. XI. of the "*American Quarterly Register*," 1836, written by the Rev. Dr. Baird, at that time residing in Paris. The old and world-renowned University of Paris was broken up and destroyed in the Revolution, 1792, and has never since been restored on its former plan—though the system of higher education in Paris is virtually the same as before. The University of France has reference to the entire school system of the kingdom, including the schools of collegiate and theological education. There are 300 communal colleges supported chiefly by tuition fees of pupils. The Royal Colleges are forty in number. They are supported by government, which also makes provision for a great number of students at the public expense. The salaries of professors are small, but pensions are granted to the superannuated who have served more than twenty years.

There are eight Faculties of Theology, six of them Catholic, one Lutheran. In 1815, there were 5,233 theological students. The government gives annually to the Catholic theological seminaries, for the education of young men for the ministry, 2,525 bourses, valued at 400 francs each, making in all the enormous sum of 189,375 dolls.; while to the Protestants it grants 30 bourses and 60 demi-bourses, amounting to 4,500 dolls.‡

The Royal and Communal Colleges are not professional schools, but schools of secondary instruction, corresponding somewhat to the gymnasia of Germany, the Rugby and Eton schools in England, and our own colleges. Pupils are admitted, however, at a very early age, sometimes when not more than

* *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

† *Mosheim*, Vol. II. p. 228.

‡ *Am. Q. Reg.*, Vol. XI.

eight or nine years old, and with very small acquirements.* The college courses, 1836, are most entirely Latin and Greek, with a little Geography, History, and Rhetoric. Examinations for degrees in arts are confined to these two ancient languages, except that the pupils must answer any questions in philosophy, history, literature, and philology, suggested by the passages in which they are examined. From these schools they proceed to the study of theology and other professions.† The higher schools are excessively stimulated by prizes, competitions, &c., all the way up into society.‡

Connect the foregoing with the public maintenance of the clergy, and there appears no want of available means in Catholic France for educating a priesthood and filling its ranks to excess.

ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES.

The English universities and endowed schools next demand our attention. That the gospel was preached in England at a very early period, by apostolic men, if not by an apostle, and with success, there can be no reasonable doubt. It is also probable that Lucius, an English king or nobleman, performed important service in the reviving and extending of British churches, in the second century; and that not long after, efficient measures were taken for the establishment of schools for the education of the clergy. Indeed, it is affirmed that this same Lucius was the founder of the great monastery at Bangor, which flourished so remarkably in the early centuries. It was at first a college of Christian philosophy, or an academy of liberal arts and learned men; but after a time, was changed into a monastery under title of apostolic order.§ The Magdeburgh Centuries speak of it as being a most noble college in the reign of Constantine, nourishing more than 2,000 men in Christian studies.|| In A.D. 603, Adelfred, king of Bernicia, having laid siege to Chester, twelve hundred and fifty monks went out from this monastery with the Britons, to assist, by their prayers and encouraging exhortations, in the defence. The enraged king sent a detachment who attacked these unarmed monks with such vigour, that only fifty of them escaped. After the surrender of Chester, he took possession of Bangor, and entirely destroyed the monastery, "a building so extensive that there was a mile's distance from one gate of it to another, and it contained two thousand one hundred monks."¶

* Bache's Report on Education in Europe, 1839.

† Essays by the London Central Society of Education, Vol. I.

‡ Bache.

§ Usher's *Britannicarum Ecclesiarum Primordiis*, Chap. V. p 132, &c.

|| Cent., IV., Chap. VII.

¶ Hume's Eng., Vol. I. p. 32, Harper's Ed.

To Iona, where was the great institution founded by Columban towards the end of the sixth century, we have already alluded. It was for several centuries the principal theological seminary of the Scottish church, and in it most of her clergy were educated.* The whole island had been given to the Scotch (Irish) monks by the Picts for preaching the gospel to them. Camden's *Brit.*, Vol. II. 401. An able account of this institution, by Rev. Dr. Pond, may be found in the *A. Q. R.*, Vol. IX. As to the manner in which they were supported, a general remark will apply to this and all similar schools of the times, whether in England or on the continent. They were connected with monasteries. The monks maintained themselves partly by manual labour, on the lands conveyed to the institutions by their founders and patrons, partly by property bestowed upon them by richer members, who, in renouncing the world for the seclusion of a cœnobite, had volunteered, according to the custom, to cast their possessions into the common stock, and partly by the contributions and legacies of "the faithful," who were disposed to sustain the cause of Christian learning, or make the sainted anchorites the almoners of their bounty to the poor.†

When Alfred succeeded to the throne of England, A.D. 871, the nation was found deeply sunk in ignorance and barbarism. Dreadful ravages had been made by the Danes, who destroyed the monasteries, burnt the libraries, butchered or dispersed the monks. Such was the ignorance of the times, that Alfred complains that he knew of no one south of the Thames who could interpret the Latin service. This prince made great efforts to restore learning, and was formerly reputed the founder of Oxford University, which, according to Mr. Hume, he endowed with privileges, revenues and immunities.‡ This statement of the English historian is now generally discredited. But, whoever may have been the founder of the university, there is good evidence that, as early as the end of the ninth century, "Oxford was the seat of a school of the highest intellectual activity then existing."§ By the end of the eleventh century, it had as good a title to be called a University as Paris.|| In the thirteenth century, it is said that no less than 30,000 scholars, including young and old, servitors, waiters, &c., were enrolled as connected with it. Allowing for exaggeration, it is certain that this seat of learning was thronged by immense multitudes of pupils. They were not, however, all nor chiefly theological students.

* Mosheim, Vol. I. p. 381, u. 7.

† Gib., Vol. IV. p. 334.

‡ Hume, Vol. I. p. 74.

§ Huber's *Hist. of the Eng. Universities*, edited by F. W. Newman, A.D. 1843.

|| *Ibid.* p. 43.

The nation at large was waking to life, and thousands flocked to the great fountains of learning to satisfy the thirst for knowledge, and prepare for the various stations which intelligent society should offer. The institution, however, met with reverses, and so lost its popularity, that, A.D. 1438, it was said, "out of so many thousand students reputed to have been here at a former time, not one thousand now remains to us."*

Cambridge was raised into a seat of learning first by the monks of England, who maintained their establishment for a time at a place about thirty miles north of that city. We hear of it in the eleventh century. After undergoing various fortunes like its elder sister, both universities, subsequent to the Wickliffite controversy, were abandoned by the people very much to the clergy. Oxford was miserably poor. The only university building of any importance erected before the Reformation, was a theological school, for which the university begged assistance from all quarters. "It still stands as a splendid memorial of the architecture of the reign of Edward IV."† The pupils were now mostly taken from the poorer classes, "so that in fact few of the academic population could support themselves." Henry VI. founded King's College, and gave many benefactions and stipends to scholars, while wealthy prelates and other great men maintained a certain number of students, at their own expense, and teachers were supported by ecclesiastical endowments and clerical benefices.‡ Indeed, the number of students now greatly depended upon the number of endowments for their support.

The most effective means employed, in the education of young men, especially for the ministry, was in the founding and endowing of colleges. These were intimately connected with the university, under its general supervision, making a part of it, but having property and rights of their own. They were not intended originally to support graduates, but "to assist clerical students through their course of study," which might last from ten to fifteen years. As a necessary evil, the Fellows were allowed to retain their stipends till they could secure a benefice; the college Fellows thus became gradually, "the actual stem of the university." The college system was, originally, briefly this: benevolent individuals established foundations for indigent scholars, erected buildings in which they lived, and entrusted the affairs of the institution to overseers, who, in their corporate capacity, were called a college. The system begins with 4 magistri, who formed University College, in Oxford, and proceeds to the 70 Fellows in King's College, Cambridge. Bishop Wykenham founded the first complete college. His endowment was named

* Huber's Hist. of the Eng. Universities, edited by F. W. Newman, A.D. 1843, p. 168.

† Ibid. p. 168.

‡ Huber, Vol. I. p. 171.

New College. It was established in the university at Oxford, and contained 70 Fellows, of whom 50 were theologians, 8 canonists, 10 chaplains, 3 choralists, and 16 chorister boys. The college had 12 prebendaries as teachers, 270 free admissions for scholars. A Latin school, kept at Winchester for preparatory education, was attached to the college.* "From the first, the endowed members of the colleges either belonged by preference to the ecclesiastical order, or were destined to the church."† The foundations were for students, masters of arts being considered students also, only of a higher class. These last being allowed to remain in their places till they could obtain a benefice in the Church, or were otherwise provided for, became in time so numerous as to occupy sometimes all the places, and exclude younger students. Hence, in the fifteenth century, foundations were given chiefly "to furnish a decent and permanent maintenance for poor men of learning of the clerical order," and not as mere stipends for undergraduates. The degree of Master of Arts became gradually a tacit condition of election to a Fellowship. This mode of filling the foundations was the predominating one at the end of the fifteenth century.‡

About this time, or a little before, the spirit for classical learning began to revive. Enthusiasm for this species of scholarship reached its highest point during the reign of Henry VIII. and under the influence of Cardinal Wolsey. This new movement was sustained chiefly by individual energy. The Eton and Cambridge foundations of Henry VI. and his noble queen had probably the revival of classical learning in view. Corpus Christi College was founded, A.D. 1516, by Fox, bishop of Winchester, especially to encourage classical attainments. It was endowed for 20 fellows, 20 stipendiary students, and 3 professorships, Greek, Latin, and Theology.§ Cardinal College was established by Wolsey in Oxford. The revenues of 22 priories and convents were diverted to it, by papal bulls and royal privileges, in 1524 and 1525. Provision was made for 60 canonists and 40 priests, with 10 endowed professorships, besides subordinate situations, stipends, &c., making in all not less than 160 members. Wolsey contributed the first year £8,000 from his own princely revenues, and also founded at Ipswich a great Latin school of preparatory education to be connected with it. Wolsey's College, after being exposed to destruction by the king, was revived by him, and further endowed with lectureships and 100 studentships. It is now called Christ's Church College, and has attained an uncontested supremacy over all institutions of the kind.||

* Huber, Vol. I. p. 201.

† Ibid. p. 203.

‡ Ibid. p. 204.

§ Ibid. p. 231.

|| Ibid. p. 262.

Queen Elizabeth was a distinguished patroness of learning. Through her influence, those who sought her favour founded the Rugby school, and nearly a third of all the endowed schools in England—of which, including Ireland and Wales, there are three or four hundred. In her reign the universities, which for a long time had been frequented chiefly by the sons of the lower classes, began to enjoy the favour of the aristocracy—and a degree became the mark of a gentleman. Sons of the gentry in Elizabeth's time, and ever since, have composed the greater part of the academic population, though ecclesiastics have always maintained a leading control, and have occupied most of the Fellowships in the institution.*

Both the universities have been greatly enriched with new colleges, and increased endowments for the old ones, since the times of Elizabeth. The resources of Christ's Church, Oxford, amount now to over £80,000 a-year. It lodges about 400 persons within its walls, having a splendid room, and sometimes suites of rooms, for each.†

Fellowships in the colleges are of different value. There are some in Oxford which are worth, in prosperous years, not less than £600 or £700, while others produce an income of not more than £100, and some in Cambridge are still smaller. But all secure to the foundationers board and lodging, and are now tenable for life, unless the holder marries, becomes possessed of large estates, or accepts a more lucrative living elsewhere. The scholarships vary, in annual value, from £100 to £80, and even £20 or less, though with some additional advantages in respect to board. There are also, in most of the colleges, a class of scholars, known as exhibitioners, who receive annual pensions either from the college, or from endowed schools of which these scholars were formerly members. Some of the exhibitions are said to be very valuable. The professorships are all established by the crown, or by private endowments, though the holders of these offices have little to do, except read lectures occasionally. In 1839 there were in Oxford, besides five halls, partially endowed, nineteen endowed colleges. In Magdalen College, for instance, there were on the foundations a president, 40 fellows, 30 demies, schoolmaster, usher, 4 chaplains, 4 organists, 8 clerks, and 16 choristers; Corpus Christi College, a president, 20 fellows, 20 scholars, 2 chaplains, and 4 exhibitioners; St. John's College, a president, 50 fellows and scholars, chaplain, &c. There were in all 557 fellowships, 26 university scholarships, 2 university fellowships, 399 college scholarships, exhibitioners, &c.; 8 university benefices, valued at £2,400; 445 college benefices, valued at £136,500; besides col-

* Huber, Vol. I. p. 333.

† Ibid. Vol. II. p. 272.

lege prizes, university prizes, &c. The total revenue at Oxford for officers, fellows, scholarships, &c., was as follows: colleges, £152,670, university, £22,000; in all £174,670. Cambridge has not quite so many fellowships, but nearly twice as many scholarships, exhibitioners, &c. The value of its benefices is considerably less than of Oxford. The whole number on the books considered as belonging, in some capacity or other, to the institution, is a little larger at Cambridge than at Oxford—Cambridge 5,575, Oxford 5,264.* Indeed, the one institution is the counterpart of the other, Cambridge being the twin sister of Oxford, or the same *theme* with *variations*.

The University at Dublin sustains the same general character with the foregoing, though in all respects of much humbler dimensions. The universities of London, founded 1836, and of Durham, 1837, are of too recent origin to be of importance to our present purpose.

There are numerous endowed schools in England for preparatory education. The school at Westminster contains from 300 to 350 boys in eight classes. They are divided into town's boys and king's scholars. The king's scholars are always forty in number, and are chosen from the upper half of the school, chosen after severe examinations, chosen solely from merit. Being placed on a foundation is thus esteemed an honour, and is a preparation for a foundation at Christ's Church in Oxford, or Trinity College, Cambridge. At Eton, on the contrary, boys are admitted on the foundation at their first coming, without examinations, without special regard to merit, but chiefly because of indigent circumstances. Hence what is esteemed an honour at Westminster is considered a degradation at Eton. The foundation scholars at the latter school are, moreover, as a general thing, inferior to their fellow pupils of the same age and standing.† These facts are instructive especially in reference to the best manner of bestowing charity upon students who need help.

Reviewing the English universities in connection with the education and supply of Christian ministers, it will be readily seen, that there has been at no time any serious want of pecuniary means for preparing a sufficient number of men for the sacred office. "Down to the middle of the reign of Henry VIII.," says Macaulay, "no line of life bore so inviting an aspect to ambitious and covetous natures as the priesthood."‡ And though a reverse in the condition of the inferior clergy bore heavily upon a portion of the order towards the end of the

* Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. XXII.

† Edinburgh Review, March 1831.

‡ Macaulay, Hist. Eng., Vol. I. p. 303.

seventeenth century, yet on the whole the clerical profession in the established church has been full of invitations at least to serious and intelligent youth down to the present time. They may acquire an education, though indigent, in a highly honourable way—be sure of a comfortable living and standing in the best society as Fellows of a college till some beneficed parish is open for them—and there in a situation secured to them for life, enjoy learned leisure, opportunities for doing good, and the respect and friendship of the first classes in the country.

Church livings are also inviting to the educated younger sons of the nobility, who flock in great numbers to the church as a means of easy, honourable support and usefulness. Especially will this be the case while lucrative and easy situations are so numerous. Besides wealthy benefices which demand more or less labour, and the enormous incomes of the high Episcopal dignitaries, according to a late Parliamentary return it appears that in England and Wales there are no less than 51 *sinecure* benefices, of which 18 are in the diocese of Norwich, their value varying from £10 to £1,125 a-year, some of them even without any church whatever.* Valuable livings are also accessible to clerical aspirants in the extensive colonies of the British Dominions. When, in these situations, the clergy cannot derive their support from a parish or diocese over which they are placed, an ample allowance is afforded them out of the immense church revenues which are under the direction of the crown in connection with the ecclesiastical commission. Faithful service for a brief period in these remoter stations entitles the missionary to a support at home for the rest of his life. We are informed, for example, on unquestionable authority, that the gentleman some time since appointed bishop of Southern Africa, after spending ten years abroad, will be entitled to a discharge from further duty, and to receive a pension of £2,000 a-year, in his native country for the rest of his days.

Moreover, the nature of the education which these universities especially propose, and which clerical situations require, is peculiarly attractive to a class of people with which England, more than any other country in the world, abounds, to minds of intelligent dignity, conservative Christianity and tasteful seriousness. These universities undertake, not so much to form scholars, as gentlemen in the largest acceptation of the term—gentlemen to sustain the honours of a noble descent, clerical gentlemen to preserve and adorn the religion of the state, and school teachers of all grades who may educate the rising generation of gentlemen. "Sound common sense," says

* Boston Christian Advocate and Christian Witness, October 25, 1850.

Huber, quoting a passage from Kültner, who, he thinks, gives a just account of the best side of things, "a knowledge of the world and mankind, respectability and dignity of manners, with an understanding of the rules and ordinances of the church, are looked upon as the best Pastoral Theology."* These are traits of character which, among other still higher qualifications, all right-minded Christians would wish to see in the clergy, and which doubtless are promoted by the generous manner in which beneficiary aid is bestowed upon the youthful scholar preparing for his office—while the character of the preparatory education, and the duties of the profession, as thus defined, attract many of the first minds in the land to the sacred offices of the church.

DISSENTERS.

The Dissenters of England are not equally favoured in all these respects, with their brethren of the established order. Shut out from Oxford absolutely, by the ordinance which requires subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles, before matriculation; and from Cambridge virtually by the rule which requires the same conformity for a degree, the Dissenters were for a time "in an evil case." They soon, however, founded seminaries of learning for themselves, some of which are in a highly flourishing condition at this day. Alexander Bowers, in his history of the University of Edinburgh, published in 1817, says, "that the history of the education of English dissenting clergymen is little known" in Scotland, and has never been properly investigated even in England. The best account of these institutions with which we are acquainted, has been written since the above date, and published in the A. Q. R., VIII. IX. and subsequent volumes. The articles were compiled by Rev. B. B. Edwards, now Professor in Andover, from original materials obtained, partly in manuscript, from Rev. Drs. Reed and Matheson, and other distinguished Dissenters. The original Dissenters had, many of them, been educated as churchmen, in the English universities, and were thrown into the ranks of dissent, by the Bartholomew Act of 1662, which ejected 2,000 of the best ministers in England from their offices and livings. Their immediate successors were educated in Scotland, Holland, and by private ministers. Public academies were soon opened chiefly for theological students. The Orthodox Congregationalists established Highbury for the express purpose of preparing young men for the ministry. This institution, we are informed, has quite recently been amalgamated with Homerton and Coward Colleges. Homerton College existed, though in different

* Huber, Vol. II. p. 341.

places and with various fortunes, for more than a hundred years. It was under the patronage of a society for the education of pious young men for the ministry. Its object was to support twenty such men of good talents, and educate them for the stations they were to hold. The evangelical institution at Newport Pagnel had its origin in the plans and liberality of such men as Newton, Thornton and Cowper. Its object was to prepare pious young men for the sacred office. Hackney Theological Seminary is under the patronage of the Evangelical Association for spreading the Gospel in England, and was founded A.D. 1803. It has sent out eight or ten foreign missionaries, and ten times as many home missionaries. "Let us continue," says the Society's committee, "to select men of decided and eminent piety, able to endure labour, men possessed, too, of mental energy; apt to acquire and communicate divine wisdom; let us do the best we can to educate them for our purpose; let us use our best endeavours to place them in useful spheres of action; let us encourage them by every means in our power; pray for them," &c. Blackburn Independent Academy is of a similar character. Most of the scholars connected with these institutions are said to come from the wealthier classes of the middling interests—and as good a provision has been made for the support of the more indigent, as, under all the circumstances, could be expected.

UNIVERSITIES OF SCOTLAND.

We turn our attention next to the North. In 1410 a "Pedagogy" of a liberal character was founded at St. Andrew's; another at Glasgow in 1450; King's College, Aberdeen, was founded in 1494. It was this year enacted by Parliament in the time of James IV. of Scotland, that all barons and freeholders of property throughout the realm should send their eldest sons and heirs to the schools from six or nine years of age, till they had acquired "perfitte Latine," and then three years to the schools of art, or "jure," or pay £20 to the king.* The high school of Edinburgh was completed in 1578, and arrangements were made to secure a thorough knowledge of Latin in it. A new impulse was communicated by this school to the citizens of Edinburgh, many of whom had been highly educated in Italy, France and Geneva. Considering the cause of the Reformation "as identified with the progress of literature and science, they became extremely anxious to erect similar schools in every corner of their own nation where there existed any probability of success." In 1579 the magistrates of Edin-

* Bower's Hist. Univ. Ed., Vol. I. p. 62.

burgh took into consideration the founding of a university; for which purpose, indeed, as far back as 1550, Robert Reid, bishop of Orkney, had bequeathed 8,000 merks. The charter was given by Queen Mary. The institution has been generously endowed by royal grants, parliamentary enactments, bequests, &c., while the city of Edinburgh has been its constant and generous patron. This university is not now of a strictly ecclesiastical character. The same is true of that at Glasgow, St. Andrew's, and the colleges at Aberdeen. The professors, however, must take the established creed, and are subject to inspection by the church in matters of faith. The professors of divinity are members of Presbytery, and the universities send each a representative to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. In other respects they are intended for general education.* There are no Fellowships in these institutions, resembling those of Oxford and Cambridge, where a number of literary men can be maintained, after the regular university course is completed. Previous to 1830, students in theology were exempted from the payment of college fees. The reason of the exemption was "the difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of young men properly educated for the church." That difficulty having ceased, the commission recommended the payment of small fees amounting to about £4 a-year, by each student in divinity.† The commission of 1830 object to the great number of small *bursaries* which they find in these institutions. At King's College there are 134 bursaries, at Marischal College 106, at St. Andrew's 55. The number has increased, and was thought likely still to increase, much beyond what is necessary for cases of indigence and for extraordinary merit. The consequence was, that many students had been induced to attend upon these institutions for the sake of the small bursary, who had mistaken their calling. Instances are noticed of persons thus drawn from their proper sphere of life, who were afterwards subjected in consequence to great mortification, and were found in conditions of extreme penury and distress. It is the opinion of many of the wisest and best men in Scotland, that if a part of these bursaries were abolished, nothing would be lost to the cause of general learning or the clerical profession.‡ One thing probably conduces more than almost anything else to the present abundant supply of ministers in Scotland, in addition to the inducements held out by the bursaries, and to the fact that the religious spirit in Scotland is of a high order. The General Assembly has a system of parochial schools under its immediate care, in which

* Report of Commissioners on the Universities of Scotland, 1830.

† Ibid. p. 69.

‡ Ibid. p. 52, &c.

100,000 pupils* are constantly instructed not only in human learning but in the principles of the Scottish church. These parish schools are nurseries not only of religion generally, but of those dispositions which predispose to the study of theology and the office of the Christian ministry.

GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

We cross once more to the continent. In Prussia the secondary schools are gymnasia, of which in the summer of 1834 there were 124, attended by 24,461 scholars, of whom 738 passed to the universities. These gymnasia are in large towns, and most of the scholars are day-scholars. The knowledge acquired in them is nearly equal to what is usually obtained in our colleges, being much greater in Latin and Greek, though less in intellectual philosophy and mathematics. These schools are supported by the funds of the State and fees of the pupils.†

The professional schools are universities, where instruction is given in the arts, theology, &c.

The university at Prague was founded A.D. 1348 by the king of Bohemia, under sanction of Pope Clement II. From this time down to the Reformation, the professors and students being considered ecclesiastics, the organization rested entirely on a spiritual basis. Under promises of salaries, immunities and advantages, teachers and scholars were attracted from all parts of the world. Charles IV. enriched the institution with lands, libraries, allowances for professors, stipends for students, &c.‡

Erfurt (not now in operation) was founded in the middle of the 15th century, and was endowed with rich stipends, and great numbers of burses: such as the collegium majus, bursa pauperum, bursa nova, bursa antiqua, bursa mariana, &c.

"What above all distinguishes Leipsic, is the great number of stipends founded by the State, as well as by private donations, and which a great number of students have always enjoyed." It will be seen in Bib. Sac., April 1850, that there are nearly a thousand of these stipends, besides foundations for professors, and that the university is unusually rich. In the university of Frankfort on the Oder, John George founded a community where sixty students might be boarded at a cheap rate. This institution has since been united to the university of Breslau. Marburg, founded A.D. 1527, the first university that was established after the Reformation, received the income of

* North British Review, Vol. XII. No. 24, p. 492.

† Bache's Report.

‡ A. Q. R., Vol. X. p. 345. "A Concise History of German Universities, by Robert Baird. Paris, May 1838."

several suppressed cloisters, and other important privileges. It was afterwards furnished with valuable stipends, foundations and endowments.

Jena, founded A.D. 1547, received the possessions of these suppressed cloisters. Not to mention other early donations, its funds were greatly increased in 1817. Stipends and prizes for meritorious students were likewise established.

Herborn, now discontinued, was founded A.D. 1584. The students were mostly natives of the country, and almost all were theologians. The natives enjoyed stipends which were all paid in ready money, and amounted to from 40 to 100 florins apiece.

Halle was founded toward the close of the seventeenth century. A theological seminary was established in the university, soon after its foundation, and was endowed with considerable stipends for poor students. Other donations succeeded, and after Wittenberg became connected with it in 1815, refectories and stipends were multiplied. In 1829 it had almost 1,300 students, of whom 944 were theologians.

In Göttingen, besides great endowments, there is an annual prize medal in each of the faculties, (for composition,) of the weight of 25 ducats. Its library contains 300,000 vols.

Bonn, founded 1786, suppressed 1801, revived in 1815, receives from the State 82,522 Prussian dollars. Prizes for superior excellence in scholarship, refectories, stipends and like encouragements are by no means wanting.*

In Würtemberg there is, or was a few years ago, an arrangement by which two hundred theological scholars, half Protestants and half Catholics, might be gratuitously supported through their whole course,—first, after leaving the gymnasium, in one of the primary theological schools, for four years; then in the university of Tübingen, for five years—on condition that they will adopt the clerical profession.†

Thirty-four universities have been established in Germany. Fourteen of them are suppressed, and twenty still exist: of these, five are Catholic, eleven Protestant, four of a mixed character. These are for a population of 40,000,000.‡

In 1836 the expenditures of the university of Berlin were 99,846 dolls., of which 64,550 dolls. were paid out of the public treasury. The expenditures of Bonn were 89,685 dolls., of which government furnished 49,949 dolls. The expenditures of Breslau were 72,299 dolls. Of this, the government paid 27,180 dolls. The expenditures of Halle were 70,738 dolls.—

* American Quarterly Register.

† Bib. Rep., Vol. I. p. 225.

‡ A. Q. R., Vol. X. IX.

government paid 42,278 dolls. Königsberg expended 60,912 dolls., of which 25,433 dolls. were furnished by the government.

These universities were chiefly founded by the governments of the country in which they are situated. They are under the immediate and entire control of these governments. Buildings are erected and repaired, libraries enlarged, scientific collections are gathered, professors supported, and all the expenses which the university revenues do not meet, are paid out of the public treasuries.*

There seems then to be ample provision in Germany for filling the ranks of the clerical profession. There are also inducements of the strongest kind to pursue a course of liberal education, and obtain the requisite qualifications to the ministry. All places of public emolument or honour, both in Church and State, are held, more or less directly, but entirely under the control of government; and none of these above the lower class of schoolmasters can be obtained, except by those who have completed the prescribed course of education at the university. There, the educated class is the true and only aristocracy. When a young man, having passed successfully his university examination, becomes an accepted candidate for the sacred office, he is entitled to expect a situation, and if he fills it with credit, to look for promotion. The best livings, the most honourable and lucrative professorships, are open to his aspirations. Or if he prefers to remain a pastor, where an easy course of prescribed duties is performed, all the remaining time is his own. This he may spend in literary leisure, or in preparing valuable works for the press, or in any other way that he sees fit. And if he is neither immoral nor particularly unfaithful, elevated above the prejudices and caprices of his parish, he may go on in the independent discharge of his office, assured of ample support to the end. While, in this state of things, there are yet many devoted pastors, who labour with untiring zeal for the good of their flocks, many doubtless rush into the clerical profession, without any just appreciation of its sacredness. But between these two classes there is, there can be, under present circumstances, no lack of ministers in Germany.

The Encyclopædia Britannica enumerates ninety universities in Europe, besides those in England, Ireland and France. But they are neither essential to our purpose, nor do our limits allow us to notice them.

* Biblical Repository, January, 1831. "Theological Education in Germany, by Dr. Robinson." For a valuable account of these institutions, see also the subsequent numbers of that journal.

UNITED STATES.

What we have to say in reference to the education and supply of ministers in the United States, may be arranged chiefly under the following heads:—1st. Motives to entering the Christian ministry. 2nd. Present and prospective call for ministers. 3rd. Facilities for acquiring the preparatory education. 4th. Means necessary to secure the requisite supply.

First. Motives to entering the ministry.—The purest motives are most powerful when spiritual religion is most flourishing. These centre in true godliness of mind, and exhibit themselves in the supreme devotion of a thorough Christian heart to the highest welfare of man. They have brought thousands into the ministry, and will always, so long as true religion exists, furnish the church with at least some pastors who sink all selfish ends in their desire to please God and benefit the world. Perhaps it is presumption, but we confidently believe that rarely since the days of the apostles, has any Christian people enjoyed in her ministry a larger proportion of self-denying, godly men, than may be found in these States.

But, with the exception of these highest motives, there are with us but few inducements to enter the ministry. Our clergy can expect no aid from government, be sure of no life-livings, look for no power or influence beyond what personal character may give them, and anticipate no important immunities or privileges, except it be the privilege of hard and scantily remunerated labour, with the prospect of rejection by a capricious people, or of breaking down, as respects health, by middle life, or of penury in old age. Of this state of society we do not greatly complain. It may help to secure a spiritual ministry and religion in the churches much deeper than forms. But it can hardly be expected that the profession will be filled—that good men will press into it in sufficient numbers to supply the demand, unless at least there are such facilities for education, that a young man may qualify himself for the ministry, without severe pecuniary embarrassments all the way through his preparatory course, and involving himself in a debt which for many years, if ever, after entering upon active duty, he cannot pay off. This remark derives emphasis from the fact, that if we would raise up a ministry, when there are few motives to attract young men to the sacred office, we must look for them, to a great extent, from those classes in society which have been inured to hardships by their circumstances, and not chiefly from those who, born in affluence, and brought up in indulgence, and without habits of self-reliance, are yet best able to bear

the expense of an education. The remark derives further importance from the facts, that new professions are inviting the educated to their ranks, and can offer our youthful graduates such attractions, and hold out such promises of usefulness, that even some of the high motives which impel one to the ministry might easily be made to turn him aside.

Second. Present and prospective call for ministers.—At a time of great pecuniary embarrassments, when all our benevolent associations were crippled, and retrenchment and contraction became necessary in both domestic and foreign missions, and many feeble societies, especially at the West, found themselves unable to sustain their pastors—this happening immediately after peculiar exertions had urged unprecedented numbers into the ministry—there may have been for a time an apparent surplus of candidates for the sacred office. But foreseeing minds then perceived, what has already begun to be realized, that the time could not be distant when an alarming deficiency must take the place of unusual abundance; and while our churches at home would suffer from want of a sufficient supply of suitable men to preach the gospel, all our operations abroad for the salvation of the world would be limited and checked. Already we hear the call from all quarters, for educated, enterprising, pious men, to fill the stations of clerical usefulness at home, and carry the good tidings of the gospel abroad. In the prodigious yearly increase of population in the United States, and in the aggressive benevolence of the American church, especially in her attempt to carry forward a work which, however Utopian some may deem it, she has seriously taken in hand, viz. **THE CONVERSION OF THE WORLD**, a greatly enlarged ministry is imperiously demanded.

Third. Facilities for acquiring the preparatory education.—We have more than a hundred colleges, great and small, belonging to different denominations, scattered over the land, with almost half that number of theological seminaries. But these institutions, except a few in the older States, are excessively poor, many of them maintaining a precarious existence, upon the charities of the public. There is not a single college or theological school adequately endowed in the whole country—not one so furnished with scholarships, stipends, bursaries, &c., that young men, however great their abilities or decided their piety, can depend upon them mainly to meet the expenses of a public education. Individuals here and there have done much in aid of students needing assistance, and churches have sometimes sustained a promising member in fitting himself for the pastoral work. Local societies also have accomplished something in selecting and partly supporting young men through a

collegiate and theological course. But the main dependence of the Congregational and a part of the Presbyterian churches, for forty years past, has been upon a central organization, which has furnished pecuniary aid to more than three thousand young men. Without the American Education Society, there would long before now have been "a famine of the bread of life."

Fourth. Means necessary to secure the requisite supply.—To endow a hundred colleges thoroughly, must be the work of half as many generations. In the universities of England, France and Germany, foundations for professors, fellowships, stipends, bursaries, &c., have been accumulating for hundreds and in some of them for almost a thousand years. They are identified moreover with the interests of the State, and government is pledged to sustain them. In our own country, from the multitude of sects, from the very freedom of our civil institutions, no great reliance can be placed, for sustaining collegiate or university education, upon the public chest. The ministry must be educated by the churches, or the churches must do without a ministry, or be cursed with an incompetent one. When every reasonable effort has been made to endow, by private benefaction, the higher educational seminaries, as the work of ages cannot be accomplished in a single generation, we can hardly expect that much more will be done than to furnish a very limited number of professors, with partial support. But ample endowments for students, especially that class of students which evangelical churches are most concerned to educate, cannot be expected. This country, compared with England, has few literary men of piety and wealth who can appreciate the importance of such endowments sufficiently to furnish them.

Besides, foundations thus established, in a large number of widely separated colleges, and in a country where there is such freedom in religion, would be greatly exposed to perversion. The best supervisors of funds are the contributors, near the time of contribution.

We cannot but feel that no arrangement is better adapted to the genius of our country and the exigencies of the American church, for the education of its ministry, than large central organizations like that to which we have already alluded. The advantages of such an institution as the American Education Society are numerous. It ensures certainty and regularity of disbursements, a result of more consequence to that quiet of mind which is essential to successful study, than the inexperienced may imagine. It promotes unity of plan, and of measures, with the requisite efficiency. It secures or may

secure wise and economical supervision, and saves the expense which must otherwise be wasted on a large number of functionaries, acting without concert if not sometimes in collision, employing their time in the service of local societies whose affairs might all be managed by a single qualified mind, acting under wise and safe supervision. It furnishes a common centre from which information can be diffused and energetic impulses given. It saves young men from that annoyance to which they must often be subjected, when individual churches, holding different shades of theological opinion, and having different views of public measures, undertake the education of its own members. It may be expected to treat with delicacy those feelings of honour and independence which every true man would wish to cherish, and which may be subject to revulsions, if they are not destroyed, when one individual this month, and another the next, bestows a reluctant charity upon some indigent student whom he consents to shelter as a sort of *PAUPER* scholar, for a season.

Nor are these the only advantages of such an organization. In a country where there are such almost irresistible tendencies to cut short the time of education, and rush half prepared into the field of public action, and when some important seminaries of learning have begun to waver in their high course, and succumb to the times, a society under wise supervision, by requiring thoroughness in its benefited scholars, with a complete course of education, may oppose an effectual barrier to the increasing of a superficial and deteriorated scholarship. Another incidental advantage of such a society is, that it will naturally help to regulate the supply. When there is a scarcity of ministers, appeals to the churches will enlarge the contributions, and at the same time encourage young men of piety to seek an education. Should the profession ever be more than full, the fact once known, contributions will be diminished, and a much smaller number of candidates sustained; and in this way, by the natural course of things, the evils resulting from the too numerous small bursaries in the universities of Scotland will be avoided. It is good, moreover, for the *piety* of the churches, always to be raising up its own ministry, always to have a pecuniary interest in selecting, sustaining, and watching over the candidates for that office on which her highest welfare, and that of society, so much depends.

Intelligent men must perceive that the objections to such a system are chiefly not in the system itself, except wherein it might be modified and improved, but, if anywhere, in its occasional administration, the mistakes of which *experience* will be able to correct. Should the managers of such an institution at

any time lack wisdom or efficiency, should they sustain men of inferior qualifications, or, by excess of supervision, cramp the generous feelings of youth, dislike to the system would be an inevitable consequence, and its own beneficiaries, as soon as they come into the ministry, would be the foremost in manifesting alienation towards it. But when directors are chosen annually, and the election is made by the contributors themselves, or their representatives—consisting of the leading minds in the churches—nothing would seem safer from the dangers of any permanent mismanagement.

The review we have taken of ministerial education and supply shows, beyond a doubt, that as it always has been, it always must be, maintained by Christian beneficence, and that in our country the demand for ministers can never be met, without generous contributions by the church to aid its rising clergy through that expansive course of education which is so essential to success. Nor can this be esteemed a hardship by any pious and intelligent layman. On him, as well as on others, rests the command, Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. Should he bear the full pecuniary burden of a young man's education, the young man himself who gives years of preparatory study and then a life to the work, sacrificing his chances to accumulate property, or secure worldly honour, makes by far the greatest sacrifices of the two. When this matter is fully understood, the church, instead of talking of her charity students, will realize that the true beneficiary is not the hard-toiling scholar scantily sustained while he struggles forward to the ministry, but *HERSELF*.

ART. II.—SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

BY REV. ROBERT TURNBULL, HARTFORD, CONN.

[Concluded from p. 129.]

BUT what is the relation of the external or created universe to God? This is a great question, which Descartes attempts to answer. It is produced, he says, by God at first, and not only so, but constantly reproduced. The whole dependent world, both of matter and of mind, is a vast mechanism, carried on by external laws, demanding the constant interposition of the Divine hand. Matter has no direct action upon matter, neither has matter any direct action upon mind, nor mind upon matter.

Their action and interaction depend upon the all-creating, all-renewing force. Therefore, concludes Descartes, there are no secondary or occasional causes, and the whole universe, material and spiritual, lies, like a passive machine, in the hands of God, moved, modified, and controlled by his resistless might.* Here, then, we find the fruitful germ of a system of pure idealism, which speedily evolved itself in the speculations of Malebranche and Spinoza.

In Descartes we see what is by no means singular in the history even of profound and philosophical minds, the most startling combinations of strength and weakness, of truth and error. For, he not only denied the existence and operation of occasional causes, but he placed the essence of mind in thought, of matter in extension, thus confounding being or substance with attribute or quality; insisted that the lower animals are mere machines, and actually lodged the immaterial spirit in the conarion or pineal gland!

Malebranche, whom we mention now, though actually following Spinoza in the history of philosophical opinions, was a minister of the Papal church, quite orthodox, of course, and certainly a man of a reverent and lofty spirit. He seized with avidity upon the principles of the Cartesian philosophy; and since all finite being has its life and action in God, and mind can communicate directly with God; and since, also, the ideas of all things, as Plato has shown, exist in the mind of God, it follows, argues Malebranche, that the human mind sees everything in the Divine, and that God himself is "our intelligible world."

What, then, is the use of the external at all? It exists, says Malebranche, by the will of God, as discovered to us in the Scriptures, thus deserting the reasonings of philosophy for the teachings of revelation.† Hence it only required some bold, consistent, sceptical spirit to adopt the same fundamental notions, and rush with them into absolute spiritualism.

Such a man was Spinoza, that singular and subtile Jew, whom Novalis, in a "furor" of admiration, calls "the God-inspired Spinoza," and whom even Schleiermacher and Schelling, as well as Cousin and Coleridge, delight to honour.

Assuming clearness and distinctness as the criterion of the

* It is on this ground that M. Jules Simon, in his Introduction to his edition of the works of Descartes, speaks (p. 57) of Cartesianism as "Une système Mécanique." See Descartes, Sixth Meditation.—Œuvres, p. 109.

† Malebranche's views are developed with much ingenuity and eloquence in his "Search for the Truth" (*Recherche de la Vérité*). A beautiful and convenient edition of his works has been published by Charpentier, under the supervision of M. Jules Simon, who has prefixed to it an instructive and elegant Introduction. Tennemann calls Malebranche "the most profound of the French metaphysicians."

validity of necessary ideas, the fundamental position of the Cartesian philosophy, starting from the supposition of necessary, self-subsistent being, making use also of those peculiar notions of Descartes, that there are no secondary or occasional causes—God himself being the only necessary and efficient cause—that matter can exert no direct influence upon mind, nor mind upon matter, that the essence of mind is thought, and of matter extension, Spinoza, by a consistent, relentless logic, deduced the following positions.*

1. That there is in the universe only one substance, that is, one self-sustaining, universal, absolute, and eternal Being.

2. That this substance has two attributes, *thought* and *extension*—thought being manifest in mind, extension in matter.†

3. That matter and mind, proceeding from the same source, or being the same attributes of one substance, are identical. Mind is real, matter is phenomenal. And as all things come from God, and exist in God, all things, that is, the universe of matter and of mind, are God; not, indeed, God, in his absolute essence, but “God immanent,” that is, God embodied, God manifested.‡

A fundamental and favourite position of Spinoza is, that one substance cannot produce another; and if God, therefore, produces finite matter or finite mind, it is but an extension of himself, or projection into space and time of his own inscrutable being. The cause passes into the effect; the effect, in this sense, is the cause, and the cause is the effect; so that the ordinary distinction of cause and effect is lost. The one is God absolute, the other is God conditioned, or, as he chose to express it, the one is *natura naturans*, the other *natura naturata*.§

Nor can we deny, if these fundamental positions are granted as just, in a word, if the universe is constituted by ideas, and thus human thought and absolute being are one and identical, that there can be, in the sense of Spinoza, only a single all-

* In proof of these statements, we refer to Spinoza's “*Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ*,” in the first volume of his Works (Tauchnitz's edition, 3 vols., edited by Dr. Bruder, an edition of great completeness and elegance, and to which all our references are made), as also to his little tract, “*De Emendatione Intellectus*,” (Opera, Vol. II. p. 7.) in which he lays down the true method of philosophical investigation. The following passage (Vol. I. p. 24) deserves particular attention, as the basis at once of the systems of Descartes and Spinoza: “*Hac igitur detecta veritate simul etiam invenit Omnium scientiarum fundamentum, ac etiam omnium aliarum veritatum mensuram ac regulam; scilicet Quicquid tam clare ac distincte percipitur quam istud verum est.*”

† Opera, Vol. I. “*Cogitata Metaphysica*,” p. 117. “*Ethica*,” pp. 187, 190. See also “*Ethica*,” Part II. p. 225.

‡ Opera, Vol. I. (*Ethica*) p. 197. Compare pp. 190 and 204, particularly Prop. XVIII. “*Deus est omnium rerum immanens non transiens.*” See also Prop. XXVI. p. 208.

§ *Ethica*, Props. XXIX., XXX., XXXI., Opera, Vol. I. pp. 210, 211.

comprehending substance. All else which we call finite, must be attribute, quality, phenomenon, however vast and varied, however grand and beautiful. If all things are in God, in an absolute literal sense, then God is in all things. The universe is not *dual*, but one, and that One, *THE ALL*. For as God, the universal, self-existent, eternal Being, the substance, par excellence, *id quod stat per se*, or, *id quod stat sub omnibus*, the necessary substratum and fount of being and thought, action and form, is infinite, he can neither be diminished nor increased; he can neither give more than he is, nor take more than he is; so that if he creates or produces—to use the language of men—he creates or produces out of nothing, that is to say, out of himself; therefore, in the universe, and throughout eternity, there can be no more than God, no less than God. Of course, the supposition that matter is necessary and eternal is thrown out. The fact, conceded by Descartes, and by the whole thinking world, with the exception of the materialists, that matter is a produced and temporary existence, on the same ground that the finite mind is a production of God, plays a most important part in the reasonings of Spinoza.* On this ground, therefore, he concludes that God is one, and not two; one, and not many; and yet the one becomes the two, the many, the all. So that, in a strict and absolute, not popular or figurative, sense, God is all and in all. Thought is absolute, infinite, universal, and matter is its form or shadow. The omnipresence of God is what Spinoza calls extension—not meaning by extension anything gross or palpable, but the universal, all-penetrating presence of the infinite and eternal essence. Particular things are only modifications of God.†

As self-existent, God, according to Spinoza, is free; for there is nothing to limit his power; this, however, amounts to nothing more than exhaustless and everlasting activity, constantly evolving itself, by necessary laws, without anything like what we call will, volition, or purpose. He thinks, thinks eternally, but contemplates or thinks only himself, without ideas, without the flow of consciousness, without the succession of reason or intellect.‡

From this it is easily seen how Spinoza explains the finite, or phenomenal world. The question is asked, is it eternally distinct from God, or is it produced or created by God? No, says the subtle and consistent pantheist, God does not really change, God does not create, “in the vulgar sense of the term,” he

* Spinoza's fundamental error consists in his denying or obscuring the idea of Cause. Properly speaking, he does not admit the possibility of an effect. Creation, therefore, is ruled out of his system. The external universe is only a manifestation, not a creation, of God. Opera, Vol. I. pp. 139, 213.

† Opera, Vol. I. p. 208.

‡ Ibid. pp. 213, 215.

simply is. He is the "I am that I am." He is the one, unchangeable, absolute, necessary being that underlies, and, in fact, constitutes all that exists. Thought and extension are attributes of his being, as unchangeable as himself. Hence all individual or particular thoughts or extensions are mere abstractions, or forms, unless they are referred to the absolute thought and infinite extension of God; that is to say, in themselves they are nothing. The phenomenal world, therefore, says Spinoza, is constituted by an infinite number of "particular determinations or expressions" of the one absolute Being, infinite thought giving rise to finite minds, and infinite extension to finite or material forms.* God, then, may be viewed absolutely, as *natura naturans*, or relatively as *natura naturata*, the one containing all things potentially in itself, the other being an evolution of this nature into all the modifications of thought and extension of which the universe is composed; or, as we might say, the one being *Brahm*, or absolute, eternal being, the other *Brahma*, or relative being, distributed in finite forms, "lying on eternity and the stars."† In a word, God is *τὸ πᾶν*, the universe, of which all things past, present, and to come, are but modes or manifestations, or, in Spinoza's own words, "Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens non transiens," while "man is but a mere balance of powers and passions, the tension by which he subsists." Right is the correlate of power, while sin is weakness, negation, or deficiency; whence the object of all law is the exercise of force, and all law is limitation.‡

How little all this differs, in the end, from the grosser system of Hobbes, or from the dreamy conceptions of the old Hindu philosophers, who, according to Sir William Jones, "believed that the whole creation is rather an energy than a work, by which the infinite mind is present at all times, and in all places, and exhibits to his creatures a set of perceptions, like a wonderful picture or piece of music, always varied, but always uniform." So that we may well say with Dugald Stewart, in reference to the reproduction of old and exploded errors, "One is almost tempted to believe that human invention is limited, like a barrel organ, to a specific number of tunes."

And yet, conceding the fundamental positions from which the system of Spinoza is drawn, with a perfection of logic which has all the force of mathematical demonstration, conceding, for example, that grand assumption of his, that being and thought

* The mode in which this is done, is explained in the Second and Third Parts of his "Ethica."

† Opera, Vol. I. p. 228. See p. 233, in which he shows that matter, or body, is a mode of the Divine extension.

‡ Ibid. p. 115. Compare pp. 131, 212, 217.

are identical, and consequently that the order of ideas is the order of the universe; or, that other, that the cause must always pass over into the effect, in fact, constitute the effect; or, that other, that the infinite Being or Cause can never produce anything different from, or separate from, himself—its absurdity instantly vanishes, and one cannot help being struck with involuntary wonder at the stupendous force of that single, solitary thinker. Ah! who can tell into what depths the noblest mind, once adrift on the ocean of speculation, may involuntarily sink? One false movement, the loss of a chart, of a compass, or a star, may involve the greatest philosopher in irretrievable difficulties—nay, insure his final and eternal shipwreck.

That Spinoza, strange and wayward in many respects, was a man of transcendent mental power—nay, more, of great depth, simplicity, and earnestness of character—can scarcely be questioned by those acquainted with his life and writings. Perhaps metaphysically fanatical, if not absolutely mad (*ferox ratione*)—for it seems to us there is a metaphysic, as well as a natural, lunacy—he was carried away, as by an evil genius, into the bogs and quagmires of pantheistic doubt and despair. Yet, poor man, he followed this *ignis fatuus*, with a sublime enthusiasm, worthy of a better fate; so that his whole life, according to Schleiermacher and Cousin, was a long and lofty aspiration after the absolute and divine. But alas! we fear the God he sought was but the dream of a distempered fancy, which, so far from conducting to the bosom of infinite love, only plunges the weary spirit into the blackness of darkness for ever.*

It may be well inquired here why Spinoza uses the term God at all to designate the great, primal, immanent, universal substance, the *Causa causarum*, if not for the purpose of softening the horrid aspect of his opinions. Indeed, Professor Norton, of Cambridge, states, on the authority of Le Clerc, that "Spinoza composed the work in which his opinions are most fully unfolded, in the Dutch language, and committed it to his friend the physician Mayer to translate into Latin; that where the name of God now appears, Spinoza had written Nature; but that Mayer induced him to substitute the former word for the latter, in order partially to screen himself from the odium to which he might be exposed."† We do not attach much import-

* The works of Spinoza were published a few years ago, at Heidelberg, by Dr. Paulus, with a highly laudatory preface. Dr. Bruder, the editor of the Leipsic edition, speaks of him in terms of equal admiration. A German translation has appeared from the pen of Auerbach, and a French one from that of Saisset. Amand Saintes has written his life with great ability; and, while dissenting from his system, commends Spinoza as a great and a good man.

† "The Latest Form of Infidelity," by Andrews Norton. It will be recollected, that when this earnest protest appeared at Cambridge, a few years ago, against the

ance to this anecdote; indeed, we have good reason to doubt its authenticity; but assuredly the term Nature would seem quite as appropriate as that of God, in the system of Spinoza. His absolute Substance is certainly not God, in any proper sense of that expression. What then shall we think of a philosophy, or of a religion, professing to be Christian, which recognizes Spinoza as the rejected saint, "verstossenen heiligen Spinoza," and speaks of him as "full of faith and full of the Holy Ghost?"*

It has been supposed by many, by Göethe for example,† that Spinoza carried philosophical speculation to its highest point, that here it found its limit, beyond which no human intellect can go. Leibnitz, however, a man of almost illimitable range of thought, had no such idea; for correcting, as he supposed, the errors, both of Descartes and Spinoza, he endeavoured to lay the foundations of a vast structure of spiritual philosophy. His system, indeed, was not thoroughly matured and developed, and it has to be collected from a considerable mass of brief and fugitive compositions, including his letters, as well as from his "Theodicea," the object of which is rather theological than philosophical. The aim of Leibnitz was practical rather than theoretical, though founded upon profound and original investigation. He wished to harmonize conflicting opinions, both theological and scientific, and find a basis upon which original and independent thinkers of all sects and schools might stand together, in the defence of a common philosophy and a common religion. He refuted the sensational origin of ideas, defended, as he supposed by Locke, carried out the spiritual views of Descartes with reference to mind, giving a better exposition of fundamental ideas, and enlarging the *criteria* of their validity. Taking the human mind, in its necessary laws, as the groundwork of his philosophy, and having attempted to reduce all things to pure ideas, he endeavoured thence to construct the universe.‡ His method, therefore, though apparently more thorough and comprehensive than that of his predecessors, was yet ideal and rationalistic. Rejecting the criterion of Descartes,

transcendental Scepticism of Emerson, Parker and others, Dr. Ware, jun., published a discourse on the "Divine Personality," the object of which was to show that no proper idea of God could be formed, which did not involve the attributes of intelligence, freedom, and will.

* Schleiermacher's *Reden Ueber die Religion*. See also "History of Rationalism in Germany," by Amand Saintes, p. 239, English Translation. A fuller statement upon this point may be seen in "Vie et Ouvrages de Spinoza," by the same author.

† "In Wahrheit und Dichtung."

‡ Leibnitz's method is not inductive and psychological, but abstract and ontological. This point is well brought out by M. Jaques, in his Introduction to the edition of his works, from the press of Charpentier, Vol. I. p. 31. His views of the human mind are developed in his "Essays on the Human Understanding," his theosophy or theology, in the "Monadologie," and "Theodicée."

that of clearness and distinctness, he took that of identity and contradiction as the criterion in necessary matter, and the principle of "sufficient reason" in contingent matter. The first of these involves the possible, that is, whatever may be conceived of as not contradictory, or, if you please, whatever must be conceived of without a contradiction. This gives us the absolute and the true, or that which must necessarily be. The next, that of the sufficient reason, measures the actual, not that which must be, but that which may be, that, in a word, for which, as actually existing, there is sufficient reason. To discover what ideas are valid respecting the contingent world, must be determined by reference to use, or final causes.*

Applying these criteria to things themselves, he finds not only the idea of substance, with its attributes of thought and extension (that is, of embodiment, for such is Spinoza's idea), but also of cause or power, spontaneous and creative; so that God, as the great primal Substance, or Subsistence, not only is, but acts and produces. Power does not reside in masses, for these are infinitely divisible; power is inherent in substance from which all material qualities must be excluded. So that, strictly speaking, we come to power or force, as a pure and immaterial essence.† This constitutes the basis of existence. Thence spring all the forces and forms of the universe.

On this principle Leibnitz constitutes the world (kosmos) of immaterial energies. His system is developed as a *Monadology*; that is, one absolute, infinite, immaterial, eternal Monad (or *One*) being assumed as a conscious and voluntary cause, he proposed to show how from this source all the finite monads or forces of the universe derived their existence, whether these appear in immaterial souls, or in what we term physical forms.‡ Leibnitz's mind, like those of Pythagoras and Plato, as well as Descartes and Spinoza, was pre-eminently mathematical, and his problem of the universe is little less than a geometrical proposition. Given one necessary, universal and eternal Monad or Force, to find all other monads or forces. Indeed, he speaks after the manner of Plato, of Jehovah as the supreme and eternal Geometer.§ From this system all dualism is excluded. Of matter,

* Spinoza decisively rejects final causes; Leibnitz as decisively maintains them.

† While the system of Descartes is mechanical, that of Leibnitz is dynamical. The universe in his view, is composed of simple forces, or monads, which he says expressly are without extension or divisibility. *Monadologie*, *Œuvres*, Vol. II. p. 463.

‡ *Œuvres*, Vol. II. p. 469.

§ "So completely, indeed, and so mathematically linked did Leibnitz conceive all truths, both physical and moral, that he represents the eternal Geometrician as incessantly occupied in the solution of this problem. The state of one Monad (or elementary atom) being given, to determine the state, past, present and future, of the whole universe."—Stewart, *Dissertations*, Part II. p. 75.

in its ordinary import, there is none. Force is the primal element which underlies all other elements, and constitutes all finite essences, all finite forms. Identity runs through matter and mind; substantially they have the same origin and the same end. They involve, indeed, infinite diversity of quantity, quality and form, but spring from one source, partake of one nature, constitute one universe. In a word, they are a combination of spiritual monads or forces, which spring from the one indivisible, absolute, everlasting Monad, or Force, which we call God.

It ought, however, to be recollected that the name, monad, does not precisely determine the nature of the essence or power to which Leibnitz applied it. It is given for the sake of distinction, and simply signifies *one*, one elementary something, essence or force,—in God, creative, conscious, intelligent, designing,—in finite mind or matter, one essence or force, not gross and material, like an atom or a corpuscle, but pure and spiritual, like the being from which it derives existence. Indeed, Leibnitz wished to avoid the difficulties which spring from the ill-understood distinctions, which we make in reference to matter and mind; he therefore gives this name to the simple idea of a force, or energy, capable of developing itself in outward act and shape. God is the original Monad, or Force, from which all others are created or generated, by a conscious act of productive volition; so that in this respect, his views differ from those of Spinoza, and, on the whole, harmonize with some of the highest forms of theological truth.* The created monads vary in character and power.† Some are in a state of stupor, so to speak, and constitute dull matter, yet possess a sort of perceptive power; while others are conscious, and form in the case of those distinct and clear the souls of men and angels, in the case of those somewhat dull or indistinct the souls of the lower animals. All these have their own inherent energy and their own peculiar sphere, and thence exert no direct or immediate influence upon each other. Each one, however, is a microcosm, and contains an image of the universe.‡ They act in harmony, by a pre-established divine arrangement, just as two automata constructed by the same artist and made to move together by the same impulse, act in harmony, by means of a pre-formed arrangement.§

* It is on this ground, that in his "Theodicea," he maintains the conformity of faith with reason, *la conformité de la Foi avec Raison*.

† "Monadologie," § 9. Œuvres, Vol. II. p. 464.

‡ Œuvres, Vol. II. p. 471. "Monadologie," § 51.

§ Œuvres, Vol. II. p. 473. "Monadologie," § 62. "Cheque monade crée represente toute l'univers." Œuvres, Vol. II. p. 473. "Monadologie," §§ 63, 65, 78.

Mind and matter, however, according to this theory are not essentially different. They are identical, being one in their origin and their end. They act according to the same fixed and necessary laws. All things, physical and moral, are pre-established. All obey one impulse, and subserve one end. Hence the doctrines of pre-established harmony, of philosophical necessity, and Optimism.

And what is all this, however grandly and beautifully developed by its author, but a scientific basis for pure idealism? Ideas not realities, forces not beings, construct the universe, and nothing but idealism or rationalism, in other words, absolute spiritualism, can spring from such a system. Still, in the hands of Leibnitz, it is made subservient to the loftiest faith, the warmest devotion. His *Theodicea* has the force of a grand moral epic, in which are celebrated the perfections of the eternal God. The celebrated Genevese philosopher, Bonnet, tells us that he used it as a manual of devotion.

Leibnitz, though speculating beyond the bounds of the human intellect, and losing himself in the untried depths of absolute being, though pouring contempt upon some of the greatest discoveries of the Newtonian philosophy, and giving ample evidence of possessing many of the weaknesses of our common humanity, was probably one of the greatest philosophical geniuses which Germany or the world has produced. His speculations found a congenial home in the minds of his countrymen. In nearly all the theories which have successively followed among that speculative people, Leibnitz constantly re-appears. It is the same lofty, but strange and fanciful, melody, with infinite and ever-recurring variations.

Wolf methodized the Leibnitzian philosophy, but not possessing the warmth and genius of his master, presented it to the schools of his native land, as a vast and complicated system of ideal abstractions, giving rise, as usual, to an arid and destructive scepticism, which lasted for many years.

But the eighteenth century closed with Kant and the Kantian philosophy, in which the possibility of metaphysics or ontology as a science, is positively denied, and, as many think, demolished, and a basis laid for consistent, philosophical scepticism. By those not acquainted with the subject, Kant is spoken of as the father of German transcendentalism; while the fact is, while often using the term, he endeavours to extinguish the very idea of transcending our subjective states. To speak of the Kantian *metaphysics*, as many do, is a gross misnomer; for in the system of Kant, metaphysics is an impossibility. The great problem of the "*Kritik of Pure Reason*" is the possibility of "synthetic judgments *à priori*," or, in plainer words, the pos-

sibility of attaining absolute (unconditioned) truth, which Kant decides in the negative. He does not, as many well-informed persons seem to think, deny the reality of the external world, or the reality of mind; far from it; but he brings subject and object together, the inner and the outer world, and shows that it is only their synthesis or union, their point of contact, so to speak, of which we can know anything. Nature is real, but is given us only in consciousness, and under the forms of perception, space and time, which are simply laws of mind, not objective realities. But in addition to perception, the mind possesses the faculty of understanding (*verstand*), which has its principles and forms equally subjective, and for aught that we know artificial; while higher still, it possesses the power of reason (*vernunft*), which simplifies and co-ordinates the whole as unity, giving us as a principle of generalization and order, the one, the absolute, the unconditional, the causative, in other words, God, the soul, and nature. But these, too, are subjective; whence objectivity or reality is assumed, and cannot be demonstrated scientifically.

Thus, again, are all things reduced to the region of ideas, of dim and visionary abstractions. Reality escapes into the void, and truth remains, like a shadowy island, in the midst of a boundless gulf. "The region," says Kant, "of the pure understanding is an island, and enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable limits. It is the region of truth (an engaging title) surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean."*

But the heart, Kant's heart itself, demands God, duty, immortality, not merely as ideas, but as realities. For these great truths, then, Kant in a subsequent work, which he calls the "*Kritik of Practical Reason*," finds a basis in the wants of the individual and of society. As the eye is adapted to light, and light to the eye, and the one being given, the existence of the other follows, as a matter of course; so, also, God exists for man, man exists for God. Deity, religion, immortality, are absolute necessities; society is organised around these ideas, and cannot exist without their influence. Here, then, he lays what he deems a broad and substantial foundation for religion and morality. But as to a proper scientific basis for these truths, according to the Königsberg thinker, reason furnishes none.† They may be believed, but cannot be demonstrated. So that the boasted Kantian philosophy, grand and imposing at first sight, as one of the castles of the dark

* "*Kritik of Pure Reason*," English translation, p. 222.

† Sir William Hamilton (Article on Cousin, in the "*Edinburgh Review*" for 1820) gives it as his opinion, that Kant's grand error consisted, not in representing reason to be *weak*, but *deceptive*. Certainly it may be the one without the other.

ages seen through the misty twilight, turns out, after all, to be a comparatively small affair. "Too frequently," as Carlyle remarks, "the anxious novice is reminded of Dryden in the battle of books; there is a helmet of rusty iron, dark, grim, gigantic—and within it, at the furthest corner, is a head no bigger than a walnut."*

Its effect upon Germany, however, was prodigious. Neglected for a time, chiefly on account of its obscure and difficult terminology, "witch jargon," as Herder calls it, it found ardent admirers, and spread like wild-fire through all the German universities. It gave rise to the most violent contentions and agitations. Heresies innumerable sprang up in its pathway, and the young divines of Germany, who were especially enamoured with it, seemed to run wild with a sort of metaphysical mania. Kant was hailed by his admirers as something more than a philosopher, as a prophet, and the entire metaphysics of past ages were trodden under foot as salt that had lost its savour. Even Leibnitz, the great German favourite, was for the time forgotten. The air of mysticism and depth connected with the Kantian system, its vast, "forest-like terminology," where the panting intellect of ordinary minds wanders amid inextricable labyrinths, or sinks exhausted with "scholastic miasma," though appalling enough at first, possessed for the speculative and enthusiastic German mind an extraordinary attraction.

While Kant's philosophy cleared the atmosphere of Wolf's abstractions, it introduced others in their room, and opened, in the case of many who carried out his logic to its legitimate results, an easy path into the Serbonian bog of absolute scepticism. But Kant himself was no infidel, in the ordinary sense of the term. He lost sight of the object in the subject, and failed to solve the problem of the universe; but he never denied the fundamental truths of religion, or transcended the dictates of common sense. A quiet, solid, thoughtful man, he performed his round of duties, and died in the bosom of the Lutheran church. Enter the gloomy and apparently interminable wilderness of his logic, and every now and then you will come to some beautiful, sunny glade, with the blue heavens overhead, and the song of summer birds among the trees. Occasionally, after long toiling among the brambles, foot-sore and weary, you reach some craggy elevation, and, forgetting all your toils, descry in the distance vast continents, with oceans of light, and islands "green as emerald." Take, for example, the

* This passage occurs in Carlyle's "Life of Schiller," a work containing more good sense than some of the later and more boastful works of the Scottish Teufelsdröckh.

following passage regarding the Divine existence, than which nothing can be found grander or more striking in the range of literature.

“The present world opens to us so immense a spectacle of diversity, order, fitness and beauty, whether we pursue these in the infinity of space, or in its unlimited division, that even according to the knowledge which our weak reason has been enabled to acquire of the same, all language fails in expression as to so many and undiscernibly great wonders—all numbers in measuring their power, and even our thoughts in bounds, so that our judgment of the whole must terminate in a speechless, but so much more eloquent, astonishment. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of ends and means, regularity in origin and disappearance; and since nothing has come of itself into the state in which it is, it thus always indicates, further back, another thing as its cause, which renders necessary exactly the same further inquiry—so that in such a way the great whole must sink into the abyss of nothing, if we did not admit something existing of itself, originally and independently, external to this infinite contingent, which maintained it, and as the cause of its origin, at the same time secured its duration. This highest cause (in respect of all things in the universe), how highly are we to think of it! The world we are not acquainted with according to its whole contents; still less do we know how to appreciate its magnitude by comparison with all that is possible. But what prevents us, since we once require in respect to causality an external and supreme Being, we should not at the same time, in respect of the degree of perfection, place it above everything else possible; which we can effect easily, although certainly only the delicate outline of an abstract conception, when we represent to ourselves, united in it as a single substance all possible perfection—which conception, favourable to the claim of our reason, in the midst of experience, by means of the direction which such an idea gives towards order and fitness, and yet is never opposed to experience in a decided manner.

“This proof deserves at all times to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, the most adapted to ordinary human reason. It animates the study of nature, just as itself has its existence from this, and thereby ever receives fresh force. It manifests ends and views, where our observation had not discovered them, and extends our cognitions of nature by means of the clue of a specific unity whose principle is out of nature. But these cognitions react back again upon the

cause—namely, the occasioning idea, and increase the belief in a higher being into an irresistible conviction.”*

Fichte, young, ardent, enthusiastic, with great logical power, and an imagination which nothing could limit, took up the problem of the Kantian philosophy at the point where his predecessor left it, and endeavoured to determine the relation of subject and object, of the world within and the world without. His mode of resolving the problem was bold and summary; subject and object, in his system, are one. The subject “posits” or realizes, or, if the term be clearer, embodies, the object. Each soul, or subject, makes its own world. The Ego posits the Non-Ego, and makes it real. The external world exists, exists necessarily, but exists by means of the internal world, and is dependent upon it. Mankind, in attributing a real existence to the external world, the world of outward forms, are right, but wrong in supposing the object independent of the subject. Both exist, but not separately. Mind and matter are identical. There is only one existence, having the twofold aspect of subject and object.†

Thus we have an immediate knowledge of all things. We are our own universe, our own world; we are spirit, we are matter; nay, in some sense, we are God. The development of self forms our world, constitutes our duty and destiny.

In this system, then, God and duty, though seen under a peculiar aspect, and perhaps belittled, are not denied. The result is subjective idealism, or, as in similar cases, the reduction of all things to pure ideas, and those ideas united in the single, individual, indivisible Ego. God, says Fichte, cannot be inferred, he must be believed in. Faith is the ground of all conviction. You believe in the existence of the world, which is nothing more than the incarnation or embodiment of that which you carry within you. It is, so to speak, your own shadow; yet to you and all of vast moment, for it is the means of your development and perfection. In the same way God exists in your consciousness, and you believe him. He is the Moral Order (*Moralische Ordnung*) of the world, as such only

* “Kritik of Pure Reason,” p. 474. It may seem to some that Kant is here somewhat inconsistent with himself, for he denies that the argument possesses what he calls *apodictical* force; and yet he allows it to be consistent with reason, and fitted to produce “irresistible conviction.” The discrepancy, however, may arise from his variant use of the term *reason*; for, notwithstanding his imposing technology, he uses this term, as Sir Wm. Hamilton says, in fourteen different senses.

† Like Descartes and Spinoza, Fichte affects absolute demonstrative certainty, not philosophy simply, but *Gnosis*, *Wissenschaftslehre*. The principal work in which his views are developed is entitled, “Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre.”

can you know him.* In other respects, he is unknown and inaccessible. In a word, he is infinite, an object not of reason but of faith. But we cannot attribute to him intelligence and personality; for thus we fall into anthropomorphism. Properly speaking, God *is*—is everything—consequently he cannot *have*.† Neither intelligence nor will can be predicated of his infinite nature. He is himself intelligence—he is himself will. Consequently Fichte, in his later works, where his system is somewhat modified, speaks reverently of God, as the supreme and everlasting Will. God, therefore, is not you, nor I, nor aught else specifically, but is in all and through all, the moral order, the infinite medium, the grand ideal of the whole.

That such a system of subjective idealism should give rise to errors the most startling, cannot be matter of surprise. Fichte, at the best, is seen evermore hovering over the abyss of absolute nothing, and occasionally losing himself in its fearful depths. "To-morrow, gentlemen," he said on one occasion with startling audacity, "I shall create God!"‡ By this he meant that he would develop the process by which God comes into consciousness as subject and object.

It must be said that the system of Fichte logically carried out extinguishes both nature and God, and leaves us nothing but thought, or subjective idealism, which creates its own Deity, its own world, and its own immortality. Fichte, however, earnestly denied the charge of atheism, and, appalled by his own principles, took refuge in a sort of stoical and mystical devotion in which God and the immortality of the soul are recognized as objects of simple faith.§ He represents himself as standing between two worlds, "the one visible, in which the act alone avails, and the intention matters not at all; the other invisible and incomprehensible, acted on only by the will," and where he sees "the Divine Life, self-forming and self-representing Will, clothed to the mortal eye with multitudinous sensuous forms, flowing through him and through the whole immeasurable universe, here streaming through his veins and muscles—there pouring its abundance into the tree, the flower, the grass. The dead, heavy mass of inert matter, which did but fill up nature, has disappeared, and, in its stead, there rushes by the bright, everlasting flood of life and power from its Infinite

* *Sittenlehre* (1798), pp. 184, 189.

† These views are brought out to their legitimate consequences, in the work which may be regarded as a supplement to the "*Wissenschaftslehre*," entitled, "*Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine Göttliche Weltordnung*"—"On the ground of our Belief in a Divine World-Order."

‡ Amand Saintes, "*Histoire du Rationalisme*."

§ On what grounds he did this, see Tennemann's *Manual of Hist. of Philos.*, p. 437. Morell, p. 431.

Source." Here, then, recognizing the Eternal Will as the creator of the world, and the creator of the finite reason, who exists in Himself, "and in whose light we behold the light and all that it reveals," he cries out with adoration, "Great living Will! whom no words can name, and no conception embrace! well may I lift my thoughts to thee; for I can only think in thee. In thee, the Incomprehensible, does my own existence, and that of the world, become comprehensible to me; all the problems of being are solved, and the most perfect harmony reigns. I veil my face before thee, and lay my finger upon my lips."*

Schelling, who is yet alive, and whose system, not yet thoroughly co-ordinated and developed, comes after Fichte, in the order of philosophical speculation. Fichte had laid the foundation of his philosophy in simple consciousness, and made it entirely subjective; Schelling rejects this as a ground of absolute certainty, and maintains that in addition to understanding and reason, man has a higher power which may be denominated transcendental intuition, or the vision of absolute truth; whence his system is that of an absolute objectivity. Plotinus had called this faculty ecstasy, Schelling called it intellectual intuition. Assuming, therefore, as existing at least in some minds (those for example, of a higher order) this vision of things as they are, Schelling attempts to construct a magnificent and all-comprehending Nature-Philosophy, by which all science, natural and supernatural, is to be explained. Schelling adopts one of the great principles of Fichte's philosophy, the identity of subject and object, but goes a step further, by maintaining that they find this identity in a higher power. The Ego and the Non-Ego which in Fichte create each other, in Schelling are created by the absolute. In themselves they are real, but identical in a single essence. Knowledge and being correspond. They are correlates. The one mirrors or represents the other. Subject and object, the finite and the infinite, are one in God. In a word, Schelling reduces the universe to the region of pure ideas, and thence takes the ideas or notions of his own mind as the types of all possible knowledge. Nature is spirit visible, spirit is nature invisible. Man is divine, that he may see God the divine. He knows all things in God.

In this system we have first the absolute Substance, not the finite Ego of Fichte, but the infinite and eternal Ego, the cause creative, immanent, universal, invisible, as Bruno and Spinoza taught; and secondly, the created or finite result, or the visible, tangible universe. But the absolute Ego produces the Non-Ego, not by its own force or out of its own nature, but out of us, by an interior creative energy. "Men are but the innumerable

* "*Bestimmung des Menschen*," as quoted in Lewes's *Hist. of Ph.*, Vol. IV. p. 164.

individual eyes with which the infinite World Spirit beholds itself."

The principle of identity, though recently modified, and to some extent abandoned, by Schelling, runs through the whole of his philosophy, and pantheism is its necessary result. Man becomes subject and object by becoming conscious of himself. God, the absolute, in the same way, becomes subject and object by becoming conscious of himself. He finds himself by an external realization. "The blind and unconscious products of nature," says Schelling, "are nothing but unsuccessful attempts of Nature to make itself an object (*sich selbst zu reflectiren*); the so-called dead nature, is but an unripe intelligence. The acme of its effects—that is, for nature completely to objectize itself—is attained through the highest and ultimate degree of reflection in man, or what we call Reason. Here nature returns into itself, and reveals its identity with that which in us is known as the object and subject."*

Thus nature and the universe form a circle. First, the absolute embodies itself in what we call finite forms, which are only reflections of itself, and thus sees itself mirrored in the productions of the external world. This is the first movement by which the absolute develops itself. The second movement is a "subsumption, or the regress of the finite into the infinite;" in other words, it is nature, as finite, again making itself absolute, and re-assuming the form of the eternal. "The combination of these two movements is the re-union of the subject and object, in divine reason; it is God, not in his original and potential, but in his unfolded and realized existence."†

This is pantheism as perfect as that of Spinoza. To relieve himself of the terrible embarrassment, felt even by the German mind, in a pantheism so absolute and overwhelming, Schelling has started upon a new track, and claiming that he had only given the negative or simply ideal side of philosophy, which springs from thought, but can never come to being, an admission of the highest moment, he proposes to give the positive side, which starts from being and comes to thought. By this means he attempts to rise above the pantheistic view of his ideal philosophy, and exhibits God as the supramundane Being, creation as an emanation from God, and man as a being at once dependent and independent—dependent as to the principle of his being, independent as to his free personal existence. But the

* *System des Transcend. Idealismus*, p. 5.

† This will strike the reader at once as precisely the view of Bruno and Spinoza, expressed by the *Natura Naturans*, and *Natura Naturata*. Schelling's system, as a whole, may be described as a Transcendental or Absolute Idealism, the title indeed of one of his principal works, "*System des Transcendentalen Idealismus*."

effort, instructive as it is, is a decided failure. The two systems are not co-ordinated; and in the second, as in the first, there are serious and fundamental errors. The absolute God is yet retained, without consciousness, intelligence and personality, except as he becomes real and personal to us by an embodiment of himself in the external creation.

Hence Schelling's doctrine of the Trinity, for he ventures upon an explanation of this mystery, as three divine potencies, and his doctrine of redemption through Christ, as the return of the finite into the infinite.*

Schelling pours contempt upon physical science, as an outward and empirical thing, and even casts away psychology as useless in a system of absolute nature-philosophy. Copernicus, Newton, Bessel, Leverrier, are plodders in the world of sense; Locke, Reid, and Stewart, mere empirical seekers in the outer courts of philosophy.† He goes to the inner shrine and centre of truth, "the *prima philosophia*," as he terms it, and constructs the universe of science from *à priori* principles. In Germany, his speculations on nature have been much admired, but are incapable of verification, and though ingenious and often splendid, lead to no practical result. On this theory, being and thought must be identical, though Schelling honestly confesses that he has lost himself between them. Finite and infinite must be one. God is centre and circumference, subject and object, the universe without and the universe within. Thought, then, is impersonal, is divine. Hence, whatever is known or thought by man exists. Ideas are the measure of the universe. So that, instead of studying nature and facts, whether as given in the world of matter or of mind, or by means of a specific revelation, we ought simply to study God in ourselves. All knowledge is given us in our existence. God is in us, we are in God. In a word, man is in some sense *omniscient*! Thought (*Das Denken*) is not my Thought, and Being (*Das Wesen*) is not my Being; for everything belongs to God or the All. We know God, then, as we know ourselves. Subject and object are identical in a third, which is the absolute, which absolute is neither ideal nor real, neither mind nor matter, but both. This absolute is God. He becomes "conscious of himself in man," and thus man, under the highest form of his existence, manifests Reason, and by this reason, "God knows himself."‡

* For a clear and interesting statement of Schelling's views upon this subject, consult Morell's *Hist. of Phil.*, pp. 451-454.

† See *Jahrbucher der Medicin*, Vol. I. His great aim here is to show that science is valuable only so far as it is speculative—that it is not "phenomenal or relative, but absolute." Reason as finite, and science as finite, are nothing. His "*Natur-Philosophie*" is the construction or science of nature *à priori*.

‡ We may be suffered to say here, that Coleridge was caught in this philosophy of

In what respect this is an improvement upon the old idolatrous pantheism of the Brahminic faith, it would take Schelling himself to say. Such a philosophy gives us nothing but abstractions, apparently grand and beautiful at a distance, like the mirage of the desert, but mocking the thirst of the traveller, and leaving behind it and before it only "the waste howling wilderness." Is it wonderful, then, that one of the most powerful of the writers of young Germany, who reprinted the Letters of Schleiermacher on the "Lucinde" of Schelling, which urge fundamentally the same views on the subject of religion, should in the preface blasphemously declare "that he would rather be in hell with Schelling, than in heaven with Matheinecke," and that the world would have been happier "if it had never heard the name of God?" * * * Such are the horrible results of boldly speculating beyond the necessary bounds of the human intellect. Under the influence of such a philosophy, the poetic and gifted Steffens mournfully said, "All living nature, the whole of varied life, seemed to me faded and gray; all my wishes and hopes vanished, for I was compelled to confess to myself that as such they contained falsehood. * * * The total abrogation (of finite personality) seemed to me to destroy all that I considered dear and holy." Philosophers like Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel, to borrow a figure from Carlyle, or rather from Schiller, who in his *Philosophische Briefe*, paints the struggles of a doubter, are like the conjuror that has pronounced the spell of invocation, but has forgot the counter-word; "spectres and shadowy forms come crowding at his summons; in endless multitudes they press and hover around his magic circle, and the terror-struck Black Artist cannot lay them." Nothing but the darkness of an eternal night opens before our terrified vision and an infinite wail, as of perdition, echoes through the universe.

It is but justice however to Schelling to say that it is asserted, on high authority,† that the Berlin philosopher has renounced, or essentially modified, the system of *identity*, and now teaches the supreme and personal sovereignty of the one true and living God; that he extols Christianity as the completion of reason and the last hope of the world. It may be, that, as he grows older, he feels the need of some better faith both for himself and for the distracted church of his native land; but whether he

the absolute, and was even more mystified and bewildered than Schelling. It appears from innumerable coincidences, and even identities (plagiarisms on the part of Coleridge) that the Englishman helped himself from the writings of the German *plenius manibus*. Coleridge was a genius of the highest order, but not a remarkably clear or consistent philosopher.

* History of Rationalism, by Amand Saintes, p. 244.

† Dr. Neander, as quoted by Amand Saintes, "Vie et Œuvres de Spinoza," p. 288.

will succeed in giving a true exposition of philosophy or of Christianity is yet to be seen.

We may here take occasion to remark, that the recent German philosophy has all turned upon the solution of a single problem, the relation of subject and object, of the Ego and the Non-Ego, or, at a higher point of thought, the relation of the infinite and the finite, and has uniformly resulted in pantheism, or the identity of subject and object, of God and the universe.

But pantheism has various forms, and it is not a little curious that both Fichte and Schelling reject what they call pantheism as opposed to their peculiar theories! Upon this subject their distinctions are amazingly delicate, and would scarcely strike ordinary thinkers as distinctions at all. Generally speaking, however, by pantheism they mean the deification of the visible or palpable universe, the universe of mere forms and phenomena. This species of pantheism, Hegel himself unhesitatingly rejects.

But this is unnecessarily to limit the import of the term. By pantheism is generally understood any system which maintains the identity of all things, which makes the finite universe not so much a product, as a manifestation of God, which denies all occasional causes, and merges the whole in the infinite essence; in a word, any system which denies or doubts the Divine personality, freedom and intelligence, and represents God simply as Being, absolute and all-comprehending, whether such Being be regarded as material and mechanical, or ideal and spiritual.

Indeed, according to the view we have given, pantheism may assume *four* distinct forms. It may deify nature as it is, making matter, or some form of vital or of mechanical force, the single substance or essence of the universe, infinite, absolute, eternal, but undergoing perpetual changes, and giving rise to all the peculiar manifestations of what we term soul and body. This is the pantheism of the ancient Ionian school, and of some of the oriental mystics. Had Hobbes of Malmesbury possessed the feeling of worship, such would have been the form of pantheism he would have favoured. Auguste Comte might be brought to worship such a God, if indeed he does not regard all worship as folly and superstition. This theory, however, is much more likely to take the form of pantheism, denying the very possibility of religion and virtue; or, if allied to superstition, to lapse into polytheism, and adore the manifold forms of matter, whether these be the starry host of the Persian magi, or the crocodiles of Egypt.

The second form of pantheism may be the deification of the human soul, or, as the Germans call it, the Ego, making that the fountain of the universe, the All that exists substantially, everything else being the Ego realized or objectified. This

is the subjective, pantheistic idealism of Fichte and his followers.

The third form of pantheism might be the rejection of what we call nature or the universe as mere form or appearance, and the deification of spirit, as the only substance, having the fixed attributes of thought and extension, and thus producing by an absolute and eternal necessity both nature and man. Such a theory would justify its abettors in speaking of finite beings and finite things, but always with the reserved or implied idea, that they are only manifestations or emanations of the universal Spirit, into which they are perpetually returning. This is the pantheism of Spinoza, and, in a modified form, that of Bruno and Schelling.

The last and most complete form of pantheism would be the reduction of all things, matter and spirit, to *pure thought*, and the construction of the universe from nothing, and its consequent *possible* return to nothing. Outward manifestations, limited forms, need not of course be deified in this system, on which account the author of such a theory might reject the vulgar pantheism; but his only God would consist of mere thought and relation, with their constant changes, and eternal succession. This is the absolute pantheism of Hegel, beyond which speculation cannot go. The universe is at last reduced to a pure abstraction, thought itself springs from zero, and returns to zero.

Das Nichts, Nothing—is the beginning and end of the Hegelian philosophy; and here therefore German metaphysics finds its completion. Between the two zeros or the two nothings, a magnificent field, including God, science, history, art, present themselves for contemplation and study; and all these Hegel, with amazing logical subtilty, has discussed. But his philosophy, whatever in other respects it may be, begins in nothing, from which come all things, and ends in nothing, to which tend all things.*

But such a statement appears so extravagant and startling that we must justify it by a few remarks. Pantheism, we have said, is the true secret of the German philosophy. The only chance, therefore, which a new theorist has for originality, must lie, not in the adoption of a new view, but of a new method. He must still tread, though in different style, and in an apparently new direction, the circle of the absolute. Hegel at first agreed with Fichte and Schelling. Common science he rejected as empirical, as belonging to the outer world of mere forms and shows. The

* We presume that the Hegelians would not say that the universe will ever be actually reduced to absolute nothing. All they maintain is, that nature is a constant *transition* or oscillation between nothing and something, between the *abstract* which is nothing, and the *concrete* which is something; consequently that nature never is, but is always *becoming*.

observation of facts, patient investigation, induction, deduction, what indeed most persons call science, he treated with disdain. Hence, in his first work, *De Orbitis Planetarum*, founded on Schelling's Nature-Philosophy, he poured unbounded scorn upon Newton and the modern astronomy! Gradually, however, he found it necessary to recede from Schelling. His mind was more orderly and logical; and he wished to establish philosophy upon an absolute basis. He would assume nothing, not even the Ego of Fichte, or the *intellectual intuition* of Schelling. He would construct, on strictly logical principles, a system of universal and irrefragable truth. Instantly he gave himself to the task with all the energies of his subtile and vigorous intellect. So absorbed was he in his work, that he went on writing when the cannon of the French army was roaring under his window in the memorable battle of Jena.

Unconsciously, however, Hegel assumed one thing, yet only one, though that one the real basis of the entire German Ontology, namely, the identity of subject and object, and consequently of being and thought. Taking it for granted that fact and idea must be coincident, he took the genesis of thought for the genesis of the universe, the process of logic for the process of God. This given, his whole system follows without an effort, and taken alone it is one of the most wonderful specimens of a gigantic and pitiless logic. Except this, however, he assumed nothing, not even consciousness, or the ordinary axioms of human thought. Literally he began with nothing. But nothing is a negation, and a negation implies the existence of something which it denies. Something and nothing are the two poles of a truth, or idea, which consists of the union or contact of the two. Neither of these exists by itself. They exist in their relation only; so that the relation in this case is the only truth.

But how can nothing be said to exist? we may well inquire; our Saxon *dummheit*, and want of Teutonic *Anschaungsvermögen*, as the Germans say, making our question seem quite a poser. Hegel, however, promptly replies, It exists as a thought, that is, as an abstraction. *Das nichts ist; denn es ist Gedanke*. And so also pure being (*seyn*), which is only a thought, an entirely unconditioned thought, exists in the same manner. Thus his famous maxim is that *Being and thought are the same*, whence also *Seyn und Nichts ist Dasselbe*.*

Thought and being, or ideas and realities, being the same, according to Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz and Schelling, Hegel's conclusion fairly follows.

* Encyclopædie, pp. 89-97. For admirable accounts of Hegel and Hegelian pantheism, see Amand Saintes' "Vie et Œuvres de Spinoza," pp. 290-333. Dr. Ott's "Hegel et Philosophie Allemande." Willm's "Philosophie Allemande," Vol. IV.

The Hegelian method may be described as the identity of contraries, which has a basis of truth in the fact that all things have, so to speak, two sides, and appear to us as contradictions; and the entire problems of metaphysics turn upon the reconciliation of these opposing dualities, as a distinguished thinker has expressed it, *les conciliation des dualités desesperantes*.* All things in the created universe spring from the infinite, whence the duality of the finite and infinite—the finite—the non or not-finite,—they have two sides, therefore, one dark the other luminous; the one bounded, the other unbounded; the one known, the other unknown, except by faith. Man is finite, yet he lies in the infinite; but how, who can tell? He discerns, or believes, the infinite, but he sees, he comprehends, only the finite. He sprung from the *Absolute*, the unconditioned, the unbounded and eternal, which he adores, but the secret nature of infinite Being or of God he cannot explore. His *thought*, like himself, seems to hover between the finite and the infinite. It reposes apparently upon the absolute, yet understands it not; for whatever is understood has relations, and never can measure the absolute. There are certain fundamental axioms of thought, which bring with them no reasons, no conditions, and rest therefore upon a simple, fundamental belief; but the instant we conceive them, apply them, or reason with them, they enter into relations and limits. All positive thought, indeed, as Sir William Hamilton maintains, by irrefragable reasons, is conditioned. It is never absolutely simple—it involves two sides, as it were two contrary poles, vibrating between the finite and the infinite, the local and universal, the absolute and related, the subjective and objective, the self-subsistent and the phenomenal. Cause and effect, one of our most essential and common ideas, is, fundamentally, but the idea of the infinite passing into the finite, or producing the finite, the unlimited passing into bounds, the eternal into time: for all finite causes, in the process of thought, must hang upon the infinite Cause; and there is a sense, both logical and religious, in which God is “all and in all.” This double character of human thought, and this apparent corresponding duality and contradiction of the universe, may be found in all science, in all knowledge: for here evermore are cause and effect, being and relation, action and re-action, darkness and light, time and eternity, finite and infinite, man and God. Even without reference to the infinite, man himself is dual, being soul and body, mind and matter, subject and object, and viewing all things, somehow, as intermediate between them both, or as having relations to both. In a word, thought is dual,

* Vinet, “*Essais de Philosophie Morale*.”

being at once subject and predicate, cause and effect, analysis, and synthesis,—in its simplest forms and highest generalizations, uniting contraries, reconciling contradictions.

Hegel had some idea of the true method of thought, but he carried it into extremes. Confounding all thought with being, all object with subject, he had to begin with nothing, as we have said, and end with nothing.

Two contraries, such as existence and non-existence, appear to exclude each other. Hegel pronounces this notion to be false. Everything, he says, is contradictory in itself—this, in fact, is its essence; and its identity consists in the union of the two contraries. Thus Being (*Seyn*) in the abstract or unconditioned is nothing, that is, apart from any individual or particular thing, is the same as nothing: existence, therefore, is identical with its negation, that is, with nothing. The two ideas involve each other. The middle term, the union or relation of the two, is conditioned existence, that is, the universe. Take another example: the idea of weakness is a negation, but it implies the idea of force; but force in the abstract is nothing. They are identical; and here, therefore, in their union or middle term, appear as a positive or concrete power. Pure or absolute light is no better than darkness, for light without colour or shadow is invisible. Absolute clearness is identical with absolute obscurity, that is, with its negation; their union, however, or their middle term, gives us light!*

If you say this is word-quibbling, Hegel would reply, on his ground-principle, the identity of thought with reality, that whether it is word-quibbling or not, it is absolutely true. But it leads to contradictions and absurdities, you say. Hegel rejoins, it must lead to contradictions, of course, but not to absurdities. Reality is found only in the clash and final union of innumerable contradictions.

According to this logical process, then, nature and thought may be constructed. Subject and object do not exist as separate realities, but exist only in their identity. Their relation is the only thing conceivable. So, also, finite and infinite, which appear to exclude each other, are identical. Mind and matter, too, are identical; indeed they are only subject and object viewed in different aspects. The two poles unite and form the truth, which is an eternal relation. God and the universe would seem to exclude each other, but they are identical after all, and their identity is the truth.†

* "Hegel et Philosophie Allemande," par. Dr. Ott. See also Lewes' Hist. of Philos., Vol. IV. pp. 203, 204.

† Our thoughts, according to Hegel, are the reality of things, and thoughts are

On this ground Hegel contended that Schelling's views of the identity of subject and object are not exact. The latter assumed the reality of both sides or poles of the magnet, or the reality of two contraries; and the identity he called the point of indifference between them. Hegel decided that the positive truth or reality is found, not in the two terms related, but in the relation itself. Thus he gives us an absolute idealism, or a universe of mere relations. All things, therefore, are not mere appearances to us, as taught by Kant, but mere appearances in themselves. Thoughts are the only realities. "The real objectivity is this: that our thoughts are not merely thoughts, but are, at the same time, the reality of things."*

If there be a God, then, according to Hegel, he is only the *Absolute Thought*, or rather the Absolute Relation; so that God, or thought, comes to consciousness only in man! He finds the highest sphere in scientific thought. "It appears," says he, "that the World Spirit has finally succeeded in freeing himself from all impediments, and is able to conceive of himself as Absolute Spirit (or Intelligence, *Geist zu erfassen*).—For he is such only so far as he knows himself to be the Absolute Intelligence: and this he knows only in science, and this knowledge alone constitutes his true existence."†

In the logic of Hegel, *this* and *that*, here and there, now and then, nothing and something, finite and infinite, good and bad, right and wrong, time and eternity, are the same things. These, too, all are as nothing, except in their identity or relation. Properly speaking, things do not exist—they are only coming into existence. They form a Trinity—Nothing, Something, and the Relation between them. These, then, are one, one in the identity or relation. So that Hegel pretends to accept the Christian doctrine of the Trinity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God the Father is the eternal Idea—*Idee an und für sich*, that is, the Idea as an unconditional Abstraction, which is the same as Nothing. God the Son, engendered by the Father, is the *Idee* as *Ander-seyn*, that is, as a conditioned or realized object. God the Holy Spirit is the Identity of the two, that is, the Absolute Relation, the negation of the Negation, and the totality of all existence. Separate from the world, then, there is, according to Hegel, no God; so, also, separate from the consciousness of man, there is no Divine consciousness or personality. The Deity is only the eternal process of Thought, uniting the objective movement in nature and the subjective in reason or logic, and coming to a

only relations, or give us only relations. "Encyclopædie," p. 97. "Geschichte der Philosophie," Vol. III. p. 690. Willm., "Hist. de Philos. Alle.," Vol. III. pp. 398, 399.

* "Geschichte der Philosophie," Vol. III. p. 689.

† Ibid.

full realization of itself only in the universal genesis or spirit of humanity.*

Thus vanishes, as a reality, the whole external world. Thus vanishes God as a self-existent, personal essence, a being of intelligence and will. Thus vanish, in fact, all possible beings and things, swallowed up in the vortex of a vast, all-devouring logic. Thought only remains, or rather relation, that is to say, abstraction, and what is this in its last analysis but nothing? The world is reduced to an idea, the foundations are destroyed. God and the universe are gone!

And yet hundreds of minds in Germany, some of them of the highest order, and all of them above mediocrity, have received all this as the last revelation of human wisdom, the most perfect triumph of philosophic thought! What, then, can we say but this, that the sophists (*σοφοί*) of this world are caught in their own subtilty? "Professing themselves wise (*σοφοί*, philosophers), they have become fools."

"Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chimæris."
A race with reason mad, and fed upon chimeras.

The German philosophy has been imported into France, and to a slight extent into England and the United States, but thus far has not, in these countries, assumed a definite form, except, perhaps, in the Eclecticism of Cousin and his followers. It is well known, that subsequent to the revolution of 1798 in France, a decided re-action against the sensual philosophy took place, and a few intelligent thinkers, aided chiefly by the Scottish philosophy, were gradually approaching a higher and purer system. Under the auspices of Laromiguière, Royer Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin, for a time, the Scottish philosophy of Reid and Stewart was all the rage. Cousin's inquiring spirit, however, led him to the study of Kant, and he began to promulgate in his lectures the doctrines of the Königsberg sage. But he did not stop here. Having introduced the Parisians to the labyrinth of the Kantian philosophy, he became enamoured of Proclus, the Alexandrian mystic, who revived the study of Plato, and introduced among the speculative thinkers of his day a sort of vague and mystical pantheism. Cousin edited Proclus, lectured on him, borrowed some of his ideas, vamped up others, and would have made him the demigod of the popular philosophy, had the giddy public been willing. A visit to Germany made him acquainted with the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and especially Hegel, who has been styled "the modern Proclus of Germany."

* "Philosophie der Religion," Vol. II. pp. 480, 481. "Geschichte der Philosophie," Vol. III. p. 377.

On his return to France, Cousin made the public acquainted with as much of the doctrine of Hegel as it could bear, adding something of his own to make the mixture "slab and good." He adopted, especially, Hegel's principles of historical criticism, and re-produced, in clear and elegant French, the comprehensive and striking views of his master on the development of speculative philosophy, as a natural growth of humanity, a necessary movement of "the divine spirit in the soul of man."

But Cousin, to be original, must find a method of his own. He admired somewhat the old Greek philosophers, especially Proclus, and yet cherished no slight respect for Locke and the Scottish philosophy. His mind is clear, methodical, and comprehensive, and his style a model of grace, vigour, and elegance. What, then, more promising than the idea of *Eclecticism*? Indeed, it was the only method left for anything new by means of the old. Philosophy had run out into two extremes, as it were opposite poles, of what might be, as Cousin supposed, a common centre. Might they not be brought together, and the truth at last discovered? In a word, might not Locke and Kant, Stewart and Proclus, Reid and Hegel, be reconciled, and a grand and beautiful system thence deduced? Yes, Eclecticism is the only system now remaining to the aspiring philosopher, who should advance the domain of science, and make himself a name in the annals of speculative thought.

Behold, then, the origin of Eclecticism, and its claims to the admiration of the world. The experiment has been successful, and now Eclecticism is the prevalent philosophy in France. It has been treated with some respect in England, though demolished in its fundamental positions by Sir William Hamilton. It has been welcomed, but not thoroughly grasped, by a certain class of minds in the United States. Its impression, however, upon the great body of our thinkers has been comparatively slight. Recently Mr. Morell of England has taken it under his protection. While objecting to some of its minor positions, he seems to regard it as the true method, and obviously adopts its fundamental doctrines. He defends it from attack, and clearly conveys the impression, that in his view it has solved the great problem touching the passage of psychology to ontology, or the relations of the finite and phenomenal to the infinite and the real. Mr. Morell, however, has not grappled with the difficulties of the question, and has turned away, as if in conscious weakness, from the strong statements and striking arguments of Sir William Hamilton.* His history, however valuable in other respects, only re-echoes the historical criticisms

* The passage, in which this occurs is curious enough, and worthy of attention. "Hist. of Philos.," p. 656.

of Hegel, Damiron and Cousin. It indicates industry, learning and skill, with a commanding use of clear and elegant English diction, but no originality, vigour or profundity of mind.

But what is Eclecticism? Is it a simple collection of philosophic fragments, in which the most incongruous and contradictory methods, processes and notions are co-ordinated by a thin spider-web of system; or is all the error first eliminated from the great mass of divulgent theories, and nothing left but the residuum of pure gold? This were much to claim certainly. Still, if Eclecticism means anything worth while, it must mean the latter. A mere collection of notions and hypotheses, though interesting as materials for a history of philosophy, would of itself possess no intrinsic value as science. A *criterion* must be found. Truth must be tested, and separated from falsehood. How can this be done? Where is the criterion referred to—where the purifying fire, the separating process, and the final touchstone to indorse the golden treasure? M. Cousin's ingenuity alone? By no means. What then? M. Cousin's system, or what M. Cousin assumes as the true philosophy? Nothing else is conceivable. So that in Eclecticism we have only a new system, added to the thousand and one which have preceded it. This must be admitted; but recollect it is a system taken out of all other systems and bringing them into fraternal unity. How? For that is the question already put—and here we begin to detect a fallacy, a sort of vicious logical circle. The gold or the true system is taken from all other systems, which, according to M. Cousin, are dross and gold together. How? By the true system—that is to say, the gold is taken from this huge pile of rubbish, by means of itself!

But you mistake, exclaims the Eclectic; all error, according to M. Cousin, is only incomplete truth, not dross and gold exactly, but gold out of place, gold incomplete. To get the truth then, or the philosophic gold in its completeness, the different parts, Kant, Reid, Hegel, Proclus, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Spinoza, have only to be brought together.

But is there not a palpable fallacy here also? What! is error in reality only incomplete truth? You might as well say that brass, iron, tin, nay, absolute dross, are only incomplete silver and gold. Error is often an absolute denial of the truth, and bears the same relation to it that darkness does to light, or wrong to right. A few grains of truth may be found in all erroneous systems, and in this their plausibility may consist; but two, or half a dozen, errors, even if they consist of incomplete truths, that is, of one-sided, imperfect, partial views, brought together, will not give us more than they contain.

Nor can an error, on one extreme, be corrected by bringing it into contact with an error, on the opposite extreme. Something must be thrown out of both ; that is, whatever is misstatement, false logic, or false inference, must be thrown out. In a word, all the dross and baser metal must be separated from the precious ore. Error doubtless is often an incomplete view of the reality, a half truth, as we call it, by courtesy, but more frequently it is something positively false ; as for example, the assumptions that all clear and distinct ideas are necessarily true, that subject and object are identical, that like can never produce unlike, that spirit cannot create matter, that the infinite cannot produce the finite, and cause it to exist separate from itself, that human thought is identical with being, the finite reason commensurate with infinite existence. So also, the opposite assumptions are positively false, namely, that all thought is derived from sensation, that there is no real distinction between mind and matter, the former being only a modification of the latter, that there is no God but the vast combination of mechanical forces, no duty but expediency, no heaven but political freedom or carnal pleasure. All these are not simply incomplete views of truth, but plain and palpable falsehoods. They deny the reality of things, and by no process can be transmuted into truth. Light and darkness, right and wrong, *yes* and *no*, God and Satan, can never be made one.

It is evident, then, that a criterion is demanded, in some intermediate system, some higher and better views ? Does Eclecticism furnish such ? In other words, what are Cousin's peculiar notions, which bring the most opposite systems together, and from the whole, give us absolute, philosophical truth ? We reply, the "pure spontaneity," and especially the "impersonality of reason," and the passage thence from the finite to the infinite, from the related and conditioned, to the absolute and eternal.

As to the impersonality of reason, the organ to M. Cousin of pure truth, what does that amount to, if not to this, that reason, while in man, does not belong to man at all ; and if in any sense finite, is also infinite ? Well, then, whose reason is it, if it is not mine, nor thine, nor man's in general ? The only reply possible is, that it is God's. In other words, it is the absolute, universal reason, and is thus identical and commensurate not only with thought, but with existence. Man's reflective power, his intellect and senses, including his affections, according to Eclecticism, lead him into error, never at least give him the pure truth. But reason, being impersonal and divine, is the immediate inspiration of the Almighty ; nay, more, is absolutely

infallible. It is enthusiasm, says Cousin, who defines inspiration by that term, that is, *God in us*.*

How does M. Cousin and Mr. Morrell, who also adopts and defends all this, prove the impersonality of the reason? They do not prove it—they merely affirm it. The whole thing is an assumption; for surely it is no proof of the impersonality and divinity of reason to say, that it is not under the control of the will or the affections, or that it has its own sphere and its own laws.†

Now we respectfully ask, can such a position touching reason in man, be entertained except on the ground of subjective pantheism? Is reason, that which is highest in man, really not himself, but God? Is the soul of man finite by its personality, infinite by its reason? In a word, is it God in humanity, as Hegel also teaches, who thinks, and thus comes into consciousness and joy, in the palpitating spirit of the human race? In a word, are God and humanity one?

That the human spirit is so constituted as to form not only ideas according to sense, but ideas according to spirit, in a word, that it is endowed with the capacity of forming fundamental and universal axioms, which are the basis of all conviction, we cheerfully grant. But to assume that reason in man is the absolute and universal Reason, in other words, God—for God and universal Reason are one—is assuming one of the fundamental positions of Spinoza and Hegel, namely, that thought is absolute and divine, or that Being and thought are one.‡ It makes man literally nothing, except as a manifestation or expression of God. Logically carried out, it would establish the complete identity of all things, and swallow up mind and matter, the universe and man, in an absolute, universal spiritualism.

But Cousin's great claim to distinction, as an original thinker, is said to be his mode of crossing the chasm between the finite and the infinite, by means of "the impersonal Reason." This, then, will test the worth and power of his philosophy: for this is the grand problem, the *pons asinorum* of metaphysics. Let it be remembered, however, that simply to assume the two points or poles of this double fact, and the relation between them, is not to solve the problem. Any one can do that, and leave the whole question just where it was before. The solution sought, must show how the one has sprung from the other, and in what sense the one is involved in the other, espe-

* *Œds et vœus*. See *Histoire de la Philosophie*, 2 s. Tome II. p. 135.

† Morell, *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 54. Compare p. 649 et seq.

‡ Indeed, Morell admits that, in his general positions upon this subject, Cousin is only "treading in the footsteps of his German predecessors."—*Hist. Philos.*, p. 649.

cially how finite beings are dependent and yet not dependent, as in the case of free agents, upon the infinite Being—how they are united, and yet separate, one and yet many. In a word, the problem to be solved is, how can there be unity, and yet duality, or plurality, God and yet man? Are both, or all of these, in the higher elements of their existence, *identical*, the difference between them being only apparent and incidental? Is reason, for example, which gives to man his peculiar distinction in the scale of being, only God as the real essence and substratum of the human soul, and is it through this medium we reach the absolute, and thus identify ourselves with all that exists? Are Reason and Being one, and is God really infinite and finite at once; in other words, the All, not in a popular and moral, but absolute and metaphysical sense?

This, we maintain, is the real theory of M. Cousin. Through impersonal reason in man, he claims to reach the absolute, the infinite and eternal. Having risen to this elevation, how does he construct the universe of finite beings and finite forms? In a word, how does he solve the great problem to which we have referred, and briefly described as the problem of creation? Does God create out of nothing? No, says M. Cousin, God creates out of himself, he creates out of a creative energy. It is his nature to create. God is a cause, a cause which must necessarily pass into effect, which therefore eternally passes into effect.* Very well; but how? Please to solve the problem scientifically. How passes the infinite into the finite, mind into matter, God into man and angels? In other words, how does God, from his own spiritual and creative energy, construct the outward universe of finite beings and finite forms? It would seem to most persons an inscrutable mystery, and certainly no metaphysician, in ancient or in modern times, has made the slightest approach to its solution. M. Cousin, however, considers it the easiest thing imaginable. A few strokes of his facile and elegant pen are sufficient to reveal the mighty secret. "To create," says he, "is a thing not difficult to conceive, for it is a thing which we do every moment; in fact, we create whenever we perform a free action. I will, I form a resolution, I form another and another, I modify it, I suspend it, I prosecute it. What is it that I do? I produce an effect, which I refer to myself as its cause, as its only cause; so that, with reference to this effect, I seek no cause above and beyond myself. This is to create. We create a free action, we create it, I say; for we impute it only to ourselves. It was not; it begins to be,

* It will be seen that Cousin here endorses one of Spinoza's fundamental errors.

by virtue of that principle of causality which we possess. Thus, to cause is to create; but with what? With nothing? By no means. On the contrary, with that which constitutes the very basis of our being. Man does not draw forth from nonentity, the act which he has not yet done, and which he is about to do; he draws it forth from the power which he has to do it, that is, from himself. Here is a type of a creation. The divine creation is the same in its nature.* God, if he is a cause, can create; and if he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create; and in creating the universe, he does not draw it forth from nonentity, which does not exist, which is only a word; he draws it from himself; for that power of causation and of creation, of which we feeble men possess a portion; and all the difference between our creation and that of God, is the general difference between God and man, the difference between the Supreme and Absolute Cause and a relative, secondary cause.”†

Well may we exclaim, as we gaze upon this product of the labouring mountain, What! is this all? Is creation nothing more than action, and especially a necessary, absolute, eternal action? Such is Cousin’s position, and such, too, is Spinoza’s. I move my hand—I trace lines upon paper;—is this creation? Does this bear even the remotest affinity, except in the idea of cause, to the Divine production of the universe, not from pre-existent materials, but from nothingness, that is to say, from God himself? You build a house—that is an act, or series of acts, which have a cause, a voluntary cause. Is it then a creation? Does it bear any proper analogy to the creative energy of God, springing, at his infinite volition, into worlds of light and beauty, or constructing, by a process utterly unknown to man, the numberless forms of concrete being? *Let there be light; and there was light!* God said, Let us make man in our image; and man, the lord of creation, walked in glory and in joy through the groves of Eden. Can man do such a thing as that? nay, can he form even the slightest conjecture as to the rationale or mode of its production? We talk metaphorically of poetical creations and what not; but who, in his sober senses, believes that any one creates in the same sense that God creates? Is Milton divine? Great indeed, and so to speak inspired, but as incapable as a Hottentot, of creating a single ray of light, the petal of a flower, or the down upon an insect’s

* To create “out of nothing,” is not what Cousin represents it to be, when the expression is used by intelligent persons. It does not mean the production of an effect, without a cause; for, in this sense, *out of nothing, nothing comes*; it means simply to create, not out of pre-existent materials, but by an inherent creative power.

† Cours de l’Histoire de la Phil. (Introduction), pp. 101, 102.

wing. Creation, forsooth, it does come, on Cousin's notions, to a very small affair.

But, no, the chasm between the finite and the infinite cannot be crossed at this rate. A pretty figure of speech, or a handsome play upon words, does not solve the problem of the creation.

But Cousin admits that God creates ; that is a good deal for a philosopher who goes into raptures at the name of Benedict Spinoza ; and yet by the very terms it is quite evident that he denies it. God, it seems, according to Cousin, is an absolute, necessary, and eternal cause, or creative force, which cannot but pass into effect. The cause, then, exists for the effect, is controlled by the effect. Whence it follows, as Cousin avows, that God is "creating without cessation and infinitely." God then *must create*—this is his characteristic according to Cousin. He has no real choice in the matter ; and the idea of a creation in time, a creation which has a beginning, is denied. The cause must pass into the effect whether it will or no ; indeed, it was always cause, always effect. In which case creation is not, properly speaking, a *work*, but an *energy* or *act*, a necessary, perpetual, everlasting act. Cousin may admit, that God is first in the order of ideas, but in reality *creation* is as eternal as God, and can never be separate from God. God and the universe are eternally one. The whole is like the genesis of thought ; subject and object, infinite and finite, go together, so to speak, necessitate and involve each other. Once more, then, thought and being are identical. God and nature are one, but one as subject and object, cause and effect. Hence Cousin's *Trinity*, bearing a striking resemblance to Hegel's ; God absolute, and God conditioned, or God in himself, and God in the universe, and the relation between them, producing unity. Human consciousness has "three momenta"—a reflected Trinity, *unity*, *multiplicity* and the *relation* between them. So also, in God, according to Cousin, there is first, the absolute unity—then creation or plurality, and the relation between them. "The unity of the Triplicity, alone, is real ; and at the same time this unity would utterly perish, if limited to either of the three elements which are necessary to its existence ; they have all the same logical value and constitute one indecomposable unity. What is this unity ? The divine intelligence itself. Up to this height, gentlemen, does our intelligence upon the wings of ideas—to speak with Plato—elevate itself. Here is that thrice holy God, whom the family of man recognises and adores, and before whom the octogenary author of the *Système du Monde*, bowed and uncovered his head, whenever he was named."*

* Histoire de la Philos. (Introduction), p. 95.

Here, then, in clear daylight, is Cousin's idealism, and notwithstanding all his protests, his pantheism, not indeed the vulgar pantheism which deifies only the outward creation, but a pantheism as decided as that of Spinoza and Hegel. The result, on the fairest logical grounds, is inevitable. God at last is *the All*, at once finite and infinite, cause and effect, immensity and space, mind and matter, divinity and humanity, eternity and time. Hence, with a boldness which is almost startling, he says, "God is at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only just so far as he is cause, and cause only just so far as he is substance; that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end and centre, at the summit of being, and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple in a word, that is to say, at the same time, God, nature and humanity. Indeed, if God be not everything, he is nothing."* Cousin, indeed, claims to believe in a personal God—a being of intelligence and will; but inconsistently and illogically, provided his language is to be taken in its ordinary sense. Protest against it as he may, an absolute pantheism, which he speaks of as "the bugbear of feeble imaginations" has swept him within its fathomless depths.

The fact is, Cousin, with all his fine genius and attainments, is caught in the snare of a bewildering Ontology. Adopting the fundamental error of the identity of being and thought, of reason and God, and discarding the very possibility of mystery, he speculates as if he were in the confidence of Jehovah, and had assisted at the creation of the world. He makes no account of the limited powers and resources of man, none especially of his imperfect and sinful condition. His system, therefore, imposing and beautiful as it may be, is constructed upon the false foundations of the German ontology. His psychology, in which are many interesting details, is an after-thought, brought in to buttress the falling fabric, but only lending it imaginary support. Embodying many fine details, and splendid historical criticism, it is nothing more than an artificial *Eclecticism*, in other words, a piece of magnificent patchwork.

Never ought it to be forgotten that ideas are not facts; and an ideal philosophy, however logical and imposing, must finally be brought to the test of reality. One theory after another

* "Fragmens Philosophiques," Preface. Quoted at p. 120 of the "Introduction à l'Hist. de Philos." Cousin claims to reject pantheism, but he explains it as the deification only of the outward or material world. In this respect his views have been greatly misunderstood. For, while this pantheism may be rejected, and proofs upon proofs of the fact cited from his works, he may reserve his faith for another form of pantheism, more beautiful, but equally false.

may be projected, like meteors on the brow of night, and men may stare and shout, but the calm heavens roll on in their silent majesty, and mock our folly from afar. The fact is, the powers of man are bounded. He may descry—he may believe,—he may adore, the primal Source of being, the absolute and infinite Cause of all that exists; but he cannot make it a science or a philosophy. The attempt to do so has uniformly failed, will for ever fail. It plunges the mind into an inextricable labyrinth of thought from which there is no escape. In this boundless “antrum,” or, as it were, illimitable forest, philosophy, like Polyphemus of old, has wildly wandered, with vast and gigantic powers, but struck with a fatal blindness, and rushing into inevitable destruction.

On the other hand, instructed by common sense and Divine Revelation, as to the necessary limits of the human mind, and taking things as they are, acting upon the spontaneous impulses of a purified soul, above all, guided by the Holy Spirit, the most illiterate Christian, though a child, often knows more of God, of himself, and of the universe, than the profoundest philosopher. Guided by knowledge and love, conveyed to the world through the mission of Christ, he is made “to lie down in green pastures, and led beside the still waters,” while the proud metaphysician stumbles and perishes “on the dark mountains.” Hence says Isaac Barrow, quoting, in combination several passages from Chrysostom, “by virtue of faith, rustic and mechanic idiots* do, in true knowledge, surpass the most refined wits, and children prove wiser than old philosophers; an idiot can tell us that which a learned infidel doth not know; a child can assure us that, wherein a deep philosopher is not resolved—for, ask a boor, ask a boy educated in our religion, who made him; he will tell you, the Almighty God—which is more than Aristotle or Democritus would have told. Demand of him, why he was made; he will answer you, to serve and glorify his Maker—and hardly would Pythagoras or Plato have answered so wisely. Examine him concerning his soul; he will aver that it is immortal, that it shall undergo a judgment after this life, that accordingly it shall abide in a state of bliss or misery everlasting—about which points, neither Socrates nor Seneca could assure anything. Inquire of him, how things are upheld, how governed and ordered; he presently will reply, by the powerful hand and wise providence of God—whereas, among philosophers, one would ascribe all events to the current of fate, another to the tides of fortune; one to the blind influences of the stars, another to a confused jumble of atoms. Pose him about the main points of morality and duty;

* Idiotai—common, ignorant persons.

and he will, in a few words, better inform you than Cicero or Epictetus, than Aristotle or Plutarch, in their large tracts or voluminous discourses.”*

ART. III.—RELIGIOUS BIBLICAL INSTRUCTION AND PASTORAL SUPERVISION IN COLLEGES.

BY C. E. STOWE, D.D., BOWDOIN COLLEGE.

Who can tell what tender affections, what earnest hopes, what fond anticipations, are concentrated on a group of young men such as is found in all our colleges? Could we see the anxious, throbbing, agonizing hearts—the father’s earnestness, the mother’s solicitude, the sister’s love—could we make present to ourselves the pride and joy which are diffused through the family circle by the young student’s success and good reputation—or the mortification, distress and bitter disappointment which follow his failure and shame—we should look upon every member of college, of whatever character, as an object of deep and permanent interest.

Whatever he may be in himself, he holds relations to others which invest him with dignity and importance. Let any man watch the yearnings of his own soul towards his own son, and then let him remember that what his son is to him, the sons of other parents are to them, and he never can despise any one who is a father’s or a mother’s child.

Important as every young man is to his family friends, considered in reference to himself, he is still more important, still more interesting. *There* is an immortal soul, destined to a never-ending existence—and what an existence! What capacities of enjoyment—what susceptibilities to suffering! What powers in that one mind to be developed or crushed—to be a source of joy to the possessor, or of misery unutterable—and that for ever! And how delicate the mental and moral structure! How liable to injury! In what imminent peril of falling to ruin! If we were intrusted with the carriage of some fragile and priceless fabric, like the celebrated Portland vase, for example, and the road was rough and rocky—or if we were to transport, through stormy weather over an angry sea, some unique product of Raphael’s pencil, how careful should we be—how anxious lest an untimely jolt, or a wandering drop of water,

* Barrow’s Works, Vol. II. p. 86, Edin. Edition.

should for ever mar the precious deposit! Yet how infinitely small is the value of all works of human art, however excellent or unique, compared with the worth of the human soul, the product of an all-wise Creator's skill! It seems to me the man is mad who can lightly esteem any human being, when he once considers what a human being is.

Our physical creation, magnificent as it is, would have but little of interest or beauty, were it not for the intelligent souls, in curiously organized bodies, which inhabit it. How infinite the variety of pleasing sounds, and how attractive—how enchanting the power of music! But, what is sound? what is music? Without an ear to catch the vibrations of the air, there would be no such thing as sound; without the organ of hearing, music would have no existence. What is this magnificent arch of the heavens above us but the combined action of light and vapour upon the eye? And if there were no eyes, there would be no sky. How beautiful is the rainbow, as it rests upon the bosom of the cloud! Yet the eye is as necessary to give existence to the rainbow, as it is to see it after it is formed. How exquisite the beauties of colour, as seen in the flowering plant or the lustrous insect; but, without eyes to reflect the rays of light, there would be no such thing as colour. And what are eyes, or ears, or nerves, without the intelligent soul within, to enjoy the results of their organization and action? In a very important sense man himself is, passively at least, the creator of the harmony and beauty which we enjoy; and wonderful and beautiful as the works of creation are, man himself is the most wonderful, the most beautiful of all—the last production of creative skill, and the only one which bears the image of the Creator.

In Scripture, the whole visible creation is represented as being formed with reference to man, and as existing for man, in a sense so intimate, that all nature sympathises with his weal or woe. When man fell, nature herself, the earth and its products, vegetation, animals, all fell under the curse for his sake; and when the work of redemption shall have been completed, and man restored to his original holiness, by the mediation of the only-begotten Son of God, then the creation itself, so long unwillingly subject to vanity, shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption, and restored to the glorious liberty of the sons of God, and there shall be new heavens and a new earth, wherein the righteous dwell, Rom. viii. 19—22, 2 Pet. iii. 13. For what purpose are all the arrangements of this world? What is the use of anything on this earth? Is it not that the world may be inhabited by comfortable, well-informed, well-behaved human beings? What but this are all the interests of society—all the use of governments, of civilization, of learning, commerce, manu-

factures, the whole social organization? And as the existence on earth is so transient, and the existence beyond the grave eternal, what, comparatively, is worthy of a thought, except the salvation of the undying soul? Was it not for this that the Son of God for a season left the glory which he had with the Father before the world was, and dwelt, and laboured, and suffered, and died on this earth?

In whatever aspect we view the subject, the moral and religious improvement of the young men gathered in our colleges assumes the very first place in interest and importance. Everywhere the religious and moral training of the educated young man is important, and in our own country it is more emphatically so, for here men never do things by halves, but whatever they are, that they are wholly, and nothing else. The French or the German young man, in his university life, may be dissipated within certain limits, not much overleap the boundaries which a worldly prudence prescribes, and in due time, as matter of course, become a staid, sober, dignified citizen. But not so with the American. Let the young man here, in his college years, act the inebriate or the profligate, and there is the end of him; he is never anything else, and early death and a drunkard's grave is the best that his friends can expect of him; for if his life is prolonged, it will be only the protraction of shame and woe. Frequent are the falls in our land, but rare, very rare, are the recoveries. How important, then, that there should be direct and earnest endeavours for the religious and moral culture of our college students! How much is depending upon it, both as it respects individual happiness and the well-being of society at large! For it is our educated young men who will give tone to society, and control the destiny of the generation in which they live. The usual course of college study, however well chosen and earnestly pursued, cannot meet the object; for mere intellectual training, without careful moral culture, does not correct the evils of the heart, on the contrary, in many cases seems to aggravate them. The ever-eloquent Cicero, who had a moral sense delicate and cultivated beyond almost any writer of the Pagan world, saw this great truth very clearly. In the third book of his work, *De Naturâ Deorum*, he introduces Cotta arguing in the following strain:—

“Sentit domus unius cujusque, sentit forum, sentit curia, campus, socii, provinciæ, ut quemadmodum ratione recte fiat, sic ratione peccetur. Alterumque et a paucis, et raro; alterum et sæpe, et a plurimis: ut satius fuerit nullam omnino nobis a Diis immortalibus datum esse rationem, quam tanta cum pernicie datam. Ut vinum ægrotis, quia prodest raro, nocet sæpissime,

melius est non adhibere omnino, quam spe dubiæ salutis in apertam perniciem incurrere; sic haud scio, an melius fuerit, humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, quoniam pestifera sit multis, admodum paucis salutaris, non dari omnino, quam tam munifice et tam large dari. Quæ enim libido, quæ avaritia, quod facinus aut scelus suscipitur nisi concilio capto, aut sine animi motu et cogitatione, id est, ratione perficitur? ———
Utinam igitur, ut illa anus optat,

—— ne in nemore Pelio securibus
Cæsa cecidisset ablegna ad terram trabes,

sic istam calliditatem hominibus Dii ne dedissent! Qua perpauci bene utuntur; qui tamen ipsi sæpe a male utentibus opprimuntur: innumerabiles autem improbe utuntur; ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii ad fraudem hominibus, non ad bonitatem impertitum esse videatur.”*

The ordinary course of college discipline cannot meet the case; for this is merely negative in its character, directed only to the suppression of disorder, and not intended or adapted to win the confidence or cultivate the affections. There must be something positive, something to bring forward the right as well as suppress the wrong—something which shall not only prevent the outgushing of bitter waters, but shall sweeten the fountain itself.

To effect this great purpose, the idea of God must be brought in close and continuous contact with the soul. Vice is mean, grovelling, earthly—a degradation of the immortal spirit, and for the soul to see and feel its relationship to God is its great security against the meanness of vice. The whole creation around us should be our temple, and every emotion of the mind an act of worship, if the heart would be secure from the assaults of the tempter. Let the young man learn to regard all that he sees as the workmanship of God; let him learn to admire the wonderful resources of the Divine mind, as developed in the objects of creation which meet him at every turn; let him become conscious of the continued presence and operation of that Great Power, which

“ Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glow in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent;”

let him become habituated to the great truths taught by Natural

* *De Natura Deor.*, III., 28-31, or 70-76. *Opera ed. Orelli*, IV. ii. 113-115.

Religion; let these become a part of the daily aliment of his mind, and grow up into its permanent substance—and can low, earthly, grovelling vice take hold of him? Not that the mere knowledge of nature can remove him from temptation, but the habit of contemplating nature in connection with the God of nature, the habit of communing with God whenever one studies nature—this it is which elevates the soul and raises it above the grosser forms of earthliness. If Natural Religion by itself cannot regenerate and sanctify, as we admit in general it cannot, it would seem that it might at least secure one against intemperance and licentiousness, and low, vulgar, filthy wickedness—and these are the forms of sin which most usually ruin our youth for this world.

Learning without God makes but a distorted mind—a soul for which God's dominions have no appropriate or safe place. Then should not God, and a knowledge of God, have a place, and a recognized, important, well-understood place, in every college? To avoid the evil of sectarianism, must we fall into the still greater evil of atheism? To prevent our young men being bigots, shall we allow them to be infidels? To give them *large and liberal minds on religious matters* (?), is it necessary, is it worth the while, will it requite the cost, to let them grow up under the influence of sensual youthful passion, without any of the counteracting influences of religion to restrain and control? *No!* a third time, *No!!*

We have a power altogether above and beyond that of Natural Religion—we have Revealed Religion, that *life and immortality which are brought to light in the gospel*—and this is and must be our great reliance, and here we have a sure and certain hope; and let us not be so foolish as to refuse to avail ourselves of this power.

Wherewith shall a young man cleanse his way? By taking heed thereto, according to thy word.—Ps. cxix. 9.

The power of the word of God must be our reliance for controlling the minds of our young men, and guiding them in paths of purity, usefulness, and peace. The days of mere human authority are past, forms and modes once venerated have lost their influence, and the requirement to submit to any routine, solely on the ground that it has been long submitted to, excites ridicule and aversion, rather than reverence and obedience.

We must have the word of God, and that word must commend itself to the unprejudiced mind by its own intrinsic merit; it must have within itself a persuasive power; it must meet the natural yearnings and spontaneities of the soul. Mere objective

authority, even though it were the authority of God himself, would scarcely be submitted to in this generation of self-reliance and self-esteem. The *objective* must commend itself to the *subjective*, or there will be continuous revolting. They who are striving to hold men by mere ecclesiastical authority and church tradition, to restrain them by the force of antiquated customs and veneration for the wisdom and virtue of their ancestors, have most painful experience of this truth. They have more than both hands full of work ; no sooner do they stop one leak-hole than a dozen others burst forth ; the whole fabric is already half-dissolved ; and they find themselves in the condition of the fifty daughters of Danaus, who were condemned to the task of carrying water in sieves.

In this matter of revealed religion, there must be authority, and authority implicitly submitted to, or the benefits of revealed religion cannot be realized. The most important topics of which revelation treats, are topics of which we know absolutely nothing, of which we have no means of knowing anything, except on the authority of the Revealer. The origin and the early history of our race ; the origin of sin and evil ; the way of redemption ; the retributions of eternity ; the nature of the spiritual world and the employments of the soul there ; the nature, the number, and the condition of the original inhabitants of the spiritual world ; these and hundreds of other subjects of a similar kind, and of the deepest interest, are utterly beyond the reach of all our natural means of information ; we have not the means of forming even a probable conjecture concerning them, and unless we have a positive, objective revelation, we are wholly in the dark in regard to them. Concerning the condition of the inhabitants of the spiritual world, for example, or even whether there be any such inhabitants, or any such world—how can we know anything except by positive revelation from above ? We have never been in the spiritual world to learn anything there of our own knowledge ; we have never seen any one who has been there, that we might learn directly from him ; and none of the original inhabitants of that world have ever dwelt with us, to tell us what they know of those unseen regions. I know there have been pretended voyages to the spiritual world, even in our own time, and every age has been visited by ghosts and apparitions in numbers greater or less ; but the character and conduct and doings of these pretended visitants, has, for the most part, been so uniformly and so monotonously silly—so exactly in the same strain and yet so abjectless and jejune, that we are compelled to think, if these are the spirits of the departed from this earth, certainly in dying they must have lost what little of common sense they ever possessed ; or on the supposi-

tion that they are the original inhabitants of the world of spirits, we must feel towards them, after they have made such exhibitions of themselves, much as the simple-minded Trinculo felt towards the awfully dreaded Caliban, when he heard him begin to talk and found him ready to fall down and worship the drunken sailor Stephano, for giving him intoxicating drink: "By this good light, he is a very shallow monster—I afeard of him!—a very weak monster—a most poor, credulous monster—I could find in my heart to beat him, but that the poor monster's in drink—I shall laugh myself to death at this puppy-headed monster—a most scurvy, ridiculous monster." Examine all the histories of these ghost doings from the middle ages down through Cotton Mather and Justinus Kerner to the spiritual rappings and the ghostly riotings of our times, and they all have the same uniform character of petty annoyance and pertinacious silliness; so that, however formidable they might appear at first, we cannot in the end avoid coming to the same conclusion in regard to them that Trinculo did in regard to Caliban, that they are very shallow, weak, poor, scurvy, puppy-headed, ridiculous monsters. If these are actual specimens of the spiritual world, then the fables of Homer and Virgil are far preferable to the reality; and this world, imperfect and hard as it is, is altogether the most respectable part of God's dominions. And yet how many, who regard the revelations of the Bible with cold distrust and decided incredulity, receive with almost implicit confidence these ridiculous manifestations! So it often is, they who reject the truth with all evidence in its favour, embrace the grossest impostures with all evidence against them. So the Jews rejected Jesus Christ and received Bar Chochba as their Messiah; and we read in Scripture of those upon whom, *because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved, God sent strong delusions that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.* 2 Thess. ii. 10—12.

In the Bible only do we find information respecting the spiritual world, of such kind and given in such a way as to deserve respect and confidence. This is our only guide. On this and all kindred topics, the Bible is the only chart of a coast otherwise wholly unknown; and yet a coast along which we must sail during the most interesting, the most critical part of our voyage. We may judge something of an unknown coast by the form and structure of the head-lands, the shape and flow of the waves, the change and run of the tides, &c., yet, from all these and other sources very little indeed can be known; and a blind piece of work it certainly would be, arbitrarily, here and there, as caprice and pride might dictate, to throw aside the

chart and sail by conjecture. Yet this is the way in which many deal with the Bible, and thus put in jeopardy the eternal interests of their future existence.

The Bible claims to be absolute and final authority on all spiritual matters; and from the very nature of the case, if it is not this, it is nothing, and worthy of no reliance. If it be not authority absolute and final, we have no means whatever of correcting its mistakes, of separating the true from the false—and having found it to be, in the most important particular, a false witness for itself, we can no longer know from itself what is worthy of belief and what is not. It is like employing a guide in a strange and difficult country, who pretends to know the whole way perfectly; but we scarcely enter on our journey, before we discover that with some very important parts of the road he is as little acquainted as we are. How much security should we feel with such a guide for the remainder of our travels?

It would be obviously impossible, in the limits assigned to us here, to go into a full discussion of the doctrine of inspiration. We must confine ourselves to one point, namely, the authority of Christ as a divine teacher, which few at this day seem willing openly to deny. Yet if we admit His authority, in any proper sense of the term, the authority of the Bible as a revelation from God is established beyond all reasonable doubt.

Christ claimed for himself full authority, as a teacher commissioned and qualified by God, to give instruction infallibly true, and of paramount authority on all spiritual matters.

Matt. xi. 29, 30; John v. 20—24, 39—43; viii. 42—49; xviii. 39.

The same authority which he claimed for himself, he ascribes most fully to the prophets and writers of the Old Testament; and even rests, in a most important sense, the validity of his own claims, on the fact, that in his person the Old Testament scriptures were fulfilled.

Matt. xxvi. 24—31; Luke xxii. 39, xxiv. 25—29, 44—46. (Compare 1 Cor. ix. 8—10, x. 1—11; 2 Tim. iii. 14—17; 2 Pet. i. 19—21, for the estimate in which the apostles held the scriptures of the Old Testament, as they were taught to hold them by the Lord. Luke xxiv. 32—46. Also the whole epistles to the Romans, Galatians, Hebrews.)

He promised also, in the most explicit manner, to endue his apostles and the writers of the New Testament with the same authority which he himself possessed.

John xix. 18, xx. 21; Matt. xxviii. 19, x. 19, 20; Luke xii. 11, 12, xxiv. 49; Matt. xvi. 19, xviii. 18.

He even engaged to reveal to them, by the influences of the

Holy Spirit, truths beyond those which he had ever taught personally.

John xvi. 9, 12, 13, 14, xiv. 25, 26.

And this authority was understood to extend to their written, as well as their oral instructions, as is demanded of course by the very nature of the case.

Acts xv. 20; 2 Thess. ii. 15; Ephes. iii. 2, 3; 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16.

And he confirmed all these claims by such mighty works as no man could do except God were with him.

John iii. 2; Matt. xi. 2—6; John v. 36, xiv. 10, 11, xv. 29.

And those for whom he made these claims, made the same claims for themselves.

1 Cor. ii. 10—13; Gal. i. 11, 12, 15—19; 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16.

And they performed the same mighty works in confirmation of their claims.

Mark xvi. 15—20; Acts v. 12, 15, 16, viii. 5—8, xix. 11, 12.

And forasmuch as their claims might be more liable to be disputed than his, Christ promised to them a still stronger external attestation, even greater works than he himself had performed.

John xiv. 12; Acts v. 15, xix. 12.

This promise of Christ, however, whatever reference it may be supposed to have to the *manner* of performing some miracles (as above cited), undoubtedly refers mainly, perhaps exclusively, to the great spiritual results of the teachings of the apostles, the foundation of the Christian church, the conversion of the Gentiles, &c.—an attestation which continues with unabated—nay, with augmenting—force, to the present time.

The authority of the whole Bible is thus affirmed by the personal and oft-repeated testimony of Christ: and if it be not authority, Jesus himself is found a false witness, and unworthy of credit on any subject. If we know that in one instance he taught wrong, how can we know, on his own authority, that in any instance he teaches right?

Of course, we do not expect that anybody will, in these days, take anything on trust; at least anything good. Whatever authority is gained for the Bible, we expect to work for it. All we ask, as the basis of our operations, is, a reasonable degree of intelligence and candour. The mind must be trained to see the grounds on which the claim of Scripture rests, to recognize these claims and submit to them. The age is full of scepticism, of evasions, of nullifications of the Divine authority. Doubts are started as to particular texts, as to certain books, the whole Old Testament, a large portion of the New; certain statements and certain doctrines are objected to as unworthy of God; or,

to get rid of disagreeable truths, the whole Bible, by means of forced interpretations, is politely bowed out of society; and the last method is frequently resorted to by the most rigid dogmatizers, as well as the loosest libertines in theology. Men are willing that the Bible should give them a lift now and then, but only so far and in such direction as they please. The influence of so great and good a man as Neander, falls in with these corrupt tendencies of the age, encourages and increases them; and his example and his teachings, in this respect, become far more pernicious than they could have been, had he been less excellent, less learned, less sincerely and devotedly a Christian. He himself seemed fully conscious of the danger to be apprehended from this source; and scarcely made a secret of his regret that his Life of Christ was about to be translated and published in America. He seemed to think (and justly, I suppose), that our young men would be rather better off without it than with it; though it might do good in Germany, where men were already so far from the Bible, and have a tendency to bring them back towards it; yet, in America it would be found, he feared, to be beneath the prevailing standard, and would therefore lower the tone of reverence and submission to the Divine authority, rather than elevate it. Such apprehensions are seen everywhere peeping out from his letter prefixed to the American edition of his work. The good man! the corrupt atmosphere in which he had always lived, had touched the conclusions of his understanding more than the feelings of his heart.

Here the great moral battle of the age is to be fought on this question: Has the Scripture any binding authority? Are its teachings of any weight to us, except so far as we can approvingly reproduce the same ideas in our own minds? In other words, is revelation *objective*, or is it merely *subjective*? Does God reveal himself to man, or is man himself the only revealer of God? Most fully and distinctly do we take the ground of the binding authority, of the *objectiveness* of revelation. Most decidedly do we believe that God speaks in the Bible, and with a clearness of utterance altogether beyond that which we can find in our own consciousness, or in the works of creation around us—and therefore it is the duty of men to hear, to believe, and to obey. The Bible itself is *the revelation*, and not merely *the record of a revelation*.

Now, with these premises to start from, what is the only proper and safe method of dealing with this matter? By the appropriate methods, by strict, laborious, faithful, historical and critical research, we must ascertain what books were recognized by Christ and his apostles as of divine authority; then, in like manner, must we ascertain the condition of these books as to

integrity and incorruptness; and, finally, having thus made ourselves sure of the words, we must learn the meaning of the words just as we learn the meaning of the words of any other book—only, never forgetting that the Holy Ghost, which inspired the writers of the sacred volume, is also needed and promised to aid the readers of it—and *here our responsibility ends*. The meaning being ascertained, all we have to do is, to take the meaning just as it is given, to yield at once unconditional, unquestioning submission to the divine authority, without any reservation or equivocation. Now, here is a resting-place, and our only resting-place. Here we have a firm foundation which can never be moved; and this is the position, and the only position, exactly adapted to the human mind—which fully meets its capacities and emotions, its oft-recurring fears, and its conscious weaknesses. A fellow man may tell me what he pleases about what is perfectly plain to his reason, and what he knows by his own consciousness; my reason and my consciousness are as good for me as his are for him (at least, good or bad, they are all that I have, and I must use them for want of better); but when God speaks to me, then I know, then I can believe, then I can safely submit. In short, the enlightened Christian must put the Bible and its authority, just where the blinded Papist puts the church and its authority. The want which drives the Papist to the church is a real one, a want inseparable from human nature in its present state; but he goes to the wrong place to find a supply for it. Let the Christian go to the right place.

And it is wonderful how Divine Providence, in these days, is opening the resources for ascertaining the integrity and incorruptness of the Bible, beyond what has been done in any former age.

The monumental hieroglyphics of Egypt, keeping pace with the Bible history from the age of Abraham, to the time of the latest Jewish kings; the mysterious arrow-headed characters on the architectural remains of the ancient Persian empire, involving the Bible narrative from the destruction of the Hebrew monarchy, to the very close of the Old Testament canon—have both been deciphered and read during our own generation, and with the most wonderful and gratifying results. And even now, the long-buried monuments of the old Assyrian empire, of which almost nothing had before been known, which, like a restless ghost, has only occasionally appeared on the field of history, and then instantly vanished; but which yet is intimately interwoven with the Bible history, from the very commencement of historic narrative in the tenth chapter of Genesis, quite down to the minor prophet, Nahum, a period of not less than 1,500

years,—the chroniclers, I say, of this old monarchy, are now emerging from their 3,000 years' burial under ground, talking in their strange old half-Hebrew tongue, and telling us important passages of their eventful story, which modern linguistic skill has already begun successfully to interpret.* Who can fail to see, that as man becomes sceptical and unbelieving, God too takes care to turn his scepticism and unbelief to shame?

But here we are met with an objection. How are the people to make these learned and laborious investigations? How are they to know what is the word of God, and whether we have it entire and incorrupt?

The people at large are not to make these investigations. It is impossible that they should make them. They have neither the time, nor the opportunity, nor the capacity, to do it; and God neither requires nor expects it of them. And therefore he has not given the Word alone—but the Word in connection with the unperishing Church and the living Ministry—that Church which will never cease till Christ again appears to re-establish for ever his authority over man, and that Ministry which is to be Christ's Ambassador and Christ's Interpreter on earth, till his great and final advent.

It is the business of the ministry to make these investigations—to ascertain these points—to be the divinely-authorized teachers in regard to them—to be the mouth of God to the people. If the people will have a ministry incapable of making these investigations, or unwillingly to attend to them—a ministry incompetent, unfaithful, or dishonest, the responsibility is their own, and they must bear the loss.

There have always, from the beginning to the present time, been teachers incompetent and false; men in all ages have been misled and ruined by them; the prophecies, the gospels, the epistles abound with warnings against them. Still, the living, teaching ministry is an essential, integral part of the Divine economy, an indisputable link in the chain of salvation; and the Bible for the people, without the ministry, is quite as far from God's plan, as the ministry without the Bible for the people—which last is the pernicious, corrupting, mischief-making error of the Romish church. The ministry must teach, and teach, too, with authority; and the people must be taught. The people, in order to be taught, must be teachable; and the minister, in order to teach, must first himself learn; and then, according to the apostolic injunction, he must *let no man despise him*.

A good man, pleading a good cause, has an influence which no bad man can have; his words have an authority which the words of no bad man ever can have. People who have neither

* How much is to come of this, time only can show.

learning nor acuteness enough to detect a false statement or sophistical argument, yet, if their hearts are in sympathy with the good and true, are very quick to *feel* the difference between a false teacher and a true one—and these, if I may so call them, *moral instincts* of the regenerate, are often appealed to by the sacred writers in reference to this very point of distinguishing the true teacher from the false.

There is something in divine truth, worthily exhibited, which awakens a response in every human heart, not utterly given over to earthliness and degradation. Independently of all argument, independently of all views of utility, of all reachings forth for happiness, a divine truth fitly presented will force a throb in the soul as surely as a pulsation in the atmosphere will produce a sound in the air.

There is no need of argument—the thing comes of itself—and our strongest, most abiding, most useful convictions, are often those which spring directly from the heart, without any conscious exertion of the discursive faculty. Says an eccentric but brilliant writer: "He who denies the existence of God is certainly a fool. He who thinks it always necessary to demonstrate his existence by argument, is a still greater fool." In the same strain writes Matthias Claudius: "No one can with truth reproach me for being a philosopher; yet I never go through the woods without having it whispered within me, Who made these trees grow so beautifully? and then softly, and as if from a great distance, comes to me, as it were the voice of a great Unknown. I'll bet you, I am then thinking of God, with such joyous reverence do I tremble while I am thinking."

There is, at the present time, peculiar need of thorough Biblical instruction in all our colleges. The wants of the age on this subject are imperative; the evil to be counteracted is wide-spread, insidious, and most destructive. There are many who receive the Bible, on the whole, as a divine revelation, who regard Jesus Christ, especially, as a teacher sent from God, who would be shocked to be spoken of as infidels, and most of all, to be regarded as the enemies or the rejecters of Christ—who yet, practically, give to the Bible very little authority, consider much of it as antiquated and even obsolete, and doubt whether the writers of it had an inspiration different in kind from that which other men have had, though perhaps in some respects higher in degree. This is an error particularly pervading the educated and active young men of the present generation throughout the world, and is one of the offshoots of a pernicious philosophy, which does not recognize the existence of a personal, self-conscious Deity, but regards the human mind as the only representative of the divine, and the creation of the human soul as

the only act by which the Creator can become conscious to himself of his own existence. Of course, individual immortality is also denied, and the whole history of intellectual existence is nothing but an eternal emanation from, and re-absorption into, the in itself unconscious divine essence. This philosophy, like a miasmatic atmosphere, corrupts many who do not know of its existence, and undermines the whole authority of revelation with not a few who imagine themselves firm believers in revealed religion. Nowhere is this philosophy of negation and destruction working more mischief than among the young men of our colleges; and if prompt, efficient and appropriate measures are not speedily taken to counteract it, we shall soon have all our learned professions, not excepting even the clerical, controlled by subtle pantheists, who will insidiously profess all reverence for the Bible, pay the tribute of a simulated respect to piety, and perpetually use, with all seriousness and gravity, the technical phrases of the most orthodox theology, entirely emptied of their original meaning, and made simply the hieroglyphics of an atheistic mystery.

From such a consummation, already realized in some portions of the Old World, may the good Lord for ever deliver this land of the Puritans!

In some subsequent number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* we shall show what this philosophy has already done and is now doing with the most sacred portions of the Christian revelation.

ART. IV.—INTRODUCTION TO THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

BY B. B. EDWARDS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

It is a gratifying fact, that amidst the prevalent scepticism in Germany, the Scriptures have found able defenders. If the authenticity and integrity of the sacred books have been assailed with great pertinacity and acuteness, they have also been vindicated with signal ability and success. Talent has been matched with equal talent; learning has been confronted with still ampler knowledge. In the benignant providence of God, the country which has supplied the poison has furnished the antidote.

But however important the defence of the Bible may be in Germany itself, it is thought by some to be a superfluous task

in Great Britain and in this country. Why should English and American scholars trouble themselves with the Teutonic scepticism? Why should our periodical publications lay before their readers the results of inquiries which would never else be entered upon, the solution of doubts which would never else be started? A sufficient answer is, that the scepticism is not confined, and cannot be, to the continent of Europe, any more than English or French infidelity in the last century could be confined to London and Paris. Error flies on the wings of every wind. It is impossible to lay an embargo upon it in any country of Christendom. It will meet and battle with truth on every field. Papal and neological dogmas cannot be imprisoned in the countries of their birth. Our candidates and ministers would do well to resort to the great Protestant armouries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and be prepared on all points to meet the Bellarmins and Bossuets of the present day. Alike necessary will it be to encounter the sophistries of the "higher criticism" which has had its congenial soil in Germany. The emigration to this country from the German States is very large, and will occasion, no doubt, the influx of no inconsiderable amount of learned rationalism. The new States will be particularly obnoxious to this evil. To encounter it successfully, Truth must have her numerous and well-trained champions. Besides, the mischief is widely propagated through the written page. It is stated, on high authority, that well prepared translations of Strauss's "cunningly-devised" work on the Gospels is largely circulated and read in England, in the form of tracts. It may soon be found that the elaborate work of Dr. Davidson on the New Testament, in which he has refuted (as some suggest unnecessarily) so many errors of the Strauss and Tübingen schools, was published none too early.

Another answer would be, that in discussing and overthrowing an error, valuable truths are elicited. The collision casts new light on some important doctrine. Fresh and interesting aspects of a subject are presented, which might have remained, in the ordinary and peaceful study, for ever unknown. The strength of a beam is not known till it is tested by a heavy weight: truth is not seen to be invincible till it has come out of a sharp encounter. Amid the storms of the last thirty years it has struck its roots deeper than ever. Till it felt the tempest it was not known how sound its heart was. The impregnable position in which the Gospels stand was not apprehended till Strauss and his followers had exhausted their quivers. For these reasons, and others that might be named, we think that no apology is needed for the frequent discussions in our pages of topics in biblical criticism, and for meeting, so far as we are

able, the attacks which are made on the volume of inspiration, whatever form they may assume. In so doing, we are consulting the best interests of the church and of the country, by providing weapons by which the truth may be successfully defended.

It is for the reasons above stated, in part, that we have translated and condensed the article which follows. It is the substance of the Introduction to the Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to Timothy and Titus, published in Göttingen in 1850, by Dr. J. E. Huther of Schwerin. It is well known that the genuineness of these epistles has been doubted or strenuously denied by De Wette and others, on several grounds, which will be specified. Dr. Huther has, as we think, satisfactorily refuted these objections, and vindicated the Pauline authorship. Great value has been given to the discussion, also, by the manner in which the author has discussed the question of a second imprisonment of Paul at Rome. It is well known that this has long been a subject of great interest, and involved in no little difficulty. It appears to us that Dr. Huther, if he has not completely established the theory of a second imprisonment, has at least rendered it much more probable than that of a single imprisonment, on which Wieseler has lately expended so much pains and so many acute remarks. Dr. Huther's commentary is the latest which has appeared on the Pastoral Epistles, and is a continuation of that of Dr. Meyer.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTICES OF TIMOTHY AND TITUS.

Timothy was the son of a Christian Jewess, whose name was Eunice; his father was a Greek. His birthplace cannot be definitely determined, for that *Δεφβαῖος*, Acts xx. 4, is to be connected with *καὶ Τιμόθεος*, is at least very improbable, since the position of the *καὶ* is rather against this connection than in favour of it. That *ἐκεῖ*, Acts xvi. 1, refers to "Lystra," is in the highest degree probable, but it does not follow that Timothy was born in Lystra. Timothy had received a pious education from his mother and grandmother, whose name was Lois; he was also conversant from a child with the sacred Scriptures of the Jews, 2 Tim. i. 5, iii. 14, 15. Paul became acquainted with him first at Lystra, on his missionary journey. He was already a disciple, *μαθητής*, and was well reported of among the believers in Lystra and Iconium. That Paul calls him his "son," 1 Tim. i. 1, 2 Tim. i. 1, 1 Cor. iv. 17, arises from the fact that he had received his first knowledge of the Gospel through the Apostle, either immediately or through his mother and his grandmother, 2 Tim. iii. 14. Paul took him as a helper in his work; yet he previously circumcised him, as his father was known in that region to be

a heathen. As an assistant, Timothy accompanied the Apostle on his journey to Philippi. When Paul and Silas left this city, Acts xvi. 40, Timothy, with some others of Paul's companions, seems to have remained there some time. In Berea they were again together. When Paul journeyed to Athens, Timothy and Silas continued in Berea; still, Paul left word for him to come to him immediately, Acts xvii. 14, 15; this probably he did. Not long after, Paul sent him to Thessalonica, to ascertain the condition of the church there and to strengthen it, 1 Thess. iii. 1—5. When Timothy had performed this duty, he again met Paul at Corinth. Timothy's name is inscribed in the two Epistles to the Thessalonians, which Paul wrote from this place, 1 Thess. i. 1, 2 Thess. i. 1. When Paul, on his third missionary tour, tarried a long time at Ephesus, Timothy was with him; where he had been in the intermediate time is not known. Still, before the uproar caused by Demetrius, Paul sent him from Ephesus to Macedonia, Acts xix. 22. Immediately Paul wrote the so-called First Epistle to the Corinthians, from which it appears that Timothy had been directed to go to Corinth, but that Paul did not suppose that he would reach the city till after the reception of the epistle, 1 Cor. iv. 17, xvi. 10, 11. When Paul wrote from Macedonia the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Timothy was again with him, for his name appears in the superscription; this would be inserted the more readily, as Timothy had just left Corinth. Then he went with Paul to Corinth, for that he was with him there is shown by the salutation which Paul conveys from him to the church in Rome, Rom. xvi. 21. When Paul, after three months' abode, left Greece, Timothy, with other helpers, accompanied him. He journeyed with him ἀχρὶ τῆς Ἀσίας, i. e. to Philippi, whence was the route over to Asia Minor. Thence Timothy and some others preceded Paul to Troas, where they remained till the Apostle arrived, Acts xx. 3—6. Here there is a large gap in Timothy's history, as he is not again named till Paul's imprisonment at Rome. That he was with the Apostle, is clear from the fact that his name is in the inscription to Paul's Epistles to the Colossians, Philemon and the Philippian; another reason for the supposition is, that none of Paul's companions stood in so close relations to him as Timothy. When Paul wrote to the Philippian he designed to send Timothy as soon as possible to them, so as to learn more exactly the circumstances of the church, Phil. ii. 19, seq. From the two Epistles to Timothy, we learn the following facts in regard to his life. On a journey to Macedonia, Paul sent him back to Ephesus, that he might there oppose the false doctrines that were constantly extending, 1 Tim. i. 3. Probably, when entering on this service, if not

earlier, Timothy was solemnly consecrated to his office by the laying on of hands by the Apostle and the "presbytery," where the fairest hopes were expressed concerning him, by prophetic words, comp. 1 Tim. i. 18, iv. 14, 2 Tim. i. 6; he had already witnessed a good confession, 1 Tim. vi. 12. Still, Paul then hoped immediately to come to him. At a later time, Paul found himself a prisoner at Rome. When he anticipated his death as drawing near, he wrote to Timothy that he should come to him immediately, before winter, that he should bring Mark with him, and also certain articles which he had left at Troas, 2 Tim. iv. 9, 13, 21.

There is no mention of Timothy elsewhere in the New Testament, except in Heb. xiii. 23; that the Timothy here named might be another Timothy, is certainly possible, but it is not probable. From this passage, it appears that Timothy, when the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, was a second time set at liberty, and that the author of the epistle intended, in company with Timothy, if he came soon, to see those to whom the epistle was sent. According to church tradition, Timothy was the first bishop of Ephesus.* From the First Epistle to Timothy, we merely learn that the oversight of the church at Ephesus was committed to Timothy, by the Apostle, a similar office to that exercised by the Apostles over the Christian churches; it was a station in which the later special episcopal office might have taken root, yet it is by no means to be regarded as identical with it.

We have still less knowledge of the life of Titus than of that of Timothy. He also was a helper of Paul, and as such is first named Gal. ii. 1, Paul mentioning, that on a journey to Jerusalem, undertaken fourteen years after his conversion, he took Titus with him. Though he was of heathen descent, Paul did not permit him to be circumcised, as he would not "give place" to his adversaries. When Paul had written the First Epistle to the Corinthians, he sent Titus to Corinth, so as to obtain information of the state of the church. After Paul had hoped in vain to find him at Troas, 2 Cor. ii. 12, he met him in Macedonia, 2 Cor. vii. 6. The notices which Titus brought, occasioned the writing of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. With this epistle he sent Titus the second time to Corinth, where he was to complete the collections for the poor saints at Jerusalem, which had been before commenced, 2 Cor. viii. 6, xvi. 23. When Paul was imprisoned at Rome, Titus had gone to Dalmatia, 2 Tim. iv. 10.

* Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. III. 4, says: *Τιμόθεος τῆς ἐν Ἐφέσῳ παροικίας ἱστορεῖται πρῶτος τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν εἰληφέναι*. Comp. also Const. Apost., I, 7, c. 46. Photii Bibl. 254. Chrysost. Homil. 15 in 1 Tim.

From the epistle itself, we learn that Titus had aided the Apostle in his missionary labours in Crete, and was left there by him, in order to finish what was further needed for the church, Tit. i. 5. In ch. iii. 12, Paul directs him to come to him at Nicopolis, where he expected "to winter." As the Apostle calls him his "genuine son, according to the common faith," it would appear that he was converted by Paul.

Ecclesiastical tradition makes Titus the first bishop of Crete. Eusebius, after stating in regard to Timothy what we have already quoted, goes on to say, "As Titus, who was over the churches in Crete."* Titus is said to have died in Crete, in his 94th year, and to have been buried there.

TIME OF WRITING THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

First Epistle to Timothy.—In respect to the time of the authorship of this epistle, different views have prevailed from an early period, as it is difficult to bring it, in accordance with the internal indications, within the sphere of Paul's life known to us. According to the notices in the epistle, Paul and Timothy were together for a long time in Ephesus; then Paul journeyed to Macedonia, and left Timothy in Ephesus, to oppose the false doctrines taught there. Probably Paul wrote to him this epistle from Macedonia, in which he reminds him of his service in Ephesus, and gives him the instructions already mentioned; for if he hoped immediately to return to Ephesus, still he might think that delay was possible. According to the Acts, Paul was twice in Ephesus, the first time on his second missionary tour, from Antioch, as he returned from Corinth to Antioch, Acts xviii. 19. In the first instance, he stopped there but a short time, as he wished to be at Jerusalem at the approaching feast. During this period, we cannot at all place the authorship. Paul was at Ephesus the second time, on his third missionary tour. He remained there between two and three years, and, after the commotion caused by Demetrius, travelled to Macedonia and Greece. Theodoret, and many other interpreters after him, suppose that Paul wrote the First Epistle to Timothy on this journey to Macedonia, or in Macedonia, Acts xx. 1, 2. Still, the following circumstances are adverse to this view: 1. According to Acts xix. 20, Paul had already sent Timothy to Macedonia, before his own departure from Ephesus. That Timothy, who had a commission to go to Corinth, 1 Cor. iv. 17, returned to Ephesus before the apostle

* Hist. Eccl. III. 4. Comp. Hieron. Catal. Script. Eccl. Theodoret in 1 Tim. III. Theophylact, Prooem. ad Tit. Const. Apos. VII. 46.

left that city, as the latter certainly may have expected, 1 Cor. xvi. 11, is not stated. 2. When Paul undertook the journey to Macedonia, he seems by no means to have designed to return immediately to Ephesus, as he decidedly hoped to do, when he wrote the epistle, 1 Tim. iii. 14, for, on his return from Greece, he passed from Troas without stopping at Ephesus, Acts xx. 16. We must, therefore, if this theory is correct, conclude that Paul afterwards altered the determination which he still cherished in Macedonia; yet of such alteration there is not the smallest trace, but, according to 1 Cor. xvi. 8, 4, and Rom. xv. 23—25, he had already designed, on his travels through Macedonia to Corinth, and then in Corinth itself, to travel thence as rapidly as possible to Jerusalem. 3. According to 2 Cor. i. 1, Timothy was with Paul when the latter wrote his Second Epistle to the Corinthians, from Macedonia, and according to Acts xx. 4, he accompanied the Apostle in his journey from Corinth to Philippi. Consequently Timothy, after Paul's departure from Ephesus, must likewise have left that city, though the Apostle had directed him to remain there till his return, which still can with difficulty be supposed. All these reasons show that the journey of the Apostle from Ephesus to Macedonia, mentioned Acts xx. 1, cannot be the same of which he speaks 1 Tim. i. 3.

In order to reconcile the authorship of the epistle with the relations known to us from the Acts, some interpreters, particularly Bertholdt and Matthies, have recourse to Acts xx. 3—5. They suppose that Timothy left Corinth before the Apostle, and then went to Ephesus, (which Luke indeed does not mention,) where he received the epistle from Paul. Matthies seeks to fortify this opinion, by inferring from 1 Tim. i. 3, that Paul had directed Timothy to go to Macedonia, thence to proceed and to stop in Ephesus. But this explanation cannot in any manner be justified; the passage rather makes decidedly against it. But leaving this out of the account, the theory can be maintained only by charging on Luke, as Bertholdt does, an historical inaccuracy. "I believe," he says, "that Acts xx. 4, 5, puts us on the right track, only I think, at the same time, that Luke has not given the account with entire accuracy. His notice that Timothy preceded Paul to Asia Minor, is indeed perfectly correct, but there is an inaccuracy in the account that Timothy journeyed in company with Sopater, Aristarchus, &c., and with them awaited Paul at Troas. It is in the highest degree probable that Timothy started from Corinth with these helpers of Paul, but that he took the direct course to Ephesus." Since Luke states definitely that Timothy accompanied the Apostle to Asia, together with other friends, (*συνέπειρο αὐτῷ ἄλλοι τῆς Ἀσίας*;) that Timothy went first to Troas, and that Paul

met them* in Troas, then has Luke, if Bertholdt is correct, not only given an inaccurate, but an entirely false, account. Should his notice not be considered as a falsification of the fact, then we must suppose that Paul had instructed Timothy to go to Ephesus, &c. But this is contradicted by 1 Tim. iii. 14, since Paul then had no intention to go to Ephesus; besides, it is not conceivable why Paul in this case did not give his instructions to Timothy verbally, rather than communicate them in writing *immediately* after his departure, which would seem the more strange, as he himself would go to Ephesus *forthwith*. Still more untenable are the hypotheses of Paulus, that the epistle was written during the Apostle's imprisonment at Cæsarea; of Schneckenburger, that it was written in Jerusalem at the time mentioned Acts xxi. 26; of Böttger, at Patara, Acts xxi. 1, or in Miletus, Acts xx. 17. Against all these hypotheses is the fact, that they alike render necessary an arbitrary handling of 1 Tim. i. 3.

If one will not allow himself in these arbitrary interpretations, there then remains (supposing that the epistle was written in that portion of Paul's life recorded by Luke in the Acts) only the supposition that the journey of the Apostle from Ephesus to Macedonia, mentioned 1 Tim. i. 3, when Timothy was left behind at Ephesus, occurred during the two or three years' abode of Paul in Ephesus, without being mentioned by Luke. This supposition, which Mosheim and Schrader favoured, Wieseler (*Chronologie des Apostolischen Zeitalters*), setting aside the manifest errors with which they connected it, has endeavoured to prove as the only one which is correct. The possibility is allowed, that Luke may have omitted to mention not merely one journey of the Apostle; several passages in the Epistles to the Corinthians, (1 Cor. xvi. 17; 2 Cor. ii. 1; xii. 14; xiii. 1, 2; xii. 21,) place it beyond doubt, that Paul, before he wrote the Epistles to the Corinthians, had been in Corinth not once but twice, though in the second instance he stayed but a short time. For this journey, of which Luke says nothing, there is no other place in the history of the Apostle, except during his abode in Ephesus (Wies., pp. 233 seq.), so that it is necessary to regard the journey to Macedonia, mentioned 1 Tim. i. 3, as identical with the one to Corinth, and to conclude that the First Epistle to Timothy was written on this journey from Macedonia. But there are several objections to this theory. Against the suggestion that the organization of the church pre-supposed in the epistle, as well as the requisition that the *ἐπίσκοπος* should not be a *νεόφυτος*, imply a longer existence

* *Οἱ*, v. 5, refers obviously to all the persons before named, consequently also to Timothy.

of the church, Wieseler indeed remarks that that journey was undertaken by the Apostle just before the close of his residence in Ephesus, so that the church there had been in existence long enough to justify the pre-supposed organization and the requisition in regard to the "elders;" but this supposition again has its difficulty, from the fact that, according to it, the Apostle *himself* was in Corinth *shortly* before he wrote the First Epistle to the Corinthians, and that consequently there could have been no sufficient occasion for *writing* to the church there. Besides, Acts xx. 29, 30 is against Wieseler's view. According to the epistle, false doctrines had already penetrated into the Ephesian church, but, according to the passage in Acts, Paul describes the introduction of false doctrines as to be expected in the future. If we allow that the words ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν refer not to the church, but only to the elders assembled at Miletus, still εἰς ὑμᾶς, ver. 29, is to be understood of the Ephesian Christians generally; and assuredly Paul, in his address to the elders, would not omit to mention the presence of false teachers if he knew that the church were so seriously threatened by them, that he had thought it necessary at an earlier day to warn Timothy against them, as he has done in his epistle to him. Besides, according to Wieseler's view, Paul had been separated from Timothy only *a short time*, and after his return to Ephesus must have sent him *forthwith* from that city. But how does this agree with the entire character of the epistle? The instructions which Paul gives to Timothy manifestly show that the latter was to labour long in the church, and the more threatening to the church the false doctrines were, the more unlikely it appears that Paul, so soon after the communication of those instructions, should have withdrawn Timothy from his labours in the church.

The Epistle to Titus.—The historical relations to which the epistle points are these: After Paul had laboured in Crete, he left Titus there; then he wrote to him the epistle, which he probably sent by Zenas and Apollos, Tit. iii. 13, in which he directs him, as soon as he had sent Artemas and Tychicus to him, to hasten himself to come to the Apostle at Nicopolis, where he had concluded to pass the winter. The epistle contains nothing definite on the first planting of Christianity in Crete, nothing on the duration and extent of the Apostle's labours there, nothing on the length of time between the departure of the Apostle from Crete and the writing of the epistle; but it is probable that the Gospel was not first preached in Crete by any other Apostle, as it was Paul's maxim not to enter into another's labours. Paul had probably laboured in Crete some time, for i. 5 pre-supposes that when Paul wrote the epistle, there were Christians in the principal cities, at least in a

number of cities ; it is probable that the epistle was written by Paul not long after his departure, for it could not be supposed that he would leave his substitute long without written instructions ; finally, it is probable that Paul had given Titus these instructions a long time before winter, for only on the supposition that Paul had allotted a considerable time to Titus for labour on the island, would he have given these instructions.

If we suppose that the epistle was written during that part of Paul's life recorded in the Acts, then we may inquire whether his visit in Crete and the writing of the epistle took place *before* or *after* or *during* his two or three years' abode in Ephesus. Each supposition has had its supporters.

Those who place both the visit and the writing *previously* to Paul's residence in Ephesus, fix either on the time during which Paul was first in Corinth, Acts xviii. 1—8, or while he was going from Corinth to Ephesus, Acts xviii. 19, or after he had passed through Galatia and Phrygia at the commencement of his third missionary journey, before he went thence to Ephesus, Acts xviii. 23. But in opposition to all these views alike, is the circumstance that Apollos could not have been Paul's helper before Paul's second visit at Ephesus, Acts xviii. 24—xix. 1 ; but as he is named as such in our epistle, then we must suppose that another Apollos is here meant—a supposition which is wholly arbitrary. Besides, against the *first* view, according to which Paul journeyed from Corinth to Crete, thence to Nicopolis in Epirus, Tit. iii. 12, and thence back to Corinth, is the fact that the second abode of Paul in Corinth, mentioned 1 Cor. xvi. 7, 2 Cor. ii. 1, &c., could not have occurred *then*, but must be placed *afterwards*. Against the *second* opinion is not only the fact that the journey from Corinth to Jerusalem was undertaken with a certain haste, so that there was hardly time for any labour in Crete, but also the circumstance that, according to this view, by Nicopolis, a city in Cilicia is meant, when it is not obvious why Paul would winter there and not in Antioch. Against the *third* view is the fact, that Paul, in his third missionary tour, had chosen Ephesus as the goal of his labours, Acts xviii. 21 ; his labours up to the time of reaching that city were confined to "strengthening the disciples," Acts xviii. 23. How would it accord with this, if Paul, instead of going at once to Ephesus, had gone from Phrygia to Crete and Corinth, and had there determined to winter in Nicopolis in Cilicia, and then go to Ephesus ?

Less probable is the opinion that Paul went to Crete at the time mentioned, Acts xv. 41, and that later, during his two or three years' abode in Ephesus, wrote the epistle. Against the former supposition is the circumstance that the definite route is given in Acts xv. 41 and xvi. 1 ; against the latter, that

almost the whole of the second and a part of the third missionary journey of Paul would lie between the beginning of the independent labours of Titus in Crete and the sending of the epistle to him.

Some, who place the visit and the writing of the epistle *after* the residence in Ephesus, think that Paul on the journey from Ephesus to Greece went from Macedonia, ver. 1, 2, to Crete; in that case Titus, after finishing his second mission to Corinth, returned again to the Apostle in Macedonia; Paul with him then made a journey to Crete; then Paul returned alone to Macedonia, then wrote the epistle from Macedonia, and then first betook himself to Corinth. Thus Paul, after he had written the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, must have twice passed Corinth without stopping, yet from the last notices which he had received from Corinth, he must have felt constrained not to delay his journey there. Others think that he visited Crete during his three months' abode in Greece, Acts xx. 3. But these were winter months, in which a journey to Crete and back was not to be thought of.

The *third* supposition, that Paul undertook the journey to Crete from Ephesus, before his departure to Macedonia, and from thence wrote the Epistle to Titus, has been defended by Wieseler with great acuteness. According to this view, Paul, having remained something over two years in Ephesus, journeyed, through Macedonia, 1 Tim. i. 3, (namely the second journey, not mentioned in Acts,) to Corinth; on this journey, which was *short*, Titus accompanied him; with Titus he went to Crete; on his departure he left Titus there; he returned to Ephesus, and there wrote the Epistle to Titus; then he sent Timothy to Macedonia, directing him to go to Corinth, and thereupon wrote our First Epistle to the Corinthians. Then he sent Tychicus and Artemas to Crete, and directed Titus to come to him; he thereupon sent Titus to Corinth. With the hope of meeting him in Troas, he commenced his journey to Macedonia; he first met with Titus, not in Troas, but in Macedonia; he now sent him the second time to Corinth; after he had written our Second Epistle to the Corinthians, he went through Macedonia to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he spent the first winter months, and then went to Corinth.

But in opposition to this theory, the following reasons may be adduced: 1. If Paul made his second journey to Corinth at the time here fixed upon, he could have spent upon it only a short time; how then is it conceivable, that he could at the same time have performed a missionary labour in Crete? 2. Paul wrote to Titus, that he should stay in Crete till he had sent to him Tychicus and Artemas, that then he should himself come to Paul at Nicopolis. According to Wieseler, Paul must

have altered this plan, for he caused Titus to come to him at Ephesus; still it is hardly conceivable, that the Apostle, when he had just committed to Titus an important service in Crete, should have so soon withdrawn him from it. 3. It is not probable that Paul would have fixed on a city as a winter residence, in which he had not been before, and where he could not know what reception he should find; his determination seems rather to pre-suppose that he had already laboured in Nicopolis. 4. In 1 Cor. xvi. 6, Paul wrote to the Corinthians, "With you, perchance, I shall remain, yea even tarry through the winter;" according to Wieseler, the words *πρὸς ὑμᾶς* are to be referred not to the Corinthians only, but in general to the Christians in Achaia, to whom, i. 2, the epistle was directed; since now, according to Tacitus, Ann. 2, 53, Nicopolis in Epirus was reckoned to Achaia, Wieseler supposes that the hope expressed by the Apostle in that passage was fulfilled; but though the epistle was not directed solely to the church in Corinth, still it especially referred to that, so that the readers would assuredly interpret those words only of an intended residence of Paul in Corinth, and not of a place so far removed from this city. That Paul could not possibly have thought of Nicopolis, is obvious from the fact, that when he wrote these words, as Wieseler himself holds, he had not been in Nicopolis, but made known the Gospel there at a later time. Paul conceived of *Christians* only as the readers of his epistle, but not those who might be afterwards converted to Christianity. Finally, if Augustus extended the name Achaia even to Epirus, it does not follow that in common usage Nicopolis was considered as lying in Achaia. Besides, Paul, according to Wieseler, did not carry out the plan mentioned Tit. iii. 13, since he remained in Nicopolis only two winter months; and thus must have travelled to Corinth in the midst of winter. Though some subordinate circumstances may favour Wieseler's view, and give an air of probability to it, as that Apollos was with Paul in Ephesus, 1 Cor. xvi. 12, Tit. iii. 13, still the correctness of the view can, thereby, by no means be shown.

Second Epistle to Timothy.—From the epistle we learn that it was written by the Apostle when he was imprisoned, and written in Rome, i. 8, 12, 16, 17, &c. The New Testament mentions only *one* imprisonment of the Apostle in Rome. We are then to inquire, whether it was during this period that the epistle was written. Since Timothy was with Paul when he wrote the Epistles to the Colossians, Philippians, and to Philemon, then our epistle must have been written to Timothy either *before* or *after* those epistles. According to the more common opinion, it was written *before*; but this is contradicted not only by the entire tone of it, but by the following particular dates:

1. In Acts xxvii. 2, Luke expressly names Aristarchus, besides himself, as the companion of Paul to Rome: when the Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon were written, Aristarchus was still with him; but when our epistle was composed, he was not with Paul. 2. At the time the two epistles were written, Demas was with Paul, but when he wrote to Timothy, he had forsaken him, "having loved the present world;" one might indeed say that at the time of the writing of the two epistles, he had penitently returned to Paul, but this would be a very improbable hypothesis. 3. According to 2 Tim. iv. 6, Paul apprehended the end of his life to be very near; on this account clearly he desired Timothy to come to him immediately; in the other epistles written during the imprisonment recorded in Acts, he nowhere represents his situation as having been earlier more afflictive and later more favourable as he does in the Second Epistle to Timothy: now if the imprisonment closed with the death of the Apostle, then it is manifestly more probable that the martyrdom took place immediately after this epistle was written, than immediately after the authorship of the others.

The second theory, that our epistle was written *later* than the three referred to [during the imprisonment mentioned in Acts], has been particularly advocated by Wieseler. But several objections lie against this. First, the passage, 2 Tim. iv. 13, is adverse. Paul could have left the cloak, together with the books and parchments, at Troas only during his third missionary tour. Now it would be singular that he should first wish to obtain these articles after the lapse of something like five years; for that he had left them with Carpus for his special use, is an hypothesis which has nothing in its favour, but rather the word ἀπέλιπον against it. Still more decidedly adverse is the passage 2 Tim. iv. 20. An unbiassed reader would gather nothing else from it, than that Paul journeyed from Corinth, Erastus stayed behind in Corinth, and Paul, on his departure from Miletus, left Trophimus there sick. Since now Paul on his journey from Caesarea to Rome was neither in Corinth nor in Miletus, so the journey here spoken of could be only the journey which the Apostle made before his imprisonment in Jerusalem. But how can it be supposed that Paul should have made mention for the first time of these circumstances to Timothy, in a written form five years afterwards, though Timothy, within this interval, had been with Paul? In order to deprive this passage of its weight, Wieseler supposes that it is to be understood of Paul's experience as a prisoner. Trophimus, says Wieseler, was not left at Miletus by Paul on his missionary journey, for according to Acts xxi. 29 he was with Paul in Jerusalem. Paul embarked in a ship sail-

ing to Adramyttium near Troas. In this he sailed to Myra in Lycia, and there went abroad another, sailing direct to Italy. Trophimus accompanied him to Myra; there, on account of his sickness, he left him and went in the Adramyttium ship to Miletus, where he would remain as his conjectured home. But aside from the artificial character of this hypothesis, and the inexactness at least in which it involves the language of the Apostle, all this, if it actually so occurred, must have been necessarily known a long time to Timothy, who had been with Paul in Rome, and so much the more, if, with Wieseler, we suppose, that Paul wished to take Trophimus to Rome that he might be a witness for him against his Jewish accusers. The idea that the emphasis is to be laid on the words *Trophimus* and *sick*, and that Paul by that would *remind* Timothy only of the *sickness* of Trophimus, which might still hinder him from coming to Rome, is an unsatisfactory artifice, since the whole sentence involves nothing less than a wish to remind Timothy of the facts. Wieseler thinks that Erastus was an important witness for Paul, whom he had sent for to come to Rome, summoned either through Timothy or Onesiphorus, but that, notwithstanding, he remained in Corinth, and that it was this which Paul now communicated to Timothy; but of such a summons there is not the smallest trace. Besides, ver. 20 has not at all the position which it would probably have if it were written in relation to the judicial proceedings. These are referred to in ver. 16, 17. If the notices in ver. 20 refer to the same things, they must have been placed in connection with ver. 16, 17; but they are wholly separated by the salutation in ver. 19. On the other hand, they stand in immediate connection with the direction to Timothy to hasten to him before winter. It is more than probable that ver. 20, 21 stand in a like relation to each other as ver. 9, 10. Timothy supposed that Demas, Crescens and Titus were with Paul in Rome; Paul now informs him that they had left him; he conjectured that Erastus and Trophimus had accompanied Paul to Rome; Paul now tells him that they had not. So the whole stands in a simple, natural connection. Thus the epistle cannot have been written by the Apostle *after* the writing of the Epistles to the Colossians, &c., during that imprisonment in Rome of which the Acts makes mention.

From the above considerations, it is evident that these three epistles could not have been written in the part of Paul's life described in the Acts; and in spite of the opposing difficulties, should it be thought not absolutely impossible that one or another of them might have been written in the period in question, still the fact is of peculiar weight, that the placing of the authorship in that period is alike difficult *in respect to all the three epistles*,

and to accomplish the same more or less improbable and artificial combinations are necessary. Besides, *the* events and circumstances in the life of the Apostle, which are pre-supposed in *these* epistles, are certainly omitted in the Acts, which is not the case, in general, of any other of Paul's epistles. Still, if one wholly dissents from the above, there are other weighty reasons, arising from the nature of the epistles themselves, adverse to the theory in question. If we look at the contents of the three epistles, we find that in all alike an attack is made on certain false teachers. These are of an entirely different kind from those with whom Paul had to do in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians; they are like those who are opposed in the Epistle to the Colossians—such false teachers as could have originated only at a later period. Paul, also, in his address to the Ephesian elders at Miletus, speaks of the appearance of such teachers in the church as something future. Christianity must have already become a powerful principle before such a mixing of the Christian element with the oriental-Jewish speculation, as is shown in those false teachers, could have taken place. If we look at the form of the three epistles and their peculiar diction, we find that the colouring is manifestly different from that of the other Pauline epistles.

According to Wieseler's theory, which, aside from this, has the most probability in its favour, the First Epistle to Timothy was written between the First and the Second Epistles to the Corinthians, after that to the Galatians, and before that to the Romans. But it cannot be denied, from an unprejudiced examination, that the entire mode of exhibition in the epistles is adverse to such a view. Whoever estimates, not simply the external relations, but the nature, the internal evidence, must consider it impossible that Paul could have written the First Epistle to Timothy at the same time in which he wrote the other epistles alluded to. Besides, the character peculiar to this epistle is entirely like that of the other two pastoral epistles. The inward connection between them is at least as great, if it is not greater, than that between the Epistle to the Colossians and the Ephesians. If one is compelled, on account of this relationship, to place the authorship of these two at the same time, then we must certainly come to the same conclusion in regard to the pastoral epistles. According to Wieseler, indeed, there was no long interval between the First Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus, though the First to the Corinthians is to be placed between them, which still is attended with much difficulty; but the Second to Timothy, which has entirely the same character with the First, is put more than five years later, during which time not only the Second Epistle to the Corinthians,

and that to the Romans, but also those to the Ephesians, Colossians, &c., were written! To rend from one another things so related, cannot possibly be justified.

As a result, it stands sure, 1. that all three epistles belong to one and the same period in the life of the Apostle; and 2. that this period cannot fall in that section of the Apostle's life which is known to us by the Acts, and by the rest of Paul's epistles. The writing of them must, accordingly, belong to a later portion of his life. But this is possible only on the ground that Paul was liberated from the Roman imprisonment related by Luke, and was subsequently imprisoned in Rome.

The notice in the Acts cannot be made to hold good against the historical probability of a liberation and subsequent imprisonment, since the martyr-death of the Apostle at the close of the imprisonment mentioned by Luke is not less an hypothesis than the liberation. We must resort to the statements of the ancient church fathers. Still, it is not to be overlooked, that they give only a few notices respecting the Apostles. Not so much an historical, as a parenetical or doctrinal interest lies at the basis of their writings. They looked at existing needs, and only occasionally at past facts. Hence we cannot wonder if they communicate only a few facts in regard to Paul, and those few only in the form of hints.

The first clear and definite notice that Paul was liberated from the imprisonment mentioned by Luke is found in Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. 22, 22, and is as follows: "Then (namely, after the lapse of the two years, mentioned Acts xxviii. 30) after pleading his cause, the Apostle is reported to have gone again on the ministry of preaching, and that having come a second time to the same city, he finished his course by martyrdom under him [Nero]. While he was in bonds, he wrote his Second Epistle to Timothy, signifying at the same time his first defence, and his impending death."* Still, the testimony of Eusebius has not remained unassailed. The attempt has been made to invalidate it, 1st, because Eusebius himself does not rely on competent vouchers, but only on the report, λόγος; and 2nd, because his conviction of the correctness of this report rests only on the Second Epistle to Timothy itself, and particularly on his interpretation of 2 Tim. iv. 16, 17. But, on the other hand, it is to be remarked that Eusebius, by the phrase λόγος ἔχει, never denotes an uncertain and doubtful report or myth, appearing

* Τότε μὲν οὖν ἀπολογησάμενον αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ κηρύγματος διακονίαν λόγος ἔχει στείλασθαι τὸν ἀπόστολον, δεύτερον δ' ἐπιβάντα τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει τῷ κατ' αὐτὸν τελειωθῆναι μαρτυρίῳ· ἐν ᾧ δεσμοῖς ἐχόμενος τὴν πρὸς Τιμόθεον δεύτεραν ἐπιστολὴν συντάττει, ὁμοῦ σημαίνων τὴν τε πρότεραν αὐτῷ γενομένην ἀπολογίαν καὶ τὴν παραπόδαι τελείωσιν.

only occasionally, but rather the general, prevalent conviction, as such; so that it appears from his testimony, if nothing more, that at his time the view generally prevailed that Paul was set at liberty from that imprisonment. Since now Eusebius met with this account, so the condition of the second epistle was a proof to him that it was written in the second imprisonment in Rome, indicated by the tradition. On the other hand, the assertion that Eusebius inferred the liberation and subsequent imprisonment only from the Second Epistle to Timothy, is without foundation, and is in opposition to the words of Eusebius. The circumstance that Eusebius adduces no testimony from an older church writer for the truth of that tradition, may be taken as a proof that there was no witness; so, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that no opposing testimony was known to him. In favour of the truth of that tradition there appear, if not direct, yet indirect proofs, and that, too, of an earlier time.

First, the passage in the First Epistle of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians, c. v. The text of the Cod. Alex., the only remaining text, as amended by the editor, Junius, is:—“Through zeal Paul received the reward of patience—. Having been a preacher in the East and in the West, he obtained the excellent reward of his faith. Having taught righteousness through the whole world, and even to the boundary of the West, having come and testified before governors, so he was released from the world.”* Wieseler remarks, that on the supposition that the text so restored is the actual original of Clement, only the extreme West may be understood by *τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*, since he thinks that Clement could have so written, even if he knew only of the Apostle's residence in Rome—and not in Spain. In proof he relies on Rom. x. 18. But it is not to be overlooked that these words are cited from the Old Testament; at the same time they answer Paul's object, since to him Rome was the city representing the West. Entirely analogous is the passage, Acts ii. 5, where Luke says that Jews were present at the Pentecost “from every nation under heaven,” and afterwards he names the Romans as the representatives of all the western nations (not, indeed, as Wieseler thinks, “as the farthest people of the West”). These passages show, indeed, that Clement's phrases, “in the East and in the West,” and the “whole world,” do not necessarily point to countries beyond Rome. But it is otherwise with the expression, *καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως*. It would be difficult to show that Rome, in the view of the

* Διὰ ζῆλον [ὁ] Παῦλος ὑπομενῆς βραβεῖον [ἔπεσχ]εν —, κῆρυξ [γενέ]μενος ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ καὶ ἐν [τῇ] δύσει, τὸν γυναιῖον τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ κλέος ἔλαβεν· δικαιοσύνην διδάξας ὅλον τὸν κόσμον καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἐλθὼν καὶ μαρτυρήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων, οὕτως ἀπηλλάγη τοῦ κόσμου.

Oriental, lay at the *utmost* boundary of the West; how much less would this be the case in the view of the Occidentals! But it is wholly impossible that a man who lived in Rome itself, and thence wrote these words, could have thought of Rome by that expression. Besides, the position of these words gives them a special emphasis; if Clement had not intended to refer to countries beyond Rome, he would assuredly have been content with the expressions first used, as these would have perfectly indicated the labours of the Apostle in the West, and consequently in Rome. Accordingly, if this passage is rightly restored by Junius, it bears decided testimony in favour of a journey of the Apostle to Spain; yet, certainly not for a *course of labour* there; this rather seems to be excluded by the use of the simple ἐλθών. But Wieseler doubts the correctness of this restoration of the text, since he believes that the original text was not καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα, &c., but καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ τέρμα, &c., and the translation would be, "after he had taught righteousness through the whole world, and *had appeared before the supreme power of the West*, and had testified before the rulers," &c. That τὸ τέρμα may mean the sovereignty, and even the highest imperial authority, is certainly granted; but with this meaning, the words ὑπὸ—ἔρχεσθαι do not well accord; besides, in opposition to this conjecture and its explanation, is the fact, that thereby the highest imperial authority would be designated only as that of the West, while its power likewise extended over the East. Certainly Clement, who, according to Wieseler's own expression, "sounded a panegyric on Paul," could have by no means described that highest authority in so limited a manner; he would certainly, if he had understood τὸ τέρμα in that sense, have not merely added τῆς δύσεως, but, in conformity to fact, τῆς ἀνατολῆς καὶ τῆς δύσεως. So the restitution of the text by Junius must stand, and it must be granted that Clement in this passage actually refers to a journey of the Apostle to Spain.

The second passage is found in the Canon of Muratori, formed about A.D. 170, "Acta autem omnium apostolorum sub uno libro scripta sunt. Lucas obtime Theophile comprindit, quia sub præsencia ejus singula gerebantur, sicuti et semote passionem Petri evidenter declarat, sed profectionem Pauli ab urbe ad Spaniam proficiscentis." That these words contain a contradiction of the position that Paul made a journey to Spain, is by no means the fact; for if it is probable, as Wieseler correctly supposes, that after proficiscentis the word *omittit* has fallen out, then the fragmentist would only say, that Luke did not mention that journey, but he does not say that it did not occur, or that it was doubtful, or was controverted. But however these words

may be explained, so much stands irrefutable, that that journey was a matter of tradition at the time the fragmentist wrote.

If it appears from these passages that tradition preserved the knowledge of a journey of the Apostle to Spain, (not of *labours* there,) then the liberation from the imprisonment in Rome mentioned by Luke, would fall in with this tradition, (confirmed by the *λόγος ἔχει* of Eusebius,) since that journey could take place only on the supposition that Paul was liberated. As no decisive argument can be urged against the truth of this tradition, by which its impossibility, or even improbability, can be shown, then the result may be rightfully used in settling the time in which our epistles were written. For if, in the life of Paul up to his first imprisonment in Rome, no fit time can be found in which to place their authorship, and if, at the same time, the authorship of the three must necessarily belong to one and the same time in the life of the Apostle, (while the contents of the epistles point to a late period,) then the supposition is authorized that the epistles were written after the imprisonment mentioned in Acts; the First to Timothy and that to Titus in the interval between the two imprisonments, and the Second to Timothy during this second imprisonment. This view, which pre-supposes the genuineness of the epistles, is the only tenable one, according to the foregoing investigation, and hence it has been received in the most recent times by the defenders of the authenticity, except Matthies and Wieseler.

If now we suppose, as can hardly be doubted after Wieseler's inquiries, that Paul first came to Rome in the spring of A.D. 61, then the epistles were not written—as the imprisonment lasted somewhere about two years—till after the spring of 63. The time, however, may probably be determined more exactly. In the summer of 64, Rome was burnt at the instigation of Nero; a general persecution of the Christians was connected with it. Since in the epistles there is not the slightest allusion to these events, it is very probable that they were written before these events, and that the martyrdom of the Apostle, which is sufficiently vouched for by tradition,* took place either before, or at the latest during, that persecution. Since it cannot be supposed that the Apostle's first defence would have terminated so favourably

* The tradition which testifies to the manner of his death—beheading by a sword—conflicts, it is thought, with the view, that he was put to death in that persecution. But this is by no means the case, since we are not informed that this kind of capital infliction was not in use at that time. Allowing that it is improbable that the mode of his death by beheading was an indulgence to his rights as a Roman citizen, still there may have been other reasons which are unknown to us. That Paul was beheaded towards the end of Nero's reign, A.D. 67 or 68, has no sure support in tradition. Had his labours, after his first imprisonment, lasted so long, tradition would have preserved some notice of it.

for him, as is mentioned 2 Tim. iv. 17, if it had been made *after* the burning of the city, then this defence is probably to be placed before the burning, somewhere about July, 64. If these conjectures are correct, then it is the interval between the spring of 63 and the summer of 64 in which the pastoral epistles were written, and in which the events took place which are mentioned in the epistles as belonging to the same time. This interval was indeed short, but not *too* short. They may have happened in the following order: In the spring of 63, Paul departed from Rome, landed in Crete, where he staid some time, and then left Titus there; he then went to Ephesus, where he met Timothy. After he had stayed here a short time, he travelled to Macedonia. From hence he wrote the First Epistle to Timothy, and somewhat later, after he had come to the conclusion to "winter" at Nicopolis in Epirus, he wrote the Epistle to Titus, to whom he communicated that conclusion. After he had passed the winter in that city, he returned, near the end of it, to Ephesus. Without stopping here, he went through Miletus, where he left Trophimus sick, to Corinth. Without taking Erastus with him from this place, as he hoped, he sailed to Spain. Unknown circumstances induced him to leave Spain immediately for Rome. Perhaps he was apprehended in Spain, and taken as a prisoner to Rome. Thus he might have reached Rome in May or June; at the beginning of July, his first defence might have been made. Immediately, he wrote the Second Epistle to Timothy, and then suffered martyrdom, either before or shortly after the conflagration.

GENUINENESS—EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

The external evidence in favour of the genuineness of the three pastoral epistles is very decisive. Eusebius reckons them among the *Homologoumena*, since not the smallest doubt of their genuineness prevailed in the Catholic church. They are found as Pauline epistles, not only in the Canon of Muratori and in the Pesheto, but are repeatedly cited as such by Irenæus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria. If they are not expressly quoted by the earlier church fathers, yet by allusions, hints, or at least reminiscences, they seem not to have been less known to them than the other Pauline epistles. Clement of Rome uses the word *εὐσέβεια*, so common in the pastoral epistles, to denote "godliness." In his First Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. ii., he writes, "ready to every good work," see Tit. iii. 1. Ignatius, in the Epistle to the Magnesians, ch. viii.: "Be not led away with strange doctrines, neither with old fables, which are unprofitable," 1 Tim. i. 4, Tit. iii. 9. Some places in Polycarp's epistles,

have a very striking correspondence, e. g., "The beginning of all evils is the love of money; knowing, then, that we brought nothing into the world, and have nothing to carry out, let us be armed with the armour of righteousness," 1 Tim. vi. 7, 10. Justin, in his *Dial. C. Tryph.* 47, copies the words, Tit. iii. 4, "the kindness and philanthropy of God." There are, also, allusions or quotations more or less direct in Hegesippus, Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras.

But, with the Gnostic heretics, these epistles shared a different fate. That they are not found in Marcion's Canon, does not prove that he was ignorant of their existence. Jerome, in the Introduction to his Commentary on Titus, charges him and the other heretics with having arbitrarily rejected them. It is well known how capriciously Marcion treated some of the New Testament writings admitted by him as genuine. It is in entire harmony with this, when he excludes from the Canon, epistles that so decidedly war against the Gnostic errors. The reason why Tatian receives the Epistle to Titus as genuine, while he rejects those to Timothy, may be owing to the fact that the heretical teachers are more definitely named as Jewish in Titus than in Timothy.

Since the time of Tatian, the genuineness of these epistles was not doubted till the beginning of this century. J. E. C. Schmidt suggested doubts in regard to the First Epistle to Timothy; Schleiermacher, 1807, decidedly rejected it, but received the other two. The first epistle was defended by Planck, Wegscheider and Beckhaus. Eichhorn then attacked the genuineness of all three, in which he was followed, though with some wavering, by De Wette, in his Introduction to the New Testament, 1826. While De Wette's criticism was rather of a negative kind, Eichhorn sought to prove that the epistles were written by a disciple of Paul. Schott, 1830, very arbitrarily describes Luke as the author. The epistles have been defended with more or less ability, partly in special treatises, partly in works of a more general kind, by Hug, Bertholdt, Feilmoser, Guericke, Böhl, Curtius, Kling, Heidenreich, Mack, and others. Baur, Tübingen, 1835, supposes that they originated at the time of the Marcion heretics, from an author, who, without being able to rid himself of Gnostic notions, was in the interest of the Pauline party, and put his attacks on the Gnostic errors into the mouth of Paul. Baumgarten, Böttger, Matthies, and others, have refuted Baur. Even De Wette does not accord with him, but, in his Commentary, 1844, thinks that the epistles were written near the end of the first century.

GENUINENESS—INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

The genuineness of the epistles has been assailed mainly on three grounds:

I. The historical difficulty of fixing on any time in Paul's life when they could have been written. But this difficulty pre-supposes that a liberation of the Apostle from his imprisonment at Rome, mentioned in Acts, did not take place. But since it has been shown that this pre-supposition is not well founded, the difficulty falls to the ground.

II. The introduction of some points, which indicate a later age than the apostolic. These are three in number.

1. The heretics attacked in all three of the epistles.

The passages in the First Epistle to Timothy, which refer directly to the heretics, are i. 3, 4, 6, 7, 19; iv. 1—7; vi. 3 seq., 20. The heretics are characterized in these passages as follows: They favoured the emanation theory; they put believers under the yoke of laws, particularly in respect to certain kinds of food, and also marriage; they were given to a tiresome love of disputing, and thereby boasted of a special knowledge; they made use of their supposed godliness as a cloak to gain earthly possessions. Besides, the passages i. 17; ii. 4, 5, 15; iii. 16; iv. 10; vi. 15, 16, seem to stand in opposition to the heretics. If this be the case, then their theology did not embrace the absolute idea of the Divine Being, which well agrees with the emanation theory; they denied the universality of the Divine grace in regard to salvation, as, perhaps, they referred it only to a class of mankind, the "spiritual," πνευματικοί; they favoured Docetism, since they rejected the truth of the human nature of Christ, and viewed the τεκνογονία of women as something in itself to be rejected, which would accord specially with their prohibition of marriage, and in general with their view of the nature of matter. Less definite is the Second Epistle to Timothy in regard to the heretics. The passages are ii. 16—23; iv. 6—9, 13; iv. 4, and perhaps ii. 8. Only one peculiarity is brought out, namely, that they maintained that the resurrection was already past, which was in manifest opposition to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. In the epistle to Titus, the heretics are referred to in i. 10, 11, 14, 16; iii. 9, 10. The characteristics perfectly agree with those in 1 Timothy, except that here the Judaizing element is particularly prominent, since the μῦθοι are described as Jewish, and the μάχαι as of the law.

It is manifest that these heretics are wholly different from the Judaizers, whom Paul attacks in the Epistles to the Gala-

tians and Romans, for if both were characterized by a "legal" spirit at war with the evangelical life, yet the one class were entirely different from the other. The "legal" spirit of the heretics of the pastoral epistles not only went beyond the Mosaic law, but had a different ground from that of the Judaizers. Its quality is indeed not formally stated in the pastoral epistles, but it cannot be denied that it lay in its fantastic, speculative theories on the being of God and his relation to the world. These heretics more resemble those attacked in the Epistle to the Colossians, than they do the Judaizers. There is no sufficient ground for the supposition that our epistles attack *different* heretics from those referred to in the Colossians. All the traits much more perfectly agree in *one* likeness, and this likeness corresponds to that which later meets us in Gnosticism. Still, an essential difference is not to be overlooked. Gnosticism was found in a stronger or weaker opposition to Judaism, while the heresy here described has a *Jewish character*. We have not then sufficient grounds to find in this heresy the first germ of Gnosticism. The same fantastic, speculative tendency is certainly common to both, but here we see this tendency in connection with Jewish-Christianity; there, on the contrary, with Gentile-Christianity. That Judæo-Christian speculation was not so fully developed as Gnosticism, is naturally accounted for from the fact, that the Jewish type of Christianity was wholly absorbed in the Gentile type; only in Ebionitism and in the Clementine system did a tendency, at least similar, continue. The more we look at this heresy and that of the later Gnosticism, the more will the semblance of an argument disappear in favour of the position that the former could not have belonged to the apostolic age, especially as then the existing Judaism likewise showed tendencies to the same speculations.

Baur thinks that the heresy referred to in the pastoral epistles is the Marcionite Gnosticism; but his position is not tenable. According to him, in 1 Tim. i. 8, the heretics would express the sentiment "that the law was not good," but a sound interpretation would draw exactly the opposite from the passage, as the word *νομοδιδάσκαλοι* shows. From Tit. iii. 9, Baur infers the Antinomian character of the false teachers; but if this were correct, it would not prove the Marcionite character of it, for Antinomianism, as is known, was found with other Gnostics. The passages 1 Tim. iv. 3, connected with Tit. i. 14, certainly show that the prohibitions by the heretics here stated, e. g., forbidding to marry, had their ground in a dualistic conception of the world; but it is manifestly too much to say, that this dualism is to be found only, or in its most definite form, in Marcion, for the same, though with modifications, is an essential element

in Gnosticism in general. Baur also thinks, that the author of the epistles was infected with Gnosticism; but it is hardly worth while to refute him. We may exclaim with De Wette, "How artificial!" How blind must Irenæus and Tertullian have been, that they—the most decided opponents of Marcion—did not discover the manifest traces of the Marcionite system in these epistles! This discovery was reserved for a Tübingen professor 1,600 years later! De Wette is compelled to place the authorship of the epistles not later than the end of the first century; but it may just as well be placed in the apostolic times, for proper Gnosticism, in its developed form, was as foreign to the close of the first century, as it was to apostolic times.

2. The church organization. Those who have attacked the genuineness of the epistles, especially Baur and De Wette, object that the strengthening and development of the hierarchy which are indicated in the epistle could not have been the work of the Apostle Paul. Baur, in his earlier work on the pastoral epistles, remarks, that in the genuine Pauline epistles there is no trace of particular officers for the guidance of the churches, while, according to the pastoral epistles, these officers are so organized, that *ἐπίσκοποι*, *πρεσβύτεροι* and *διάκονοι* come out prominently; in connection with which he supposes that the plural, *πρεσβύτεροι*, in the collective sense, designates the single overseers, one of whom, under the name *ἐπίσκοπος*, had the oversight of single churches. In his later work on Paul, Baur maintains, that the Gnostics, as they were properly the earliest heretics, first gave occasion for the establishing of the episcopal organization. It is granted, that they were thus actually organized, yet in this we may certainly find a proof for the earlier authorship of our epistles than the period of Gnosticism, for in the epistles there is not a trace of the peculiar episcopal organization; yea, even if Baur's view on the relation of the expressions *πρεσβύτεροι* and *ἐπίσκοποι* were correct, still the meaning of *ἐπίσκοπος* here would be essentially different from what it was later in the proper episcopal organization. In our epistles, we meet with the simplest form of church order. The institute of deacons originated in the earliest apostolic period: and if the time when the "presbytery" had its origin and the manner in which it was introduced, are not handed down by tradition, still it must, apart from all the testimonies of the Acts, have originated very early, since no church could be conceived of without a government. Now in all the precepts which are given in our epistles on the presbyters and deacons, the writer has obviously in view nothing else than that such men only should be taken for this work, who by their previous conduct were worthy of the confidence of the church, and were fitted for

successful labour. Where is there aught hierarchical in this? How different in this respect are the Ignatian epistles! If one thinks it strange, that while, in the eight epistles of Paul acknowledged as genuine, such references are not found, they should be met with in our epistles, he is to consider that these epistles, if genuine, belong to the last period of Paul's life, when he was near the end of his labours. It must have been natural for him, especially when he saw a heresy, destructive to the churches, beginning to extend, to turn attention to church institutions, and also to men that, to a certain extent, would take his place in care for the churches. That Paul had not the smallest interest in ecclesiastical institutions, and that this want had its deep foundation in the spirit and character of the Pauline-Christianity, is an absolutely groundless idea, as it stands in the most decided contrast with what we know in the Acts, of the Apostle's labours.

3. Institute of widows. Schleiermacher takes *χῆραι*, 1 Tim. v. 9 seq., in the sense of *deaconesses*, and adduces it as a testimony of the later origin of this epistle. Baur supposes, that by this expression, according to its usage in the church in the second century, those females were denoted, who adopted an ascetic mode of life, and, in this character, gradually formed a peculiar ecclesiastical order, closely connected with that of the bishops, presbyters and deacons, on account of which the name deaconesses was given them. Baur adds, that they were not so much actual widows, as nominally such. But he allows, however, that widows only were first received; later, the unmarried were admitted, while the name remained unchanged. But if *χῆραι* indicates a peculiar kind of ecclesiastical persons, it would prove nothing against the apostolical origin of the epistle. It would well accord with apostolic times, and with the spirit of Paul. That virgins were admitted into the number of widows, or that the widows were devoted to an ascetic life, cannot be proved from 1 Tim. v. 11, as Baur thinks. But it is still a question whether the word *χῆραι* here means deaconesses. Mosheim and De Wette contend that it does not. According to the former, the "deaconesses" waited on the women, without performing spiritual duties, while the "widows" had an honourable place in the assemblies, exercised a kind of superintendence over other women, and attended to the education of the orphan children that were supported by the church. If this view be correct, such an arrangement in regard to widows might have properly been made in the apostolic church. De Wette objects to the regular and formal choice of these widows, as something foreign to that period, but there is nothing said in the entire passage of a formal choice; *καταλεγίσθω* does not

imply it. That the widow must have been the "wife of one husband," i. e. married only once, by no means indicates that a second marriage was not regarded as Christian. The ground of the precept may have been, that the widows might have a "good report" among "those without," the heathen considering it as an honour not to marry the second time.

The manner in which Paul speaks of Timothy, in his epistles to him, is regarded by some as an objection to the genuineness. According to De Wette, Timothy must have been at least thirty-five years of age, having laboured ten years with Paul. He is represented as a timid *youth*, needing, in his inexperience, many instructions. But we should infer from the first account of him, Acts xvi. 1 seq., that he was much below twenty-five years. Then, the difference between his age and position, and those of Paul, would render it proper for the latter to speak of him as his son, as a young man, and to address him as one needing exhortation and encouragement, especially as he was to take the oversight of an important church, in which there were many "elders."

III. The last objection to the genuineness of the epistles relates to the peculiarities of expression and modes of thought. We are to inquire whether these are of such a kind as to preclude the apostolic origin of the epistles. That they contain a multitude of peculiar words, ἀπαξ λεγόμενα, manifestly decides nothing, for each of Paul's epistles contains a greater or less number of such expressions. These phrases would be a proof of the spuriousness of the epistles only as it should be shown that they belonged to a later period, or were borrowed from other writings.

It is urged as an objection against the three epistles, that some passages have a colouring peculiar only from the fact that they are borrowed from other New Testament epistles, and in fact can be explained only by means of these epistles. Instances are found 1 Tim. i. 12—14, "And I thank Christ Jesus our Lord," &c., compared with 1 Cor. xv. 9, 10; 1 Tim. ii. 11, 12, "Let the women learn," &c., with 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35, "Let your women keep silence," &c.; also 2 Tim. i. 3—5, with Rom. i. 8 seq.; 2 Tim. ii. 5, with 1 Cor. ix. 24, and others. The resemblance is undeniable, but it cannot constitute an objection. The agreement is not complete. There are some deviations. In that case, the objector must suppose that the author of the pastoral epistles either designedly deviated from the text lying before him, so as artfully to conceal his deception, or that he had almost unwillingly admitted these urgent reminiscences. Still, it may be supposed that the Apostle himself, while he was treating kindred subjects, might use similar expressions, when, on

the whole, his diction had a colouring different from what was earlier peculiar to him. Besides, instances of agreement of the same kind are found in other epistles of Paul without invalidating the genuineness of any of them. That these passages cannot be understood without reference to similar expressions in other epistles, is decidedly incorrect.

But how do we explain the often observed difference between the diction of these epistles and that of the other Pauline epistles? The opposers of the genuineness hold that the author was an impostor of the post-Apostolic age, who had indeed imbibed not a little of the Pauline mode of conception and expression, but who could not conceal his own peculiar manner. Baur has pointed out some post-Apostolic phrases, which are used in attacking the heretics. But these prove nothing, since the position that the heresy here attacked originated after the Apostolic age has no sure support. The influence of these attacks on heresy is not to be confined merely to the proper polemic passages, for not only did the Jews and heathen, but also the heretical Christians, furnish material for the expression of Christian ideas; this "polemic" gave occasion to ideas and phrases which could not otherwise have been formed in this peculiar manner out of the simple Christian consciousness. This holds not merely of the later Church teachers, but of the Apostles. As instances, we refer to John's idea of the *Lógos*, and Paul's of *δικαιοσύνη*. Let it be granted that at the time of the Apostles there was a heresy akin to Gnosticism, which our epistles pre-suppose, still there is nothing un-Apostolic in the fact that the mode of describing the heresy revealed an effect of that heresy, as is the case in the words *φανερῶν*, *ἐπιφάνεια*, *ὥς ἀπρόσιτον*, &c.

Besides these, there are expressions which, it is urged, belong to the church language of the second and third centuries, e. g., "man of God," "husband of one wife," *εὐσέβεια*, *Βασιλεῖς* (the last to be explained from a custom introduced by Hadrian). But it may be replied, that the later writers may have borrowed them from the Apostolic—especially as some are found in the writings of the so-called Apostolic fathers.

These epistles differ from the other Pauline epistles, not only in single expressions, but in the mode in which the thoughts are developed, though there are points of agreement. Is this peculiarity unworthy of Paul? The answer will vary according to the subjective feelings. Schleiermacher finds no fault with the Second Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus. De Wette denies to the Second Epistle all good grammatical and logical connection, as well as a true tact for what is befitting, while he thinks that Schleiermacher exaggerates what is objec-

tionable in the First Epistle, and did not penetrate sufficiently into the spirit of the author, and saw want of sense and connection where a fundamental interpreter must have judged otherwise. Baur even thinks that the First Epistle is not wanting in unity and the carrying through of a definite idea. De Wette objects to the transition of the thoughts; "but prejudice was so strong in him," "that where all is in the most perfect order, he would find some things unworthy of the Apostle."

If these epistles bear a stamp different from that of the Galatians, Romans, and Corinthians, it is to be considered that Paul would not resort to a dialectic development in pastoral letters—private epistles to his assistants. Where this peculiarity does not prevail, the course of thought is not so different as some have maintained. Even the peculiarity in respect to general truths urged by De Wette is seen in the other Pauline epistles; comp. Rom. xiii. 10; xiv. 9, 17; 1 Cor. iv. 20; vi. 7; vii. 19. The reason urged against the genuineness from the prevailing view of practical morality will not hold. The same view is by no means less prominent in the other Pauline epistles. A perfect agreement exists in all, in the fact that faith is the deepest ground of a moral life, and faith also in the atoning death of Christ. The morality taught in 1 Tim. ii. 15; iii. 13; iv. 8; vi. 18, 19, is not in opposition to Paul's doctrine of grace. It is also urged that the contents of the epistles are not so rich and weighty as those of the other Pauline epistles; the thoughts are too general, are feeble, &c. But it is to be considered that Timothy and Titus needed only general precepts; such discussions as those in the Galatians were not demanded.

As the result of a careful examination, we find:—1. That the external evidence furnishes no ground to doubt the genuineness of the epistles: 2. That the difficulty of bringing the authorship of the epistles within the period of Paul's life, disappears on the theory of his second imprisonment in Rome; there is no adequate reason for not admitting this imprisonment: 3. That the internal peculiarities of the epistles, in regard to the subjects handled, the development of thought and mode of expression, show indeed some things of an unusual character, but still not of a kind to have any decided weight against the genuineness: and 4. That it would be far more difficult to show, both in general and in particulars, how an impostor could have prepared three such epistles as these are, both in contents and in form, and foisted in the name of the Apostle Paul, than it is to prove their genuineness. No evidences for their post-Apostolic origin exist; they accordingly hold their place in the Canon as Pauline epistles.

ART. V.—HICKOK'S RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

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[Concluded from p. 165.]

THE rapid sketch we proposed to make of this work was brought down, in the previous number, to the Second Division of the Second Part, or the Understanding in its Objective Law. The survey then taken of the first portion will give the reader a fair view of the writer's method. It may, therefore, be sufficient here to state, in the most cursory manner, that the general plan is carried out, in all the mental departments, with the same rigid intellectual symmetry. The investigation of the understanding in its idea is concluded by two chapters of the highest interest—"The *à priori* Principles in a Nature of Things," and an "Exposition of False Systems of a Universal Nature." We have then, as in the sense, The Understanding in its Objective Law, followed by an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the notional and its objects.

The same method again meets us in the study of the Reason. We have, first, the idea—secondly, the law—and thirdly, the ontological demonstration of the absolute verity of those objects of which reason takes direct and exclusive cognizance, or, in other words, of the supernatural. The sense envisages, or distinguishes quality and conjoins quantity in space into phenomena; the understanding substantiates, by connecting phenomena into a nature of things: the reason gives meaning to, and comprehends, the whole operation of both, and the objects of both.

To comprehend nature, we must obtain for nature an origin and an end, and thus some existence, not only before nature, and above nature, but reaching beyond it. In the sense we had the pure intuition, in the understanding the pure notional, and here we must attain the pure idea, or the ideal. This must rise above space and time, and because it would comprehend the natural must be supernatural (Ch. II.). Again: in the sense we found our first *à priori* position in the primitive intuition of space and time remaining indestructible for the intellect after the abstraction of all that has come into consciousness through sensation; in the understanding we took our second *à priori* position on the notion of the space-filling force remaining indestructible for the intellect after a like abstraction of every-

thing involved in the conceptions of substance and causality that had come to us through experience; and here, in the reason, we obtain our third and highest *à priori* position in an idea which resolves into its own simplicity the duality of the space-filling force, and gives origin to the substance of nature. This is the idea of The Absolute.

Next for the elements of comprehension. Here the trine method again presents itself. In the sense operation of conjunction, the three *à priori* elements were unity, plurality, and totality. In the operation of connection in the understanding they were found to be, 1st, substance in space or source and event in time; 2nd, cause and effect; and 3rd, reciprocity in action and re-action. In like manner the elements of this higher operation of comprehension are found to be, pure spontaneity, pure autonomy, and pure liberty. Pure spontaneity is simple act standing above all conditions of force, and thus not under a necessity as nature; although essential to personality it is not of itself sufficient for it. Pure autonomy is end above nature, a law to its own action found in the behest of its own intrinsic worthiness. In the syntheses of these there is found something distinct from both, making the third element, or pure liberty. In these we have a completed personality determined *à priori* to the Absolute (Sec. II.); and in this pure personality of the Absolute we have the *à priori* comprehension of nature. This pure personality, we may remark, altogether transcends the first cause of the naturalist, and this comprehension of nature is a distinct thing altogether transcending all natural science. It is a comprehension of nature, not only in its beginning, but in its continuance and its consummation. It is the highest rationality that the Absolute Reason be himself the end of all ends. This is, too, the opposite of pantheism. It is pure holiness, or perfect separation from nature, not only as originating power, but also in the finalities, whether moral or artistic, for which it acts. It is, in other words, in the language of the Bible, the catechisms, and the old theology—the glory of God.

To sum up then briefly the substance of several sections—Sense conjoins into phenomena, but cannot tell whence they came, nor whither they go,—in other words, what they *are*. The understanding connects phenomena in their substances and causes, but cannot tell what they mean. Something within us affirms that they have a meaning, and that this meaning, and the elements of its comprehension, may be thus found in the ideal of an Absolute Personality and finite personalities, and the relations existing between them,—in other words, in God, the soul, and immortality.

Thus we have the reason in its idea. We have, or may have, this ideal comprehension of nature and the universe. It is a glorious idea. Without it existence is an enigma, nature thick darkness, and man a dream. To some minds there would be, in this thought alone, proof abundant of its objective realization. But in the consummation of his admirably sustained scheme, the author next proceeds to an examination of the facts which go to verify this idea in its objective law. These are traced, 1st, in respect to a finite, and 2nd, the Absolute Personality. Under both of these, without noticing the divisions and subdivisions in which they are arranged, we have æsthetic facts, mathematical facts, philosophical facts, psychological facts, and, higher than all, ethical facts. There are, moreover, the ready assent to the fact of final causes in nature as a reaching forth to something beyond nature, although it may not carry us out of nature,—the easy recognition, in all ages, of miraculous interpositions,—the order of nature's formation by a combining of natural development with the addition, from time to time, of new forces from the supernatural, as evinced in geological facts,—the recognition of a free personality in humanity—the comprehending facts of an ethical system. In these we have the reason in its law.*

To the whole is appended an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the supernatural as deduced from the harmony of such a law of facts with such an idea. It is briefly presented under three heads, the valid existence of God, the valid being of the soul, and the validity of the soul's immortality. For the valid being of the soul, there are two sources of argumentation: 1. The fact of a comprehending agency; 2. The facts as given in an ethical experience. For the valid existence of God, there are three lines of demonstration: 1. The fact that all atheistic speculations are from the antinomy of the discursive faculty as understanding; 2. The fact of new forces originating in nature; 3. The fact that an ethical system is in being. For the soul's immortality, the line of argument is briefly this: God is,—a future state, in view of the moral demands of this soul, *ought* to be; the existence of God is a guarantee that what *ought* to be, *will* be. And thus we have the science of our entire being, including the functions of the sense, the understanding, and the reason: in other words, a *Rational Psychology*.

On the argument against the materialist, we have already dwelt. The confutation of the idealist is a work of far more

* In this, which is one of the most interesting sections of the work, the author has anticipated some of the most striking arguments of a late remarkable volume entitled "The Footprints of the Creator."

difficulty. We will state concisely what, unless we have utterly mistaken his meaning, we must regard as the substance of the author's proof of an objective world, as given under both the sense and the understanding. He shows how perception is possible, and how, if it is at all, it must be. The same demonstration is given in respect to an experience. If there is an objective world, thus, and thus, will its phenomena be perceived by us, and thus, and thus, will its things and events, its substances and causalities, become the objects of our experience. Sensation and experience have put us in a position to construct such a proof, but the proof, when found, is also found, just as conclusively, not to depend for its certainty on either, but to exist in indissoluble connection with certain intuitions, notions, or knowledges, which we cannot separate from the mind itself, and which we cannot even conceive of as separate. Hence, such proof, *in regard to the soul*, is justly called *à priori* and necessary.

But, secondly—thus do we actually perceive; and such is really our experience. The objective law which we find the soul actually following, corresponds precisely to the *à priori* idea which had before been thus conclusively proved, as not only a possibility, but the only possible process. But this involves the conception of an external world as a necessary part of the ideal theory. The objective world, therefore, which *seems* to enter into the actual perception and experience, is as real and necessary a part of such experience, as the hypothetical or ideal objective world (if we may use the strange expression) which actually entered, and necessarily entered, into the *à priori* idea (thus found) of the sense and the understanding.

This certainly proves that an objective world *may* be; but does it show that it actually *is*? One cause is adequate to the effect; does this exclude every other? Is the actuality, and, in a certain sense, the objectivity, of the perceiving and experiencing, the actuality or reality of their apparent objects? In other words, does the hypothetical objectivity necessarily make perception and experience what they are, or might they not have been, or is it impossible to show that they might not have been, just what they are without any corresponding real objectivity? Now, we *know* that there may be perceptions, *to all appearance*, and experiences, which have every known characteristic of objectiveness, and yet wholly subjective. There are the cases which have been presented from the time of Heraclitus down to Hume, such as the phenomena and experiences of dreams, of revery, of disease, of madness, and, in short, of all that are called false perceptions. "Have you never heard," says Socrates to his pupil,—as though it were a question which

had come down from the olden time, and was familiar to all who had ever thought—"have you never heard it asked what proof we can give that we are not now sleeping, and that what we now say and do, may be but a dream, from which we may hereafter awake and find it so? and do you not see that the same ground may be taken in respect to madness and disease?"* In all these cases, then, are conjunctions of quantity, and distinctions of quality, and notional connections of substance and causality, and yet they have, in themselves, no mark by which they can be distinguished from those that are supposed to have a real objective ground. They may differ in many respects from other states of the soul, but in nothing on which we can rest as a distinct characteristic of true outward objectiveness. They may appear less rational, less coherent, less vivid, but these, it may be said, are but their *appearances* to some other subjective state, and such judgments may be, after all, but the delusions of one subjective condition of the soul claiming to decide upon the experience of another.

We are compelled to say, that we do not perceive the conclusiveness of the author's reasoning on this head. He makes a distinction between what he calls an ideal and an actual phenomenon, p. 303. The first only *seems*, the last actually *appears*. But what is there which makes one a *seeming* and the other an actual *appearing*? It is not anything in the phenomena or experiences themselves. There are the same conjunctions, the same distinctions, the same connections, in both. Is it, then, something in the constructing mind itself, and which transcends all these operations? In the case of an ideal circle, (which is the author's example,) the mind, it is said, "has given a product which stands out separate from the agency that produced it, and, as other than itself, is object to itself in its own intuition," p. 301. "But, is there no difference," he proceeds to ask, "between this ideal form and the phenomenon of a material ring with its given content in the sensation," that is, "no difference in the consciousness?" Is there not, however, some content in sensation even in the case of the ideal form, only by an inverted process of the mind upon the sensorium, instead of having come from without, as we endeavoured to show in the previous number of our review, (note, page 135,) and is not the statement too strong that "no intellectual (or spiritual) act can give content to a void sensibility?" Again, says the author, "the intellect has given all it may to the pure form to make it objective, and yet *most manifestly* the phenomenal ring

* Plat. *Thætetus*, 158, B.

has something more in its objectiveness than the pure circle, and this something more must have been given to it from some other than a mere intellectual operation." We have been so carried along with the author's general method of investigation; we have become so intensely interested in his work, that it is with feelings of strong disappointment we find ourselves unable to follow him in any of his conclusions; but we can only say, it is not most manifest to us. It seems, on the contrary, the very thing to be proved. Again he says, "in the ideal, however complete in the construction and vivid in the imagination, there is not what the real phenomenon possesses." But wherein do they differ, quasi phenomena, if alike in completeness and vividness, and of course in the power of accompanying belief, though it be but for a moment? They have both been constructed by the same laws. Both, according to their vividness, exclude other objects, whether actual or ideal. Both, whilst they exist, limit alike all our thinking respecting them. We cannot think anything inconsistent with the ideal, any more than with what we call the real circle.

The difference then, if it exist at all, must be in their origin; and here there does seem to be something of which consciousness may claim to take cognizance. One is cognized as being with volition, the other without. Both meet in the sensorium, but, to use the author's expression of the difference, "one is *produced* by the intellect, the other is *found* by the intellect." True, here is a difference which may be traced in certain cases. It is, however, even here, a difference, not in the phenomena, but in the mind's, or rather the will's, relation to them. Still it does not seem to reach the idealist's position. He maintains that sense is the intellect giving objectivity to its own creations. This is sometimes done with volition; and then we seem to be conscious of the process. But may not the spiritual energy do the same, or a similar thing, without volition, or without a consciousness of volition? and then the perception would appear to be *first*. It would, too, be according to those laws of construction which are the same for all cases; and then how are they to be distinguished? There are ideal creations of the soul which seem to come without our volition, just as much as those we choose to style real perceptions. We know that this is sometimes so; why may it not then be done in all cases that would seem to involve objectivity? If men had never dreamed, —if there had never been such a thing as false perception, the proof might have been deemed (for us) satisfactory, if not conclusive against all possibilities. But we have had dreams, and consciousness at the time has had no doubt of their real objec-

tivity. Consciousness has had no doubt of the reality of the madman's subjective world. And yet, all these dreams, and all the false perceptions of that subjective world, have been constructed and connected in strictest obedience to the *à priori* scheme of the sense and the understanding which the author has so scientifically demonstrated.

Had there never been, we say, these strange phenomena in our strange existence, had there never been distinct and vivid subjective states to which we know there was no outward, idealism might with some justice be regarded as that absurd thing which certain schools would represent it. But with such facts forming so large a part (almost one half, we were tempted to say) of our existence, there is a natural ground for the mode of thinking which has led to such conceptions. There is much in this life of ours to lead the soul, at times, to the thought that "man walketh in a vain show," and that we need some other assurance of reality than can be found *alone* in the sense and the understanding.

We wonder not, therefore, that there has always been in the world a tendency to such idealism. He can hardly be called a thinking man who has not, at some periods of his life, been more or less drawn to the indulgence of some of its peculiar contemplations. We have no doubt that it has often been the dream of musing childhood, and that it has not unseldom come over the soul of the aged when he looks back upon his long sojourn in this seeming land of shadows, and begins to live almost wholly in a subjective recalling of the past. It has ever, too, been a speculation more or less attractive to men of an introspective or philosophical habit of thought; and it is not, therefore, to be driven out of the world by any such stubborn dogmatism as that of Reid and Brown, nor by any such superficial witticisms as those of the Rev. Sidney Smith. It can never be laughed away by any ridicule of Berkeley, neither will it regard as a conclusive answer the stale joke, such a favourite among a certain class of writers, about running ideal heads against ideal posts.

And so also we may say in respect to the doctrine of mediate or representative perception. It still keeps its place in the world. It appears in the structure of all languages. It has created metaphors, instead of having been derived from them, according to the easy explanation so often given. They are the natural offspring of this innate and universal *prejudice* of a representative correspondence between the soul and the outward world. Hence, too, the thought, noticed by the earliest writers, and which must have occurred to every man who thinks, that our sensations, though unvarying correspondences for the same sentient,

may be very different for different sentient;* so that as far as the sense is concerned, the dogma ascribed in the Theætetus to Protagoras, τὰ αὐτοῦ ἑκαστον μόνον δοξάζειν, that each man has his own seemings, may be strictly true. It is a striking fact, too, that those who show so much contempt for the old and universal doctrine, cannot state their own positions without running into inconsistencies of thought and language,—a sure evidence that they are at war with nature and the laws of the human mind. The witty Sidney Smith thinks it as easy to make Berkeley ridiculous as to raise a vulgar laugh against the noble Carey and the Baptist mission. And yet after a lecture devoted to these "images from the moon," we find him gravely making this distinction between the senses of sight and hearing. "In the latter," he says with all seriousness, "we hear only a sound which experience leads us to refer to the bell as its cause." But why may we not hear an external world, if it make a noise, and even smell an external world, as well as see an external world? An affection, then, produced in us through undulations in the air only authorizes us to infer a cause; an affection produced in us through undulations in a finer medium is thereby raised to the rank of an immediate perception; in reading a book we are conversing directly with an outward world; in hearing a speaker, we are following an association of ideas through which we infer its existence. And yet this writer attempts to be facetious about "metaphysical lunatics," as the best name he can bestow upon all those to whom such nonsense as his own is utterly inconceivable!

To return, however, to the general position of the idealist—the method of argument our author employs against it, is of a much higher and more serious kind, and as far as it goes we are willing to yield our assent to its force, if not to its conclusiveness. Taking the general view we presented several pages back, it might be maintained, that although it fails, or seems to fail, in respect to the sense and the understanding, there is about it a conviction of conclusiveness when viewed in reference to the department and objects of the reason. An idea of a process of perception and experience, although it includes the hypothesis of an objective world, is not proof of such objective world, however exactly such idea may seem to agree with an actual law of perception and experience. The law of perceiving may be in itself real and actual, in one sense, and yet wholly subjective; or the law and the idea may be but two aspects of a coinciding unity. It is because such objectivity, although included in the

* * Ἡ συ διίσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὥς οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἑκαστον χρώμα τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄντῳ ζῳῳ; ΟΕΑΙ. Μα ΔΙ' οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἔλλω ἀνθρώπων;—Theæt. 154, A.

idea, *is not included as an absolute necessity*. It is yet to be ranked among contingencies. The seeming, or the appearance even, may come from some unknown operations of our minds, acting instinctively, or without volition, and without consciousness, or they may be produced by some higher mind acting upon our sensorium. In other words, the idea of a sense and an understanding may be consistent, we think, with the contingency of their objects. But in respect to the reason, the case would seem to be carried, or rather to carry itself, to a higher tribunal. Here the very idea would appear to include the non-contingency of its objects, either on the ground of necessity or impossibility. Certainly may this be said of the highest of them. The true thought of Deity as the Absolute would seem to necessitate (for our mind) its actual existence. The Glorious Idea must have objectivity, on the ground of there being (for our minds, we say again) no alternative between its actual reality and its impossibility. What we call nature, *may be*, or *may not be*. So, also, as a *fact* merely, some most exalted being, far higher than man, yet still finite and imperfect, may be or may not be. But that which, if true, is the highest of all truths, the source of all truth, the truest of all truths, if truth admit of degree, cannot itself belong to the class of contingent verities. We do not put it forth as any mystical or transcending thought. It seems to us, that if one place the mind intently and steadily upon it, he must see it, in its own light, as a certain and intuitive axiom. It cannot, we say, belong to the class of contingent verities. If not contingent, it must be necessary or impossible. If not impossible, therefore, it must be actual. In other words, if we cannot affirm its impossibility, as we certainly cannot, then are we driven to the belief of its reality. Or to present the statement more formally: If God, the Absolute, the Infinite, the All-perfect, the All-wise, the All-good, the All-holy, *may be*, HE IS, because *necessity* of being, both by itself, and as included in *perfection* of being, is involved in the very idea, as it is not in the ideas of sense and nature. The proposition, GOD IS, must surely be of as high a rank as the one that maintains that *the sphere is two-thirds of its circumscribing cylinder*, and if so, it cannot be *dependent* for its proof, to any mind, on any inductive or *à posteriori* reasoning.*

The argument against the materialist, we have said, is com-

* This argument, which we have here presented in our own way, and in the most concise form, may be found more fully stated in Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, Vol. III. p. 390, Eng. ed., where it is given as a modification of the Cartesian. The closest examination has never enabled us to detect its fallacy. There is another which has been suggested to us by a passage in the *Parmenides*. *Truth* is inseparable from *thought*; thought is inseparable from a *thinker*. The first is in-

paratively easy. There is that in the perception, which could not have come from the sense. We ask him, whence it is, and he cannot tell us. Here, however, the position is reversed. There are some things in the perception, or experience, that could not have come from the mind. This we affirm against the idealist, but it is not so easy to maintain it, as the other proposition. He brings up certain facts, and very startling facts, too, which go to show that there may be perceptions and experiences possessing in consciousness every known *appearance*, or characteristic of objectivity, and yet known to have no other origin than the mind itself.

Let us, then, endeavour, in the first place, to ascertain what consciousness truly reveals. If it cannot affirm directly that some phenomena are from without, it certainly does lie within its power and acknowledged office to make distinctions between those that lie within the spiritual realm, whether some of them come originally from without, or not. And this it surely does. We know it by an internal light (*a lumine aliquo interiori ostendente verum*), as Descartes calls it, in distinction from a blind impetus, *spontaneo quodam impetu me ferente ad credendum*. There are certain constructions, envisagings, &c., which the mind knows to have been preceded by its own volitions; others have had no known connection with the will. All *may* be from the mind. Consciousness can utter no denial of this. But all are not from the soul's direct volition. That she knows and affirms. Here, then, is an interior difference which is well stated by Descartes, in the passage to which we have already referred, and where he sums up the whole in this distinction of voluntary and involuntary. "*Ita videor doctus a natura, et præterea experior illas non a mea voluntate pendere. Sæpe enim vel invito obversantur, et jam sive velim sive nolim sentio calorem, &c. . . . Deinde quamvis ideæ illæ a voluntate mea non pendeant, non ideo constat ipsas a rebus extra me positas necessario procedere; ut enim impetus illi de quibus mox*

conceivable without the second; the second is inconceivable without the third. There are certain truths which the laws of our minds (out of which we cannot think) compel us to regard as independent of time and space, and all created things; in other words, as necessary and eternal. Necessary and eternal truth cannot be conceived of by us, except as necessary and eternal thought; necessary and eternal thought is inconceivable by us except in connection with an eternal thinker, or rather with an eternal intelligence. If we think steadily upon it, we shall find that by the laws of our minds we cannot take the one without taking the other. But we are compelled to take the one, therefore we must take the other. If we sever the chain, all collapses and falls to the ground, the first proposition as well as the second. The word *truth* loses its meaning, and only gets vitality again by connecting it with *thought* and *mind*. Οὐκ ἔχει λόγον νοήματα ὄντα, ἀνόητα εἶναι (132 c). And again, ἀδύνατον νόημα εἶναι, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός. The view is just as conclusive, whether we regard οὐδενός here as expressing the *object* or the *subject*. There cannot be *truth*, except as *νοητὸν*; there cannot be *νοητὸν* without *Noûs*.

loquebar, quamvis *in me* sint, a voluntate tamen mea diversi esse videntur, ita forte etiam *aliqua alia est in me facultas nondum mihi satis cognita istarum idearum effectrix*, ut hactenus semper visum est illas, dum somnio, absque ulla rerum externarum ope in me formari.”*

Speaking of the Berkeleian hypothesis, that all sensation is itself purely mental, the author says: “This is affirmed from the want of such an *à priori* cognition of sensation as may make it competent to show that no possible intellectual subjective agency can induce sensation, nor give to any ideal creations the characteristics of real objective phenomena.” But has this been shown, or can it be shown? Are there not startling facts in our being, which show just the contrary? Is there not real sensation in dreams? We mean not the half-felt bodily states of which we are more or less conscious in slumber, but sensation connected directly with the visions and perceptions of the subjective dream itself. Is there not often, not only sight and hearing, accompanied, as we have every reason to believe, with an affection of the sensorium, but also intense pleasure in the sentiency and intense pain? Is there not sensation (a real affection even of the *material* sensorium) in false perceptions, in spectre-seeing, in imagined sounds,—and this not rising merely from a diseased condition of the material organ, but derived from the previous originating action of the spiritual mind? We mean, is there not, in all these cases, or may there not be, an affection in that very same sensorium which is the seat of all sentiency derived from without? In other words, may not the soul by thinking *make the body feel*, or produce an actual content in the sensibility? This is the hinge-question, on which the validity of the demonstration must wholly turn. But there is this difference, it may be said,—the subjective states, so called, are imitations, suggestions, or reminiscences which imply a *previous* objectivity and would never have been without it. This, however, would be assuming that the objective is already proved on independent grounds; otherwise, as was said before, it is only the judgment of one state upon another, both of which may be equally subjective, equally destitute of any ground for deciding upon their mutual relations.

We come back, therefore, to the distinction before taken, and which is the only one we can find. Some perceptions, or rather some constructions of the sense (for the propriety of the word perception may be denied), have been preceded by an exercise of will, others have not. Of these latter, some have, for a time, all the seeming characteristics of what we call objectiveness;

* See Reid's View of Descartes's Doctrine, Ch. VIII. p. 140.

afterwards they take the appearance of subjectiveness (that is, when another seeming objective world is in possession of the mind) and are recognized as such. In others, the "objective characteristics," to use the author's phrase, endure for a longer period; but certainly this is not a question to be determined by longer or shorter continuance; otherwise an indefinitely prolonged dream would, by that very circumstance, become reality.

The distinction of consciousness, then, is not between constructions *ab extra* and from within; but surveying them all as lying within the mind, and in this respect alike, she acts within her own province in pronouncing some voluntary and others involuntary. It is not, then, so much a direct recognition of a world *without* us, in the first place, as of a power *above* us—of something which is independent of our will. There has been an attempt to cut the knot of the difficulty by maintaining that perception directly involves an antithesis. There is the famous German flourish of the *me* and the *not-me*. But this is only the dogmatism of another school. It escapes no difficulty as long as we admit that the subject may create its own object, and give to it all the appearance of objectiveness, or that there *may* be real acts of the soul which are nevertheless without volition. But *will* and *not-will* is a distinction falling within the spirit regarded as embracing all its objects, and within the direct light of consciousness. It is not a direct cognition of an external world, but it is a direct cognition of something which is not my will, and through this there is a path to the recognition, if not the proof, of another and a higher will by which my perceptions are affected, whether through an objective world, or through laws and operations of my mind, which, although carried on by me, are not under my will, and must, therefore, have received their origin and their action from another.

Thus there springs up in the soul the *thought* of a causality *above* us rather than of a world *without* us. If there were no external world, a variation in the soul's own subjective states, running back to a period of not being, would suggest the same idea of a power which is not our power. It may be objected that this is giving precedence to the later and more metaphysical conception. And yet the notion of causality may be the origin of that of outwardness, although the latter, when born, grows much more rapidly, and by being thus more early and distinctly developed, comes, at last, to be regarded as the first-born, whilst the former is comparatively obscured, and therefore placed among later and more difficult conceptions. The ideas of space and time present a similar case. The latter, as connected with the inner sense, precedes the former, which belongs more to the outer, and yet the intuition of space is sooner developed

in distinctness, and thereby assumes the appearance of having been more original and fundamental in the soul.

A similar method is employed in the work, to prove the valid being of the notional, and of the objects of the understanding. The law corresponds to the idea. Nature is as we are compelled to think her; that is, if there is an objective nature, thus, and in no other way, can we have an experience of her, or understand her to be. This is proved in a series of demonstrations exceedingly clear, beautifully illustrated, and without a flaw that we can detect. Yet still we have a difficulty similar to that which met us in the field of the sense. There might have been, or rather it is impossible to show that there might not have been, just such notionals, just such an understanding, comprising just such an experience, and yet wholly subjective. Can the soul by its own energy create content in the sensibility? That was the turning point before. Can the soul, by its own energy, create within its own experience a phenomenal of *antagonism** which shall correspond to the understanding conception of *force*? That is the hinge-question here. If the negative of this can be shown, the author's argument is perfect. It not only proves a possibility, but invincibly shuts out all opposing possibilities.

On page 489 there is a distinction very strongly and clearly stated between the subjective experience of our dreams and our waking objectivity. "We cannot," it is said, "bring the times of our dreams into one connected whole of a dreaming time, or identify the times passing in our dreams with one objective universal time, except as we have some substantial source for phenomenal succession, and subject the times of our dreams to this one common standard which marks the progress of one universal time for all." This we think too strongly stated. We cannot, it is true, when in what we call the waking state, bring our dreaming into one such connected whole; but we cannot say there may not be, even in the same subject, a consciousness in which this is done, or which may connect into one universal time of its own all our dreaming experience, wild and incoherent as it may seem to be. What forbids there being in this way double or triple consciousness belonging to one subject (if we take something back of consciousness as the real personal self, or ground of identity), and yet so separate, that they never intermingle, and we know not in one state what we have known as we knew it in the other? On such a supposition, the experience of one state perdures *through*, or rather *across*, all the intervals, and bridges over and connects all its chasms, however

* Not only a subjective *not-me*, but something further—that which is *opposed to me*.

much they may seem to be severed by the intervention of others. That such a supposition, instead of being altogether a chimera, has some ground of possibility in our most mysterious being, would be shown by those facts (if facts) which are to be found related in certain books under the head of double consciousness. Such facts, however, should be attested by the highest evidence. None that we have ever read of have a profounder connection with some of the most important and fundamental positions in psychology.

We should like to dwell upon our author's very striking comparison of subjective time to mirrored spaces, either existing separately, or themselves regarded as appearing in one constant mirror supposed to contain them all. We can only refer the reader to it, and the simile of the current in the same chapter, as presenting matter of great interest, and as excelling in beauty and pertinency anything we ever met with in any similar work. But the limits of our review forbid. The argument for a real objective time, as law to the idea, may be condensed into the following statement:—

“It is a fact that we *somehow* determine time to be perpetual, and to have been continually passing during sleep and other interruptions.

“This can be no intuition of the sense; it cannot come from any conjoining agency: I cannot *perceive* time passing, nor myself in the current.

“Therefore I must *think* it discursively through some medium as data which lie beyond the subjective experience.

“And finally, all the *facts* in our determination of the interrupted periods of our experience to be in one perpetual time, are brought in colligation by the notion of *perduring* source as time-filling substance.”

This proves the notional, as a fixed part of our spiritual constitution; but does it prove its truth, or that it tells the truth? The notion says there is an outward *perduring* time, and we must either have no experience, or one that conforms to it. As clearly as the sense informs us that we are sailing on a river, so does this more interior oracle assure us that we are sailing down one steady stream of time. But one is no more infallible than the other. The notion is within us, and may dream. Neither is it helped when another mind is brought to testify, not only to the existence of the same subjective notion, but to its outward realization in some fixed standard, through which alone the otherwise independent consciousnesses of the two can be reconciled. But this other mind is without us. How can we know

its existence? All other men may be but phantoms floating in our subjective sensorium, or imaged in the glass of our minds, or we may be all mutually enmirrored and contained in the all-inclusive mirror of Spinoza's dream.

The strong point, if it can be proved, is the necessity of some common objective standard which shall give "one time for us all." Otherwise there might be as many times as consciousnesses, or the same seeming objects might be for different subjects, in different subjective times, and yet somehow strangely thought into one, or what might seem to be one, common experience. And yet who knows, the sceptic might say, but that it is so? May they not be thought into one time, just as phenomena in all parts of differing spaces may be mirrored into one common space? I do this in my dreams. Scenes and events and thoughts long past I bring up and mingle with the present, without allowing a consciousness of separation. Nay more, I create a past wholly my own, wholly new in itself, and yet I somehow strangely invest it with that character we call *familiarity*, and which is supposed to be the result alone of long experience. I people my subjective realm with other conscious agents, new yet seemingly well known. I fill it with space-filling forces. I give to all its associations the required consistency with their and my own one seeming common experience. I bring all this into simultaneousness, and thus clothe it with every characteristic of reality. Now can we certainly affirm that such may not be the simultaneousness of what we call our waking state? We may compare it to the effect produced upon our phenomenal experience by the varying periods occupied in the transmission of light; and by the operation of which a universe of past events, belonging to all periods of past time, may be now passing before us with all the apparent simultaneousness that may be claimed as belonging to our objective experience. It may be said that it is not, in that case, the past we now see—for that would contradict the notionals of our understanding—but the present representation. And yet a whole experience may thus be made up of representations of what now *is not*, and never *had been* during the whole life of that experience. The comparison may be imperfect, and yet it is sufficient to show, that even in a physical world of admitted objectivity there may be such an arrangement, or organization, that what we regard as near in space and present in time, may, in one sense, be billions of leagues distant for the one, and billions of centuries remote for the other.*

* What shall we say of the subjective vision of the prophets? Sometimes they received verbal messages; sometimes they saw signs; at others they seem to be represented as beholding the real scene before it *was*. As in Num. xxiv. 17, "I see

These very terms, distance, remoteness, it may be said, show a law of our minds compelling us to recognize this notional of a one universal space, and a one universal time, as involving an objective reference. True, it shows the validity of the notional, and it is much to prove this as involving something more than Hume's association, and Brown's voice of ceaseless prophecy. But still it proves only the notional, we think, and then we must go out of the sense, and out of the understanding, to that "behest of the reason" which requires faith in the Absolute, as the ultimate and sure ground of confidence in both. It is much in this sense, to prove the validity of the notional. So distinct, so uniform, so decided an utterance of the soul, although *in itself* not infallible, could not have been given to deceive us with a mere show of substance and causality if, after all, they are nothing but phenomena and sequences. Such a world might furnish an extensive science of shadows for the sense and for the understanding, too, but it would have no *meaning* for the reason or for faith. In one sense, "man walketh indeed in a vain show," (מַצְלֵחַ, ἐν εἰσόῃ,) but all is substantial when he truly believes in God.

If there is any truth in the view we have taken, we are indebted for it, and for much in the manner of stating it, to ideas received from the author's book: although we may have seemed to find difficulty in some parts of his argument. A regard to the symmetry of his work may have led him to attribute too much, we will not say to the sense and the understanding, but to considerations drawn solely from them. The ontological verity of their objects cannot, we think, be proved *by them* nor *from them*. Taken, however, in connection with the higher department of the soul, it does seem to us that he has settled the great question of the reality of an objective universe. God meant that we should *ordinarily* trust the phenomena of the senses and the notionals of our understandings, as giving true intelligence of an outward world; but then, with all reverence be it said, we think we can see a reason why there were allowed to be those strange facts in our existence which would prevent an implicit reliance. The validity of the notional well settled, as not the mere offspring of association, or of a blind belief, but as a distinct part of our mental constitution, we are kept *ordinarily steady*, notwithstanding our dreams, to the common apprehension of one substantial external world, one space, one time, one universal common ground of experience for all. But,

It, but it is not now; I behold it, but it is not near." The form of the tense in the passage would denote a present *seeing of the future*, rather than a prediction of a *future seeing*. What shall we say too of what is called the second sight? or is this all fable?

then, when we are compelled to think about it, the ultimate trust is not so much *in* the notional, as *through* the notional, in something higher. When the question comes before us in all its seriousness, we find, on the other hand, enough of a dreamy and subjective experience to make us flee to this strong hold, and feel, that as "*the Lord liveth*," so is the assurance that "*our soul liveth*," and that the objects of our senses and of our understanding have a true, and substantial, and *perduring* being.

This is not Cartesianism. The author's exceptions to that theory are well taken, and conclusively maintained. In it, "the Deity," as he shows, "is degraded to a physical force as cause in an understanding conception." "The divinity of the supernatural is brought down to the perpetual servitude of the natural;" or, in other words, "the Deity is needed only for holding nature in its place." A similar objection is also well taken to the "occasional causes," to which the doctrine of Descartes was carried by his religious follower, Malebranche. And yet, we think, there is a vast difference between them and the view on which we have been insisting. It is one thing to sink Deity into nature, or to elevate nature to Deity; it is another thing to derive from the idea of God a proof of the objective reality of nature, and of a real separate substance and causality in nature, as involved in the truthfulness of the notionals he has given us. A conviction thus derived, that there is a real nature of things with its real immanent powers aside from immediate divine agency, is very different from that hyper-pietism of Malebranche and others, which, in its making everything in the natural world proceed from the direct act of God, would confound Deity with nature, by absorbing the natural in the supernatural, just as certainly as Spinoza does, by developing nature out of the Deity.

God has given us these perceptions, and these notionals, and we therefore believe that there are real phenomena corresponding to the one, and real substance and real causation corresponding to the other. Thus viewed, the author's argument seems to us conclusive. With this thought ever held in connection, the proved correspondence of the idea and the law (which is his great argument) does give us, notwithstanding our occasional dreams, a real world, an *established* nature of things, with its conjunctions, its connections, its chain of efficiencies, its contexture of reciprocal influences, in distinction from the continual miracle or supernatural of one school, the mere development or extension of a first cause which characterizes another, and the mere empty phenomena and unconnected sequences of a third.

In this way our philosophizing brings us round to the old doctrine of the Scriptures and the Catechism—a true creation of a true nature of things, and a work of Providence since carried on (with occasional miraculous interventions) *through* and *by* this nature of things. In other words, God made a nature—originated its substances—gave being to its dynamical agencies, so as to have immanent and *perduring* efficiency in themselves, or during their unhindered operations, and then implanted in the human spirituality trustworthy notions corresponding. The Malebranche theory may seem very pious in thus ascribing everything to the direct act of God; but besides the objection before mentioned, it is directly opposed to the Scripture. Even with its continual recognition of an ever-present Deity, the Bible everywhere assumes the fact of a nature of things distinct from God, and to which powers belong that are supposed to *remain* in it, and to act by their own efficiency thus given. Even the *first* productions of our renovated earth were through an imparted dynamical agency, instead of proceeding from the immediate energy of God. The new forces were working already, according to an *immanent* law. We gather this, not so much from the causal form of the Hebrew verbs employed, as from the general aspect of the Scriptural declaration: “And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass (אֲשַׁמְרָת); and the earth *caused* to come forth (אֲצַמַח) the herb yielding seed (זֶרַע), or *causing* the growth of seed, after its kind.”

If there can be a proof of the reality of an objective world, or of an objective nature of things, we do not say by the understanding, but by considerations drawn solely from the field of the understanding, then it would follow, that there might be such proof even in an Atheistic hypothesis. But can this be so? Can man, or the soul of man, be anything but an enigma—can our perceptions and our notionals be anything else but dreams—can the world have any other reality than that of coming and departing phenomena and unconnected sequences—can there be any real unity of nature, or any harmony of the universe, to a mind for which the highest reality is supposed to have no meaning, and the absolute ground of all truth and all being no objectivity?

If it be demanded what this real *substance* (or hypostasis) is, which thus *stands*, or, to use a more convenient metaphor, lies, beneath nature, and which the notional of our understanding claims to represent, we can conceive of nothing that better answers its conditions than our author's “space-filling force.” This has its difficulties, but every other view we attempt to take has still greater; that is, if we *will* think upon what matter is

and cannot satisfy ourselves with the Johnsonian argument of kicking the foot against a stone. Our main trouble is with the originating conception. That once mastered, or assumed, the beauty of its applications, and the harmony of the scheme deduced from it, are the great arguments for its absolute verity. The author makes the following distinction between it and *pure act*:—

“This, being in one direction, and meeting no other action, could have nothing answering to the conception of force. Except as action meets action, and thereby *counteraction* takes place, no generation of force is conceivable, and hence all conception of force is not original *pure act*, but a product of an antagonism. At the point of contingency, as pure notion in the understanding, shall we first attain the conception of force as pure understanding conception. Such a point becomes an occupied position in space resisting all displacement; and to the extent to which the diverse points in space are contiguously occupied by pure forces is there a filling of space, and a resistance to all foreign intrusion within such space.”—P. 386.

But how is this—an antagonism of an antagonism, each of which, if there is nothing conceived of as lying under by way of hypostasis, is an absolute nihility without the other!—a counteraction of a counteraction! We confess that we are quite lost.

Neither is the difficulty wholly cleared up by what is said, p. 608, of creation, or the origination of such force by the Absolute:—

“As incorporeal and uncreated reason and will, the Absolute has his own spring of action within himself, and in this a power in liberty which is wholly above and separate from all force in nature. He may originate simple acts which in their own simplicity have no counter-agency, and can, therefore, never be brought under any of the conditions of space, and time, and nature. From his own inner self-determination, he may designedly put forth simple acts in counteraction, and here a force begins which takes position in space, and occupies an instant in time. There is a beginning in something where nothing was, and this has position, instant, and *permanence*. This *perpetuated* energy and counteraction is creation in *progress*. A space is filled, a time is occupied; there is an impenetrable substance which may give content in a sensibility, and be conjoined in definite phenomena. *Above* that point of counteraction, all is simple activity, unphenomenal, unsubstantial, and having all its

essentiality in the power of the supernatural as will in liberty. *In* and below that point all is *force*, phenomenal in the sense, substance and cause, from its antagonism, in the understanding, and existing as physical nature in its essential conditions."

Our author is one of the last writers that can be justly charged with using words for nothing. Whenever we do follow him, although it has been sometimes with difficulty, we have always found his sentences opening into clear and definite significance. We have derived from him too much light to believe that he has not here, as elsewhere, a meaning distinctly apprehended by his own mind. But we must confess our perplexity. The propositions are all clear if we can only draw a true line between the dualistic *force* which is *in* nature, as the beginning and continuation of nature, and the duality of simple *activities* which are *in* the supernatural above it. Otherwise this *perpetuated* energizing in counteraction would seem to resemble the very thing which is charged upon the Cartesian hypothesis, namely, the "bringing down the divinity of the supernatural to the perpetual servitude of the natural."

And yet the difficulties are increased by the conception of matter as *inert* substance excluding all thought of force, or tendency, except as superinduced *ab extra*. It would be, as the author elsewhere says, a mere *caput mortuum*, and all attempts to show from it how it could become causality would be in vain. It could give no content in a sensibility; it could exhibit no varied modes of being, so as to appear as events, except by some *ab extra* efficiency. It would *do* nothing, and, therefore, as notion for ground or source, would *be** nothing; the *ab extra* efficiency accomplishing all without it. There would still be required the Divine activity *immanent* in space, as constant causality and immediate source for every event. Now the understanding may be satisfied with its force, or its matter, let it get the conception whence it may. But the reason demands a separation of nature from God, although not its entire independence of origin and termination. It demands it as the only means of preventing us from falling into that abyss of pantheism, which is just as subversive of the moral and the supernatural as the most atheistic naturalism. Hence, if it could get nothing better, it would be content with the *fact*, however it might transcend every conception we might attempt to form of the

* It may be doubted whether we can ever wholly separate the thought of *being* from that of *power*. Can anything truly *be* which *does* nothing? or is not this, as Plato says in the Sophista, the very *eros* or definition of it? Τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ—εἴτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὄντιον, εἴτε εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ συμκρότατον.—Sophista, 247, E.

manner in which it was accomplished. And here the Scripture coincides with this highest behest of the reason. "*Lo, I call to them; they stand together.*"* It gives us the origination and the subsequent perdurance, as though by a separate inherent force, once imparted and then self-exercised through its own immanent law. "He *commanded*, and they *stood fast*,"† is the sublime language of another passage. What was the *commanding*, and what was the *standing*, or *standing fast*, are not explained to us, and perhaps we could never know; but the fact, as a fact, may be admitted, and once received, it makes all the separation between God and nature which the reason demands, and on which the understanding can rest. We may accept, therefore, the author's space-filling force as the nearest approach that can perhaps be made to the absolute and ineffable verity, regarding, however, its origin and its perpetuation as among the mysteries which pass all understanding, and all powers of adequate representation in human speech.

Taking, however, this conception of force, as the mother of matter, or as itself matter enough for all substantial‡ purposes (seeing there is no event or phenomenon of matter that may not be deduced from it), and taking, too, this perpetuated antagonism or counteraction as once assumed, we may go on to those interesting results which are presented as its legitimate deductions.

"Past a doubt," says the author, speaking (p. 555) of an *à priori* law running through all distinguishable forces in nature, "past a doubt such a law exists, and determines how each distinguishable substance *must be*." This *à priori* law would be the exact correlation of the developed ideal contained in the understanding conception of the first substance in nature and of the added forces that may be in harmony with it. In other words, just as in the pure intuition of *space*, the intellectual energy (call it by what name we will) finds all mathematical truth, so in the pure conception of *force*, an intellect strong enough and clear enough, and with a keenness of vision that could be sustained long enough, would see involved all physical science. This is very different from the belief that nature, in itself, is necessary. It *may* be, or it may not be. It may be empirical or purely ideal. God may originate it, or he may not; he may allow it to continue or he may cause it to cease, just as he pleases.§ But if it *is*, it *does* something; and, in that

* Isaiah xlviii. 13.

† Psalm xxiii. 9.

‡ A view very similar to that of Dr. Hickok, has been given in a late mathematical work, entitled, "The Calculus of Operations," by John Patterson, A.M., a production presenting a rare union of high mathematical and metaphysical talent.

§ Pure *space*, pure *force*, pure *will*, in personality. In this ascending series we have the initiatory cognitions for the phenomenal, the physical and the supernatural.

case, he has given an understanding and a reason to see, that in certain initiatory conceptions are to be found its most general conditioning principles, and which compel us to affirm, even when from the tiring of the intellectual energy we cannot see and cannot understand, that in those first conceptions and those first conditioning principles, there is somehow certainly contained the science of the most minute operations that fall under the notice of our senses.

Past a doubt physical knowledge has its *à priori* axioms, necessitated (for us) by the laws of our understanding, as well as the mathematics. Nor does this drive us to the conclusion that *all that now is* in the natural world grew by development out of the first force, or as a work which since its origination by the Absolute has been going on without him. It is perfectly consistent with the idea of new forces implanted by God in nature at different periods, or from time to time coming into nature from the supernatural;—which new forces, also, when once sown by the Divine hand, have their own conditioning principles and the understanding conceptions connected with them by an ideal or *à priori* bond. There is more in nature now than there was in the beginning. This appears from the rock-bound volumes of geological science, as is most conclusively shown in the examination which the author gives of “the order of nature’s formation.” Sec. II. Ch. II. Part III.

It is perfectly consistent, too, with the belief of the miraculous and the providential. In other words, it may admit, as coming from the Supernatural Power, not only new forces *added* in nature, and afterwards becoming a part of nature, but also new *directions* of forces already existing, turning them to results they would not otherwise have produced; and, moreover, sudden *interventions* breaking up any particular action of any particular force, or putting an end to all nature herself with all her forces. Yet still we must agree with the author, that as a nature undiverted, unimpeded, it is *à priori* determinable;—determinable (we would say by way of qualification) in its first general conditioning principles by our intellects—determinable downward, even to its ultimate operations, by an intellect of a given energy.

The expression is not too strong. Past a doubt, we find the conviction in our souls, if we look for it, that nature, thus viewed by herself to the exclusion of *ab extra* considerations, is *one*, and *must* be one. Even to the most common mind it is the security (although there may not be a direct consciousness of it) against that dissolving view which would represent the universe as a mere collocation of phenomena, or a mere succession of arbitrary unconnected sequences. The mind demands some such concep-

tion as that of the universal space-filling force, as the support of its very natural, if not in-born, idea of a one nature, or one kosmos, an undivided plenum, instead of a phantasmagoric series of *events* which after all are not *e-vents* because they come out of nothing, or a ghost-like procession of magical *occasions* with voids of all power, and, therefore, of all being between them.

There is a letter of Newton to Bentley, in which this great philosopher says, that "it is inconceivable to him how one thing should act upon another through a vacuum,"—that is, not a mere exhaustion of the air-pump, but a vacuity of all being; such as our author has set forth (p. 369) where he regards the space-filling force, although with its added modifications forming higher or lower degrees of substance, in particular places, yet in its primary state as pervading the universe. Instead of being a scholastic subtlety, the axiom that "nothing could act but *when* it is and where it is," was one out of which Newton could not think. Dugald Stewart, however, and others of that school, find no difficulty with what appeared to Newton so inconceivable; and in their doctrine of occasions and sequences, there certainly is no such difficulty. They have in this respect greatly the advantage of the author of the Principia. If one thing is but the occasion, the antecedent, or the sign of another, without any inherent causality or efficiency, then, *ex vi terminorum*, they may be parted, not only by distance, and periods, occupied with reciprocally acting *influences*, or *contiguously* impulsive forces, but by any chasms of nihility both in space and time. Newton could not conceive of this. His great mind, like the most common mind, could not divest itself of that conception of causality which God had made part of its constitution,—an imperative law of its thinking. He felt himself compelled to follow that vulgar notion of impulse through an intervening medium, (whether we call it matter, or fluid, or force, or anything else,) as of a real *ens* in space, in distinction from *non-ens*; and the result was his sublime doctrine of universal gravitation. That false Baconianism which is everlastingly talking about bare *facts* and sequences, as being the only object of science or of philosophical investigation, would never have seen the one-ness of the kosmos in the fall of the apple. To the sound understanding of Newton, nothing possessed the dignity of a fact unless it could be held to be what the word truly imports, a something *done* (*factum*) an *effect*, an *e-vent*, coming out of an efficiency, and that connected with all the physical efficiency of the universe.

Thus regarded, the smallest change in nature is a witness to this universal efficiency. There is before me on my table a beautiful toy, which does as well for this purpose as the most

extensive philosophical apparatus. It is an elegant representation of a ship with its masts and sails all rocking upon a point, and brought to an equilibrium by a weight suspended below the frame on which it is supported, and directly underneath its centre of gravity. As it swings gracefully upon its pivot, or rests calmly in the repose of its equilibrium, it answers every purpose of an intellectual sedative. I gaze upon it as an object not only of sensitive but of ideal beauty. It represents visibly to me this great truth,—the unity of nature, the unbroken plenum of causality, the perfect reciprocity of dynamical influence, not only through all the space but all the time occupied by the natural universe. All that ever has been, all that is now, and all that ever will be, is here—here, as an assumed centre of all previous causality, of all present efficiency, of all future effect. In other words, it may be taken as the symbolical embodiment of the necessary *à priori* conviction of all rationalized understandings, that, as far as nature is concerned, (we mean nature uninterrupted and undiverted,) no one thing would now be what it *is*, if all things were not what they *are*, and had not from the beginning been just what they *were*. Why do we feel that the mind is compelled by an inward law to make this affirmation? Why is it a necessity of our thinking, unless God has implanted it in the organization of our souls as a witness to the outward truth to which it corresponds, and made such a connection between them, that, the conception of nature's unity once broken, the conceived unity of our own existence suffers a shock, if it is not wholly broken up with it into a fragmentary succession of sequences, occasions, and phenomena, to the exclusion of all substance from our spiritual as well as our material being?

Nature abhors a vacuum. This intense and far-reaching affirmation of the ancient mind has long enough been the stale jest of superficial lecturers. It is, however, some satisfaction to know that the best modern science is slowly but surely coming round to it again. There is a law of the understanding which makes it a necessary part of our thinking, as long as we remain true to the innate notions of cause and effect; and it is one great recommendation of the author's doctrine of the space-filling force, that in it we find the best scientific expression for such a law. Nature is a plenum. The universe is full. Whatever may be the limits which God assigned to it in the beginning, when He created the heavens and the earth,—however remote may be that frontier where utter non-existence commences—still, within those limits there is no part or point of space in which there is not something which is truly *ens*, in distinction from non-ens. It is a plenum, not of that which is

capable of affecting *our* senses, but of something conceived by the understanding, as a space-filling entity, and which, as the author maintains, might give content in the sensibility to beings of a higher and more refined organization.* The differences would be differences of intensity, (πύκνωσις καὶ μάνωσις, to use Aristotle's terms,†) and that of every degree from zero upwards, as the author says, p. 388. He must mean, however, as far as the occupation of space was concerned, without denying that there might be other differences. But nowhere within these bounds of the created universe is there absolute nothingness. Everywhere is there the רֶאשׁ עֲפָרוֹת הָעוֹלָם, *the highest or first part of the dust of the world*, as the architectonical Wisdom styles it, Prov. viii. 26. If we admit at all the idea of nihility, then is nature severed, and equally severed, whether the chasm be thinner than the almost invisible leaf of beaten gold, or wider than the widest bounds of stellar systems; whether below the keenest search of the microscope, or extending to a distance immensely beyond where the telescope has ever reached.

In this conception of nature, too, as the author shows, there necessarily comes in, not merely a *chain* of causality, or the conception of many chains tending ever in one direction of progress, but a wide woven contexture of reciprocal influences. It is not only up and down, but transverse and athwart. Nature is a web, and every point in space and time may be taken, at pleasure, as the centre on which all her past and present influences may be regarded as being brought to bear. Although pressed for space, we cannot omit giving an extract to this effect from the volume we are reviewing. It is presented not only for the great value of the thought, but as one specimen, out of many that might be offered, of the writer's admirable power of language.

“With this conception of the *reciprocity* of *influence* throughout nature, and that no one thing can be changed in its inner modifications, but it has been acted upon by all, and that thus one portion of nature acts through every other portion, while every other portion is also acting through it, we have the analytical judgment *à priori*, and thus a primitive principle of nature, that it can be no *coacervation* of particular things which are merely in *apposition* in space; nor yet a mere *concatenation* of various series of things in independent lines of cause and effect;

* Thus Aristotle gives two senses in which the word κενόν, or vacuum, may be taken. “Some say it is that ἐν ᾧ μήδεν ἐστι σῶμα αἰσθητόν, in which there is nothing sensible; others say it is that ἐν ᾧ ὅλας μεθ’ ἐστι, in which there is nothing at all.” —Phya. Ausc., Lib. IV. 6, 3.

† Ibid. 9, 5.

but that while all have a *perpetual* source, and a conditioned order of *succession*, this warp of all lines of causation is also woven across with the *connecting* woof of reciprocal influences, and thus that nature has its complete *contexture* which may be held as one web of a determined experience, and which no more *adheres continuously*, than it also *coheres transversely*."

We would only remark, that the etymological precision so striking here, especially in the words we have italicised, is everywhere a constant characteristic of the author's style. When it is difficult to follow him, it is because the region through which he takes us is dark, or it has been but little visited, or, which is more likely, it has become intricate in consequence of being traversed by the confused paths and cross-roads which more careless writers have made in every direction upon its surface, and not from the want of the utmost caution of the author in setting upon it guide-posts at every point exposed to the danger of error. The reader accustomed to the confused platitudes of Dugald Stewart, or the loose exuberance of Brown, or the smirking common-places of Sidney Smith, or it may be, the spectral twilight of the mystical and idealistic schools, is not prepared for the exact simplicity of terms employed throughout this book. Thus in reading the above extract, (although we do not select it as presenting any unusual difficulty,) one may see no emphasis in such words as *particular*, *series*, *perpetual*, *connecting*, &c., to say nothing of the more unusual and therefore striking expressions. He may even regard some of them as redundancies, when a close examination would show in respect to every one, not only a distinct thought, but a thoughtful selection,—would show, not only their adaptedness, but that no others would have answered in their place. A still more careless reader might take it as some common sentence in which words are often used for their rhetorical flow, or to round a period. Another critic might condemn it for its length and apparent complication, without being aware that this is sometimes the only mode of securing the utmost conciseness and the utmost perspicuity. In the above extract alone there is truth and thought enough to furnish some writers with material for half a dozen chapters. It might, in that way, too, require much less study, but what it would gain in ease it would lose in force and clearness. If, on the other hand, it were cut up into short periods, it would lose that *con-vincing* power which it can only possess when the whole thought, with all its *complications*, is presented as a unity.

The easiest reading is not always the most perspicuous,—certainly not the most conspicuous. One who reads Dr. Hickok's

work as it ought to be read, will find, often, that it requires great steadiness and concentration to follow him; but he will also find, that there is meaning there, and that when discovered nothing could be more transparent. He will often, too, be satisfied that in no other manner could the thought have been presented without some deficiency, or some redundancy, or some less eligible arrangement of its parts that would have detracted from its force no less than from its significance. In these respects we do not deem it extravagant to compare him with some of the master minds of antiquity. His sentences must be studied; and so must those of Bacon, of Plato, and of Aristotle. But if the text of these writers be not corrupt, we are sure of a meaning, and when we discover that meaning we are sure that we have it, and not only that, but as with a flash of light comes the conviction, that, much as its deciphering may have cost us, there is no other way in which that meaning could have been so well expressed. We see that their sentences have been the result of great pains and carefulness on their part, and that only by a like process could the thought, in all its completeness, and all its unity, be mirrored in the reader's soul.

It may appear to some a strange assertion, and yet it is strictly true, that Dr. Hickok's style is deeply metaphorical. We refer not now to the formal figure or comparison, although some of his illustrations of this kind are marked by great force and beauty, but to that hidden metaphor which is contained in the most important terms in language, and in no department more than in that which is representative of psychological processes. They are the metaphors involved in the primary senses of words, and which were originally brought into use, not for purposes of adornment and illustration, like the figurative language of later times, but through a necessity of the soul striving to find the best outward expression of the inward action, and thus the safest representative of all we can truly know respecting it. They are a development, a formation of the soul acting spontaneously without a philosophical consciousness, and thus are they the best exponents of its laws, just as any physical product is the most exact outward expression of the interior force to which it owes its formation.*

Seldom do we find more of this etymological precision than in the work before us. The author has proceeded, and proceeded

* It would be enough to suggest, for example, to any reader of the book, how much depends on getting a clear view of the etymological distinction between the words *conjunction* and *connection*, and how much of what is said of the different action of the sense and the understanding would otherwise appear pointless and unmeaning.

safely, on the principle that in the primary senses and metaphors contained in the most truly philosophical as well as in the most common language (and the most philosophical ever resolves itself etymologically into what was once the most common, although long since passed from an ordinary to a scientific use), we have the most direct guide to those original notions of the human soul *out of which we cannot think* without a logical contradiction. How different this from the course of some of the more popular writers on psychology whose works are used as text-books in our colleges, and who are ever telling us that this or that idea is but a "*pre-judice* generated in unphilosophical minds by the unfortunate use of metaphorical language." But whence came the metaphor? and is it the child or the parent of the prejudice? This question they never think of answering; or should they attempt the solution of the difficulty, they would doubtless maintain that they had poured upon it all needed light, by resolving it, as they do all causality, into some unaccountable sequence of the human mind, or some inexplicable *occasion* through which, without any *conceivable* necessity therefore, it is ever running into falsehood and absurdity.

A science of psychology, says Morell, is still a desideratum. We will however hazard the assertion, that in this book of Dr. Hickok such desideratum is supplied. Whatever may be thought of its completeness, it is the *science* of psychology—the science itself, instead of that mere writing *about* it, or those rambling semi-historical, semi-philosophical discussions of certain topics connected with it which form the substance of most of the treatises used in our schools and colleges. Abstract indeed the author is, but there is an intellectual beauty in the mathematical straight-forwardness with which he carries us on from section to section through every part of his condensed and well-arranged system. Independent of the truths presented, there is awakened a scientific interest allied to the æsthetic emotion called out by contemplating an exquisite work of art. It is as though some splendid and harmonious structure were rising before the eye, as we observe him, preparing for his after-work by the most exact definition, commencing next with consciousness in order to make a pure and perfect abstraction of all its content except the indestructible intuitions which, by remaining, show themselves to have been *à priori* conditions for all experience,—then, after thus going down to the foundation, returning step by step, and *building up* through the aid of these shaping intuitions an *à priori* science, every part of which has been as rigidly demonstrated as any theorem in geometry,—and lastly, going back to experience, not now for the purpose of emptying it in order to get at the underlying cognitions, but to show how its *whole* con-

tent is *actually filled up* by a law in exact correspondence with the before-constructed *à priori* idea.

Nothing diverts the attention from that rigid method the writer has marked out for himself. He suffers himself to be led away by none of that fondness for illustrative discussion, or still more idle philosophical story-telling which characterizes such writers as Brown and Abercrombie. In proof of this it may be observed, as a striking fact, that in this large volume there is not a single note from beginning to end. Whatever came not directly within the field of scientific demonstration is not allowed to divert the attention even to a passing marginal remark. Could the book be introduced in the higher classes in our colleges, it would, no doubt, possess a value, even as a means of mental training, or a course of intellectual gymnastics, equal to, if not surpassing, any that is afforded by the most accurate instruction in mathematics or philology.

We can, however, very readily anticipate an objection arising from its very title-page. *A Rational Psychology—The Subjective Idea and the Objective Law*. These, and the very common use of the words *à priori*, to the shame of our philosophy be it said, are sufficient to frighten many readers, and to give others a ground for condemning the work at once. It must be all transcendental moonshine, or German idealism, or Hegelianism, or something worse. Facts—give us facts. This is the law of philosophizing since the time of the great Bacon, whom everybody quotes. Facts says Dugald Stewart,—facts says Brown,—facts says Sidney Smith,—facts says Macaulay,—facts say the Edinburgh and Westminster Reviews,—facts say all the popular lecturers—this is now the demand of science, of philosophy, of theology. "With facts," says the writer of a late most valuable essay, "philosophy begins, proceeds, and ends; ideas and ideal systems however profound must give way to realities." There are so many rich trains of thought in the treatise to which we now refer, that its author, we hope, will pardon our slight criticism on the passage, should it meet his eye. We should not have chosen it, had it not come in so appositely to the view we are taking. We introduce it to show that although one who thinks, and thinks profoundly, may fall into this style, he must very soon be led by the *à priori* necessities of his own mind, to qualify, in some way, the barrenness of such a statement. We read on—"These the mind seeks in the realm both of matter and spirit, and as thus fact after fact, and principle after principle, discovers itself in *beautiful harmony*, the soul rejoices, &c." But where is the scale which is to guide the ear in resolving noise into tune and proper music? In other words, what is it which converts a "fact" into a "principle,"

and whence the "harmony" that shapes these facts, the spirit that hovers over them, and without which they would ever remain in chaos? How are they ever to rise from the *tohu* and *bohu* which becomes darker and deeper with their accumulation, unless there is an *ideal* light in the soul that shines down upon them, and which is *à priori* to the facts themselves. We must somehow have the harmony, or who shall tell, or how shall we tell, whether they truly "rise in harmony" or not.

On the other hand, nothing can be more opposed, than the method of this book, to a smoky and mystical idealism. As the result of the most diligent study we are prepared to pronounce the author one of the *most* common-sense writers we ever read—in other words, most in accordance with the *κοινὰ ἔννοια*, the *semper ubique et ab omnibus* of the universal human soul. The whole design of his book is to give a substantial ground for all our knowledge; and the result of our own individual experience is this very feeling of substantiality as opposed to all that is dreamy and sceptical. We rise from its perusal with the thought that we are on solid ground,—with a clearer conviction of a one substantial nature, a true human soul and a true human body,—a dread absolute personality, and a moral accountability tremendously real.

It is on these accounts we feel warranted in describing this work by an epithet which is seldom applied to similar productions. It is a very *serious* book. Although so purely speculative, there is, at times, something almost fearful in the views it presents, of the superiority of the ethical to the æsthetical and the philosophical, of our ethical relations to the Absolute Right, and the awful doom and degradation which must await the related finite personality when it irrecoverably sinks the spiritual and the supernatural into the sentient and the natural.

Should we make any objection to this part of the work, it would be to point out what seems to us an omission rather than an error. The author, we think, is led by the peculiar course of his argument to find sin too exclusively in the sentiency, or the region which connects our spirituality with nature. Certainly he would not deny a soul-sin, or a pure sin of the spirit, having its seat in the supernatural will above all temptibility from nature, and deriving an immensely enhanced malignancy from this very fact. By such sin fell the angels. By such a sin of the spirit must our first parents have *first* fallen, or Satan never could have tempted them through that poor sentiency on which some theologians, as well as philosophers, are so much disposed to throw the blame of all our depravity. The author's mind was too exclusively drawn to the relation of the natural to the supernatural. We regret that

he did not enter into the analysis of such soul-sin; as he might well have done in connection with what he says of the æsthetic and philosophic characteristics. Such an analysis might have made the subject of one of his richest chapters.

But our space will not permit us to dwell on these important themes. Instead of giving even a summary of them we must content ourselves with calling attention to a few of the admirable positions the volume furnishes for assailing some of the worst errors of the day. It is in its later chapters a complete armoury of weapons against the scientific naturalism of such books as the *Vestiges of Creation*, and that still worse thing, the spurious ethical naturalism which sinks all ethics into physics, making the great end of human existence obedience to physical laws, and that, too, through a continual exchanging of one physical good for another, as Socrates says, teaching men to be temperate through intemperance and to be brave through fear, or which has no idea of self-denial except as a means of avoiding a greater pain or securing a greater pleasure. So, also, its strong maintaining of the *inherent* merit of righteousness, and, of course, the inherent demerit of sin irrespective of all physical consequences, leads directly to the inherent *desert* of punishment, and presents one of the best grounds of argument against all such theories (now so rife) that would resolve it into cure, or prevention, or a police contrivance for the preservation of order in God's political universe. For the same reason, we may say, its whole spirit is in point blank opposition to that monstrous system of theological Benthamism which makes the universe a grand sentient democracy in a *state of nature*, where all law and all morality are nothing more than a summed expression for the *majority*, or balance of "pleasing sensations" (as a late writer defines happiness), and God is to be had in respect and deferred to, mainly as being a greater sentience, or as having a greater *capacity* for happiness than all lower *natures* in existence.

But we must bring our long review to a close. Deeply impressed with a conviction of the value of the book, we have attempted, as well as we could, to convey that conviction, and the grounds of it, to others. In doing so we have endeavoured also to discharge a debt of gratitude for the rich instruction received from its perusal. After weeks of intense study, we laid it down with the impression that it must be henceforth one of our few books, to be kept as a settled standard for future thinking. We believe the same feeling of substantiality will be left upon the mind of every intelligent man who will give it that close study which is the only worthy tribute to its intrinsic excellence.

ART. VI.—DR. JONAS KING'S EXPOSITION OF AN APOSTOLICAL CHURCH.*

THIS brief but lucid and, to us, satisfactory exposition of an Apostolical Church, is designed for such Greeks as are more or less convinced that the religion of their church is not the religion of the Bible, the source, and the only source, of all true religion. The following summary will give the reader a good idea of its contents.

The true Disciples of Jesus Christ—Their Religious Guide—Nature of the Christian Church—Its Government—Bond of Union—The Pastor—His Support—His Principal Duties—His Titles—His Dress—Equality of Pastors—Deacons—The Lord's Supper—Nature of the Bread and Wine—Baptism—Sponsors—Mode of Baptism—Church Discipline—Anathemas, Curses, Excommunication—Prayer—Fasts—Divorce—Recreations—The Lord's Day—Worship of Saints and Angels—Offerings—Pictures and Images—Theatrical Representations of the Sufferings and Death of Christ—Holy Relics—Crosses—Amulets—Prayers for the Dead—The Seven Sacraments—Confession of Faith—Of God—The Fall of Man and his Moral Corruption—The Incarnation of Christ—Salvation through Him—Faith and Works—Regeneration—Mediation of Christ—The Holy Scriptures—State of the Soul after Death—The Resurrection and Judgment of the Dead—Everlasting Life and Punishment—Canonical Books of the Bible.

It is now more than twenty years since Dr. Jonas King settled as a missionary at Athens, the capital of that small and unhappy portion of Greece, usually known as Greece Independent. Like a servant faithful to his Master, he has laboured hard for the spiritual welfare of the people among whom he lives, and his rewards have been constant disappointment, anathemas, and curses fulminated against him by the heads of the church, insults, persecution, and many other vexations which bigotry, superstition, unprincipledness, envy and malice could devise. A Protestant missionary in Greece is, by the bigoted, hated and shunned as an accursed heretic, the enemy of the Mother of God; by the infidels, that is, by the majority of those who are more or less educated, he must be prepared to be regarded as a hypocrite or fanatic. Protestantism in that country is, by a singular confusion of ideas, confounded with Freemasonry, which, in its turn, is imagined to be systematic atheism. And because the Protestant missionaries who first settled there, were Americans, the term *American* is now synonymous with *Freemason* (Φαρμασόνος), or *Atheist*. We should not be surprised, therefore, if this publication subjected its

* Έκθεσις Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας. ὑπὸ Ἰωνᾶ Κίγγ. Ἐν Κωνσταντινῇ τῆς Νέας Ἀγγλίας, ἈΘΜΑ. [An Exposition of an Apostolical Church. By Jonas King. Cambridge, New England, 1851.]

author to new trials. Still, we cannot but hope that the successors of Annas and Caiaphas will profit by his advice, "not to employ against him their usual weapons, namely, anathemas, curses, and insults, but to refute his errors by the Word of God," if they can.

It has often been asserted that the Greeks are very violent in their opposition to the Bible, and numerous facts have been adduced in support of this position. We would suggest, however, to those who make this statement, that hostility to the Word of God, is not peculiar to the Greeks as a nation. In Greece, the blind lead the blind; the masses are like *πρόβατα ποιμένα μὴ ἔχοντα*, and the individual is like *κάλαμος ὑπὸ ἀνέμου σαλευόμενος*, too ignorant to oppose anything. The head-quarters of the opposition are at Constantinople, *τὸ κατοικητήριον τῶν δαιμόνων*, *ἔπου ὁ θρόνος τοῦ Σαρανᾶ*, the residence of the most influential High Priests and other sons of those who crucified the GREAT MISSIONARY. The causes of this apparently obstinate resistance to divine truth are numerous. We submit the following:

First. The natural depravity of the human heart, *διότι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἐχθρὰ εἰς Θεόν· τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται*. This indeed would be enough of itself to account for all hostility to revealed truth; but we must add,

Secondly. The religion of the Bible requires natural honesty, reflection, and sobriety, qualities of rare occurrence in Greece, where, unfortunately, thoughtlessness passes for genius, sincerity for hypocrisy, honesty for stupidity, and where adulation, lying and meanness are believed to be necessary to success. How can religious knowledge make much progress in a country where lying and speaking the truth are regarded by most of the instructors of youth as in themselves indifferent things, good when they benefit, bad when they injure? The fountain-head of lying, however, is the church, in other words, the higher clergy, who, in fact, constitute the church, the common people having no voice in its government. Among other kinds of deception, it almost daily causes pictures of saints, and especially of the Virgin, to perform extraordinary cures, which are adduced as irrefragable proofs in favour of the orthodox faith. The most remarkable of these pictures are those painted by Luke the Evangelist, who, according to Paul's testimony, was a physician, and if so, he might have been also a painter, and therefore he was a painter. Besides, say the hierarchs, if Luke did not paint these miracle-working pictures, who did paint them? As to their number, he might have painted seventy, for the Bible speaks of three score and ten palm trees, and of

seventy disciples; therefore, he did paint seventy, three or four of which have already been discovered, and are doing wonders. Such arguments are very conclusive in the East, although to some of our readers they may appear nonsensical. The church, moreover, has sanctioned many of the popular errors, such as the effects of the evil eye (*βασκανία*), for which she has provided appropriate prayers.

Thirdly. We have already intimated that the chief opposition to the spread of Biblical knowledge comes from the higher clergy, whom the ignorant masses believe to be the lineal successors of the Apostles. And although they may despise their character, yet they dread their anathemas, and consequently they dare not disobey their impious mandates. They are early taught to distinguish between the character of the man, and that mysterious power supposed to reside in him; the result of which illusion is, that the clergy in general, and the higher clergy in particular, are looked upon as a superior order of beings, having the power of binding and loosing (*τοῦ δεσμεῖν καὶ λύειν*), by which the ignorant understand, that when a man has been anathematized or otherwise cursed by a Bishop or Priest, his body remains unchanged after death, which shows that his soul is, in an inexplicable manner, *bound* to its tabernacle, and is consequently miserable, until the same or any other ecclesiastic causes the body to be *loosed*, that is decomposed, by reading over it the prayers entitled, *Εὐχαὶ συγχωρητικαὶ εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρὰν καὶ ἀφορισμὸν εἰς τεθνεῶτα ἀναγινώσκομεναι παρὰ ἀρχιερέως ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρὰ πνευματικοῦ πατρὸς; εἰ οὐ πάρεστιν ἀρχιερεὺς*, for which he charges a pretty round sum of money. And here the classical scholar will naturally be reminded of the Homeric verses (Il., 23, 71—74):

Θάπτε με θνητὶ τάχιστα, πύλας Ἀΐδαο περήσω,
Τῇλ' ἐμὲ εἰργουσι ψυχαὶ, εἰδωλὰ καμόντων,
Οὐδέ μ' ἐμὲ πω μίσγ' εἶσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἐώσιν·
'Αλλ' αὖτως ἀλλάττημαι ἀν' εὐρυπύλλης Ἀΐδος δῶ.

Let my pale corse the rites of burial know,
And give me entrance in the realms below:
Till then, the spirit finds no resting place,
But here and there the unbodied spectres chase
The vagrant dead around the dark abode,
Forbid to cross the irremeable flood.

Pope's Translation.

Fourthly. In Greece and Turkey religion is, with the individual, a point of *honour*. If the missionary intimates to a Greek, directly or indirectly, that his church is in error, especially if he attempts to confirm his position by a quotation from the Bible or the early Fathers, the person thus addressed is apt

to take it for a personal as well as national insult. When a Moslem intends to offer the highest insult to a Greek, he aims at his cross; the Greek, under similar circumstances, abuses his Mohammed. The technical terms used in theological disputes of this nature are too gross to be mentioned here; besides, they are fortunately untranslatable.

Fifthly. The illusion of the restoration of the Byzantine empire has been one of the most serious obstacles to the progress of Scriptural religion among the Greeks. And as the church in its present form is the only thing that can bind them together as a nation—for, as soon as a Greek changes his religion, he loses his nationality—all their politicians are systematically opposed to religious controversies of any kind whatsoever. In view of the realization of this dream, even the disciple of Voltaire is heard to talk loudly about his holy religion.

Sixthly. The Greek church virtually, if not formally, regards the Canons of the Seven Œcumenical Councils as the highest court of appeal in all religious matters. The bare text of the Scriptures is looked upon as an obscure oracular response, having no meaning without the explanations of the divinely instructed (Θεόσοφοι) Fathers, the only legitimate expounders of the Word of God. This is one of the most formidable enemies the Evangelical missionary has to contend with. He must convince the Greeks that the rules of the Bible alone are binding upon Christians, before he can make the least progress in his work. And the book before us, we hope, will do considerable towards accomplishing this object.

For the benefit of those who wish to know something about the leading peculiarities of the Greek church in its present state, we add the following remarks. In its external form, it is a compound of Heathenism and Judaism, the former being the basis of it. Its religion consists of little else than a series of bodily motions, including the motion of the tongue, and abstinence from certain kinds of food on certain stated days. The chief object of worship, in a practical point of view, is MARY, the mother of Jesus, who, although a historical personage, is the latest phase of Rhea, Athene, and Artemis, united into one being. The progress of *Mariolatry* in this church seems to be this: "The blessed among women" was a virgin when she became the mother of the Son of Man. About the early part of the third century, some persons, confounding her probably with Athene, imagined that she remained a virgin after the birth of the Anointed. About the latter part of the fourth century, the second Œcumenical Council contrived to have her name inserted in the creed, usually but incorrectly styled the *Nicens Creed*. This, however, does her but little honour, since in the same

creed Pontius Pilate also figures. By the third Œcumenical Council, held about fifty years after the second, she was most solemnly declared to be *The Mother of God* (Θεοτόκος). After that, she continued to gain glory very rapidly, until finally she has virtually supplanted the worship of God in Christ. The God of the Bible is indeed still regarded theoretically as superior to Mary, but for all human purposes the latter is all-sufficient. Is a Greek in distress? he usually cries, Πανάγια Θεοτόκε, βοήθει μοι. God, in fact, belongs to a religious system now become obsolete. He is to Mary what, with the ancients, Kronos was to Zeus. She is now Ὑπεράγια Θεοτόκος, Ἀειπαρθενος, Νύμφη ἀνύμφευτος, Μήτηρ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ Ὑψίστου, Τιμητέρα τῶν Χερουβιμ, Ἐνδοξοτέρα τῶν Σεραφίμ, Ἡ μόνη ἐλπὶς καὶ προστασία τῶν πιστῶν, and an endless variety of similar absurd and blasphemous titles. Protestants are commonly shocked at the heathenish expression, "The Mother of God;" but what will they do when they are informed that the Greek church has provided also a *Grandmother* and *Grandfather* for him? We are aware that very few will be disposed to credit our statement, and therefore refer those who doubt its accuracy to the Greek Calendar (Ὡρολόγιον), where they will find under September 9th, Τῶν ἁγίων καὶ δικαίων Θεοπατόρων Ἰωακείμ καὶ Ἀννης, *The feast of the holy and just parents of God, Joakeim and Anna*, they being the traditional parents of Mary. Under July 25th, Ἡ κοίμησις τῆς ἁγίας Ἀννης, μητρὸς τῆς Θεοτόκου, *The feast of the sleep (death) of Saint Anna, the mother of the Mother of God*. Anna is called also Θεοπρομήτωρ, *The Grandmother of God!*

The language of the "Exposition" is now spoken, or rather written, by such Greeks as are more or less acquainted with the authors of ancient Greece. This language resembles the ancient in most of its forms, but the meaning of many of its words is not to be found in the classical authors, and its syntax and versification are entirely modern; and the more it approaches the ancient as to its exterior, the more it departs from its spirit. It is in fact little else than modern ideas, chiefly French, in Greek dress. As a specimen, take the following extract from one of the leading Journals published at Athens:—

Ἡ κυβέρνησις μας σήμερον φέρει ὅλα τὰ σημεῖα καὶ ὅλας τὰς ἀθλιότητας τῆς παρακμῆς. Ἡ παρατήρησις αὕτη ἤρκει, νομίζομεν, νὰ πείσῃ τοὺς διενθύνοντας τὰ πράγματά μας ὅτι τὸ σύστημα τοῦ Κωλέττου εἶναι ὀλίθριον καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς καὶ διὰ τὸν τόπον. Ὁ μηχανισμὸς τοῦ Συντάγματος δὲν ἐκπληροῖ πλέον τὰς λειτουργίας του. Ἡ Βασιλεία ἐταπεινώθη, ὁ λαὸς ἔπαισεν εἰς χαμέρπειαν, ὁ μηχανισμὸς τοῦ Συντάγματος ἐκπληροῖ ἐργασίαν δυσώδη, καὶ ρυπαρὰν, ἀνακινεῖ καὶ σηκόνει βόρβορον, μ' ἄλλους λόγους, τὸ Σύνταγμα κατήντησε ἀληθῆς βορβοροφάγος.

To the uneducated, that is, to the mass of the nation, this dialect is almost unintelligible, partly because its words are often different from those in common use, but much because the vocabulary of the illiterate is as meagre in Greece as in any other country. For philological purposes, however, the language of the common people is infinitely more important than that of the educated. Add to this the fact that the most valuable portion of Romaic literature has appeared in this dialect.

We observe here that the inhabitants of Bœotia, Attica, Megaris, Argolis, Poros, Hydra, and Spetsais, are mostly Albanians, and speak a language as different from the Romaic as the Slavonic is from the Greek. Further, in Tsakonia, a small district of Lakonia, a curious jargon is spoken by the common people. Some learned Germans regard it as a branch of the Doric; we have no doubt it is a barbarous Romaic. Take this specimen:—

Τὸν τσερὲ 'ποῦ μᾶ ἔχουντε τὸν πόλεμο μὲ τὰ κοτσονὶ καβα-
λάριδε, τὰ μούτσουνά σου δέ σ' ὀράκαμε. Γκιὰ ἔσα τότε, τσε ἔδαρι
ἐκάνε ρεογὶ τσε μᾶς ταρασοῦμενε; Οὐ! νὰ χαθῆρε, ὄνε! That is,
in common Romaic:—Τὸν καιρὸ ὅπου ἡμεῖς εἴχαμε τὸν πόλεμο
μὲ τοὺς Τοῦρκους, τὰ μούτσουνά σου δὲν τὰ εἶδαμε. Ποῦ ἦσουν
τότε, καὶ τῶρα μᾶς ἤλθεις καὶ μᾶς κουνιέσαι; Οὐ! νὰ χαθῆς,
γάδαρε!

It is more than probable that in a few generations both jargons will disappear from Greece.

ART. VII.—LIFE AND CHARACTER OF DR. NEANDER.*

BY GEORGE M. ADAMS, CASTINE, ME.

JOHANN AUGUST WILHELM NEANDER was born on the 16th of January, 1789, at Göttingen, in the present kingdom of Hanover. He was the child of Jewish parents of the name of Mendel, and accordingly bore that name during his early years. His father was a wealthy merchant at Göttingen, but, while Augustus was yet a child, was reduced by misfortunes in business to comparative poverty, and removed with his family

* We are indebted for many particulars of the early life of Neander to the kindness of a friend in Berlin, Candidate Carl Pischon, who had access to sources not open to the public. The account of the illness and death is condensed from "Neanders Heimgang," by Licentiate Rauh in the publication "Zum Gedächtniss August Neanders," Berlin, 1850.

to Hamburg. He had five children, of whom one son studied medicine, but died young; another became a merchant in Russia; a richly-gifted daughter, after many vicissitudes of fortune, became insane; and another daughter, Johanna, shared to the last the fortunes of the son of whom we have chiefly to speak.

Augustus was distinguished in the family from his earliest youth by a decided fondness for study. His progress was remarkably rapid. When eight years old he could learn nothing more from his private teacher. It is told that at this time a worthy bookseller in Hamburg, "was struck with the frequent visits to his shop of a bashful, ungainly boy, who used to steal in and seize upon some erudite volume that no one else would touch, and utterly lose himself for hours together in study." At the preparatory school and at the Gymnasium, Neander won the lasting favour of his instructors, especially of Johann Gurlitt, then Director of the Gymnasium at Hamburg, and esteemed throughout Germany for his services in the cause of education. This worthy man was a second father to his favourite pupil, and his kindness to him did not end with their connection at the Gymnasium. The mutual attachment formed here continued through the lifetime of the teacher. Gurlitt, though not free from the reigning rationalism of the age, was a man of high moral principle, and we should naturally attribute to him an important part in developing in Neander that extreme conscientiousness which distinguished him as a Jew, and which was always among the prominent traits of his character. And doubtless something was here due to the teacher, but more to the mother of Neander, who had a deep, earnest religious character, and seems to have exerted over him a commanding influence. His youthful associates speak of the peculiar tenderness with which he always alluded to her. And all the readers of his "History" will remember the manifest predilection with which he delineates the character and maternal influence of Anthusa, Monica, and other eminent mothers.

We come to the latter part of his life at the Gymnasium, the year 1805—6. A valuable insight into his inward history at this period is furnished in a few letters from him to Chamisso, published some years since in connection with the biography of the poet, and translated in part for the fourth volume of the "*Bibliotheca Sacra*."* These letters indicate a mind remarkably mature, thoughtful and introverted, closely studying but not yet able fully to understand itself, and accordingly self-distrustful and timid. He had, as he says, hitherto found no one among his associates "of similar tastes with whom he could form an inti-

macy, and was disinclined to seek for one." The prejudices against his race and religion had doubtless helped to keep him inwardly aloof from his companions. Indeed, there must have been few boys in the Gymnasium mature enough to sympathize with the young philosopher. And his kind teacher, Gurlitt, was too far from him in age to be the confidant of all his heart. So his mind had been developing in solitude, confirming itself in its native introversion.

He now found at length the needed sympathy from some young men several years older than himself, who had come from Berlin to complete at Hamburg their preparation for the university: Varnhagen Von Ense, who has since distinguished himself in German literature, and Wilhelm Neumann. These enthusiastic students, though it is hardly probable that they fully understood Neander's religious struggles, yet recognized and admired the depth and richness of his mind and the simple earnestness of his character. He was on his part as delicately responsive to the voice of sympathy, as he had been timid in seeking it, and an intimate friendship grew up between him and them. They made him a member of the Society of the North Star, a literary fraternity which had been formed at Berlin, including besides themselves, Chamisso and others. This served as an introduction between Neander and Chamisso, and without ever having seen each other they corresponded occasionally for several years. It is the letters of Neander in this correspondence, to which we have alluded. He seems to have lavished upon his new-found friends all the long pent-up frankness and affection of his nature, and perhaps drew them nearer to his heart than the degree of affinity in character and aims would have induced under other circumstances. This intimacy was of much advantage to him. Without it his speculations and struggles, shut up too closely within himself, would soon have become morbid. "From that time," he writes to Chamisso, "I can truly say that many things became clear and intelligible to me which before were obscure, and seen as it were in the distance. I now understood myself better. No one really comes to *feel* that which he is blindly in pursuit of, till he is brought in contact with others who are like himself."

We have alluded to his religious struggles. We wish to trace their progress more closely. They had commenced and proceeded far, before he met with Varnhagen and Neumann. We find no intimation of any strong influence exerted upon him from without, by circumstances or by associates, to which the commencement of this inward conflict is to be ascribed. It seems rather to have originated in the movements of his own reflective soul, seeking under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, as we must

believe, satisfaction of its spiritual wants. The Judaism in which he had been brought up could not satisfy him. He felt the need of a religious life. *That* offered him only dead, cold forms, which had forgotten the truths and feelings they once expressed. His classical studies made him acquainted with Plato, and he became deeply interested in him. He found much in him which harmonized with his own intense nature. There is a reflective earnestness in the strugglings of that noble mind after the truth which stirred all the sympathies of the young Jew. Here was what he had most painfully missed in the formal religion of his fathers, and he embraced the great philosopher as a friend who had read his soul. Neumann, with whom his acquaintance was now commencing, writes of him to Chamisso: "Plato is his idol and his perpetual watchword. He pores over that author night and day, and there are probably few who receive him so completely into the very sanctuary of the soul." But when the glow of his first love had passed away, he found that though Plato had read his wants, he had not satisfied them. The spirit of God had now awakened within him a deeper want, which philosophy has no means to supply. He demanded a voice more mighty than that of Plato to lay the "demons which infested his soul." In short, he was convicted of sin.

The struggle was long. All the sacred associations of childhood conspired with the suggestions of corrupt nature to blind him to the truth. At this period—as he told his friends in later years, and always with the deepest grateful emotion—while his mind was groping in the darkness, he read Schleiermacher's *Reden über die Religion*, and soon the Sun of Righteousness rose upon him. What he had sought in vain in the teachings of Plato, he found in the teachings of Christ,—in Christ himself. For it was eminently a personal relation to the Saviour in which he henceforth stood. His native character and the peculiarity of the process through which his soul had passed, had prepared him to seize with delight upon this distinguishing feature of Christianity. He embraced Christ with the ardour of a soul that had sounded the depths of its own wants. So in later years, he contended with a severity quite foreign to his nature, against the Pantheistic philosophy which would rob men of a personal God and Saviour.

Early in the year 1806, at the age of seventeen, he joined the Christian Church, assuming at his baptism the significant name Neander (*νεον ἄνδρα*). His mother and his sister Johanna soon followed him in professing the Christian faith.

He completed his course at the Gymnasium with distinguished honour. On leaving he delivered an address on the subject of the Possibility of the Admission of Jews to the Offices of the

State, which indicated, it is said, "how deeply the youthful writer had thought out the relation of Judaism to Christianity." It produced so much impression that it was immediately printed, —a rare honour in those days.

As his father was unable to give him much pecuniary assistance, Gurlitt, and the Baron von Stieglitz, a Jewish banker, who was a distant relative of the Mendel family, furnished him means to study at the university, and in accordance with their wishes he proposed to study Law. His friends Varnhagen and Neumann were going to Halle, and he concluded to yield his preferences, which had been for Göttingen, and go with them. They entered the university at the commencement of the summer semester, 1806. The study of the law grew more and more unsatisfying to Neander, and soon after reaching Halle, by earnest entreaty he persuaded his patrons to allow him to give it up and devote himself to Theology. He writes to Chamisso, "I have made up my mind to study Theology. May God give me strength, as I desire and shall endeavour to do, to proclaim to erring men the only true God in a spiritual way, which the unassisted intellect can never comprehend." This was henceforth the purpose of his life. It would not be easy to express it more fully and truly in a few words. There was need of such efforts. The commencement of the present century was the period of greatest religious declension in Germany. Rationalism had reached its supremacy. It had swept away all faith in things supernatural, all enthusiasm, all that belongs to the heart, and sought to satisfy men with moral precepts drawn from and addressed solely to the understanding. But when Neander commenced his theological career, there were some indications of a re-action against this system, at least an indefinite longing in the hearts of many for something more living than Rationalism could afford. Neander was fired with the thought of being one who should help to meet this want of the age with the proclamation of a spiritual faith. He, too, had wandered through the dry places of intellectual morality, vainly seeking rest, and he longed to lead others to the loving Saviour he had found.

The University of Halle was at this time one of the most distinguished in Germany, and shared largely in the new life that was beginning to be felt in all branches of literature and science. F. A. Wolf, the philologist, was there in the bloom of his reputation and influence. Schleiermacher, now at the age of thirty-seven entering upon his more distinctively theological stadium, had recently been called thither. Steffens, the genial, spirited poet and philosopher, had at the same time come from Copenhagen to take the chair of natural philosophy

in the rising Prussian University. At the head of the medical faculty, and hardly less eminent in his department than Wolf and Schleiermacher in theirs, was Johann Christian Reil. Around these four men, who adopted a more comprehensive and liberal method of instruction than had been before known in the university, gathered a circle of students comprising the flower of the institution. Among them were Karl von Raumer, Bekker, Boeckh, and Friedrich Strauss.* Professors and students here alike forgot the difference of "Faculties" in the sympathy of spirit which pervaded them all. Indeed the distinction between professor and student was by no means sharply defined. They met every week at the table of one of the four professors, where the utmost freedom reigned. Earnestness and enthusiasm in study characterized the members of the circle. Into this circle Neander at once entered, though probably by some years the youngest of its number. Thus he came into contact with the best minds of the university, and was led to a comprehensive course of thought and study. Here with Wolf, and afterwards under the direction of Creuzer and Boeckh at Heidelberg, he gave special attention to classical antiquity, to which indeed his love for Plato had already introduced him; but this only in subordination to the theological studies in which his soul was absorbed. Schleiermacher, Knapp and Steffens were his teachers and advisers. To the latter he became much attached. Steffens was the youngest of the professors we have named,—indeed one of those men who never grow old; and his deeply religious spirit fitted him to sympathise most fully with Neander. They were firm friends from this time until the death of Steffens in 1845. It was also without doubt religious sympathy that drew Neander to Knapp, then the only remaining representative at Halle of the Pietistic school which had once held sway in the university. He was then delivering to his classes those Lectures on Theology which in a translation have since found so much currency in this country. But Schleiermacher was the professor who most of all attracted Neander. His mighty intellect, his earnest Christian spirit, the new direction and impulse he was giving to theological study, would under any circumstances have attracted Neander as they did many others. But Schleiermacher was the author of the "Discourses upon Religion," which had pointed him to the Saviour. Of course he felt a peculiar reverence for him as in some sense his spiritual father, and he soon learned to admire and love him personally. It has been sometimes represented

* G. F. A. Strauss, now Professor of Theology at Berlin,—not to be confounded with David Friedrich Strauss, author of the *Life of Christ*

that Schleiermacher gave form and direction to Neander's character. Doubtless his influence upon him was great, greater than that of any other man, and it may have modified some of his opinions and habits of thought at this early period. But it did not at all *mould* his character. What Neander was in his maturity, that he had been essentially in his youth. The first glance which we obtain into his inward life, in the letter of Neumann to Chamisso noticed above, reveals the germs of his later development; and so in his own earliest letters to Chamisso we see him searching after the essence of truth, disregarding—too contemptuously, perhaps, disregarding—all that is merely formal, incidental, external. Neander's studies in this commencement of his theological education were of course chiefly exegetical. He began, however, already to study the history of early Christianity, especially in its connection on the one hand with Judaism and on the other with the Platonic philosophy.

But this quiet life was suddenly and rudely interrupted. The victory of Napoleon over the Prussian army at Jena, Oct. 14, 1806, left the country helpless. Oct. 17, Marshal Bernadotte took Halle, after slight resistance, and three days later Napoleon came, and, vexed by the independent bearing of the students, suspended the university, and drove the students,* at twenty-four hours' warning, out of the city.

Neander and Neumann started afoot for Göttingen, Varnhagen venturing to remain in Halle. Neander was delicate in health, from the effects of undue application. Uncalculating charity soon exhausted his purse. He fell ill by the way, and might have perished in the confusion, but for Dr. Gesenius, who found him suffering, and brought him in a carriage to Göttingen. Here he remained about three years, and completed his university course. With earnest study, and oftentimes severe inward wrestling, he wrought out independently his system of theological belief. The change was a sad one to him, from the genial circle at Halle, to the cold Rationalistic atmosphere of Göttingen. But it proved a valuable part of his religious as well as of his intellectual discipline, and he recognized it as such. "It was well," he says, "and I thank God for it. In no other way could I have made such progress. From every human mediator, from every agreeable association, must one be torn away, in order that he may learn to hang only and entirely on the eternal Mediator, who is Man and God in one person, and who, suffering and dying, has won for himself all those who in faith yield their inmost being to his suffering and death."

* It is told, among other things, that a student to whom he spoke, replied to him with the address, "Monsieur."

In the letters written from Göttingen, humility and childlike submission are especially discernible. Alluding to the intellectual struggles through which he was seeking the "light" of truth, he writes to Chamisso: "God give to me, beholding the light in my own soul, also with a loving sympathy to receive the beams of that light everywhere, though refracted and distorted in an earthly atmosphere; and at length, when His time has come, may I send out the collected rays to illuminate others, and to be reflected back again upon myself;—God grant it, or grant it *not*; His will be done. So, my heartily dear friend, similar storms and trials, proceeding in the case of one of us more from the inner, in case of the other more from the outer, world, have brought us both into distress which has but one relief; they point us both to the one Refuge which will be secure in all perils of inward and outward life, to him who places no proud reliance upon that even which is highest and noblest and eternal in man, but humbly trusts in God, and resigns himself entirely to His will, even when He seems to forsake him; He *seems* only to do it; He lets the ground sink under us, and (as at present he is doing with our generation) leaves us to a sickly life, only that death may destroy death, and that life may come to life; *ὅσον ὅσον ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἤξει καὶ οὐ χρονιεῖ!*" In the latter part of this extract, he alludes to a conflict, partly at least of a religious nature, through which Chamisso was passing. Neander wrote to him repeatedly, with reference to it, and did his utmost to lead him to the Saviour. He closes such a letter, as follows: "Would that I might be with you, and embrace you before the cross of Christ, and with you behold His glory! May it be with you as I pray and desire! Yes, I believe that it will be so. I press your hand and commend you to the love of God and of Christ, for present and eternal salvation. May you live as you desire, in God! His blessing upon all that you undertake. Amen! Amen!"

Neander completed his university studies at Göttingen, in the year 1809, and returned to Hamburg, with the intention of entering upon the life of a pastor. After the necessary private study, he had passed the severe examination with much honour, when the whole course of his future life was somewhat unexpectedly changed.

The city of Hamburg had a small fund, the income of which was devoted to the support of one of its young theologians, as lecturer at the university of Heidelberg. Gurliitt succeeded in obtaining this stipend for Neander: and in 1811, the latter commenced his career as an instructor, by a course of lectures on Church History, in that ancient university. His promotion to the higher academic offices was remarkably rapid. In 1812,

he was made Professor *Extraordinarius* at Heidelberg, in acknowledgment of the historical talent evinced in his first published work, the monograph upon the Emperor Julian and his Times. In 1813, at the age of twenty-four, he was called as Professor *Ordinarius* (the highest academic rank) to the new university at Berlin, where the Prussian king was collecting the best talent of Germany. Schleiermacher, De Wette and Marheinecke were already there. With the former, Neander stood in the most friendly relations. With De Wette, as is shown in a late Number of this Review, he lived "on terms of high mutual respect, but not of intimate friendship." De Wette, at this period of his life, inclined too far towards Rationalistic views, to gain Neander's full confidence and sympathy.

Here at Berlin, Neander spent the remainder of his life. His external history during these thirty-seven years presents but few points to arrest attention. In 1818, he was made a member of the Supreme Consistory, which has the direction of the affairs of the church in the Prussian kingdom. In 1830, he came into a controversy (if the honest and Christian discussion of differing opinions deserves so harsh a name) with Hengstenberg, the editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. Neander's name had been announced as one of the contributors to that journal. Some severe attacks appeared in it upon Schleiermacher, and also upon Gesenius and Wegscheider. Neander published a protest against these articles, and withdrew his name from the journal, though with full expression of his personal affection towards the editor, and of respect for the honest but, as he thought, mistaken principles upon which he had acted. Neander did not defend the views attacked, but objected to criticism of the opinions of individual theologians in a popular journal. He has sometimes been blamed for this course, as apparently in opposition to his principles of Christian union and catholicity; and Gesenius and Wegscheider were certainly exerting a baneful influence by their Rationalistic sentiments. But Neander thought that the rules of Christian charity required more forbearance with them, than had been exhibited; and it is to be remembered, that he was bound by ties of peculiar gratitude to Gesenius as well as to Schleiermacher. Several years later, when controversy waxed warm between the Hengstenberg party and the more liberal school, who respect, without closely following, Schleiermacher, Neander refused to take sides in it, but sought to act the part of a peacemaker. It would not be right to infer from Neander's charity towards Gesenius and Wegscheider, that he had now lost any of the opposition to Rationalism, with which, in one of his early letters to Chamisso, he proclaimed "against such a system, against everything which it

holds sacred, its gods and its temples—eternal war.” Against the system, he contended constantly, vigorously, effectively. To him, among the first after Schleiermacher, does Germany owe her deliverance (which now seems accomplished) from that chilling form of error. It is against another and more subtle infidelity, that the evangelical theologians of Germany have now to contend—the Pantheism of Hegel, Bruno Bauer, and Strauss. Here Neander was most earnest and decided. Indeed, if in anything he was liable to overstep the limits of Christian charity and mildness, it was in his opposition to this entire tendency. It was evil, and only evil, in his eyes. Any one who has spent an hour with him, during the last ten years, has almost certainly heard a vigorous expression of his antipathy against this modern Gnosticism. He regarded it as the chief source of the great social and political evils under which his country is now suffering: for, in common with very many pious men in Germany, Neander considered the revolutions there, during the past three years, as religious no less than political movements, revolutions against the restraints of Christianity, no less than against those of monarchy. And it is a significant fact, that, perhaps without an exception, the leaders of the democratic movement in Germany, the Hecker, and Blum, and Vogt, have been men of infidel principles. They have assumed that liberty and atheism belong together; that the fear of God and the fear of kings are inseparable. Neander wrote to the editor of the *Deutsche Kirchenfreund*, under date of October 28, 1849: “What by many has been called freedom in our father land, during the mournful year that is past, is something very different from that which the spirit, sprung from the bloom of Puritan piety in your America, seeks and intends. It was here a contest between Atheism and Christianity, between Vandalism and true culture. Already tens of years ago I foretold it, that the philosophy of a distorted logic, of intellectual fanaticism and self-idolatry, must lead in its consistent development, to these consequences—which it has now reached by infusing itself into the popular mind. We stand on the brink of an abyss, of the destruction of European culture, or on the boundaries where a new creative era shall make itself a path through manifold storms,—a new, grand act in the world-transforming process of Christianity. We will hope the *latter* from the mercy of a long-suffering God.”

Strong as were these *private* expressions of his opposition to the ideal philosophy; Neander confined himself in his efforts against it, to strictly scientific means. He believed that it could be overcome only on the open field of free discussion. So, when Strauss's *Life of Christ* was published, and the Prussian govern-

ment was disposed to prohibit its sale in that country, Neander, whose advice was asked, said emphatically, "No! it must be put down by the truth." Neander's life at Berlin was a very laborious one. He discharged the responsible duties of a member of the Consistory; he delivered not less than fifteen lectures a-week, on subjects varying in successive semesters, so as to cover almost the entire field of theological study; he conducted in private the exercises of the class in Church History; and during his thirty-seven years there, he published more than twenty-five volumes, and left additional ones nearly ready for the press.*

He was never married. The maiden sister Johanna, of whom we have already spoken, kept his house and watched over him with affectionate solicitude. With much practical wisdom and tact, of which he had nothing, she directed all his worldly affairs. It is not easy to see how he could have lived without her. He submitted cheerfully and gratefully to her direction. In only two points did he claim unyieldingly the right of acting for himself: he *would* study more closely than she wished in her care for his health, and he would give no account of the money he spent in charity. Next to his affection for his sister was that for his pupils. His attachment to them became proverbial. He never seemed so happy as when in the midst of them. When his physician advised him to leave for a time the anxieties of the university, he replied, and no doubt with literal truth, that he should pine if denied the opportunity of associating with and aiding and directing youth. He was accustomed to gather a circle of students about him every Saturday evening in his study, where he accommodated himself to their thoughts and feelings, and became so entirely one of them in the affectionateness and simplicity of his heart, that it was hard to be always mindful of the difference due to his years and genius. We remember some of those social occasions with peculiar satisfaction. The number present was from eight to twelve, of the young men most closely attached to Neander, including often one or two French, Scotch or American students. As each one entered, Neander rose and gave him the hand with some word of welcome or friendly inquiry which came evidently from the heart. The walls of the study were lined with books; books were scattered on window-

* Neander's principal works are, "Julian and his Times," "St. Bernard and his Times," "Development of the principal Gnostic Systems," "Chrysostom and the Church in his Age," "Memorabilia from the History of Christianity and the Christian Life," "Anti-Gnosticus: Genius of Tertullian," "Planting and Training of the Church," "Life of Christ;" all these preparatory or incidental to the great work of his life, "The General History of the Christian Religion and Church," which he brought down to the fifteenth century. Of the manuscripts which he left behind him, some account will be found in a later note.

seats, sofas, tables and chairs, and here and there stacks of them upon the floor. We made our way among them as best we might, and took seats about a table on which stood a shaded study-lamp. Around the study, above the book-cases, hung portraits of distinguished scholars. Neander sat in his study-gown, with nothing in his own manner to distinguish him from the rest. A servant soon brought in tea, the books and papers were pushed to one side of the table to make room for the tray, one of the students (the sister Johanna was never present on these occasions) passed the cups and a basket of plain cake, and the simple meal was despatched without interrupting the conversation. This was perfectly free and informal, guided altogether by the inclinations of those present. If it was left to Neander to direct it, he usually asked, especially from the foreign students, for anything of interest to the cause of Christ which they might be able to communicate. We recollect that on one of these occasions, a student read aloud at Neander's request the Introduction to De Wette's last work, the Commentary upon the Apocalypse, which had then just appeared; in which the author expresses more decidedly than ever before, his faith in spiritual religion. After alluding to the dangers which were threatening the church, De Wette says: "In my labours upon the Apocalypse I have not learned to prophesy, and the vision of St. John did not reach to our times. I therefore cannot know what the fate of our dear Protestant church will be. Only this I know,—that in no other name shall we find salvation, but in the name of Jesus Christ and him crucified." And we shall never forget the glow of joy which lighted up Neander's countenance, and the tear which stole down his wrinkled cheek, as these words were read. It cheered his pious heart to receive this evidence of a return to the truth, in one whose soul had so long been torn with the inward struggle between Rationalism and Faith.

It was a chief object with Neander at these times, to draw out and answer the theological or practical difficulties of those who resorted to him, and he did this with the utmost regard and tenderness. But upon this point, as well as with respect to the whole-hearted, admiring love with which his German students returned his kindness, we let one of their own number speak :*—

"From this time I attended regularly his Saturday evening assemblies—delightful, ever-memorable hours. However different might be the company, Neander remained the same, always simple, cordial, mild. He entered into the views of every one; in the presence of minds the most rigid and unbending, his affectionate tolerance, his humility, shone only the more brightly.

* Hermann Rossel, in his "*Leben und hinterlassene Schriften.*" Berlin, 1847.

How he could ask, persuade, nay even beg, when he suspected there were yet doubts and difficulties remaining; how winning was his bending attitude, his tone and look, when he asked, 'Do you not think so? to me at least it appears so; or, do you think differently?' And yet how entirely free from everything which looked like urging his own opinions upon another! If he saw that the inquirer manifested judgment and an earnest will, he would kindle into a youthful fervour. I remember that once he was engaged in conversation with a student who sat at some distance from him, and little by little he drew his chair nearer, till he found himself close before the speaker. When the point was settled, and the conversation gradually became less animated, he moved himself backwards in the same manner to his place again. Of that stately bearing and outward dignity, and all the substitutes for true, inward dignity, which little minds, and often, alas! even great ones, think they must assume—of this, Neander had just nothing. He sat among us as a father, as an old friend. Rank and circumstance were nothing for him; he spoke with the student as with the professor, and he would not have spoken differently with a prince. He expressed assent and dissent, without respect of person, according to the naked, undisguised truth. For this very reason, the youth almost idolized him. Under many a plain student-coat, beat a heart that would have poured out its last drop for Neander.

"One evening we were assembled at Neander's, when a pastor from the neighbourhood of Düsseldorf was announced. An early scholar of Neander's, he with others had often sat around him, just as we were now sitting. He was a slender man, and his head was already growing gray; yet he had sat at the feet of Neander, who now with jet black hair and in the fullness of his strength stood up and gave his hand to his former pupil. Joyfully he took it and held it pressed in both his own; his voice trembled as he expressed to Neander how very glad he was to be permitted once more in his life to stand thus before him. With eager eyes he hung upon the countenance of his teacher, as if he would drink in his whole appearance, the familiar, loving tone of voice, the indescribably mild look. How glad he would have been now to find that Neander also remembered him, and how heartily glad would Neander have been to afford him this pleasure. But it could not be. He tried hard to remember; by hints and the mention of accompanying circumstances he could almost reach it, but then he lost the trace, and he was too candid to conceal it. It made a sorrowful impression on us to see hope sink on the countenance of the stranger. In further conversation his strong attachment showed itself by unmistakeable signs. He seemed to be a well-

meaning man, but of narrow views, so that on almost every point he found himself opposed to Neander. Against any other man he would have maintained his opinion stiffly, nay, perhaps, with a blind zeal; but here his heart was too much on the side of his opponent. With timid love he softened down every difference; and when he ventured to express his own views, he did it with evident anxiety, although Neander was always so kind and ready to assent to everything: yet, for all that, he could not find it in his heart to oppose Neander.

“What Neander so finely exhibited in these evening interviews, the sacred truthfulness of his entire being and life, and the most affectionate regard for the feelings of others,—this was always the soul of his social life. Open-hearted, inoffensive as a child, he stood before the world, separated only from every rude contact by the breath of heavenliness which surrounded him. With noble natures he thus came easily into close connection. As if by a magnetic influence, one knew, without hearing him speak, what he thought and felt, was himself attracted by him, and drawn into the peaceful motion of his inward life. And what a heavenly composure descended then upon all his thinking and feeling! Amid the whirling impulses of the times, in the conflict of strangest contradictions, where the noblest feelings of humanity are staggered, where heart and nature are silenced before the brawl and babble of dialectical subtilty, how safe did one feel, how sound in mind and heart, how simple and clear did his soul become, in Neander’s sacred presence!

“This simplicity it was which led Neander into the heart of things; nothing with him was mere form. What other men do more or less from habit and according to the fashion of the times, received from him the spirit in which it originated. When he greeted any one, gave his hand, or inquired after the health of a person, it was always an expression of truth. At a simple ‘How do you do?’ from his mouth, one could not preserve that placid indifference with which such inquiries are usually received; that he was truly solicitous appeared plainly in word and mien. If any one who visited Neander was in trouble, he was sure to perceive it, and would ask, ‘Is there anything the matter with you? You look so cast down,—you are not unwell, I hope?’ One could not do otherwise than answer, ‘Oh no, I am very well.’ While a look and tone so soothing, so healing, entered the heart, one felt that he really was very well.

“Never shall I forget the impression which his manner towards a blind young man made upon me. He was a poor youth, who, because he had not the means to pursue a liberal

course of study, wished to educate himself for the business of teaching. For this purpose he attended Neander's lectures, although he was but poorly acquainted with the ancient languages. Pale and worn, he sat always in the same seat, attentively listening, and repeating over to himself, with silent motion of the lips, those parts which pleased him most. If he found any one afterwards, with whom he could go over again, in his child-like way, what he had heard, he was perfectly happy. He was truly one of those of whom it is written, that they are poor in spirit and of a lowly mind. To see now this man, sickly and silent, stand before Neander, whom he so heartily revered, but whom he could not see, and to hear the tone with which Neander asked him, 'How do you do?'—I was obliged to turn away, the tears started into my eyes. Oh, how many of those forsaken by all the world would be happy, at least for one hour in their solitary life, if they could stand before Neander, and hear him ask them, 'How do you do?' To see and hear him, is to believe and know that it will yet be better, that it will be well. How could one thus blessed by his kind words, fail to be reminded of the Heavenly Friend, who says to all that labour and are heavy-laden, 'Come unto me, and I will give you rest?'"

This might be thought the partial view of a devoted friend, but a theological opponent says of him, in a hostile criticism of one of his works :* "It were not easy to find among the prominent characters of our time, a person whose life is so true a mirror of the principle which actuates him, as is that of Neander. What he is, that he is wholly. There is in him no ostentation, no striving after effect, not a trace of the current hypocrisy. Herein lies the cause of the great influence which Neander has gained over the life and consciousness of the age; here the ground of the satisfaction which men of the most opposite views find in his works: for the smallest of them is a revelation of his pious heart, every subject that he touches becomes the lovely mirror of his soul, and is thus, to those who sympathize with him, a translation of their own inward life—to those who differ from him, an object of hearty enjoyment."

It may not be uninteresting to refer more particularly to the personal appearance of Neander. He was one of those men who seem to be sent into the world to teach us the superiority of the soul to the dull clay into which God has breathed it. That mind which made itself felt wherever Christianity is known, was encased in a body as frail and untutored as that of

* Georgii, in the "*Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst*," April, 1839.

a child. He was of medium height, rather slender and meagre, with a dark complexion, and the whole cast of features plainly Jewish. His hair long, and as black as a raven, hung carelessly over the high forehead. The eyes were almost hid by jutting, bushy brows, and nearly closed lids; but now and then one caught a look into them, deep, dark, sparkling as a shaded fountain. His voice was full and deep, swelling and sinking with his delicate sensibilities. But his whole outward appearance gave a certain impression of helplessness, fitted at first to excite compassion. He walked when alone, which was seldom, with an uncertain, distrustful step.

A stranger who should have found himself unexpectedly in Neander's lecture-room, would have been ready to believe that the professor was spending an hour in abstracted reflection, and that the students had stolen in to hear him think aloud. Leaning upon a high desk which, when excited, he now and then tilted forward, threatening to plunge with it into the midst of his audience, his eyes apparently closed, his face turned sometimes to the floor, sometimes to the wall behind him, but never towards his hearers, his fingers mechanically twisting and twirling a pen,—there was nothing to indicate his consciousness of the presence of others, and one was surprised to see that he retained connection enough with the outward world, to heed the bell which marked the close of the hour. The stories which are told of his appearing at the lecture-room in his study dress, of his complaining of lameness when he had unconsciously walked home with but one foot upon the sidewalk, and the like, may be exaggerations; but if not true, they are truthful; none of them would seem strange to one who had known the professor's extreme abstractedness.

But in all this there was not the slightest trace of affectation. His whole nature was the very opposite of that. And, moreover, all the first impressions of the ludicrous excited by his appearance passed away after one began to give attention to what he said, and to catch the earnest spirit of his soul. Indeed we almost regret having dwelt so long on these peculiarities. *They are not* what one remembers most in Neander.

His health was always poor. A rheumatic disease lurked in his system from the time of his illness at Göttingen. He held it in check by the most conscientious regard to diet and exercise, but chiefly by the power of an iron will. Many men with his constitution would have given up active life and died years ago. Three years since, the disease turned upon his eyes and reduced him almost to blindness. But he toiled on by the help of readers and amanuenses, delivering his lectures regularly, and carrying forward, though slowly, his great work, the *History of*

Christianity. He felt more and more, during these years of declining health, the desire to exert a direct influence upon the religious life of the community, and published brief practical commentaries upon the Epistle to the Philippians and the Epistle of James. He also, in connection with Nitzsch of Berlin, and Julius Müller of Halle, founded a weekly religious Journal, the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft und christliches Leben*, intended, as its name indicates, to bring the results of theological learning and science to bear upon and promote practical piety.

But his health was constantly failing. When we received his touching farewell two years ago, his hand was nerveless and tremulous, and his whole appearance suggested sad apprehensions. It seemed impossible that even his firm resolution could sustain him much longer against the disease which had been perceptibly wasting his strength for months.

The end of the struggle came in July last. Monday, July 8th, he was worse than usual, and as the weather was unpleasant, he was urged to postpone his lecture. But he could not be persuaded to do so. In the midst of the lecture his voice failed him more than once, but he forced himself on to the end of the hour. Completely exhausted, he reached home with difficulty by assistance of the students. In the evening the disease assumed a more alarming aspect. His first thought was for his troubled sister. He called her to the bedside, and said tenderly, "Don't feel anxious, my dear sister, 'tis only temporary. I know my nature." But that nature was at length unyielding to the stern will which had so long ruled it. After a night of pain, it was with a touching sadness that he inquired, "I shall hardly be able to lecture to-day, shall I?" He expressly desired that his lectures should be postponed "only for to-day," believing that on the next day he should surely be able to resume them, and feeling that life, and labour for the youth who were to be led to Christ, were to him one and the same.

On the afternoon of Tuesday he suddenly asked for his reader, and desired that the work on which he had been last employed (Ritter's Palestine), should be still further read to him; he impatiently censured the care of his friends who had prematurely sent the reader home, supposing he would not be wanted. Then, according to his daily custom, he had the newspaper read to him by another of his pupils. With eager attention he observed what was read. Later in the afternoon, while suffering much pain, he was solicitous lest he should occasion trouble to those around him, and with earnest entreaty begged his sister to "go and get some sleep." During the night his pains were much alleviated, and this awakened on the following day the almost

expiring hopes of his friends. He begged to be allowed to rise from his bed. The unconquerable will which had so often been victorious over the infirmities of his physical nature, he believed would yet exercise its wonted power. The following night his disease assumed the appearance of cholera, and those spasmodic hiccoughs came on which are almost certain premonitions of dissolution. And although a happy ignorance of the nature of these symptoms prevented any unusual alarm on the part of his hoping friends, yet the impression of a power which even the will of a Neander could not overcome, occasioned anxious forebodings. Meanwhile the spirit, which through long-continued habit had gained the power of quieting the storms of bodily disease, remained clear and bright. He distinctly recognized all who surrounded him. With that touching modesty and self-forgetfulness which had always been the garment of his kingly spirit, he turned aside the proffered aid of those whose love to him would call them away from their usual employment, and with failing voice he expressed his cordial thanks for the least assistance. The frequent repetition of those dreadful hiccoughs interrupted his slumbers as soon as begun. With deeply moving, though feeble voice, he prayed, "*Gott, ich möchte schlafen*" (God, would I might sleep!). The Lord heard his prayer beyond his expectation.

On Saturday his sufferings were still more intense, but his desire to rise from the bed to make a trial of his strength broke forth with more eagerness than before. The gentle man, from whom his attendants had never heard a harsh word, now peremptorily commanded his servant to bring him his clothes, that he might rise and try to resume his holy work. With difficulty could a student who was watching him persuade him to recal the order. The will of the sick man was not completely subdued until his sister, who had been called, said to him, "Think, dear Augustus, what you have often said to me when I have resisted the orders of the physician,—'it comes from God, therefore we must willingly submit.'"
"That is true," replied he, with a tone of voice suddenly growing quiet, "it all comes from God, and we must thank him for it."

A little later, the physicians, giving up all hope of saving his life, determined to resort to extreme measures to sustain him for a few hours. A bath of wine and strong herbs was prepared, which procured for him the joy of being able to rise. They led him out of the dark bed-room in which he had hitherto lain, into the sunny chamber which, for twenty years, had been the witness of his unwearied labours in the kingdom of God. The sight of the familiar apartment, the lofty spirits which were wont in friendly confidence to talk with him from the walls

around, repressed even now the demand for final repose. With earnest effort rising from his seat, he began, in regular discourse, a lecture on New Testament exegesis. Next, a new image rose before his excited vision—the meetings of his beloved class in history; and he called for the reading of an essay recently assigned to one of their number. And as if he would in his struggles with resisting nature, produce the impossible, he dictated the subjects of the lectures which he proposed to give during the following semester,—among them, “The Gospel of John, considered from the true historical point of view.” And finally, as his earliest efforts in the cause of sacred science had been designed to present a picture of those glorious results which the spirit of Christianity has produced in ages past, so his last thoughts, amid the phantom visions of the decisive struggle, were devoted to this work of his life. Beginning a dictation precisely at the point of his Church History at which he had left off before his sickness, he described the peculiar character of the so-called “Friends of God” of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and their relations to the church generally. When he had come to the close of a section, he asked what time it was. They replied, “It is half-past nine” (Saturday evening). “I am weary,” repeated the well-tried man, “I will now go to sleep;” and while he suffered himself to be led by friendly hands, to his last repose, he whispered with a love-breathing voice which thrilled through heart and nerve of all present, “Good night, good night.” And as if the Lord would give a witness that the stern conflict of this Christian sufferer was designed only to introduce him to a so much the more undisturbed Sabbath of rest, he slumbered four hours, receiving, even in a literal sense, the answer to the prayer pressed from him by the tortures of disease, and only the gradually fainter and fainter breathing gave signs that a living soul was passing into that realm which we shortsighted mortals call death. It was the weekly festal day of the resurrection of our Lord on which his cross-bearing disciple entered into his closer fellowship. And yet perhaps one might not regard this as specially significant in Neander’s departure. It was a Sabbath day wherever his soul drew breath, for he thirsted for God and lived in God. He died as he lived, and well he might, for he had lived as a citizen of a heavenly world.

The funeral was attended on Wednesday, July 17th, with a sympathy more general than had been known at Berlin since the funeral of Schleiermacher. Early in the morning a crowd gathered about the house in Markgrafen-street. At the university some hundreds of the students assembled and walked in procession to the door of the dwelling. The house was filled

with the professors, the clergy, high officers of government, and students. Professor Strauss, a friend of Neander since the time of their student life together at Halle, delivered the funeral discourse. The body lay there in the study which had been its home, decked with flowers and surrounded with lighted candles, the placid countenance uncovered.

"It hath pleased the Almighty Disposer of life and death," commenced the venerable speaker, "to call home his blessed servant, our beloved friend. Thousands in our city and in our German fatherland share at this moment our grief, and soon will the whole evangelical world join in it. It is a mighty company of mourners. We who stand around his body form the visible centre of the great invisible funeral assembly. Human words may not now express the fulness of our feelings.

"We turn to the Word of God. With irresistible power presses itself upon our minds a passage from that Gospel most dear to the heart of our departed friend, and with respect to the Apostle whom he most resembled:—'Then said that disciple whom Jesus loved, It is the Lord!'—(John xxi. 7). In this word lies the essence of the character of the Evangelist—of the character of him who followed the Evangelist in his life. Our Neander was a 'disciple whom Jesus loved;' that may be traced in all the way through which his Saviour led him. 'It is the Lord!'—this the message it was the object of his life to proclaim."

A vast procession followed the body to the grave. A whole city paused in its busy life to join the mourning. The hearse was surrounded by students carrying lighted candles; in advance was borne that greater light which had illuminated the life of the departed—his own much-worn Bible. At the grave a lofty choral was sung by a thousand voices. The pious, eloquent Krummacher spoke touching words of the loss which the learning and the life of the church had suffered. One of the deputation sent from the University of Halle to assist in these last honours made an address in the name of his fellow-students. After a prayer and benediction, flowers were strewn upon the coffin, which had been lowered to its long resting-place, and each one present, according to a beautiful German custom, threw a handful of earth into the grave. In the same hour, in a neighbouring city, was laid the foundation of a most appropriate monument to the memory of the departed.* The day

* The meeting of the Conference of pastors and delegates annually holden near Cüstrin, fifty miles east of Berlin, fell in the last year upon the 17th of July. It had been proposed among them to found an asylum for the care and moral training of vagrant children, on the plan of the noted "*rauhe Haus*" at Hamburg. The propo-

closed at Berlin with an address in the Aula of the University by Professor Nitzsch, setting forth the important services of his colleague to the institution and to theology.*

We had proposed to gather from our own impressions and from other sources at command, the more prominent characteristics of Neander. Most of those we shall name have already been sufficiently illustrated: others we will develop briefly.

Some of his more striking traits of mind and manner are grouped in and around what Rossel calls "the sacred *truthfulness* of his entire being and life." Here are, in the inner circle, child-like simplicity, openness, and honesty; and farther away on the other side, humility and implicit submission to the Divine Will; in another direction, strict conscientiousness. His humility was touchingly exhibited a few years since, on the occasion of his birth-day, when the students testified to him in the strongest manner which the customs of German student-life admit, their esteem and affection, by a torchlight procession. They paused under his windows, the band pealing out a lively greeting; they sang in full, deafening chorus, a song in his honour, and then one of their number addressed him, expressing in strong term their admiration and love. At the close, torches

sition was adopted with the warmest interest, and a committee was appointed to issue a circular and collect subscriptions. During the discussion one of the pastors, so deeply moved that his voice often failed him, said—"They are now bearing to his burial the man to whom I owe so unspeakably much, who was my spiritual father in Christ. Allow me, as a testimonial of my reverential love and gratitude towards him, to subscribe one hundred dollars for the proposed asylum." Upon this the suggestion was made, and adopted by acclamation, to give to the asylum, if by God's blessing it should be established, the name "*Neanders Haus*."

* Neander left no will. His sister—now suffering much under her affliction—inherits his little property. She will doubtless realize a considerable sum from his posthumous works. For the present she is assisted by the king. The publication of the manuscripts is conducted by a commission, at the head of which is Dr. Twisten, Professor of Theology at Berlin. The other members, selected with reference to their intimate acquaintance with Neander's labours, are—K. F. T. Schneider, editor of the *Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft*, with which Neander was closely connected, Prof. J. L. Jacobi, and Licentiate Raub. There will probably be published the Lectures upon Systematic Theology, Ethics, History of Ethics, History of Doctrines, Outlines of Church History, Contrast of Catholicism and Protestantism, and upon Exegesis, including the whole New Testament to the Apocalypse—of that, only the Epistles to the Seven Churches; finally, an additional volume of the Church History (a part of it, indeed, only in outline), bringing the work down to the death of Huss, in the fifteenth century.

As to Neander's successor in the Professorship of History, nothing was definitely determined at the date of our last advices. The Theological Faculty had proposed to the Government four candidates:—Professors Liebner of Kiel, Hase of Jena, Ullmann of Heidelberg, and Niedner of Leipsic. The political opinions of the candidates will have considerable influence upon the decision. It was thought that the choice would probably fall upon Liebner, author of the monograph, "Hugo of St. Victor," and of a Christology.

were tossed aloft in the fulness of youthful enthusiasm, and cheers rent the air. It was too much for Neander. He felt he did not deserve this. Tears filled his eyes. He approached the window, unmindful of everything but what filled his heart, and begged them not to speak so of him, for he was a poor weak sinner, hoping forgiveness only through the blood of Christ. "Oh, Divine Love," he exclaimed, "I have never loved thee strongly, deeply, warmly enough!" Of his conscientiousness, we add a single illustration. The students tell that three years since, when disease attacked his eyes, he was unwilling to suspend his labours in the university. When friends urged him to leave for a while, he replied that his lectures had been announced, students had come to Berlin to listen to him, it was his duty to go on, and God would give him strength. But, as the disease increased, almost destroying his sight, and the students assembled and formally voted that they were willing to release him from his obligations to them, and begged him to regard his health, he reluctantly yielded, and hurried away to a distant city to consult a skilful oculist. As soon as he arrived, he sent at once for the surgeon, and still fearing that he had needlessly deserted his post, demanded to know if there was any radical difficulty with his eyes. "Alas, there *is*, Sir Professor," he replied. "So then, it's all right," exclaimed Neander, now relieved of his scruples.

Not far distant among his characteristics from the group we have named, is another constellation, in the centre of which lies his disposition to grasp the essential point of any subject, disregarding comparatively everything incidental or formal—his regard for the *Spirit above the Letter*. We have seen indications of such a feeling in the history of his religious experience. His youthful dissatisfaction with Judaism, his deep sympathy with Plato, the subjective type of his conversion, all show the native bent of his mind. But it was the reception of Christianity as a spiritual system which especially developed this trait in him. To his soul, wearied with the heartless forms of an external worship, and oppressed by its own unsatisfied longings, Christ appeared as indeed a deliverer. He saved him from the yoke of the law, He removed the burden of his sin, not by any outward appliances, by no priestly rites or forms of words, but by implanting an inward life; and from that day forth he cast Judaism, under whatever name, for ever behind him. If ever his meek spirit showed signs of contempt, it was in view of efforts to re-instate formalism in the Church. He had seen deeper into truth. He had looked through and through all the forms in which it is represented to the senses or to the intellect, and it

was so plain to him that these are subordinate, that he could hardly preserve his proverbial forbearance towards those who would yet place them higher than faith and love.

Closely connected with his disregard for the mere forms and names of Christianity was his catholicity of spirit. He was ready to recognize the image of Christ wherever he found it, and though connected with much which he must dissent from—much that he must even condemn. He felt, that all our knowledge is but fragmentary, and that it is absurd for those who agree in essential points to waste their energies and their Christian graces in contending, because one sees this side and the other that of the same great eternal truth, which none but God can symmetrically comprehend. In one of the last lectures which Neander delivered—only eight days before his death—he said, with allusion to efforts which Dr. Gutzlaff was then making at Berlin in behalf of missions to the Chinese, “What we need in China is not a Catholic, a Lutheran, a Calvinistic, nor a Moravian religion, but the religion of Christ, which is fitted to all situations, to all nationalities, to all people, which, under peculiar social and political conditions, may assume the form most appropriate, and in this form may become the herald and creator of a new era.”

Neander respected the opinions of other men, though they differed from his own. He had the rare faculty of placing himself in the position of others, and looking upon a subject from their point of view. He thus appreciated the difficulties under which they laboured, and was ready to embrace them in his broad charity. “Far be it from me,” he says,* “to judge the heart of any man; in this regard, each must be his own accuser. A man that knows he serves a truth above the range of the human mind, knows at the same time how far below it he himself stands, and how, on the other hand, others whose individual culture, modified by the spirit of the age, has laid them open to error, may in heart be raised above their error.” But this did not make him consciously indifferent to the truth. In the same connection, he adopts the “golden words” of Niebuhr:—“The man who does not hold Christ’s earthly life, with all its miracles, to be as properly and really historical as any event in the sphere of history, and who does not receive all points of the Apostolic Creed, with the fullest conviction, I do not conceive to be a Protestant Christian, and as for that Christianity which is such according to the fashion of the modern philosophers and Pantheists, without a personal God, without immortality, without an individuality of man, without historical faith—it may be a very ingenious and subtle philosophy, but it is no Christianity

* “Life of Christ.” Preface to the third edition.

at all. Again and again have I said that I know not what to do with a metaphysical God; and that I will have no other but the God of the Bible, who is *heart to heart*. Whoever can reconcile the metaphysical God with the God of the Bible, may try it, and write symbolical books to suit all ages; but he who admits the absolute inexplicability of the main point, which can only be approached by asymptotes, will never grieve at the impossibility of possessing any *system* of religion." Neander was sensible of the one-sided, speculative tendency of the entire German character and theology, and once expressed to one of the editors of this Review his conviction that what was most indispensably needed among them was a large infusion of the practical element of the English mind. We have already spoken of his efforts in his last years to promote this end.

As his pre-eminent regard for the essential above the formal led Neander to a large tolerance towards others, so it was connected with what one of his friends has called "a spirit of Apostolic free manliness," in conducting his own investigations. That he carried what is here meant somewhat too far cannot be denied; that this tendency in him gained him the confidence of sceptical minds, and so won them in very many instances to the truth, is equally certain.

We turn to the outermost limits of the constellation we are observing, to notice Neander's whole-hearted, generous confidence in the self-sustaining power of the truth; or,—as the sum and essence of the truth most important to men was in his view the truth which Christ taught and was,—his unlimited faith in the power and progress of Christianity. That familiar passage will here occur to every one in which he lays at the foundation of his History the principle enunciated by our Saviour in the twin parables of the mustard-grain and of the leaven, and represents Christianity as growing through the course of the centuries, from the small seed up to the mighty tree which is destined to overshadow the earth, and under the branches of which all its people are to find a safe habitation. Unlike most of the evangelical theologians of Germany, Neander desired for the truth no support from the State. All that the church has to ask of earthly powers, in his view, is to be let alone. Nay, "the *persecution* of the State is better for the church than its patronage," as he once remarked; "all history shows it."

But the sun—rather, the great central Pleiad of his mental heavens, was *love*. All else in him moved in subordination to its invisible law. All within him and without him felt those sweet influences which none can bind.

When the writer was asking at Berlin which of Neander's courses of lectures he should attend, the students, who had

heard him most, said, Neander is excellent in all departments; but, if you want to know the man, hear him in Ethics or Church History, where his feelings will have scope. And no one could hear those lectures without feeling that there was in the blind old man before him, ready to gush out at every crevice of the subject, an exhaustless fountain of Christian love. The science of Christian morals became in his hands an attractive representation of the life, actuated by love—warm, genial, glowing, from a heart which had felt it all. And what interest he thus threw around the history of the church we all know, but none so well as those who have heard his tones, and seen emotion glow in his countenance, and shine through all his uncouth but expressive gestures, making the pen twirl faster in his fingers, and the desk reel more heavily under him. He follows into its retirements the Christian life and feeling which underlie the outward history of the church. An acute sympathy with all that is Christ-like conducts him through cloistered cells, to the caves of hermits, and the mountain retreats of persecuted sects, into the retired abodes of humble men and women, and detects for him unsuspected indications of faith and love, and even of missionary zeal in the ages which seem darkest.

We need not undertake to point out the manifold developments of this fundamental principle of love in all Neander's life and action. The preceding narrative of his life has already suggested them. His unbounded charity alone demands a moment's notice. Unbounded it truly was. But for his sister's greater prudence they would often have been reduced to actual want. Besides his salary,* the income from his published works was large, but he never had anything in reserve. All the property that he left behind, exclusive of his books,† amounted to two thousand rix dollars (1,400 dols.); while among his papers were found receipts for the fees remitted to poor students during his residence at Berlin, amounting to sixty-five thousand rix dollars (45,500 dols.). He founded among the students a Union devoted to the care of the poor and sick among their own number, and gave to it the copyright of several of his works. It is now steadily pursuing its humane object under the name of the *Neander'sche Krankenverein*.

His native kindness was manifest in the manner of his charities. "I was myself witness," says Prof. Jacobi, "of a case in which he entreated a young man, with affectionate urgency, I may say even imploringly, to accept from him a gift of money

* German professors are supported in part by a moderate salary, in part by fees received from the students who attend their lectures.

† About four thousand volumes.

in an hour of need. Seeing that the young man's sense of independence was so strong as to humiliate him in view of receiving such relief, he reminded him, with touching delicacy, that it is more blessed to give than to receive, and entreated him to accept the gift for love's sake." Many of his charities will never be known among men. He sedulously concealed them. Here and there some of them come to light since his death. One of these instances relates to the youthful Rossel, whose glowing description of Neander we have quoted above, p. 372. He lay weak and suffering under an illness which proved to be his last. He was too poor to obtain all that was needful for his comfort in this condition. The friend who took care of him went in his trouble with a heavy heart to Neander. As he approached the subject diffidently, Neander interrupted him, and begged to know precisely how Rossel was situated. The student named the sum which he needed. Neander wrung his hands in anxiety and distress. He had as usual no money at his command. He walked about the study looking upon his books, one after the other, as a father upon his children. Suddenly he stopped before a huge volume in gilt, one of the most valuable books in his library, the more precious, as but few copies had been printed and distributed by the author among his friends. He seized the book, put it into the hands of the student, and said—"I have no money, but take this and try to sell it. But I beg you, do it secretly; nobody must know it!" The seal is now removed from the lips which it held so long closed. Only he, as the narrator remarks, who knows what Neander's books were to him, how he, who spared almost what was necessary from his person, became a prodigal with regard to books, how a bond of love and gratitude bound him to them—only he can appreciate the greatness of the sacrifice.

Such was Neander as he appeared to us: a great, a good, a lovely man. He was not indeed perfect. He had errors,—serious, dangerous errors. We have no disposition to conceal them. Who that has known Neander, his truthfulness, his humility, would dare to represent him as he was not? His views with regard to the nature and extent of inspiration, and upon some other points, were such as could not be approved among us. His *Life of Christ*, which has done so much good in Germany, and here too, has so much aroused independent thought, has yet exerted an evil influence upon some minds among us. It bears marks of the struggles that brought it forth. These deficiencies, though of little comparative importance in Germany, over against the sweeping, annihilating infidelity it opposed, greatly impede its usefulness here.

It is to be noticed further, that the errors which in Neander

and some of his eminent contemporaries have seemed to exert no deleterious influence upon their Christian character, will not remain so harmless among us. There, theory and life are in a great degree distinct. Here, they interpenetrate and affect each other constantly. An error in the one becomes at once vice in the other. Not that the lax views of German Theology have been without their evil effect upon German practical life. If in some cases not so immediately perceived in the individual, this effect is yet deeply and sadly manifest in the community at large. And many of the friends of Christ there are beginning to acknowledge this, and to feel and express their new-gained but earnest conviction that Germany cannot overcome her present social evils, her infidelity and vice so rife among the lower classes, without higher doctrinal views upon certain points.

It were easy to point to the tendencies in Neander which have doubtless led him into some of his peculiar views. As we have already intimated, his admirable attachment to the one essential point in everything has sometimes passed over into undue neglect of minor but not unimportant particulars. So in his ardent desires for the union of all true Christians, his judgment may sometimes have followed his heart further than was prudent or just, over the space which divided him from errorists. When he believed that fundamental truth was not at stake, he has been ready to waive all disputed points, or to re-examine, to seek some common ground—*anything*, rather than be divided from those who are united with Christ. His unlimited confidence, too, in the power and progress of Christianity, may sometimes have betrayed him. There is a certain carelessness with regard to the exact limits of truth, which naturally enough associates itself to the assurance that her territory is broad and secure. One is tempted sometimes generously to yield a disputed point, while sure that there is enough beyond candid doubt or dispute. Why contend bitterly for pebbles, while the rock-fortress towers impregnable?

These, and such as these, may be the reasons to which we must attribute Neander's deviations in some points from views which we believe to be essential to the truth. His errors are errors of the head, not of the heart. This ought, in justice to him, to be fully understood. It ought to be acknowledged by those who dissent most from his views,—as it is surely most deeply felt by all who have known him personally,—that there was in him, so far as man can perceive, not the slightest ambition to build up a school; no pride of opinion, no conscious unwillingness to bow to the word of God. His errors have not proceeded from these causes. They are those into which a humble seeker after the truth has unconsciously fallen. Let us

remember with what humility he confesses to his "Christian Brethren in America," that he is "conscious of the dimness which surrounds him, growing out of the errors and defects of an age just freeing itself from a distracting infidelity." Notwithstanding his errors,—his earnest love for Christ, and his unwearied labours, have brought hundreds, perhaps thousands, to the truth as it is in Jesus. Through that labour, in that love, to his holy rest may we follow him! *Ave pia anima!*

ART. VIII.—THE NATURE AND WORTH OF THE SCIENCE OF CHURCH HISTORY.

AN INAUGURAL ADDRESS, BY PROF. H. B. SMITH, UNION THEOL. SEM., NEW YORK.

IN addressing the Directors of the Union Theological Seminary and this respected audience, upon an occasion of such solemn interest to myself, and so closely connected with the welfare of the institution which they guard and cherish, I would, if possible, forget my own unfitness for the office to which I have been called, and accept its duties in the name and for the sake of the Great Head of the Church. It is the history of his church which I am to teach. And if the guidance of his wisdom is needed at all times by all his disciples, it is especially needed by his ministry; yet more by those called to train men for his ministry, and in some peculiar respects by one who is to narrate the history of his kingdom to its future preachers in our age and country.

The history of the church is not the straightforward narrative of the fortunes of an isolated community with inferior ends in view, but it is an account of the rise, the changes and the growth of the most wonderful economy the world has known, embracing the most comprehensive purposes which human thought can grasp. It has maintained itself in the historic progress of the race, as has no empire. It has been aggressive, attacked, progressive and diffusive, as has no other community. It has moved through States, intertwined itself with institutions, changed politics, shaped national and individual character, affected all moral and social interests, and been interwoven with the whole web of human destiny. He who would know the principles which have really controlled human thought and action, will, if he be wise, explore the records of

that kingdom which has had the longest duration and the strongest influence. On human grounds alone it may challenge the most earnest study of every thoughtful mind. But this history is invested with a solemn, a sublime interest, when it is viewed as the record of a divine economy, established in an apostate world, centering in the incarnation of the Son of God, and having for its object the redemption of the race, through the might of the Holy Spirit. As such, it contains the most antagonistic elements. For, though the origin of this kingdom be divine, and though its consummation will be the glorious and untroubled manifestation of God's grace and wisdom, yet, between the origin and the consummation there is a theatre of strife, where the strongest energies of good and ill, all the forces of a supernatural and all the forces of a natural kingdom, wage perpetual warfare. It is in the vanquishing of mighty and subtle foes that the kingdom of Christ has shown its superior and supreme authority. There is progress, but it is progress through conflict. There are the victories of faith, there is also the partial success of unbelief, there is advance in spiritual freedom, there is the exaltation of spiritual despotism; there are enemies without, and feuds within; there is the growth, there is also the perversion, of Christian doctrine; there is the church separate from the world, and the church contending against submission to, and domineering over, states and empires; and all this, not in one land, or one century, but from East to West, through many centuries, in the most puissant nations of the earth. And if it is chiefly in the conflicts of the race that we are to read the destiny of the race, then through these, its mightiest conflicts, may we be taught, that he who would reach forth his hand to grasp the solemn urn that holds the oracles of human fate can find it only in the Christian church. And if Lord Bacon could say in view of the visible creation, "God forbid that we give forth the dream of our fancy as the model of the world, but may he rather vouchsafe us his grace that we may indite a revelation and true vision of the march and signet of the Creator impressed upon creation;" much more ought he, who explores the revelations of God in his new and spiritual creation, to feel the constant need of that divine illumination which can alone enable him to distinguish what is from God and what is from man, what is transient, and what is worthy of lasting veneration; which can alone enable him to get above all these contests, so as to read their meaning, and so to read their meaning as to see the march and signet of redemptive grace impressed upon the moral history of our earth.

While the position of a teacher of Church History is thus,

from the nature of the case, always responsible and arduous, it is especially so to one who is called to discharge the functions of this office in our age and in our land. There are advantages, indeed, as well as disadvantages, but both the advantages and the disadvantages increase the measure of his toil. There is an accumulation of historical materials, and this is an advantage; but they are more than sufficient to task the freshest powers in the longest life. There are now better digests of the materials than were even imagined possible half a century ago, but the teacher must verify their details and try their principles. The presumptuous and ignorant assaults of a base philosophy against the Christian church, have well nigh spent their force; no sane and instructed mind would now dare to represent it as injurious to humanity, as the work of priestcraft, as a complex of endless and useless logomachy, and as sterile of all rational interest. These vulgar objections had their origin in schools which imagined that matter was more intelligible than mind, and in countries where the history of Christianity was identified with the progress of Romish corruptions; and they now live only in the souls that are the fitting receptacles of the veriest dregs of human thought. They have been refuted in part by the very progress of Christianity, as well as by a better philosophy, and a more comprehensive view of man's history. But these larger views of human history bring with them still graver duties to the historian of the church, because most of them assign to the church a subordinate position in the development of the race, and thus impose the necessity of giving a more philosophical character to the exposition of that history, so that it shall be seen to embrace all, as well as the spiritual interests of humanity.

There are also disadvantages in the study of this branch of learning, springing from our systems of education and national habits of thought. As a people, we are more deficient in historical training than in almost any other branch of scientific research. We live in an earnest and tumultuous present, looking to a vague future, and comparatively cut off from the prolific past—which is still the mother of us all. We forget that the youngest people are also the oldest, and should therefore be most habituated to those "fearless and reverent questionings of the sages of other times, which," as Jeffrey well says, "is the permitted necromancy of the wise." We love the abstractions of political theories, and of theology, better than we do the concrete realities of history. Church history has been studied from a sort of general notion that it ought to be very useful, rather than from any lively conviction of its inherent worth. History is to us the driest of studies; and the history

of the church is the driest of the dry—a collection of bare names, and facts, and lifeless dates. It is learned by rote, and kept by mnemonic helps. Whole tracts of its course realize to us the notion of the philosopher in Addison, who used to maintain the existence of tenebrific stars, whose peculiar office it was to ray out positive darkness. Its sources are buried in the dust of alcoves, and when exhumed it is seldom with the insignia of a resurrection. They are investigated for aid in present polemics, not to know the past but to conquer in an emergency; as if one should run over American history only in view of incorporating a bank, or passing a tariff-bill. While we all confess that there are sources of sublime interest in the study of the visible heavens, and that no research is too deep into the successive strata of the solid earth, we are slow to believe that in the course of human history, we are to find the revelation of the sublimities of a spiritual kingdom, and the registry of the successive epochs of that new creation, in which divine wisdom and love are manifested and mirrored forth, as they cannot be in the orbits of lifeless stars, or in the growth of the unconscious earth.

While I attempt, then, as a subject appropriate to the occasion, to set forth the Nature and Worth of the Science of Church History, I would also crave the indulgence of this audience to my seeming exaggerations of an unfamiliar theme, in the belief that its inherent dignity will commend it to their favourable regard.

And I propose to speak in the first place, of the nature or true idea of the science of church history; and, in the second place, to show its worth as a part of theological training especially in our times.

I. The nature of the science of church history. What is, then, church history as a science? What is the true idea of this branch of theological learning?

The different departments of theological study are usually and most appropriately grouped under the four divisions of exegetical, doctrinal, historical and practical theology. The scope of each branch is well defined by the term applied to it. Historical theology embraces all that pertains to the historic progress of the church, under the historical point of view. Doctrines and polity as well as external facts belong to it, yet not as doctrines and not as polity, but as the history of doctrines and polity, reproducing them with impartiality and critical sagacity in the order in which they have really existed. The church historian ought indeed so to teach, as, by his instructions, to confirm soundness in faith and attachment to ecclesiastical order; he ought to apply to history at all points the

test of that word which alone is inspired and authoritative; but in order to do this, his first duty is to present the facts themselves in the order of their occurrence. Then he may judge them in their bearings on the great ends for which the church was instituted. And all the facts in both the external and internal history of the church, its progress and its reverses, its constitution, doctrines and ritual, its theologies and its spiritual life, its effects on nations and the influence of races upon itself, its contests with human thought in all the phases of philosophy, its bearings on social, moral and political well-being, its relations to art and culture,—all these points fall, in their historical aspects, under the department of historical theology, they constitute the materials of the science of church history.

What is, then, the true idea of this science? We may answer this inquiry by considering these three points: that it is history, that it is church history, and that it is the science of church history.

1. It is, in the first place, history with which we have to do; and the history of the church falls under the conditions and laws, and has the dignity of all history. It is what has been transacted on the theatre of the world in its past centuries through human agencies, made known to us by means of monuments and testimony. It is a body of facts, but specifically of facts about the human race. It is with man that history has to do; we can talk of a history of animals or of nature only by courtesy. It is with men collectively that history has to do, and not as individuals; historical personages are historical because they are the actors in events which affect the general good. The life of an individual is a biography; the life of a community is its history. And such a history is made up of a *series* of events, an orderly succession, no one of which can be understood except in its connections with the rest. And it is a series of events containing all the great and permanent interests of humanity. Human history in its real character is not an account of kings and of wars; it is the unfolding of the moral, the political, the artistic, the social, and the spiritual progress of the human family. The time will yet come when the names of dynasties and of battles shall not form the titles to its chapters. And the events of history are great, because they are freighted with the weal and woe of States, with the social and moral welfare of mankind. Historical facts have not only an existence in space and time, but they have also a moral life, they are instinct with the vitality of human interests. The whole movements of past centuries, and the whole momentum of centuries yet unborn, may meet upon a single plain, a single day, a single will. And of such epochs is the history of our earth made up in its majestic

course, as the historic races of the human family have come one after another into the van of that uncounted and ever-advancing host which started from its cradle in the East, swarmed through the plains of the Orient, skirted all the outline of the Mediterranean, toiled with slow advance from southern Europe even to its Northern shores, leaped the flaming walls of the old world, and now finds its largest theatre in this our Western continent, whither all nations, tribes, and tongues are congregating, bearing with them the elements, from which, it may be, the highest destiny of man is to be wrought out.

The greatness of history consists then, essentially, in these two things: that it is a body of facts, and that these facts are a means of leading us to a knowledge of the great realities of human welfare, and of the actual development of the race under the pressure of all its vital interests. Its solidity is in its facts; it is above the sphere of mere speculation, as much as is nature, though it is a proper and the highest object of speculative inquiry. And it is impossible to get at a comprehensive view of man's nature and destiny, without the lights and monuments of the past. The most speculative nation of modern times, in its re-action from the unsatisfying results of its universal and abstract philosophical systems, has thrown itself with ardour into the most elaborate historical investigations. The most imposing pantheistic system which was ever framed, the most compact and consistent, was bereft of its power, chiefly in its attempt to reconstruct the moral and religious history of mankind in conformity with its desolating principles. It fell upon this stone, and was broken. It touched the monuments of time, and became impotent. Fiction may be great, but history is grand. Philosophy is noble, but history is its test.

It is now the province of the historian to revivify the past. Its successive periods are to live again upon the historic page. "Even what from its antiquity is but little known," says Harris in his *Hermes*, "may, on that very account, have all the charm of novelty." It will have this, if the historian gives us, not dead facts, but living men and broad human interests. Of that high art which thus makes the past present and the absent real, Gibbon is the greatest English master, though his vision reached only to the confines of the central kingdom of our earth. The historian is also to reproduce events, so that we may read them better than did the very actors in them; for he who is fighting in the thick of the conflict sees but a small part of the movements of the army, and even the general who directs the host cannot foresee the results of his victory or disaster. But in the results the historian is to read the causes. He is to teach us the events in the light of their principles and

laws. These he is to seek out with a patient, a sympathizing, a reverential, and a truly inductive spirit. And his true office is not completed, if he gives us only partial principles and laws, but only as he gives us those which truly explain the greatest results of the greatest events. It is indeed true that historical causes are so manifold, that nothing is easier than to build up some brilliant and partial theory, and cite facts in its confirmation, but it only requires a more thorough study of history to disclose the deception, just as it only needs an open vision to see that a Grecian temple, or a Gothic cathedral, or a phalanstery is not the whole of the landscape, though it may engross the meditations of some rapt enthusiast. He who thus reads history in the light of all its impregnable facts, to get from them its laws, will be led along to see that human motives and interests do not embrace the whole of it, but that it is also the sphere of a divine justice, and the theatre of a divine kingdom.

2. And this leads us to our second point, and that is, that the subject of our science is not only history, but church history, that is, the record of the progress of the kingdom of God, intermingling with and acting upon all the other interests of the human race, and shaping its destiny.

That man looks with limited or with sealed vision upon the annals of the human race, who does not descry, running through all its course, underlying it, and prominent above it, the workings of a spiritual kingdom, whose influence, in one or another form, has defined the metes and bounds of history. To the rest of history it bears the same relation that the granite does to the earth's strata, it is both deepest and highest, it supports by its solidity beneath, and juts out in its sublimity in the loftiest summits.

The character of a people is shaped in part by its geographical position, whether along the lines of rivers, or among the mountains; it is formed in part by the influence of climate, and in the same climate, by diversities of race; political institutions serve to make men submissive or independent; social influences act with keener energy, reaching to the very fireside; more potent still are strictly moral causes, the degree in which right or wrong is practically applied; but that which shapes the whole character, and determines the final destiny of a people, that which has always done this, and from the nature of the case must do this, is its religious faith. For here are the highest objects acting on the deepest and most permanent wants of the human heart. And in the whole history of man we can trace the course of one shaping, overmastering and progressive power, before which all others have bowed, and that is

the spiritual kingdom of God, having for its object the redemption of man from the ruins of the apostasy.

This kingdom gives us the three ideas in whose light we may best read the history of our race, and they are sin, holiness and redemption.

If we could but fully realize the majestic simplicity of this kingdom, its spiritual nature and sublime intent, if we could make present to us the full idea of it, which is not an idea alone, but also a reality; if we could see that holiness is the great end of our being, and that sin is its very opposite, and that redemption is for the removal of sin, and the establishment of a holy kingdom, then were we in the right position for reading, in their highest meaning, all the records of our race.

To narrate the history of this kingdom is the object of church history. And it brings us at once to the very centre and life of all history. By its light we may discern the very structure of human history, even as it is said that the anatomist may dissect the Brazilian fire-fly by the light which it emits. It runs through the chronicles of recorded time, from the beginning even until now. It has educated the race. It was revealed in the first promise, it survived the flood of waters; it was made a special covenant in the family of Abraham; the law given on Sinai was to prepare for its full manifestation; the Jewish people was secluded, that it might bear it safe in type and prophecy, and in their very lineage, in the midst of the corruptions of Pagan idolatries; the heathen nations came under one empire, and through them was diffused one language, that they might be prepared for its complete advent; and it was brought to its full establishment, and invested with all its functions and powers, when the Son of God became incarnate, that He might die for our redemption; and from this, the era of the Incarnation, this kingdom has gone on, conflicting and conquering, with each century binding new trophies upon its victorious brow, adding strength to its loins and swiftness to its feet; and now it remains, still militant, hopeful as in its earliest youth, and wiser in its matured vigour, diffusing far and wide its innumerable blessings, and bearing in its divine powers and sacred truths the hopes and destiny of the human race.

The true idea of church history then embraces these points; God has made a revelation of himself to man, having for its object the redemption of man. "What education is to the individual, that is revelation to the race." This revelation is made in a real, instituted, historical economy. This economy centres in the Person and Work of our Lord, who is the living Head of a new creation. Of the life, the doctrines and the growth of this new creation, the elect church, he is the source,

through the energy of his Spirit. And the history of the church tells us how far the redemptive purposes of God have been accomplished in the actual course of human events. That history, in its actual course, has been a connected series, all its facts being bound together by their common reference to Christ and his kingdom. That history has been a developing process, not only in the way of external diffusion, subduing the nations, not only in its external politics, changing to meet the exigencies of the times, not only in the application of its principles more deeply and sharply to all the relations and institutions of society, but also in its doctrines which have been unfolded, defined, and systematized, so as to ward off objections, and to bring the Christian system into harmony with all other truth as a scientific whole. This developing process is not arbitrary, but it has its laws, and also its tests, both of which it is the duty of the historian to set forth. He is to exhibit all the elements which constitute the Christian church, in their just relations, doctrines, polity, spiritual life, and external events acting upon each other, and all working together in the unfolding of the kingdom of God. And this history does not stand alone; it is a part of universal history, containing its central and controlling elements; so that as a mere matter of historic justice, he who would study the records of the race with a humility like that which animates the true minister and interpreter of nature, will find impressed upon them the principles and laws of that supernatural kingdom whose final glories shall be hymned in anthems of exulting praise in that heavenly realm where the triumphant church shall celebrate the centuries of its jubilee.

This is the general idea of church history. And here I cannot forbear citing a passage from the works of the elder Edwards, our greatest American divine, which, taken for all in all, is perhaps the most remarkable he ever penned, and which shows the clearest insight into the real nature of the Christian church. In his letter to the Trustees of Princeton College, when they invited him to their presidency, he says, "I have on my mind and heart a great work, which I call a History of Redemption, a body of divinity in an entire new method, being thrown into the form of a history, considering the affair of Christian theology, as the whole of it, in each part stands in reference to the great work of Redemption by Jesus Christ; which I suppose to be of all others the grand design of God, and the summum and ultimum of all the divine operations and decrees; particularly considering all parts of the grand scheme in their historical order; the order of their existence or their being brought forth to view in the course of divine dispensations, or the wonderful

series of successive acts and events; beginning from eternity and descending from thence to the great work and successive dispensations of the infinitely wise God, in time; considering the chief events coming to pass in the church of God, and revolutions in the world of mankind, affecting the state of the church, and the affair of redemption, which we have an account of in history or prophecy, till at last we come to the general resurrection, last judgment and consummation of all things, when it shall be said, 'It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end;' concluding my work with a consideration of that perfect state of things which shall be finally settled, to last for eternity. This history will be carried on with regard to all three worlds, heaven, earth, and hell, considering the connected, successive events and alterations in each, so far as the Scriptures give any light; introducing all parts of divinity in that order which is most scriptural and most natural; a method which appears to me the most beautiful and entertaining, wherein every divine doctrine will appear to the greatest advantage, in the brightest light, in the most striking manner, showing the admirable contexture and harmony of the whole." In this most striking sketch, which is only partially carried out in Edwards's Posthumous History of Redemption, and in which the very involutions of the style show the presence of the ideas that are struggling for utterance, we have an outline of the history of the church, as noble as any man ever sketched, as yet unrivalled in the English tongue, and which, of the men of his age, Jonathan Edwards alone could fully conceive: *solus sed sic sol*.

3. The third point necessary to an understanding of the true nature of our subject is, that church history is to be exhibited in a scientific form. It is history, it is church history, and it is the science of church history. It ought to be studied in a scientific method, in accordance with true scientific principles.

That exhibition of a subject, properly called scientific, consists essentially in this—that its facts are brought under their legitimate laws or principles, and that they are viewed in their connections with the causes which have produced them, and the ends to be accomplished by them. The basis of all science is facts; the first process is to bring these facts under their appropriate general laws. Many philosophers, especially in the natural sciences, stop here, neglecting both the efficient and final causes, scouting them as metaphysical, or banishing them to what they esteem a barren theology. This view not only limits science, but it favours pantheism. And it is essentially unphilosophical, for the inquiry after the really efficient causes,

and the ends of phenomena, is as philosophical as the inquiry after their immediate antecedents.

And what we here claim is, that the history of the Christian church ought to be presented in a scientific method. As so presented, it is one of the noblest objects to which human thought can be directed. And this is now of special importance, in consequence of the prevalence of partial and unchristian speculations about the history and destiny of the human race.

The time is past when history could be viewed as a bare narrative of events, without any purpose or deductions. Everybody now-a-days speculates about events, more or less, well, badly or still worse. That style of treating history too, which consisted in explaining all great events by merely personal motives, is tolerably antiquated, as if the Reformation broke out because Luther wished to marry Catherine von Bora, or Mohammedanism sprang up because Mohammed was ambitious and had visions in epilepsy. It has even been found that steam, electricity, gunpowder, and printing, are not sufficient to account for the whole of modern civilization, and we only wonder at the enthusiastic admirer of the typographic art, who exclaimed, "Be not deceived, Luther was great, but Guttenberg was greater." All thinking men must and will seek for higher and better causes for the great events of time. At the same time, many a brilliant and partial generalisation of the facts of history, which protrudes some social or political object as the great end of the race, is seducing even earnest and thoughtful minds from the simplicity and sublimity of the Christian faith. And hence we say it is well to present the history of the church in a truly scientific way, that the superiority of Christianity may be evinced. Church history is now to be conducted and taught in comparison and contrasted with the false philosophy of history. And, as thus taught, it is the best philosophy of history which can be written, the best vindication of the ways of God with man. It is the true philosophy of human history.

What is necessary to such a view of it we will proceed to state in the light of that definition of science which has been already given. According to this, the scientific exhibition of the history of the church would consist in the presentation of all the facts that concern the kingdom of God in Christ, in their orderly succession, with their causes, whether proximate or ultimate, and in their bearings on the divine purpose for the redemption of the world through Jesus Christ, which purpose will be fulfilled in the perfect fellowship of a divine kingdom,

where justice shall adjust and love harmonise the relations of all its members.

For the sake of distinctness, it may be well to bring out more definitely the points embraced in this statement.

Church history rests upon a broad basis of facts, given in the Revelation on which it reposes, or in the course of its history. This is the basis of the science.

These facts are to be presented, as they occurred, in orderly succession grouped around the signal epochs in which the combined interests and relations of the church have undergone some decisive change. Such points of convergence and divergence are, for example, the age of Constantine and the Reformation. This would give us the real historic course and main epochs of the history.

Here, then, we have a series of events, comprising the great and decisive interests of the human race. The inquiry next suggested is, what are the principles and laws upon which this development has proceeded; what are the actual principles, and what is their inherent worth? The proximate principles, now, are unquestionably the motives and feelings of the actors in the events. But the motives of the actors are determined by more general causes, inherent in the times, and the institutions in the midst of which they live and act.

And in determining these more general causes, Christian philosophy runs counter to all naturalistic or pantheistic schemes. The latter finds them in an impersonal reason, in universal ideas, in human interests or rights, in abstract laws, in social impulses. The former refers them ultimately to the purpose of God, to a real personal Providence, to an Incarnate Redeemer, to the living agencies in a divine kingdom. The one makes them to be from God, the other from reason; the one speaks of a real manifestation of God, the other of an advance in human freedom. The latter equally with the former must concede the actual existence of the church and its history; but he tries to explain this history without God, or Christ, or the Spirit's influences, and without assuming the reality of the truths which centre in this kingdom. Christian philosophy does not deny that men are animated by ideas of justice and freedom, by political and social rights, for this were unwise and contrary to fact, but it says that the facts of history are not fully and rationally explained by them alone, that they demand more than this. It does not deny that there is in history a mixture of causes, some good and some evil, but it says that the overruling ones have been for good, and chiefly through the church of Christ, and wholly through the providence of God. It claims that the very facts of church history, which all must

grant to be a part of human history, cannot be rationally accounted for, excepting on the supposition of the historic reality of the grand revelation of God in Christ and his kingdom.

Abstract ideas, or human interests, or both combined, will not account for the rise and growth of such an economy as is the Christian church. It has been admirably said, "There is one symbolical book of the Christian faith, which will ever do despite to the attacks of a negative criticism, and this is the history of the world. In proportion as historical investigations are elaborated into a universal historical science, in the same proportion will Christ be acknowledged as the eternal and divine substance of the whole historical life of the world, and his sacred person will greet us everywhere on the historic page, as it also greets us everywhere in the Scriptures of our faith."*

But to explain aright this historical progress of the church, we need a test as well as a cause ; we need to ask for the value and authority of the facts. For without such a test we are in utter confusion, and must take all as it comes, for better or worse. We may become the prey of any system of delusion under the vague notion that it is a part of the historical development. Rome might claim us, for she has been developed ; all the systems of philosophy might claim us, for all the systems of philosophy have been developed ; all the sects in Christendom might invoke our homage, for all the sects in Christendom have been developed ; all the parties out of Christendom might claim us, for all the parties out of Christendom have been developed. And if we were divided among them all, little of faith or reason would be left to us.

No idea more vague or unsubstantial has ever been more current than has that of a mere development. It is not merely pernicious, it is also worthless, unless we can show what it is that is developed, what are the laws that regulate the development, and what are the tests by which it is to be tried. And here is where the philosophy of history must differ from the philosophy of nature. In studying nature we may be content with generalising the facts, thus getting at its laws ; although a rigid and complete method would compel us to carry out our speculations still further. But in studying history, in the investigation of moral causes, we need a test by which to try the facts and the principles ; for sin is in history as well as holiness, error as well as truth, man as well as God. We need a test, and one not taken at random, but approved as such by the very course of history itself.

* So, for substance, Professor Brandis, of Bonn, in his *History of Philosophy*.

And to the believer in a divine revelation, such a test is given in the sacred Scriptures. By its truths and doctrines all history, and especially the history of the church, is to be judged. And that this test is not an arbitrary one may be inferred, not only from the proof of the inspiration of the Bible, but also from the actual course of human history. As a matter of fact, the truths revealed in the Bible have been the touch-stone which has tried men's spirits. Human speculation has not gone beyond, has not even fathomed its wonderful revelations. It has been the historical arbiter of Christian controversy. Its perversions have been judgments, and its truths light and life. It is a marvellous thing to see the supremacy of this Revelation in the actual course of human history. It is instructive to read the history of the church, and all human history, by its light. For, as a matter of simple fact, the whole history of the church might be summed up with saying that it consists in pouring into the human race the treasures of this volume, there to germinate, until the kingdom revealed in word and promise shall be fully manifested in its reality and power.

To complete the philosophical view of Christian history one additional point is needed, and that is the exhibition of the end or object to which the history is tending. Of anything living and spiritual, we do not have the true conception until we know the end for which it was made, as well as the actual course and laws of its growth. We understand man fully only in the light of the ends of his being. We have no intelligent apprehension of the true nature of the Christian church until we see not only the course and laws of its history, but also *how* the whole course of its history bears on the great object for which it was instituted. That object is the bringing the race back to union with God, through the grace of Christ, by the influences of the Spirit, and in the fellowship of men one with another. And this object can only be achieved by the application of the principles of God's kingdom to all human relations and institutions, bringing them all under its divine supremacy, in accordance with justice and in subordination to love. It is the bringing all inferior ends into subjection to the highest end, it is the making the laws of a divine kingdom supreme over all lower laws. Church history shows how far this end has been actually accomplished, and it ought to make us both wise and earnest in carrying on the church still further towards the same great object.

In the greatness and grandeur of the end which Christianity thus holds out to man, the superiority of the Christian system over all other systems is most fully manifested. It embraces more than they all, and what is more adapted to human wants, and what is more consistent with the facts of history. For the

most current and fascinating of these schemes represents some purely human or social interests, some organization for the promotion of "humanitarian" ends, as the great object for which the race has been toiling, as the grand secret so long hidden in the womb of parturient time, with which she has been in travail these six thousand years, and of which she is soon to be delivered. But never was there so long a labour for so slight a progeny. This toil of all the nations, these conflicts of the church, this slow advance through strife, only to issue in the securing of political rights and a better social state! If any view could lead us to despair of Providence and of man, it is such a view of human history as this. All the great labours and conflicts of the past have been for unreal objects. And this is the view of those who believe in man alone, and in the supremacy of reason; they are the very ones who find the least of truth in history, and nothing of permanency in the church, which still has been made up of rational men.

But while protesting against such philosophemes, and such a view of human history, as essentially defective, and contrary to fact, we should also be careful not to err on the other extreme, and deny human rights and human reason, and be indifferent to social progress. It is a dishonour to the church to suppose that it can be indifferent to these questions. One of the ends of Christianity, not its highest end, but necessary thereto, is to elevate reason, to secure freedom, and to enhance all social blessings. To take any other ground is to leave Christianity in the back ground. The Christian church must set itself right with these, or it loses its hold of the age, as did Rome, three centuries ago. It must show its superiority to all other systems chiefly by showing that only on its basis can human rights be safely adjusted, human welfare promoted, and a higher social state introduced among mankind. Christianity is designed to make this world fairer, and wiser, and happier. It must show its supremacy by labouring for all human interests with the wisest zeal and the calmest energy, and the most assured conviction, keeping them subordinate in theory and in life, to the one comprehensive purpose which includes all the others, and that is, redemption from sin. Without haste, but without rest, earnestly, yet wisely, protesting against all that is unjust, and labouring for its eradication, with an intense sympathy for all who suffer, and bear the burdens, and know the wretchedness of our mortal life, giving with the largest charity, having the very spirit of self-sacrifice in heart and in life, ever working for truth and righteousness, and believing that they will come, using, as has been said, the very ruins of our earth to build up the temple of our Lord,—in such a spirit, and with

such ends, must the church of the redeemed labour, if it is to set forth the inherent superiority of the Christian system ; and under such aspects must it be viewed, that it may realize the full idea of the kingdom of Christ, as a holy society exhibiting the manifest glory of the supreme God in the redemption of mankind from *all* the consequences of the great apostasy.

Such is the sublime view of the great objects at which God is aiming, and of the final destiny of the race, which is given us in the Christian church and its history. All the interests of the human race are garnered up in its comprehensive purposes. It has principles so universal and efficient that they alone can reconcile the conflicts and restore the disorders of our fallen state. It gives us the most elevated and inspiring view of the ultimate destiny of the human race. It gives us not a speculation, but a real historical economy ; not a merely projected scheme, but one which has endured and conquered, one which has thus far approved itself as adapted to human wants and to human welfare. It gives us a kingdom which reaches forward through the world, beyond the world, even to the eternity of our being. It is a kingdom, too, in which are first adjusted the highest antagonisms, as the means of harmonizing all our lesser conflicts. It gives us agencies sufficient to carry all these ends into fulfilment. This kingdom, reposing for its foundation upon the purpose of the Father, centering in the God-man, divine and human both, animated by the living energy of the Holy Spirit, adjusting the relations between a holy God and a sinful world, intended to reconcile men with each other as well as with God, and having for its object the final redemption of mankind, —such a kingdom is as far superior in its majesty and rightful authority to any merely philosophical speculation about the destiny of the race, as fact is superior to theory, and as a divinely-revealed system is superior to the one-sided excogitations of the poor sciolist, who talks as if humanity were all, and as if his own speculations were the first light that has ever illumined the earth.

This exhibition of the great ends to be wrought out by the church completes the scientific view of its history, and gives to it fulness and roundness ; that which was from the beginning in the purpose of the Father is that which is realized in the end in the kingdom of his Son. And thus the circle is completed, the end returns to the beginning, and God is all in all.

And if the inquiry about the ends for which the race was made is a necessary inquiry, if no science can be complete which does not answer it, and if that science is best which answers it from the point of view which embraces all the relations of man, then, on the basis of the Christian revelation, may we erect the

best science of human history, for here we know by the sure word of prophecy, what is the great end set before the human race.

Such a scientific view of the history of the church as is that whose outline we have thus attempted to sketch, gives us the real philosophy of human history, and that, too, not on speculative but on historical grounds. That there is such a philosophy, not all the vagaries and delusions of infidel speculations should lead us to deny. They should rather induce us to use the old prerogative of our faith, that of turning the weapons forged in the camp of its enemies into the means of its own defence and victory. They should lead us to show that that view of human nature and destiny which is given by the light of Christianity, is immeasurably more comprehensive and elevating, more friendly to real progress and rights, more accordant with the whole welfare of mankind, and more consistent with all the facts of history than any scheme which infidel speculation is capable of projecting. Until any one can propound a system which shall propose to do more (and what is more needed than the redemption of a sinful world through an incarnate God, in an eternal kingdom, whose blessings are bestowed on all who will accept them?) the supremacy of Christianity as a system must needs be conceded. And this is our confidence—either Christianity is to go on and do its work, and redeem the race, or it will be superseded by something higher and better, and if so—by what?

And it is our conviction that if any would really study the history of our earth in a truly philosophical and docile spirit, even if he began from the merely human point of view, asking only what has actually approved itself as best and highest to man, that he would be led through the race above the race; that from the very facts of the case he would come to the recognition of the existence, and authority, and need of just such a kingdom, and of just such a view of human history as is given us in the records of the Christian church. If any do not come to such a result, it is because they do not study history in a truly inductive spirit, or else they study it with some preconceived bias against Christianity. Those who think metaphysics to be the highest of blessings, and abstractions to be the great realities, might come to different results. But this is because they have neither reverence for facts, nor a right method of interpreting them. They do not study history to learn, but to try their own schemes upon it. They destroy the substance of the facts to make out their theories. There was once a statue of Isis, veiled, in the hall of a priest's temple at Memphis. His son, longing to see the face, struck off the veil with hammer and

chisel, and found only a block of raw, shapeless stone. And this wise child is no unapt representative of those who study history without reverence, and without taking into account the fact that man is a religious being; they may strike off the veil of the divinity, and then say there is no divinity there; but they have not studied the statue, they have only tried the power of a hammer and a chisel. If we reverence the divinity that is in history, we shall see it through its veil, we shall feel and know its power, we shall see that there is a divinity which shapes man's ends, rough-hew them as he may.

I should be doing a silent injustice to the memory of a venerable and beloved teacher, if I closed this part of my subject without acknowledging my indebtedness for a right view of church history to the teachings and writings of the most eminent church historian of our day, the venerated and beloved Neander. His favourite motto, inscribed under his likeness, was—Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face. In this spirit he lived and studied, and now, we trust, he sees face to face, taken, alas! too soon, as we vainly say, in the midst of his gigantic toil upon his incomparable history. Still can we see that familiar and bent frame, that countenance so Jewish in outline, and so Christian in expression when he let out upon you the full light of his eyes, usually veiled. The records of the Christian church were the study of his life, and his works are a monument to the dignity of its history. He explored the dark mines and brought to light radiant treasures. He united the most laborious research, with the most genial sympathy for all that is human, for all that is Christian. We almost forget that he may have been too lenient, when we remember how easy it is to be too intolerant. We think less that he fails in the graphic narrative of detail, because we feel so deeply the richness of that spirit, which could make the whole of Christian history so dear to our hearts, and so elevating to our faith. While we would ever judge his particular opinions only by the highest standard, we would speak of himself as we ought to speak of a man, who passed through all the conflicts of his age and country, and kept firm and high his conviction of the supernatural origin of Christianity, and had a living sense of Christ's grace, and in all his life and writings exemplified the power of that faith which overcometh the world, and of that charity which is the greatest of the virtues. And the unobtrusiveness of his studious life has been equalled only by the extent of his growing influence. His memorial shall not depart away, and his name shall live from generation to generation.

II. The Worth of the Science of Church History. If the view we have given of the science of church history be correct,

we can hardly over-estimate its value for all who are interested in the great problems of human destiny, and especially for those who are to be the preachers of the gospel of Christ, in our age and country.

1. And it has, in the first place, an inherent dignity. It is valuable for its own sake.

If man was made to know, so that all knowledge is good, then must that history be of an elevating influence, and most worthy of regard, which reveals to us what the race is for, what it has been and is to be, and which brings us into the heart of all its conflicts. There is something admirable, worthy even of our wonder, in seeing the might and progress of a spiritual kingdom in a sinful world. There is no history to be compared with it in its intrinsic interest and grandeur. Beginning among the hills of Judea, it went forth amid the chaos of Pagan idolatries, and within a century its churches were planted, in spite of persecution, in all the chief cities of the Roman empire. It became strong through suffering. The succession to its chief churches was, as Ranke says, a succession to martyrdom, as well as to office, but the succession was always full. It fought in the shade, only because the air was filled with the arrows of its foes. It became so strong in Rome, that neither a Nero nor a Decius could quench its fires in blood. The persecutions of a Diocletian through the whole empire, only served to reveal its hidden might. As Dante says of the Pope, that his adversity was great, until he became great in his adversity, so was it with the early church; and when it became great in its adversity, and the emperors could not suppress it, then they bowed before it. It had existed in the catacombs, but under Constantine it was established upon the throne of the Cæsars, and its worship was celebrated in the basilicas of Constantinople. It changed the whole face of the ancient world. When the northern barbarian hordes desolated the empire, the church was consolidated and prepared for their coming; so that although Italy was laid waste, the kingdom of Christ subdued these fierce foes unto herself. This irruption of the North upon the South, was the providential means of spreading Christianity from the south to the north of Europe. The church converted the Teutonic races, which, under its auspices, have been the regenerating element in modern civilization. When the balance of the political power of Europe was transferred from the south to the north, the Papacy of the south resisted and subdued the imperial encroachments, in that long strife between Guelph and Ghibelline. It gave to Europe strength to resist that Moslem zeal which strove to scale its battlements. It influenced the prowess of that honourable yet corrupt chivalry, which showed both its might and its blindness,

in regaining the sepulchre of our Lord. Through its very successes, the church had now become almost inebriated; and in the pride of its power, it usurped the place due only to its Head. Yet, even in the night of the middle ages, its scholars were giving needed shape and precision to its theological systems. The learning which it brought from the east, awakened a new spirit of inquiry; its depotism provoked national resistance; its Pelagianism called out the spiritual prowess of the heroes of the Reformation, and the old Gospel was spoken anew in their mother tongues to the waiting nations. Rome was left in the south; and, among the free and investigating nations of the north, the church exhibited itself in new forms, to meet the exigencies of that new spirit which was spreading among the people. It was a new trial for the Christian church, whether it could maintain its authority in the midst of freedom of thought and of philosophical research. And Protestantism has proved to us that it can,—the thoughtful Protestantism of the Lutheran churches, and the aggressive and advancing Protestantism of the Reformed churches. To the latter was vouchsafed the office of maintaining the supremacy of Christianity among the freest, the most commercial nations of the earth. The aggressive and progressive portion of modern church history belongs to this branch of the church. And nobly has it fulfilled its office, both in the Old World and in the New. Calvin once said, the greatest living German historian was the virtual founder of the United States of America. And here the Christian church still lies at the basis of our institutions, and sustains them by its power, which we feel the less, because it is so equally diffused. It has grown with our growth, and strengthened with our strength. That sacred kingdom which began its contesting course at the city of Jerusalem, and passed victorious from Asia to Europe, and from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, which crossed the Atlantic in adventurous barks, has extended itself through the length and breadth of our land, and is now planted on the borders of the vast Pacific, to carry back, it may be, the treasures of its grace, from island to island, in a returning course, to the continent and the hills whence it first sprung, and fill Jerusalem with a higher praise.

And what other history can tell such a tale, or knows such marvels, such conflicts, and such victories?

And there is not only this, its external life,—there is also its hidden, spiritual life,—there are its spiritual heroes. It has its array of martyrs and confessors. There is the refiner's fire, and in it the molten gold. It perpetually renews the story of the burning bush that is not consumed. It tells us of those who have taken poverty for their bride, and, for the good of souls,

gone to the ends of the earth. It tells us of those who "have done things worthy to be written, and written what is worthy to be read." There are rivers of peace, gently flowing, "life, love and joy still gliding through;" through its whole history runs the river of God, whose depths are ever peaceful, though its surface be torn by the storms. And thus, from the history of Christ's church we may draw such spiritual lessons, that it shall be to us indeed a "book of holy doctrine," nourishing our hearts in the truth and love of God.

2. Another point of view under which the value of church history may be considered, to which our limits allow us only to advert, is its bearings on the vindication of God's providence in his moral government of the world. The strongest objections to God's providential rule, are on the field of history; and in the history and progress of the Christian church, with the aims it has in view, we have our best basis for a reply to the objections. Without the light of Christianity, human history is dark indeed, and hardly intelligible to any serious mind. And though difficulties may be left even from the Christian point of view, yet the most perplexing questions are solved, and solved not in the way of bare possibility and speculation, but on the ground of actual facts, on the basis of a revealed economy, which is full of blessings and of grace for the human race. This gives us points that "throb with light," in the midst of all the darkness. God's government of the world is thus seen to vindicate itself. As the scientific study of nature has given the best reply to the well-known Lucretian objection, *stat tanta prædita culpa*, so the thorough study of history will reveal to us a wisdom in the divine dealings, which is the best answer to inconsiderate objections to the moral government of God. But we cannot dwell upon this topic further, because for our present objects it is more needful to consider a third aspect under which the value of church history may be considered.

3. And that is, its general doctrinal bearings. Church history comprises the history of doctrines. This is its more important portion. It gives us the real internal life of the church. And it is a field more fruitful in interest than is almost any other portion of this history. Here we have that greatest of controversies, between philosophy and faith, of which all external conflicts are but the symbol. Here we are taught how Christianity approves itself as the highest reason. Here, too, we see that

" Truth crushed to earth shall rise again,
The eternal life of God is hers;
But error, wounded, writhes in pain,
And dies amid her worshippers."

It is animating to follow this record, and note the stadia of that

grand process through which the church has been passing, in order to come to a full comprehension of God's revealed will, and to reconcile the verities of Christianity with all other known truth. Each age has here had its special office. It is as if no one period had been able to grasp the full meaning of revelation; the first age was devoted to the Incarnation and the Trinity; the next to sin and grace; the next more especially to the polity and the sacraments; the age of scholasticism to a systematising of the previous labours. The Reformation brought out into bold relief the doctrine of justification, and the true idea of the church, while it delivered the church from an usurped ecclesiastical authority, and it produced the largest body of symbols and confessions. Then came the period of the conflict of Christianity at all points, even to its foundations, with criticism and philosophy, its contests with all the forms of infidelity, and the great attempt—in the midst of which we now stand—to reconcile the whole of Christianity with all the thoughts and interests of the race, to bring all our knowledge of human and divine things into one self-consistent system.

And whoever reads this inspiring record in a right spirit, will find it to have a two-fold value; it guards against heresy, and it confirms the essential truths of Christianity.

It is a preservative against error, according to the maxim, "forewarned, forearmed." Many an objection made against what are called the formulas of doctrine would vanish, if the history of those formulas were known. And, in fact, they cannot be thoroughly understood excepting in the light of their history, which tells us the reason for almost every word in the chief definitions. The formula, then, becomes full of life. If it is seen how Arius, and Pelagius, and Sabellius, were conquered, we shall give less heed to the attenuated repetition of their thrice-slain objections. It is a wise saying, "that only he who is able to trace an error to its roots, can tear it up by the roots." If we get at the roots, we need not spend so much time on the new sprouts of heresy. We shall thus be less apt to quake at every objection to the truth, and we shall have more of that calmness which is one prognostic of victory.

Of equal service is the history of doctrines, in confirming us in the truth. If, in the year 1384, Wyckliffe could write, "Truly aware I am, that the doctrine of the gospel may, for a season, be trampled under foot, and even suppressed by the threatenings of Antichrist, but equally sure I am that it shall never be extinguished, for it is the recording of the truth itself," much more may we say this now, with a faith confirmed by the history of almost five subsequent centuries. There have been, and there will be, conflicts; but those truths which are both

old and new, which are always and never old, which are always and never new, have still maintained their vantage ground. Those very truths, against which human reason has brought the subtlest objections, the Incarnation, the Trinity, Atonement, Justification, and Regeneration, those very truths, which to the superficial view seem contrary to reason, because they are above mere natural reason, are the ones which have received the strongest additional confirmation, in the progress of doctrinal discussion, which have approved themselves as fundamental in the Christian system. Thus, for example, the doctrine respecting the Person of our Lord, the union of the human and divine natures in his sacred person, that central doctrine of Christianity, has been assailed by every imaginable objection; some have denied his divinity, at the expense of his humanity; others, his humanity at the expense of his divinity; others still, have feigned a nature neither human nor divine; some have confounded the natures; others have divided the person; every form of philosophy, in each successive age, has done battle against this most vital and most comprehensive truth—and almost every form of philosophy has come at last to pay it obeisance. It has maintained its hold, so that in every century men have bowed at the name of Jesus, with such love and faith, as none but a suffering God-man could inspire. And the history of this truth reveals to us its sublimity and authority, and shows us the great practical end to be gained by a review of past controversy, and that is, in the mutations of human opinions to see the immutability and progress of divine truth.

4. This study of church history is of importance, not only in these general doctrinal aspects, but also, in the fourth place, in its application to present controversy.

We live in an age and in a country of sects and of controversies, and this is not so bad as an age of indifference or of spiritual bondage. Sects are better than coercion, and controversy than thoughtlessness.

But this variety of opinions imposes the necessity of a broader theological culture, so that we may know the grounds of difference and the points of agreement. The study of the history of opinions contributes to this.

All present controversy has a tendency to sharpen and limit the vision; the study of history has a tendency "to inbreed within us," what Milton calls, "that generous and Christianly reverence one of another, which is the very nurse and guardian of Christian charity." It gives a position above the controversy which is of inestimable value, especially to him who is involved in the controversy. Thus can we best distinguish between the essential and the contingent.

All intense doctrinal discussion has, likewise, a tendency to run back upon metaphysical distinctions, and to make these appear of too great relative importance; and as these distinctions are not so readily apprehended by the popular mind, there is a strong disposition on the part of the polemic, for the sake of popular effect, really to misinterpret his opponent, and to say that he denies the whole of a truth, when he only objects to some one of the forms in which it may be stated. And this, too, in forgetfulness of the fact that phraseology, which to the popular mind is definite, has become indefinite among theologians through the stress of controversy. The study of doctrinal history does not make any one less scrupulous in the use of terms, but rather more so; and it also shows the value of nice distinctions, and that is, that they are rather scientific than practical; and it makes one averse to the petty and easy art of the unscrupulous polemic, who appeals to popular prejudice to sustain a cause which he is in danger of losing in argument. He, who knows the full history of controversy, will be as little disposed as any one, to tamper with the truth for the sake of novelty; he will see the wisdom of the forms in which it is embodied; but he ought also to acquire such breadth of vision, that he will not unnecessarily exalt minor points of difference, even for the sake of displaying his own orthodoxy. It is easy to gain the notoriety of a polemic—little knowledge is needed to that; it is easy to exalt the difference between Old School and New, between Presbyterians and Congregationalists; but it is wiser and better to work together for our common good, and against our common foes. A state of things in our American churches, which should lead to more serious collisions between those so substantially at one as are Congregationalists and Presbyterians, which should annul that old Christian freedom and brotherhood, which made transitions from one to the other easy and unnoticed, could not be too much deplored. Far distant be the time when it can be said, that he who would go from hence thither cannot, neither ought any man to come hither from thence.

But the controversies among Protestants are not those in which church history has the most solid and needed lessons to convey. There is the still more important and urgent controversy between the Protestant and the Roman Catholic communions. While the political power of Rome is dying out at the heart, its spiritual claims are exalted at the extremities. And from the very nature of the Romish polity, this spiritual includes a political claim, wherever it can be enforced. Its dignitaries may praise republicanism, and toleration, and rights of conscience, and the social compact, in republican cathedrals and in

the halls of Congress; but, behind the rights of man are the rights of the church, the toleration they invoke is for them and not for mankind, the inviolable conscience is the Roman Catholic conscience; and, above all social compacts, is a sovereign and infallible church. They catch the popular ear by words, which, when interpreted in the light of their full system, are abhorrent to the popular ear. It may be, that they will yet be plagued by their own inventions, and that what is policy in the leaders may become conviction in the followers.

And this church invites us to a conflict, which cannot long be put off. It throws down the gauntlet, and boasts of our decline, perverting the facts of modern history, as it forged donations and decretals of all. And there is need among our ministry of a more thorough study of its real character, for the flowing lines by which we now vaguely define its differences from us, are not the real lines on which the battle is to be fought. Rivers are said to be good for the boundaries of peaceful States but bad for the defence of armies. If we would learn the real power and strategy of Rome, we must away from the rivers, to its hills and encampments.

The strength of Rome is in its completeness and consistency as an organic system. The Roman Catholic system is the most comprehensive, subtle, self-consistent, flexible and inflexible polity, which the mind of man ever wrought out for purposes of spiritual and temporal authority. Its parts are knit together. Doctrines, polity and rites—they are all members of one body, an organized, aggressive and zealous spiritual hierarchy, whose claims run through all the relations of life, trespass upon the sanctity of the family, unbind the oaths of political allegiance, and know no human or civil rights, which are not subordinate. From the cradle to the grave it accompanies each of its members with its mystical sacraments. It changes its astute policy at each emergency; as has been said, "it neutralized Aristotelianism by scholasticism, printing by art, the Albigenses by the Franciscan order, and a Luther by a Loyola." It is wise even to wiliness, and when it seems to succumb, it is just preparing to strike. It has something of that insatiable variety which Cicero attributes to nature, and also of that complex order, which modern science finds everywhere in nature. It can afford to be inconsistent for a moment, that it may be consistent in the end; it can outbid any other system with both the populace and the politician. It is by turns servile and despotic. And its systematic power is rivalled only by its zeal, and its zeal is not greater than is its adaptiveness to almost all moods and classes of mind. It awes by its power those whom it cannot enchant by its flatteries; it is harmless

to the submissive, meek to the inquiring, and intolerant to every adversary. It appeals to all the senses in its varied rites; it charms the understanding by the consistency of its system, and it subdues reason itself by its claims to infallibility. It is seductive to the barbarian, and alluring to the imaginative; its later converts have been among cultivated minds, who have lost sympathy with human rights, and despaired of reason, and were glad to submit to a venerable authority, which was strong through its traditions, and unfaltering in its aspirations. And all its policy and efforts look forward to one great end, that of a spiritual domination, embracing all the great temporal interests; the supremacy of a single see, having its seat in that ancient, venerable Rome, which, having conquered the whole of the Old World, and been supreme in mediæval times, would also give the law to the whole modern world, and make of Rome the centre of the earth.

While the strength of the Roman Catholic system is thus to be found in its consistency, and completeness and pliancy as an organized whole, the arguments in its favour, and its means of defence against assault, are chiefly on historical grounds. From the nature of the case, its claims to unity, infallibility and supremacy stand or fall with its tradition. This open foe of all our Protestantism, and this covert foe of all our civil rights, can be thoroughly undermined only on the historic field. The wisdom of the Reformers was seen as conspicuously in the production of the Magdeburg Centuries, as in any other of their works, and the *Annales* of Baronius, with all its continuations, have not filled up the breaches which were then made in the Roman bulwarks. A superficial study of history may be favourable to the Papacy, but a thorough exploration reveals the gaps in its assumed successions, destroys the figments of its traditions, shows the arts by which it came to power, and the gradual rise of its corruptions until Christ was hidden, and Christianity externalized and materialized, and the whole ecclesiastical system wrought out under Pelagian views of human nature and carnal views of Christ's spiritual kingdom. And the modern portion of that history exhibits the judgment that has been passed upon this usurping hierarchy. Even if, on historical grounds, Rome might prove itself fit for the middle ages, on the same grounds it can be proved unfit for the modern world. What might have been Catholic in mediæval times, is sectarian in modern times. Its history since the Reformation contains an argument against it as strong as is that derived from the record of the growth of its previous corruptions. Under the ardour of the attack, it did indeed at first exhibit the revival of missionary zeal; but its Eastern missions have died

away, and its churches in South America are among the most corrupt forms of Christianity. In Europe, its intolerance has provoked all the great religious wars; it has armed the Inquisition with new powers; it has published the decrees of Trent; and it has produced, denounced and welcomed back the society of the Jesuits. The decrees of Trent and the Jesuits are the great products of Rome since the Reformation; and in these decrees it has petrified itself in its doctrinal corruptions, and in the society of Jesus we have a body, all whose spirit does violence to the sacred name it bears. In our own country we have more hope of its reform, were it not that its leading advocates are so thoroughly hostile to our general spirit as a people, and so ultra-montane in all their tendencies.

And it is also worthy of remark, that in all the great contests of Christianity with its modern foes, Rome has kept in the back-ground. Once it led. But from the very nature of its system, it is not able to meet manfully the questions between science and revelation, between philosophy and faith, between the past and the present. The honour of these conflicts has been given to Protestantism; all the controversies between materialism and pantheism on one side, and Christianity on the other, have been conducted under Protestant auspices. Rome does not know how to reconcile Christianity with popular rights, nor reason with Revelation. It cannot do this on the basis of its system. It has said something about these things, but it has not discussed them. It can enforce duties, but it cannot recognize rights. It does not know man as man. Nor does it know, nor is it able to satisfy, the highest spiritual wants of man. It is not fitted to grapple with the great social problems of modern life. And while the whole of modern society is stirred to its depths by these great questions, which must be met and answered, this venerable hierarchy, in its great councils, is busying itself most intensely with that most important theological inquiry, upon which so much can be said and so little known—the immaculate conception of the Virgin.

A review of the whole history of the Roman Catholic Church is thus one of the best means for refuting its claims, showing us that what it attempts in theory never has been realized in fact; that, if in its grandeur it be like the venerable cathedrals in which its service is chanted, it is also like the greatest of these cathedrals in another respect, and that is, it has never been completed,—as also in another point, that however grand they are, they are not large enough to hold, nor strong enough to bind, that spiritual Christianity, which rests in Christ and not in the church, in justification and not in works, and which is ever favourable to human reason and to human rights.

5. That same history of the Church, which may thus be of use in respect to present controversy, is also of value in preparing us for the future. It has a prophetic office. It bids us look forward to the progress of the church, and to the unity of the church.

"It is a maxim in the military art," once said Napoleon, "that the army which remains in its entrenchments is beaten," and eminently does this hold true of the moral conflicts of the race. And as we read the record of the past victories of the church, we realize more fully its missionary character, and acquire greater confidence in the reality of the scriptural promise that the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ.

And for the future unity of the church, as well as for its missionary expansion, the study of church history may serve to prepare us.

If any lesson is written broad and deep upon the whole course of Christ's militant church, it is this, that the unity of the church is to be the consummation of the church, and not the means of its consummation. This unity is to be attained by means of its inward life, and not by means of its outward forms. External unity is not Christian union. Nothing is more conspicuous in Christian history, than the disdain with which external forms and successions have been treated when they cramped the spiritual power and progress of the Christian church. Nor is such unity to be found in a sacrifice of faith to feeling, though without the feeling it cannot be realized. There must indeed be more of Christian charity, and a more whole-souled faith, living in the great spiritual realities of God's kingdom in Christ. But there must also be—and here is where the study of the doctrinal history of the church has its important bearings,—a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole course of Christian theology, so that each sect and each doctrine may be judged in the light of the great central truths of the Christian system, and receive its true relative position. Put the church question, and the sacramental question, and the inquiries concerning divine sovereignty and free agency; put the doctrines of atonement, and justification, and regeneration, in their real relations to Christ the living Head; exalt his person and work, and his intimate relations to believers; make him the centre of our systems, as he is of our faith, as he is of the divine revelation, as he is of the history of the church, as he is of the whole history of our fallen race, as he is of the whole kingdom of God in time and in eternity, and we are advancing farthest and fastest towards that unity of the church which is to be its hallowed consummation. And that he is this centre, the whole

history of his church, next to the Scriptures, gives the most convincing evidence.

In the spirit in which I have now attempted to set forth the nature and the worth of the science of Church History, it will be my aim to teach it, as the Lord may give me strength, in training in this school of the prophets such a ministry as our American churches now need. If ever churches needed a thoroughly trained ministry, it is our American churches in their present position and conflicts. If all the wisdom and fulness of the Christian system ever needed to be poured into the very heart of any society, ours is that society,—so united in a few great political and religious convictions, and so divided on all other points. Though the mariner has a richly-freighted bark, and all the powers of steam, and even the terrestrial magnet, he needs more than ever the stars and the sun, and the best instruments of science, to tell him where he is. No theological education can be too thorough for our ministry, which does not interfere with the higher moral and spiritual qualifications for the ministerial work. And the most thorough intellectual discipline does not do this, though an inferior culture may: for the most sublime truths of the Christian system are those which have the greatest practical efficiency; and the most comprehensive study of these truths will enable the preacher to apply them most directly and wisely to the heart and life, and such study alone can qualify him to answer all the objections which he must encounter. Only he who knows the times in which he lives, can act upon the times; and only he who has studied the past, can know the present, and act wisely for the future.

We need a ministry trained for conflict and discussion, and trained through investigation and discussion; for on the field of open controversy all the great questions which come thick and fast upon us are to be adjusted. We need a ministry qualified to refute error by showing its grounds, and to advance truth by displaying its symmetry; which can meet argument by argument, a vain philosophy by a higher wisdom, novel speculations by showing either that they are too novel or too antiquated, pretended ecclesiastical claims by pointing to the gaps in the succession, and the assumptions of an infallible church by the documents that prove its fallibility. We need a ministry which shall be conservative without bigotry, and progressive without lawlessness: which shall neither nail the conscious needle to the north, nor strive to watch without the needle's guidance; which shall hold the truth in its fulness, and the truth in its simplicity, and the truth in its symmetry, and the truth in its power; which shall sympathize with all human wants and woes, and which

above all temporal wants shall labour for the spiritual welfare of immortal souls; which shall be ready to live and to die for the church as the body of Christ, and for Christ as the Head of the church, and for all men for the sake of Christ and his kingdom.

We need a ministry filled with the powers of the world to come; living in the grand realities of God's spiritual kingdom, and really believing that it is the Lord's; that he hath not forsaken it, that he will not forget it; that though a woman may forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb, yet God will not forget his Zion. Behold, he says, I have graven it upon the palms of my hands, and thy walls are continually before me. Fear not, for I am with thee. I will bring thy seed from the East, and gather thee from the West; I will say to the North give up, and to the South keep not back; bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth.

ART. IX.—NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. SEDGWICK'S DISCOURSE.*

In the Numbers of the "*Bibliotheca Sacra*" for July 1850, and Jan. 1851, we adverted to the systems of education pursued at the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and to the reforms proposed, or now carrying into effect. The great question in regard to those venerable seats of learning, as well as in respect to the American colleges, founded on the English model is, Shall they be reformed or revolutionized? Shall the discipline and course of studies be radically altered, or shall salutary, yet not fundamental, changes be effected, from time to time, as the wants of advancing civilization and knowledge shall demand? Many persons, both in England and in this country, are calling for a re-organization of the college system, so that it may conform more or less to the German university course, rather than to the English, and so that physical and mechanical science may

* A Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge. By Adam Sedgwick, M.A., F.R.S., Woodwardian Professor of Geology, and Fellow of Trinity College. Fifth edition, with additions, and a Preliminary Dissertation. London, 1850. pp. ccccxlii. and 322. This edition may be regarded as a new work, the fourth edition containing only 169 pages. A large portion of the new edition is taken up in refuting the views advanced in the *Vestiges of Creation*. The whole volume is full of interest to the general reader.

become a prominent, if not the absorbing, subject of study. We have endeavoured to show (and we may do it more at length hereafter) that no such re-organization is demanded. The study of the mathematics and classics must remain as the basis of the system. No substitute, as regards their effect in disciplining the mind, will ever be found. Besides, no wise man would sever these collegiate systems from the Past. They are rich—especially the English universities—in historic fame. Their present means of doing good depends in no small degree on these historical associations. Much of the best education acquired at these seats of knowledge is the effect of silent and intangible influences, which a radical reform would sweep away.

We have also shown that the University of Cambridge, whatever may be said of Oxford, has not been inattentive to the new claims made upon it in the progress of society. It has undergone great changes, and adopted many improvements within the last fifty years. In confirmation of previous testimonies which we have adduced, we are glad to quote some facts from Prof. Sedgwick. These are of great value, as they come from one eminent in natural science, always in favour of judicious reforms (now acting as a member of the Royal University Commission), and perfectly competent to testify, as he has been almost half a century resident in the university as an undergraduate, or fellow, and professor.

Since the general peace of Europe, the numbers at Cambridge are more than double what they were before. Thirty years are gone since the formation of the Cambridge Philosophical Society. In the Transactions, there is hardly a subject which has engaged the attention of the great mathematicians of Europe that is not discussed in original papers of great value. All the powers of high analysis have been brought to bear on the most severe and knotty questions of physics. The only great discoveries in physical astronomy made by Englishmen since Newton have been made at Cambridge—Mr. Airy's discovery of the long period of perturbation in the earth's orbit, by the planet Venus, and Mr. Adams's theoretic discovery of a planet external to Uranus, both the results of enormous labour and consummate mathematical skill. In the early part of the last century Queen Anne dined in Trinity College, and conferred the honour of knighthood on Newton. In 1847 Queen Victoria offered the same honour to Mr. Adams. On the same occasion, Sir John Herschel presented to Prince Albert, the Chancellor, the first bound copy of his *Astronomical Observations*, made at the Cape of Good Hope, and the Completion of the Telescopic Survey of the whole Surface of the visible Heavens, begun in 1825.

Prof. Sedgwick goes on to say that during the last four years,

in the Fellowship examinations at Trinity College, he has found that some of the younger men have shown a very exact knowledge of the Aristotelian logic and other kindred works, of the best metaphysical authors of the last century, and of the bold speculations of the modern German school. Annual courses of public lectures are now given in Chemistry, Mineralogy, Geology, Botany, Anatomy, Physiology, three courses in Divinity, also one course each in the Hebrew, Arabic, and Greek languages. Forty years ago, only one course in Divinity was given, and none in the three languages just named. Now, in these six departments, "public lectures are read to good and earnest classes of young men." The moral and metaphysical lectures of Dr. Whewell form an entirely new part of the academic course.

During the last half century, the external aspect of the university has been greatly changed. The foundation of Downing College was laid in 1807. Large additions, at great cost, have been made to several of these colleges. St. John's, with its new quadrangle, &c., stands pre-eminent. A noble observatory, stocked with first-rate instruments, has been built from the corporate funds of the university, aided by private subscriptions. Fourteen quarto volumes of *reduced* observations attest its activity. One side of a new quadrangle has been added to the public library. The upper floor will hold 100,000 volumes. The number of volumes has been trebled within the present century. Five or six thousand volumes are in constant circulation from the library, besides the thousands from the individual college libraries. A site for a new botanic garden has been purchased. An excellent anatomical museum has been collected. Two large collections in mineralogy and geology have also been added. A magnificent museum of art has also arisen from the bequest of Viscount Fitzwilliam.

The social and religious changes have not been less marked. "Intemperance and convivial brawlings have ceased to disgrace the colleges." "Intemperance is now regarded as disgraceful, and ill-befitting the manners of any one who wishes to pass under the name of a Christian and gentleman." "We now see more earnestness, and decency, and gravity, in the conduct of our sons, than was seen in the early years of this century." Bishop Wilson of Calcutta, in his last visit to England, spent some time at Cambridge, and expressed again and again, in very strong words, his conviction of the great social and moral benefits of the Cambridge training. La Place, a few days before his death, in conversation with Prof. Sedgwick, used these remarkable words:—"When I was a young man I had not the means of travelling; then came the terrible war of the

Revolution; and now I am too old to travel, and I must die without seeing the place where Newton made his great discoveries." "I think your teaching right, and were I in your place, I should deprecate any great organic change; for I have lived long enough to know, what we did not at one time believe, that society cannot be upheld in happiness and honour without the sentiments of religion." Prof. Sedgwick speaks in decided opposition to the Romanizing spirit of the Oxford Tracts, and asserts that they have not made a deep impression at Cambridge. In proof, he mentions the dissolution of the Camden Society, and adds, that no individual who was at all prominent at Cambridge has apostatized to Rome.

II. SMITH'S NEW CLASSICAL DICTIONARY.*

We may name the following as the principal merits of this Dictionary: 1. The form, small octavo, is convenient and portable. It is printed in double columns, on good paper, and with clear type. The titles of the articles are in small capitals, and are sufficiently distinct to catch the eye. The proof-reading, which in such a volume is a most anxious and laborious affair, has been well attended to, so far as we can judge from reading some of the longer articles. 2. The amount of matter under the different titles seems to be well proportioned to the importance of the topics. 3. The information communicated comprises the substance of what is known, according to the latest and most exact inquiries. The extensive and profound studies of a multitude of German scholars have illuminated almost every corner of this vast field. Judicious and abundant use has been made of these ample stores. Special acknowledgments seem to be due to Pauly's admirable *Encyclopædia of Classical Antiquity*, now carried on by Waltz and Teuffel. The influence of the great work of Niebuhr is seen, directly or indirectly, on almost every page. 4. The truth is well sifted from the mass of matters often conflicting, and is stated with precision. In a volume, designated for lads in part, exactness of phraseology and directness of statement are indispensable. In this respect the dictionary has great merits. 5. The moral tone of the work is unobjectionable. The wretched stories, and the unguarded statements, which disfigure or injure some of the old lexicons, find no place in this. The volume may be safely

* A New Classical Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, Mythology, and Geography, partly founded upon the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, by William Smith, LL.D. Revised, with numerous Corrections and Additions, by Charles Anthon, LL.D. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1851. pp. 1,039, 8vo.

put into the hands of the young. 6. The appendices, filling eighty pages of small print, are of special utility. They include chronological tables of Greek history, parallel years of the Christian, Roman, and Greek eras, a list of the Athenian Archons, list of kings of various countries, and sixteen tables of measures, weights, and money. 7. Dr. Anthon's additions, corrections, &c., impart much value to the dictionary. His additions are enclosed in brackets, and amount to 1,400 independent articles, besides adding to or correcting articles already in the work. In the department of bibliography, many improvements have been made. Special pains have also been taken by the American editor, to accentuate the Greek words and to secure a correct typography.

We have one or two suggestions for future editions. In some cases the statements might have been more exact and discriminating. Thus, in the article on Saint Jerome, that father is stated to "have had a profound knowledge of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages." This remark would need qualification, were he compared with modern philologists. And we should hardly apply the word "profound" at all to his knowledge. Again, a fuller list of the best editions of works of different authors, and of works illustrating the life of individuals and the topography of places, would be highly serviceable. Indeed, there are few objects in a classical dictionary more important. The inquisitive scholar, though young, wishes to be directed to larger sources of information. Thus under "Cicero," we observe no reference to the excellent edition of the Orations by Klotz : under Chrysostom, no allusion to Neander's volume, or to the able work of Paniel on Christian Eloquence ; under Plato, no reference to the excellent editions of some of his works by our American scholars ; under Melite, no use made of Mr. Smith's admirable volume. Our last remark we will introduce with an extract. "As a statesman and citizen, Cicero cannot command our respect. He did good service to his country by the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy ; but this was almost the only occasion on which he showed vigour and decision of character. His own letters condemn him. In them his inordinate vanity, pusillanimity, and political tergiversation appear in the clearest colours." Now this condemnation is much too sweeping. It should have been added, that persons well qualified to judge, have formed a far more favourable opinion of the great orator. "He was not a man of weak character," says Niebuhr ; "when-ever there was need of it, he showed the greatest firmness and resolution. What makes him appear weak is his sensitive nature ; a thing which he thought an indignity (*indignum*) completely annihilated him." "His pure mind was above all

baseness, and it was only the consequence of his noble ambition that he wished to show himself in the most brilliant light."*

III. VIEWS OF A PAINTER IN PALESTINE.†

Sir David Wilkie was one of the best painters of the modern English School. He was the son of a Presbyterian minister at Cults, Fifeshire, Scotland,—was born Nov. 18th, 1785, and died near Gibraltar, on his return from a visit to the East, June 1st, 1841. In search of health and for the purposes of his profession, he travelled extensively, and resided several years abroad. We have been quite interested with the journal of his tour in Syria and Egypt. We have here condensed a few of his observations on some of the objects and scenery in the Holy Land. They have value, coming from an acute observer, and an accomplished artist. "Great as the assistance," remarks Sir David, "I might say the inspiration, which the art of painting has derived from the illustration of Christianity, and great as the talent and genius have been, which this high walk of art has called into being, yet it is remarkable that none of the great painters to whom the world has hitherto looked for the visible appearance of Scripture scenes and feelings, have ever visited the Holy Land. Though Paul Veronese, Titian, Giorgione, and Sebastian del Piombo, all Venetians, have by commerce and immediate intercourse with the Levant, succeeded in giving their works a nearer verisimilitude to an eastern people, yet who is there that cannot imagine that such minds as Raphael and Da Vinci, great as they are, might have not derived a help had they dwelt and studied in the same land which Moses and the Prophets, the evangelists and apostles, have so powerfully and graphically described?"

"The walls which encompass Jerusalem on every side, are higher and more superb than any city walls I have ever seen. The square towers of her gates recal those of Windsor castle; while their lengthened elevation, with the spires and cupolas they enclose, would have arrested the Poussins and Claudes in preference to all other cities. Her streets are stone-built, massive, surmounted by arches, through which the solemn vista claims the painter's art, though by that art still unknown and unrepresented; and the people, the Jew and Arab, and the more humble and destitute, who never change, recal, by their appearance, a period of antiquity in everything removed from the present time."

* Niebuhr's *Lectures on Roman History*. Lond., 1849. Vol. III. pp. 19, 27.

† *The Life of Sir David Wilkie*, with a Selection from his Correspondence. By Allan Cunningham, in three vols. London, 1843.

"The impression produced by first arriving in Jerusalem, by first walking her streets and viewing her massive buildings, the enduring rocks on which she is placed, the deep ravines, valleys, and hills, by which she is surrounded, is beyond what can be again felt in any other place in the world. It is not merely in what they might have supplied to art, if they had been known to the artist, or in what they might furnish, if seen by the student, or commentator of Scripture, but as the *originals* in conjunction with the great events that have there occurred, from which the sacred writers have drawn their narratives. I understand that a leading foreign painter was here, and regretted that Raphael and Domenichino had not in their day seen the place and people, which, with all their power, they had but vainly tried to imagine." "Here the people, as well as their situation, lead one to ages long passed away. The Jewish synagogue is in their miserable quarter of the city, but it is on *Mount Zion*, where it can be seen now only with the most touching interest; and excluded from the rock and stone walls of their own temple, they still believe that the tables of the law and the tabernacle, supposed to be buried in its ruins, will yet one day be found, and restored to them. The Arabs, who form the mass of the poor people, looked as if they had never changed since the time of Abraham."

"Roberts has done much; but I almost wish he had done more, and had been here longer. For a landscape painter, the road from Jericho, as you come nigh to Jerusalem, and as you pass 'the valley' right over against you, and begin to descend by the Mount of Olives, combines a scene which Claude Lorraine and the Poussins would have indeed delighted in." "Whoever has been accustomed to walk through the streets, lanes, walls, rocks, hills, valleys, brooks, and fountains of Jerusalem, where the scripture events have taken place, will be convinced that he sees before him a part of the original material whence the inspired writers drew their narratives; at once satisfying him of the accuracy, while it gives a perfect idea of the situation, of the details. The art of painting in Italy has arisen and triumphed in her devotion to such scenes, with scarcely a reference or resemblance to these obvious localities."

IV. A DEVOTIONAL EXPOSITION OF THE PSALMS.*

This work is strictly what it purports to be, a *devotional exposition* of the Book of Psalms. It is conducted on a plan

* A Devotional Exposition of the Psalms, containing an Argument to each Psalm, a Paraphrase, Suggestive Remarks, and Parallel Scriptures at length. By Rev. J. Edwards, King's College, London. 8vo. London: James Darling, 1850.

somewhat novel, and highly advantageous, we think, to the simple object of the work. The usual plan of *notes* at the bottom of the page, which all who read for devotional purposes find not a little inconvenient and often cumbersome, is discarded. The *results* of learned inquiry and investigation in the various matters bearing on criticism, and on the development and illustration of the true meaning of the text, are embodied in a Paraphrase. On the right side of the page is a column containing Suggestive Remarks, and on the left, one for Scripture Testimony, in which striking parallel scriptures are cited at length. The titles of the psalms are partially expanded and explained, and placed before the Argument; but the type of each department is of such a character that the eye detects at a glance the intention of the arrangement. The text adopted is that of the common English version. It is printed in *italics*, while the paraphrastic part is in Roman letters, so that (the type being bold and clear) the text can be read by itself with facility, or in connection with all the necessary light of criticism and exposition, without the slightest interruption or inconvenience.

In our judgment, the work is admirably executed. It cannot fail to be useful. We hope to see the work introduced into this country. The mechanical execution of this edition is in the very best style of the London books. J. M. S.

V. THE CHRONOLOGICAL TESTAMENT.*

Whatever labours increase the facilities for studying the Word of God—for comparing scripture with scripture to ascertain what is the mind of the Spirit—lay the Christian community under obligation. The work before us is of this character. The plan is, in many of its features, new and admirable, and so far as we have been able to examine it critically, is wisely and ably executed. The editor has evidently spent much time and careful and patient labour upon the work. It is confined to the New Testament, which it gives in the authorised version, without “note or comment.” The plan embraces the following features: The text is divided into Paragraphs and Sections, rather than Chapters, with the dates and places of transaction marked, and each is headed with its subject matter, and bears a figure which indicates its place in the order of time. The marginal readings are given, and parallel passages are printed

* The Chronological Testament, according to the Authorised Version, newly divided into Paragraphs and Sections, with the dates and places of transactions marked, and many illustrative Parallel Passages printed at length. London: Robert B. Blackader, 1851.

in full, in separate columns; and letters are added to aid the reader in the work of self-examination. These are only a part of the novel features of this arrangement. On the whole, we are greatly pleased with it, especially for devotional reading. It simplifies the search of the Scriptures. It is a harmony and a concordance woven into the text, so that the mind takes in at a glance, the date, the occasion, the place, and all the parallel passages, without labour or inconvenience. It is printed, too, in large, clear type, so that aged persons can read it without difficulty.

J. M. S.

VI. DR. BELLAMY'S WORKS.*

The writings of Dr. Bellamy are well known to our readers on both sides of the Atlantic. To commend them were an act of supererogation. We prefer to congratulate the theological public that the American Doctrinal Tract and Book Society have commenced the re-publication of such standard works. Our national honour demands this enterprise. We have no right, as good patriots, to allow the productions of our old divines to lie, some of them unpublished, some of them forgotten. They are valuable in their intrinsic character. They are useful as developing the history of theological opinion. They will instruct and gratify many private Christians, while they task the energies of clergymen and scholars. Where are the sermons and treatises of Dr. Samuel Spring of Newburyport, and Dr. Samuel Austin of Burlington College?

VII. NEW VOLUME OF DR. EMMONS'S WORKS.†

In his autobiography Dr. Emmons remarks: "I read deep, well-written tragedies, for the sake of real improvement in the art of preaching. They appear to me the very best works to teach true eloquence. They are designed to make the deepest impression on the human mind, and many of them are excellently calculated to produce this effect. A preacher can scarcely find a better model for constructing a popular, practical, pathetic discourse than a good tragedy; which all along prepares the mind for the grand catastrophe, without discovering it till the whole soul is wrought into a proper frame to feel the final im-

* The Works of Joseph Bellamy, D.D., First Pastor of the Church in Bethlem, Conn. With a Memoir of his Life and Character. In two volumes. Boston: Doctrinal Tract and Book Society, 1850. London: Thomas Delf.

† The Works of Nathaniel Emmons, D.D., late Pastor of the Church in Franklin, Mass., with a Memoir of his Life. Edited by Jacob Ide, D.D. Vol. VII. Boston: Crocker, Brewster, and Co. London: Thomas Delf.

pression." No attentive reader of this new volume of Dr. Emmons's Discourses can fail to perceive the influence of the author's style of reading. He constructs his sermons on such a plan as to surprise his readers with some sudden inference or practical remark. For one instance; the eighth sermon in this volume is on the text, "*O taste and see that the Lord is good.*" The first division defines the goodness of God; the second explains the act of tasting the goodness of God. Christians exercise true benevolence; this benevolence has the same nature with God's benevolence; they know their own benevolence, and therein know the nature of God's benevolence, and thus *taste* it. In their holy love they are partakers of the divine goodness, and as they taste their own love they taste the divine goodness of which they partake. The third division enumerates the effects produced by this taste, and the first head of the "Improvement" explains "what is properly to be understood by a *moral taste*, principle or disposition." It is not a "dead, dormant, inactive, natural principle, but an active, voluntary, moral exercise," and thus we are surprised into a discussion of the notorious "taste scheme."

Another well-known peculiarity of Dr. Emmons's discourses is, a strict adherence to his definitions. Not one of the Reviewers who have opposed him, has, so far as we are informed, understood him, and the reason seems to be, that his antagonists have not attended to his definitions. He has a sermon in the present volume on "sins without law," and he shows, first, that the heathen are without law; secondly, that they sin without law; and thirdly, that they must perish without law: Hence he remarks in his "Improvement:" "It is easy to see how all the posterity of Adam became sinners without law." A superficial reader might thus infer, that Dr. Emmons, in contradiction to the entire spirit of his theology, believed in the existence of sin where there is no knowledge of a rule of conduct. But at the commencement of his discussion he defines law to be not a mere rule of conduct, but "a rule of conduct given by proper authority, and sanctioned by precept and penalty." He thus defines law to be something more than a mere standard of moral obligation, something communicated by other means than the human conscience. He is discoursing on the written law, as distinct from the known rule of duty. His remarks seem thus to be perfectly just, rigidly consistent with his definition, and startling by their exact conformity with a definition somewhat peculiar. It is to this feature of Dr. Emmons's discourses that we must ascribe their power to arrest attention, and also their tendency to be misunderstood by inaccurate readers. The 24th sermon in this volume is one of great in-

terest, derived in no small degree from the apparent contradiction between it and the well-known views of its author. The appearance of contradiction vanishes, when we detect the precise meaning which he attaches to the more important terms used in the discourse. He demands close attention, or he will not be appreciated. Hence the mental discipline derived from perusing his sermons.

He preached to a congregation of farmers; he very rarely wrote a sermon for the press; and yet in one of these discourses, we find him discussing the principles of Mr. Locke with regard to the distinction between rational and irrational animals; in another, examining the old scholastic distinction between the merit of *condignity* and the merit of *congruity*, &c. Yet he was well understood by his auditors. He made them intelligent. To him was this power given. He was a remarkable man, and a benefactor to his race. May the excellent editor of these volumes be enabled to add still other discourses to the rich collection which he has already given us! The next age cannot afford to lose the sermons of so original and profound a thinker as Dr. Emmons.

VIII. M'COSH ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT.*

This volume has been received in Scotland with much enthusiasm. The Banner of Ulster regards it as "fixing a marked era in the history of philosophical and ethical inquiry in Great Britain." Its author was a pupil of Dr. Chalmers, and his present effort seems to be his introduction into the philosophical world; for the North British Review characterizes him as one who "has thus by a single stride secured for himself a position in literature such as few ever reached by a first publication."

In many respects, the metaphysical style of the Scottish writers seems inferior to that of their predecessors in the last century. The luminous page of Adam Smith has certainly not been outshone by any that have succeeded it. Reid, Hume, Beattie, and Campbell, were precise and definite in their phraseology. Adam Ferguson sometimes wearies us by his uniformity of regular yet transparent periods. Dugald Stewart brought into the present century the neat and accurate diction which had distinguished Robertson, Blair, and Walker, in the Scottish pulpit. At the present day, however, we miss the nice adjustment and the punctilious correctness of phrases for which the older philosophical treatises of Scotland are so widely celebrated,

* The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral. By Rev. James M'Cosh. American edition.

and which are so important for a distinctively metaphysical style. In compensation for this loss, the recent Scottish metaphysicians give us more vigour and energy of diction, a more animated and glowing imagery. The style of Mr. M'Cosh is bold and nervous. It abounds with fresh illustrations, and indicates an extensive acquaintance with the popular literature, as well as the physical and mental science of the day. He is by no means a narrow-minded theologian, but has ranged over the wide fields of philosophy, and has collected thence rich arguments for the truth of the evangelical system. We are often surprised at his carelessness in the structure of sentences, but we presume that many of his ungrammatical phrases are the errors of the typographer, rather than of the author.

The work is divided into five Books. The first contains a "General View of the Divine Government, as fitted to throw light on the character of God." The second contains a "Particular Inquiry into the Method of the Divine Government in the Physical World." The third contains a "Particular Inquiry into the Principles of the Human Mind, through which God governs mankind." Here the author gives his view of the will as a "self-acting" power, and of holiness as the act of the will, or as the man willing. He says, "Mind is a self-acting substance, and hence its activity and independence." "Now, we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and one of great importance, that the true determining cause of any given volition is not any mere anterior incitement, but the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will." "A mere incitement can become a motive, only so far as sanctioned by the will; so that it is not so much the motive that determines the will, as the will that gives strength to the motive." He says that "*Pseudo necessarians*, perverting the proper doctrine of philosophical necessity, have represented man as having all his thoughts and feelings determined by an external cause, and thus as the mere creatures of circumstances." He advises the *true* necessarians to drop "the word necessity as ambiguous, (to say the least of it,) and as unhappily associated," &c. He admits, however, that the law of cause and effect extends to the will, and "reigns over it," and he is a stout advocate for the certainty of sinful volitions in the unregenerate. If we might be allowed to indulge in our national vanity, we would suggest that our author's phraseology might be much improved by the perusal of our American treatises on this subject.

Mr. M'Cosh supposes that conscience judges "of acts of the will, and acts of the will exclusively;" that all moral character belongs to the will as distinguished from the sensibilities; that our natural emotions and natural affections are neither virtuous

nor vicious in themselves, &c. He thus distinguishes between the doctrine of total depravity, as presented in the Scriptures, and the doctrine of total depravity, as exhibited by Helvetius and Rochefoucauld. Holiness he defines as "something more than the mere love of promoting happiness. It is not so much the love of promoting happiness as the love of that pure love which seeks the promotion of happiness." Notwithstanding his verbal difference from Pres. Edwards, on the nature of true virtue, it is easy to see that the difference is merely verbal, and that in fact he coincides on this theme with our countryman, whom he denominates "a philosophic divine, whose intellectual and spiritual clearness of perception in theological subjects appears to approach nearer the angelic than has been the attainment of any other in these latter days."

In the Fourth Book, the author sums up the results of the preceding, and considers the "Reconciliation of God and Man." Notwithstanding a few errors, this, and the foregoing Books, are in harmony with the general spirit of the evangelical scheme, and evince a love of manly discussion, and no small degree of philosophical acumen.

IX. RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AMONG THE ARMENIANS.*

Asia Minor, next to Palestine and Greece, is perhaps the most interesting country in the world. But, besides all its natural advantages, and its historical associations, it is now specially interesting to the people of this country, from the fact that it is the seat of a flourishing Christian mission, or rather missions. The light of the Gospel is re-illuminating its old seats. A cordon of missionary posts is establishing around the whole of this vast region, from Constantinople to Tocat, Trebizond, Erzurûm, Oroomiah, the mountains of Kûrdistân, the Ancient Nineveh, Tarsus, Aleppo, Antioch, and Smyrna, in addition to innumerable lesser lights that native hands are kindling in the interior. If we are not mistaken in providential signs, the garden of the Lord, in a physical sense, is soon to become a paradise in spiritual beauty. Everything betokens a brighter day. The most active parts of the native population, those which have the most physical and intellectual stamina, are fast becoming acquainted with Christian truth, and throwing off the superstitions of ages. Armenians and Nestorians, if not Jews and Greeks, seem to be destined to become the illuminators of the regions in which they live and traffic. Mr. Dwight's volume

* Christianity revived in the East; or, a Narrative of the Work of God among the Armenians of Turkey. By H. G. O. Dwight, Missionary at Constantinople. New York: Baker and Scribner, 1850. pp. 290. London: Thomas Delf.

gives a faithful and trustworthy account of the origin and progress of these wondrous changes among the Armenian communities. Its simple details are fraught with interest, not only to the Christian, but to the scholar and the philanthropist, who rejoice in the spread of civilization and knowledge. To the student of church history, too, the book will be specially attractive. Mr. Dwight is a veteran in the service, having accompanied Rev. Eli Smith in a tour of observation in Armenia and Persia, in 1830. He has also been an eye-witness of much which he records.

ART. X.—SELECT BIBLICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

UNITED STATES.

THE biblical and theological works lately published, or in press, so far as we know, are not numerous. A great proportion of the educated talent of the country is employed, as would be expected, on books for day schools and Sabbath schools, on works of a practically religious character, on occasional addresses, sermons, lectures, &c., and on newspapers and periodical publications. The number of works of an elaborate character, and of permanent value, is consequently small.

Professor Stuart's Commentary on Ecclesiastes, in a duodecimo volume of 350 or 400 pages, is just published. The Introduction fills 103 pages, and discusses the general nature of the book, its special design and method, diction, author, credit, and general history, ancient and modern versions and commentaries. The book of Ecclesiastes is of a practical, moral and religious character, from the position of an Israelite, not of a Greek or of an Egyptian. Its great theme is the vanity and nothingness of all earthly efforts, pursuits and objects. The writer gives a picture of the conflicts and struggles which he passed through in his inquiries. The final conclusions to which he comes, (not the objections which he considers,) are to be taken as the index of his ultimate and established opinions. It is not the treatise of a sceptic, or of an Epicurean, but of a practical, religious, Jewish philosopher. There can be no doubt but that the whole proceeds from one writer. It has every mark of unity. The diction is that of the later Hebrew, with some mixture of Chaldaisms. Solomon does not appear to have

been the author of the book, as he is introduced as only occasionally, not constantly, speaking; the general condition of things indicates a period very unlike that of Solomon; the style and diction are quite different from those of the Proverbs written by Solomon. Who the author was, we have no means of knowing. The time in which the book was written was perhaps between 535 and 455 B.C. Among the mass of commentators, Knobel, 1836, and Hitzig, 1847, are decidedly the best, and "in a critical respect are worth all the rest." The commentary is strictly and minutely exegetical.

Professor Kendrick has published an excellent work for schools and colleges, entitled the "Greek Ollendorff," being a progressive exhibition of the Greek grammar, designed for beginners in Greek.

Prof. Hackett's Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles is just published in Boston, in an octavo of 400 or 450 pages.

Dr. J. A. Alexander of Princeton has published a new edition of his Commentary on Isaiah in a condensed form.

Pres. Hitchcock of Amherst College has published a work entitled "The Religion of Geology and its Collateral Sciences."

An edition of the Philippic Orations of Demosthenes is in the press at Cambridge, under the editorial care of Prof. M. J. Smead of William and Mary College, Va.

The edition of Horace by Prof. Lincoln of Brown University, with various readings, notes, &c., is just published. The text is printed with great beauty and correctness.

Dr. E. A. Andrews's Latin Lexicon, on the basis of Freund's great work, and on which he and his assistants, Prof. Robbins of Middlebury College and Prof. Turner of Union Theol. Seminary, have been employed several years, is published. We shall endeavour to furnish a brief review of it in our next Number.

A Selection of Reading Lessons in Greek, with explanatory Notes, is preparing by Prof. Felton of Cambridge. The selection will be entirely new, and will introduce the student to a wider acquaintance with Greek literature than has been common in works of this character.

Prof. Owen of New York has in preparation a new edition of the Iliad.

A new edition of Kühner's Latin Grammar with exercises, a Latin Reader and Vocabularies, translated by Prof. Champlin, has been published. The same author's Preparatory Latin Exercise Book, being an Introduction to the Latin Grammar, translated by Prof. Champlin, is in press.

The Psalms, translated and explained, by Joseph A. Alexander, is now completed in three vols.

A new edition of the Index to periodical Literature, pub-

lished about two years ago, under the auspices of a literary society in Yale College, is prepared and will soon appear. The author, Mr. F. Poole, has enlarged the plan, so as to cover the whole ground of the leading periodicals, without regard to the General Indexes published by the proprietors of some of them. It will make an 8vo. volume of 600 or 700 pages, and will doubtless be welcomed by all libraries, and by many individuals.

The Second Volume of the American Oriental Society's Journal is published. The following are the *contents*:—

I. Shabbathai Levi and his followers. By the Rev. Wm. S. Schaufflers.

II. Account of a Japanese Romance, with an Introduction. By W. W. Turner. Note on Japanese Syllabaries. By S. W. Williams.

III. Contributions to the Geography of Central Koordistan. By Azariah Smith, M.D.

IV. Journal of a Tour from Oroomiah to Mosul, through the Koordish Mountains, and by the Ruins of Nineveh. By the Rev. Justin Perkins, D.D.

V. Characteristics of the Peshito Syriac version of the New Testament. By Prof. J. W. Gibbs.

VI. Syllabus of the Siva-Guana-Potham, one of the Sacred Books of the Hindoos. By the Rev. H. R. Hoisington.

VII. Specimens of the Naga Language of Asam. By the Rev. N. Brown.

VIII. Remarks on the Causes of the Peculiarities of the Chinese. By the Rev Samuel R. Brown.

IX. Et. Taleary's Conquest of Persia by the Arabs; translated from the Turkish. By John P. Brown.

X. Notes of a Tour in Mount Lebanon. By Henry A. De Forest, M.A.

XI. The Forms of the Greek Substantive Verb. By Prof. James Hadley.

XII. Translation of two Unpublished Arabic Documents, relating to the doctrines of the Islamites and other Batmian Sects. By Edward E. Salisbury.

Miscellaneous.—Maltese Antiquities—Hints on the Introduction of Buddhism into Burmah—Plan for effecting a Uniform Orthography of African Languages. Valuable Arabic Manuscripts belonging to the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.—Native Printing in India. Latest Sanscrit Publications in India.

Libraries. The number of books added to Harvard College Library, during the year ending July 1850, was 1751, besides 2,219 pamphlets. To the Massachusetts State Library in 1850, 365 volumes and 46 pamphlets and plans were added. The

Astor Library, New York, now has 28,869 volumes; the State Library at Albany, more than 20,000 volumes valued at 100,000 dols.; about half are law books. During the last year 1,600 volumes were added to the library of the Philotechnian Society in Williams College: see Bib. Sac. 1850, p. 404. An effort is now making with encouraging success, to procure a library for Amherst College.

The prosperity of oriental and biblical studies in this country is essentially depending on the prosperity of the Theological Schools. The elementary study of Hebrew is as yet mostly confined within their walls. Accordingly, their condition is a good index of the interest which is felt in the study of the original languages of the Bible, as well as of systematic theology. We here put on record a statement of the numbers at the principal theological schools in the United States at the beginning of the half century.

		<i>Jun.</i>	<i>Mid.</i>	<i>Sen.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
Bangor, Me.	Congregational.	8	16	8	32
Andover, Ma.	"	27	28	29	84
Cambridge, Ma.	Unitarian Cong.	5	11	7	23
Newton, Ms.	Baptist.	9	10	17	36
New Haven, Ct.	Congregational.	8	12	11	31
East Windsor, Ct.	" (1850)	5	8	9	22
Union Seminary, N. Y.	Presbyterian.	20	28	25	73
General Theol. Sem., N. Y.	Prot. Episcopal.	13	15	15	43
Princeton Theol. Sem.	Presbyterian.	34	53	53	140
Auburn, N. Y.	"	20	23	10	53
Oxford, Ohio.	Ass. Ref. Pres.				17
Alleghany City, Pa.	Presbyterian.				35
Seminary near Alexandria, Va.	Prot. Episcopal.	5	15	13	33
Lane, Cincinnati, Ohio.	Presbyterian.	4	4	6	14
Western Res. Theol. Dep.	Pres. and Cong.				14
Total,					650

GREAT BRITAIN.

The entire reading public have been absorbed for several months with the papal question. In one month, 180 books and pamphlets appeared, besides newspaper articles without number. To us, who live three or four thousand miles from the strife, there is something not a little amusing in this new-born and overpowering zeal, especially considering the apathy with which the strong papal tendencies in the church of England have been regarded for many years. We apprehend now that the subject will not be probed to the bottom. The papal question needs to be considered as an European question; the elements of the strength and weakness of the Catholic church should be viewed apart from all local controversies; the bearings of the union of the Church and State in England on the growth of Catholicism, the elements in the English church favourable to that growth,

the position of Ireland as affecting the general question, &c., should be carefully investigated.

The works which are now publishing in England, on the history and literature of ancient Greece, are a striking proof of the utility of combining the extensive and profound investigations of German scholars, with the taste, the good sense, the clear and vigorous style and the political wisdom which characterize English writers. Grote, Thirlwall, and Mure, show on almost every page how much they owe to the varied researches of their German cousins. Equally prominent in these works are the good sense, the spirit of independent investigation, uninfluenced by theory, and the large and practical views of social and political life, which have been sadly wanting in the speculations of many German scholars.

In the use which English classical scholars have made of German resources, two stages are to be noticed. In the first place, we have direct, unaltered translations, e. g. the Greek grammars of Matthiæ, Rost, Thiersch, the Roman History of Niebuhr, Böckh's Economy of Athens, Müller on the Dorians, Ritter's History of Philosophy, &c.; and secondly, where the knowledge drawn from German sources is worked over and incorporated, so as to result in the production of works more or less independent. In some cases, the multifarious materials have not only been wisely selected, but incorporated with English modes of thought and expression, so as to lose their foreign air. Independent scholarship and sound judgment have shaped and transformed the entire mass. A conspicuous instance of this is the Greek Lexicon of Liddell and Scott. We may name as another instance the Classical Dictionaries of Dr. William Smith. They are constructed with so much judgment and learning, and come out in a form so attractive, that they will probably soon displace all other works of the kind in the language. Dr. Smith studied some time in Germany; subsequently he has had several years' experience as a writer, and a teacher of the classics. He is now the classical professor in the new Dissenting College in St. John's Wood, in London.

Mr. Barnes's Commentaries continue to have an undiminished sale in England. It is stated that nearly 100,000 copies of "Cobbin's edition" have been sold. The Isaiah and the New Testament, in 12 vols., are sold for 5.00 dolls. We hope that the sense of justice and honesty on the American side of the Atlantic will soon be strong enough to lead to an international copyright law.

GERMANY.

As the "paternal" sovereigns of Germany are becoming more firmly seated on their thrones, and the inconvenient disturbances of 1848, are subsiding, the number of political books and pamphlets is diminishing, while the general book trade is increasing. After the convulsive efforts to construct political systems, the Germans are retiring to the abstract realms, where kings and ministers will allow them to be unmolested. The catalogue of the last Leipsic book-fair contained 5,023 works.

The last annual meeting of the German Oriental Society was held in Berlin, from Sept. 30th to Oct. 4, 1850. The opening address by Böckh, the president, was "splendid and masterly." Some of the high functionaries were present, and took part. After the reading of the annual report by Prof. Rödiger, Humboldt made some remarks in his "usual instructive and kind manner." The *Antigone* of Sophocles was acted before the Society, by order of the king. The number of members present was 353. These are interesting, social, as well as literary re-unions. The Germans enter into the matter with the whole heart.

We are glad to perceive that the Commentary begun by Dr. Hermann Olshausen is to be completed. The Epistles to the Philippians, to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, have been explained by Licentiate Augustus Wiesinger, in a volume of 743 pages; and the Epistle to the Hebrews, in a volume of 496 pages, by the well-known professor Ebrard of Erlangen, some time a colleague of Olshausen. The Commentary of the latter, in 5 vols. and two parts, is in the process of translation, in Clark's Theological Library, Edinburgh. The translation of the Gospels and Acts, is in 4 vols., Romans in 1 vol., and the two Epistles to the Corinthians, in 1 vol. Price of the six volumes is about fifteen dollars.

Among the most entertaining works which have lately appeared is Hagenbach's "Lectures on the Church History of the 18th and 19th Centuries, viewed from the position of Evangelical Protestantism." The second edition in two moderately sized octavos was published in 1848, 1849. The first volume contains twenty-two lectures, the second, twenty. The view is, of course, mostly confined to Germany, yet some interesting sketches are given of the religious history of England, France, Holland, &c. The author, who is a German Swiss, and, since the death of De Wette, the best known of the theological professors in the university of Basil, writes in a lively manner, with considerable power of imagination, with a happy intermixture of anecdotes and biographical incidents, and, as far as we can

judge, with a very commendable degree of fairness towards the different schools and parties. Certain aspects of church life, e. g. the propagation of Christianity, History of Missions, &c., he proposes to consider in a separate work.

Dr. Thenius, of Dresden, author of the Commentary on the Books of Samuel and Kings, in the "Condensed Exegetical Manual of the Old Testament," is evidently a painstaking and thorough scholar, familiar with the stores of philology, deeply interested in his subject, and anxious that the reader should be so also. But the commentary hardly meets the wants of the English and American student. The extreme condensation, the crowding together of textual, verbal and grammatical criticism, and of historical and exegetical remarks, into so small a compass, without paragraphs, and with many abbreviations, disfigure the page and weary and perplex the reader. On the difficult texts, a more extended commentary is needed. We wish, also, to have the author's own view stated more distinctly, unmixed with the speculations of others. If he cannot solve a problem, let him give the best light which he has, and inform us precisely where the difficulty lies. Thenius, too, belongs to the class of subjective critics, who can divide a book into fragments, and determine what is historical, what traditional, &c., as though he had been recorder to Josiah, or one of Ezra's assistants. In this dislocating process we have little faith. Still, the commentary is important to the practised philologist. It has materials which a skilful architect could shape into a goodly edifice. The volume on the Kings was published in 1849, in 471 pages, besides an appendix of 45 pages, describing Jerusalem and the temple, as they were before the captivity. There are several plates and a chronological table.

The second edition of Meyer's Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, 1849, pp. 364, is "amended and enlarged." The author speaks of having carefully consulted not only the most recent commentaries and monographs, but of having thoroughly reviewed the earlier interpreters, the Greek and Latin Fathers, &c. He alludes in terms of high commendation to the labours of Tischendorf on the text of the New Testament. Several writers, e. g. Rodatz, Schenkel, Rübiger, Goldhorn, Dähne, Kniewel, have lately discussed some special topics in this epistle, with more or less ability. The excellences of the author as a commentator, exact philological knowledge, acuteness, and in general sound judgment in marking the connections of the discourse, apposite historical and antiquarian illustrations, an independent use of other commentators, &c., are conspicuous in this revised labour. The author is now at work on the Apocalypse.

Dr. Lünemann's Commentary on the two Epistles to the Thessalonians, 1850, pp. 233, appears to be thoroughly elaborated. "The commentators from the earliest to the most recent times, have been compared with independent care, and in greater number than was possible for my predecessors, in consequence of the rich treasures of the university library here at Göttingen." Koch has lately written a Commentary on the First Epistle. Dr. L. concludes that the first epistle was written at the beginning of Paul's residence in Corinth, A.D. 53, about six months after he left Macedonia; and the second epistle in the same city, probably in the beginning of 54. The genuineness of the epistles is successfully vindicated against Baur and others. The price of this volume, unbound, is about 50 cents; that of Meyer on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, 90 cents.

Dr. R. Stier, Berlin, (1850, pp. 126,) has published a Commentary on the "Epistle of Jude, the brother of the Lord, as a prophetic warning to all believers of our times who would be watchful." Stier maintains, with Herder, that the epistle was not written by an apostle, but by a son of Mary, and brother of our Lord. It was very probably written before the destruction of Jerusalem. Stier supposes that the author had before his eyes both of the Epistles of Peter, which accounts for the resemblance and citations. The statements in regard to Michael, the body of Moses, &c., v. 9, Dr. Stier supposes were drawn from the Jewish tradition, either oral or written, from which Paul, 2 Tim. iii. 8, appears to have derived the names of the Egyptian magicians. The Spirit who inspired the writers, could separate truth from fable in these traditions.

The first part of the second volume of Hengstenberg's Commentary on the Apocalypse, Berlin, 1850, pp. 405, closes with the 20th chapter. The second part will contain the notes on the two concluding chapters, and various introductory matters. We shall endeavour, as soon as we receive it, to give a synopsis of the writer's views.

The Encyclopædia of Classical Antiquities, conducted for some years by Dr. Pauly, is now under the charge of Professors Waltz and Teuffel. It combines the results of a great amount of study, and is full of interesting and accurate information. The Dictionaries of Dr. William Smith are largely indebted to this work. The two last fasciculi, the 127th and 128th, extend from Trebia to Tullii. The whole number of pages published is 2,240 octavos, at about 20 Thaler.

The Bibliotheca Græca, published at Gotha, by Hennings, was commenced under the editorship of the late Frederic Jacobs, and of Rost, the Greek grammarian and lexicographer. Parts

of this edition have deservedly had great celebrity. Some of the editors, e. g. Stallbaum, Dissen, Spitzner, Goetling, stand in the front rank of scholars. Stallbaum, the editor of Plato, has just published the third edition of the *Phædo*, "much improved and amended," being the second section of Vol. I. The ten or eleven volumes of Plato, bound, can be bought in Germany for ten or twelve dollars. Wunder, the editor of Sophocles, has just published the second edition of the *Trachiniæ*, being the second section of Vol. II. Prof. Schneidewin, of Göttingen, has published the second fasciculus, second section, second edition of Pindar, pp. 174—376. The first section contains the text and critical notes,—the second, the commentary. The edition was begun by Dissen.

A valuable History of Classical Philology (*Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum*) is publishing by Dr. A. Gräfenham, teacher in the gymnasium at Eisleben. Four volumes have been published, the last in 1850. The First Part contains the history of philology from the earliest times to the end of the fourth century; the Second will embrace the history of the philology of the Middle Ages, from the beginning of the 5th century to the invention of printing; and the Third, from the last-named epoch to the present time. The first four vols. are wholly occupied with the first part, and discuss the beginnings of philology among the Greeks, the history of philology from Aristotle to Augustus Cæsar, and from Cæsar to the end of the fourth century. Under the special history of philology, the author considers, 1, Grammar, embracing elements, forms, syntax, rhetoric, lexicography; 2, Exegesis, allegorical, learned, and practical; 3, Criticism, textual, higher, and æsthetic; and 4, Erudition, religion, politics, literature, and art. A great excellence of the book is the citations adduced in the margin in support of the positions in the text. It is full of bibliographical information. The four vols., bound and beautifully printed, cost in Germany about 8 dolls.

The fifth edition of Passow's Greek Lexicon; under the charge of Rost, Palm, and Kreussler, is printed as far as the word *πῆρας*. It will be comprised in two large quarto volumes. The ninth edition of Kühner's Elementary Greek Grammar, with a series of exercises for translation, and the seventh edition of his Elementary Latin Grammar, with exercises and a vocabulary, have been published. L. Döderlein's new Homeric Glossarium is in one volume of 274 pages. The new edition of Nägelbach's Notes on the Iliad, with Excursus, has received some improvements. A second and enlarged edition of Prof. Hand's Practical Manual for exercises in Latin Style has appeared. Prof. Klotz's Dictionary of the Latin language has been printed as

far as the word *Condictio*, in all 1,024 pages. The work of Freund, up to the same word, embraces 918 pages.

The entire works of Livy, under the editorship of William Weissenborn, have been published to the end of the 23rd book. The first volume of the edition by Karl Hahn of the complete works of Tacitus embraces the Annals in 348 pages.

The most important, perhaps, of the German theological journals is the *Theologische Studien u. Kritiken*, conducted by Profs. Ullmann and Umbreit of Heidelberg. It is published quarterly by Perthes of Hamburg, and costs in this country about 4 dols. per annum. The January number for 1851 contains the following articles:—I. On the Regard to be paid to Majorities in the Church, by Dr. Ullmann—an enlargement of an essay communicated by him at a meeting of the Baden clergy, May 30, 1850, an elaborate and temperate discussion of 58 pages.—II. The Relation of the Morality of Classical Antiquity to the Christian Morality, illustrated by a comparative view of the doctrine of Love to Enemies, by G. Schaubach, superintendent at Meiningen. The topic is discussed, in 62 pages, with much learning and candour, and in an eminently Christian spirit. The general conclusion is, that the doctrine of love to enemies is, in Christianity, founded on principle; it is nothing accidental; it proceeds necessarily from the tendency of the Christian life; it is absolutely inseparable from the nature of Christianity. In the classics we find passages apparently teaching the same doctrine. But the love to enemies which they teach does not rest on fundamental principles; it is not a heartfelt, paternal love. They lack the thought, "forgive, as God forgives thee." In Socrates, Plato and Antoninus, we see some approximation, but no resemblance in Aristotle and the Stoics.—III. Johann Denk and his little book on the Law of God, by Heberle of Tübingen. It is an elaborate article of 74 pages, partly biographical, and partly an analysis of the book. Denk acquired much notoriety in the sixteenth century by his freedom in thinking and acting, often in opposition to the reformers. The essay is a valuable contribution to an extended history of those times.—IV. On the Fragments of Pherecydes (of Syra, contemporary of Thales and Teacher of Pythagoras) in the Church Fathers, by Prof. J. L. Jacobi of Berlin.—V. Examination of the passage, Rom. viii. 18—23, with a special view to Prof. Zyro's exposition of the same, by Pastor Rupprecht, of Krögelstein, in Bavaria.—VI. Survey of some works serving to make known the religious life of the Middle Ages, by Prof. Schmidt of Strasburg.—VII. The Affliction of Joseph, church considerations, by Pastor Kienlen of Colmar, in Alsace, a spirited discussion of some of the great practical questions which now agitate German Christians.

We learn that the venerable geographer, Dr. Karl Ritter, is still earnestly engaged in his great work. He is said to be the life of the meetings of the Geographical Society, though he will be seventy-two years of age in August next. His views are carried out in this country with great ability in the lectures by his pupil, Prof. Arnold Guyot. The first Part of Vol. XV. of Ritter's geographical work has been published. It contains a general Introduction to Palestine, and a description of the entire system of the Jordan valley with the Dead Sea. The second Part, which will soon be published, will embrace the country east of the Jordan. It will be only of moderate extent, and will conclude with an Index to Vols. XIV. and XV. Vol. XVI. will describe the western slope of Palestine, including Judea, Samaria, Galilee, and northern Syria, together with an Index. Ritter acknowledges his obligations to the unpublished papers of Seetzen, who travelled in Palestine in the years 1805—7, to the communications of Schultz, Prussian Consul in Jerusalem, who has made extensive tours in Galilee, and also to many MS. notices, letters, &c., of the author's friends and correspondents. Prof. Ritter speaks of Dr. Robinson's *Researches* as constituting an epoch in biblical geography. His journey is distinguished from every former one "by combining the keenest observation of topographical and local relations with much preparatory study, especially the learned study of the Bible and philological and historical criticism, and also a knowledge of the language of the country on the part of the younger traveller, Rev. Eli Smith, a missionary who had resided for many years at Beirût, and become thoroughly naturalized." Ritter, also, refers to the "*Boston Missionary Herald*" as containing a great treasure of special investigations on the upper Jordan region, especially in respect to the inhabitants. It is gratifying to notice the many references to and quotations from the *Missionary Herald*, the investigations of Lieut. Lynch, and the papers in our own *Journal* from the pens of Dr. Robinson, Messrs. Wolcott, Thomson, Smith, De Forest and others.

OTHER COUNTRIES.

Universities in Holland, 1850. The number of teachers and students was as follows :

Leyden,	36 teachers,	4 of theology,	297 students.
Utrecht,	26	" 3	342 "
Groningen,	22	" 5	226 "
Amsterdam, (Athenæum,)	15	" 1	135 "

The last-named does not confer degrees ; the students, on finish-

ing their course, take their degrees at Leyden without further study. There is much to regret in the theological teaching of the universities, but it is gratifying to know, that the department of biblical literature in all, is in the hands of evangelical men. The literary men of Holland seem to be reposing on the reputation of their predecessors. The treasures of the Leyden library are suffered in a great measure to lie useless. Of her living scholars, Hamaker among the orientalists, and Bake and Peerlkamp among the classical editors, are occasionally heard from.

A congress of delegates of the literary and scientific societies of the different provinces of France was held at the Luxembourg in Paris on the 20th of February, to consider the condition of the public libraries, the methods by which they can be rendered more useful, the state of the collections of fine arts, antiquities, &c., the ways in which a more effective connection may be established between the different societies, &c.

We regret to learn that the Chinese Repository, which has been published for the last nineteen years at Canton, China, was to be discontinued at the close of 1850. It has shared the fate of some other excellent periodical works, of enjoying lavish commendation and a very insufficient patronage. As a storehouse of authentic information in respect to the vast regions of China, Japan, Corea, &c., its value can hardly be over-estimated. We hope that the managers of our public libraries will hasten to obtain possession of a complete set of this thesaurus. Application may be made to the publisher, S. Wells Williams, of Canton. A general index will be published with the last number.

The two German travellers, Drs. Barth and Overweg, who are attempting to enter the interior of Africa from the North, had reached, Aug. 24, 1850, the frontiers of the kingdom of Air, or Asben, i. e. about 20° 30' N. lat. and 9° 20' E. long., a point never before reached by Europeans. The adventurous missionary, Livingston, has discovered another large lake north of Ngami. Mr. Layard was about to explore, when last heard from, the ruins on and below the site of ancient Babylon. A subscription is making in England by individuals, in order to defray his expenses. Major Herbert Edwardes, the hero of Upper India, has brought out in two thick volumes, a narrative of his perilous adventures and hair-breadth escapes, during the late war. They contain, in a very graphic and soldier-like style, much geographical and topographical information in regard to a country never before investigated by Europeans.

MISCELLANIES.

Helps for the Study of the Sanskrit.

The following list contains some of the more necessary works for the study of the Sanskrit language.

Wilson. *Sanskrit Grammar*, 2nd ed. London, 1847.

Bopp. *Kritische Grammatik der Sanscrita Sprache in kürzerer Fassung*, 2nd edition. Berlin, 1845. Wilson attaches himself more to the method of the native Indian grammarians. Bopp treats the subject according to the principles of his *Comparative Grammar*. Wilson's *Grammar* contains a compendious *Syntax*, and an exhibition of the peculiar dialectic forms of the *Vêdas*.

The only complete dictionary of the language is that of Wilson. *Sanskrit and English Dictionary*, 2nd ed. Calcutta, 1832.

The roots of the language are best exhibited by Westergaard. *Radices Linguae Sanskritæ*. Bonn, 1841. An admirable work, which contains the verbs both simple and compound, with definitions and illustrative citations.

The roots of the language are also given by Bopp. *Glossarium Sanscritum*. Berlin, 1847. With cognate forms of other Indo-European languages. This work gives also the derivatives which occur in several Sanskrit books, so as to form a pretty complete and satisfactory lexicon for the six following works :

Indralôkâgamanam. Ardschuna's *Reise zu Indra's Himmel*, Berlin, 1824.

Diluvium, cum tribus aliis MahâBhârati episodiis. Berlin, 1829.

Nalus, MahâBhârati episodium, 2nd ed. Berlin, 1832.

Bhagavad Gîtâ. Schlegel and Lassen. 2nd ed. Bonn, 1846.

Hitôpadêsas. Schlegel and Lassen. Bonn, 1831.

Urvasia, Fabula Calidasi. ed. Lenz. Berlin, 1833.

Bopp's edition of the *Nala* is accompanied by a very literal Latin translation, and a few notes ; it forms an interesting textbook for the beginner.

The following work contains a large amount of Sanskrit texts at a very cheap rate ; the *Lexicon* and *Grammar* promised in the *Preface* have not yet made their appearance. Bôhtlingk. *Sanskrit-Chrestomathie*. Leipzig, 1845.

We subjoin a very few of the most important works on the *Comparative Philology* of the Indo-European languages.

Bopp. *Vergleichende Grammatik*. Parts 1—5. It is to be completed next summer by the publication of a sixth part ; the first part, it is said, has been some time out of print. The five have been translated into English, chiefly by Lieut. Eastwick.

- Pott. *Etymologische Forschungen*. Lemgo, 1836.
Grimm. *Deutsche Grammatik*. Göttingen.
Grimm. *Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache*. Leipzig, 1848.
Curtius. *Tempora und Modi im Griech. und Lat.* Berlin, 1846.
Schleicher. *Die Sprachen Europa's, in systematischer Uebersicht*. Bonn, 1850.

Helps for the Study of Arabic.

Petermann's Arabic Grammar, Berlin, 1840, gives a list of sixty Arabic grammars, lexicons and chrestomathies. A number have been published since that time. The most important in the list are the grammar of Erpenius, 3rd edition, Leyden, 1638; subsequent editions of the same by Albert Schultens; Tychsen's Grammar, Rostock, 1792; De Sacy's *Grammaire Arabe*, 2nd edition, 1831, two volumes, 600 large octavo pages each, closely printed; Rosenmüller's *Institutiones*, Leipsic, 1818; Oberleitner's *Fundamenta Linguae Arab.*, Vienna, 1823; and Ewald's *Critical Grammar*, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1831—33. The last named is a learned and original work, and considers the language in connection with the sister dialects. It is, however, wholly unfitted for the beginner. De Sacy's grammar is the storehouse from which most of the later grammars have been drawn. Its great merits are universally recognized. Still, from its large size, from its being printed in a solid form, so that the more important parts are not distinguished by the type, &c., it does not answer the purposes of the young scholar. He would only become confused in its immense details. The two latest grammars which have appeared are Caspari's *Grammatica Arabica*, in Latin, one volume, Leipsic, 1848, pp. 350, and *Grammaire Arabe*, in French, by Ch. Schier, Leipsic, 1849, pp. 466. "Both are essentially dependent on De Sacy and Ewald." Yet they are useful compends, and may be recommended to the young student in the Arabic language. We have Richardson's Grammar, which is now nearly obsolete, as it proceeded on a totally erroneous system; the grammar of Mr. Lumsden of Calcutta, which is incomplete, and unfitted for beginners; and the *Practical Arabic Grammar* of Duncan Stewart, London, 1841, pp. 302, which may be recommended, as "calculated for the use of those who, not making the study of languages the chief pursuit of life, learn Arabic, less for the purpose of reading the many valuable books which it contains, than for its bearing on the religion and law of the Mohammedans," and for other practical purposes.

An excellent book for beginners is Locman's Fables, with notes and a glossary, edited by Prof. Rödiger, 2nd edition, 1839. There are, also, the Arabic Chrestomathy of De Sacy, a thesaurus of materials, 2nd edition, 1827, 3 vols.; Oberleitner's Arabic Chrestomathy, 2 vols., Vienna, 1823—4; Freytag's Arabic Chrestomathy, Bonn, 1 vol.; Kosegarten's Arabic Chrestomathy, collected from MSS., with notes and a lexicon, Leipsic, 1828, and many others.

We have the Lexicon of Golius, 1 vol. folio, Leyden, 1653; of Willmet, for the Koran, the Life of Hariri, and the Life of Timour, Rotterdam, 1784, quarto, very useful; Freytag's great work, in 4 vols., quarto, Halle, 1830—37, and an Abridgment of the last named, for the use of beginners, quarto, Halle, 1836.

Helps in the Study of the Syriac Language.

The Syriac Grammars are, A. T. Hoffmann's, Halle, quarto, 1827; F. Uhlemann's (*Elementarlehre der Syrischen Sprache*), 8vo., Berlin, 1829; Rev. George Phillips's *Elements of Syriac Grammar*, 2nd edition, 8vo, London, 1845, pp. 208, containing lessons for exercise, analysis, &c. As reading books, may be named the Syriac New Testament of Leusden and Schaaff, Leyden, 1717, and the Syriac Chrestomathy, with a glossary and grammatical tables, by Prof. Rödiger, Halle, 1838. Schaaf published a Syriac Lexicon of the New Testament, Leyden, 1717. Dr. Bernstein of Breslau is now engaged in preparing a complete Lexicon of the Syriac language, partly from MS. sources.

THE LORD'S PRAYER, printed in 608 languages in Roman Letters, and in 200 languages in the Characters peculiar to each language, produced at the Imperial Printing Office at Vienna. This unique achievement in Typography has hitherto not been obtainable by those desirous of purchasing it: a few copies have been placed in the hands of the publishers of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, and are sold at Twelve Guineas each.





